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This study demonstrates how U.S. support for the 1976 Argentine military 
coup exemplified a defining feature of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the 
Cold War, namely, the maintenance of strong links with politically ambitious, anti-
communist Latin American militaries to protect U.S. national security.  By integrating 
Argentina into the larger pattern of imperial U.S. policy toward the region, this study 
reveals how U.S. military assistance and training programs in the 1960s and early 
1970s undermined Argentina’s democratic institutions and contributed to the 
formation of a distinctly Argentine national security doctrine—the blueprint for the 
military’s extraordinarily brutal counterinsurgency campaign following the 1976 coup 
d’état.  Second, this study illuminates how the effort to curtail state-sanctioned 
violence in Argentina served as a defining test-case for the blossoming human rights 
movement in the United States.  Comprised of a disparate mix of grassroots human 
rights organizers, Washington-based lobbyists, and sympathetic members of Congress, 
human rights advocates consciously embodied a counter-movement to the 
maintenance of close U.S. ties to staunchly anti-communist, right-wing military 
regimes.  Finally, this study asserts that Argentina served as a defining test-case for 
Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy.  Entering the White House at the height of state-
sanctioned violence in Argentina, Carter aimed to dramatically shift United States 
policy from subtle support for the military’s dirty war to public condemnation of 
 human rights violations.  With strong ties to the non-governmental human rights 
community and sympathetic legislators on Capitol Hill, the newly-formed Department 
of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was particularly active in 
the struggle to promote human rights in U.S.-Argentine relations.  The results were 
mixed; on the one hand, by late 1978, the Carter Administration had achieved 
significant success in eliciting human rights improvements from the military junta, 
particularly by orchestrating a formal visit by the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission.  On the other hand, as the Administration grappled with rising Cold War 
tension, revolutionary ferment in the Developing World, and a flagging U.S. economy 
over the course of 1979 and 1980, human rights moved increasingly to the background 
as a U.S. policy priority, a trend particularly evident in U.S.-Argentine relations. 
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“... he knew that the tale he had to tell could not be one of final victory.  It could be 
only the record of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done 
again in the never ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their 
personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to 
pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.” 
—Albert Camus, The Plague 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
In a massive outpouring of public condemnation, on March 24, 2006 over one 
hundred thousand people took to the streets of central Buenos Aires on the 30-year 
anniversary of the 1976 military coup d’état.  Promising to establish political stability, 
economic growth, and social calm, the military government’s counterinsurgency 
campaign against perceived left-wing subversives instead resulted in the systematic 
abduction, torture, and clandestine murder of tens of thousands of Argentines.  Three 
decades later, led by a banner reading, “30 Thousand Disappeared, We Vindicate Your 
Ideals and Continue the Struggle,” and chanting, “30 years, memory, justice, truth,” 
the crowd filled 10 city blocks, a scale unprecedented in recent memory.  
Underscoring the breadth of popular participation in what Argentine President Néstor 
Kirchner described as the effort to recover Argentina’s “historical imagination,” 35 
human rights groups, 213 social and cultural neighborhood organizations, 50 political 
associations, and 30 groups representing the international community participated in 
the capital rally, while hundreds of additional commemorative acts were performed 
across Argentina to honor the recently-dedicated National Day for Truth and Justice.1
A nation-wide holiday, the mood in Buenos Aires on the anniversary was far 
from celebratory.  As human rights advocate and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Adolfo 
Pérez Esquivel made clear, “The 24th of March cannot be a festive day.  It should 
serve so that a process of reflection and analysis on what happened in this country is 
     
                                                 
1 Luis Brushtein, “A Trienta Años del Golpe de Estado Culminan los Actos de Repudio,” El País 
(Madrid), March 24, 2006, accessed online (March 28, 2006) at www.elpais.es; Marta Dillon, “La 
Marcha por los 30 Años del Golpe Militar Desbordo la Plaza de Mayo,” El País (Madrid), March 24, 
2006, accessed online (March 28, 2006) at www.elpais.es; Marcela Valente, “Argentina: Few Imagined 
the ‘Horror Around the Corner’ of 1976 Coup,” Global Information Network, March 27, 2006, pg. 1. 
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undertaken in all workplaces, universities and schools.”  Anything else, Esquivel 
asserted, “does not serve memory.”2
Following Esquivel’s lead, this study has a threefold purpose.  The first is to 
demonstrate how U.S. support for the 1976 Argentine military coup exemplified a 
defining feature of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the Cold War, namely, 
the maintenance of strong links with politically ambitious, anti-communist Latin 
American militaries to protect U.S. national security.  By integrating Argentina into 
the larger pattern of imperial U.S. policy toward the region, I hope to reveal how U.S. 
military assistance and training programs in the 1960s and early 1970s undermined 
Argentina’s democratic institutions and contributed to the formation of a distinctly 
Argentine national security doctrine—the blueprint for the military’s extraordinarily 
brutal counterinsurgency campaign following the 1976 coup d’état.   
 
Second, this study illuminates how the effort to curtail state-sanctioned 
violence in Argentina served as a defining test-case for the blossoming human rights 
movement in the United States.  Building on the Civil Rights and the anti-Vietnam 
War movements, the effort to institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy 
emerged in the early 1970s thanks to widespread disillusionment with U.S. support for 
dictatorial regimes, and surged in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.  Comprised 
of a disparate mix of grassroots human rights organizers, Washington-based lobbyists, 
and sympathetic members of Congress, human rights advocates consciously embodied 
a counter-movement to the maintenance of close U.S. ties to staunchly anti-
communist, right-wing military regimes.   
Finally, this study asserts that Argentina served as a defining test-case for 
Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy.  Entering the White House at the height of state-
                                                 
2 Quoted in Larry Rother, “On Coup’s Anniversary, Argentines Vow ‘Never Again,’” New York Times, 
March 25, 2006, accessed online (March 25, 2006) at www.nyt.com. 
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sanctioned violence in Argentina, the Carter Administration aimed to dramatically 
shift United States policy from subtle support for the military’s dirty war to public 
condemnation of human rights violations.3
By situating Carter’s policy toward Argentina within the broader human rights 
movement, this study seeks to advance our understanding of the degree to which the 
Carter Administration’s initial emphasis on human rights constituted a watershed 
moment in the evolution of the movement as a whole.   To a considerable extent, my 
research thus complements existing “revisionist” foreign relations scholarship that 
   With strong ties to the non-governmental 
human rights community and sympathetic legislators on Capitol Hill, the newly-
formed Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs—led 
by the fiery former-Civil Rights activist Patricia Derian—was particularly active in the 
struggle to promote human rights in U.S.-Argentine relations.  The results were mixed; 
on the one hand, by late 1978, the Carter Administration had achieved significant 
success in eliciting human rights improvements from the military junta, particularly by 
orchestrating a formal visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 
(IAHRC).  On the other hand, as the Administration grappled with rising Cold War 
tension, revolutionary ferment in the Developing World, and a flagging U.S. economy 
over the course of 1979 and 1980, human rights moved increasingly to the background 
as a U.S. policy priority, a trend particularly evident in U.S.-Argentine relations. 
                                                 
3 The term “dirty war” was coined by the Argentine military to justify the use of non-traditional tactics 
against left-wing terrorists, and was subsequently appropriated by critics of the military regime’s human 
rights violations.  In this study, the term “dirty war” is used to as shorthand for state-sanctioned 
violence during the Argentine military dictatorship (1976-1983).   As such, my intention is to facilitate 
clear and efficient prose, and is not meant as implicit justification for the military’s coup d’état or 
counterinsurgency tactics.  I use the term “state-sanctioned violence” rather than “state violence” to 
differentiate between the use of violence within the rule of law (state violence)—such as the legal 
application of the death penalty—and violence that is carried out by the state but falls beyond the 
purview of the legal system (state-sanctioned violence), a tactic epitomized by the abduction, torture, 
and clandestine murder of tens of thousands of Argentines by state security personnel during the 
military dictatorship.  
 4 
underscores the significance and foresight of Carter’s human rights policy.4  By the 
same token, the erosion of the president’s support for human rights in the latter-half of 
his Administration served as touchstone for the Administration’s larger failures in the 
foreign policy arena, and lends considerable credence to critical scholarly analyses of 
the thirty-ninth president.5
While this work is written primarily for scholars concerned with the character 
of American Cold War foreign policy, it also has much to offer students of modern 
Latin America, human rights, and transnational social movements.  Drawing on 
recently declassified documents and oral history interviews, my research aims to make 
a significant contribution to the existing literature on U.S.-Argentine relations during 
the Cold War.
   
6
                                                 
4 For recent positive appraisals of Carter’s foreign policy, see, for example, Douglas Brinkley, "Bernath 
Lecture: The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The "Hands on" Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth President," 
Diplomatic History 20, no. 4 (Fall 1996); John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation 
(Manchester, UK: New York, 1993); Friedberg Pflüger, "Human Rights Unbound: Carter's Human 
Rights Policy Reassessed," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 (Fall 1989); David F. and Vanessa 
Walker Schmitz, "Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-
Cold War Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 28, no. 1 (January 2004); Tony Smith, America's 
Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter 
and the Making of American Foreign Policy (2002).  
  This study also seeks to contribute to the growing body of largely 
5 For critical analyses, see, for example, Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-
Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Revised ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1994); George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Donna R. Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War 
Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2007); Burton I. Kaufman 
and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., 2nd, Revised ed. (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2006); Victor S. Kaufman, "The Carter Administration and the Human Rights 
Bureau," Historian 61 (Fall 1998); Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Morris H. Morley, Washington, 
Somoza, and the Sandinistas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); A. Glenn Mower, Human 
Rights and American Foreign Policy: the Carter and Reagan Experiences (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1987); David Skidmore, Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the 
Failure of Reform (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996); Donald S. Spencer, The Carter 
Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1988); Richard 
C. Thornton, The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order (New York: Paragon House, 1991). 
6 Little has been written on U.S.-Argentine relations during the Cold War.  See, for example, Ariel C. 
Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 1977-
1984 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997); David M. K. Sheinin, 
Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
 5 
internally-focused research on the Argentine dirty war period.7
For students of modern Latin America, using U.S.-Argentine relations as a 
case study, my research underscores the importance of the Cold War in terms of Latin 
American political development, particularly by demonstrating how Argentina utilized 
U.S. military aid and counterinsurgency training in ways United States policymakers 
did not anticipate or necessarily support, as well as the degree to which the South 
American nation alternatively accommodated and resisted Carter’s human rights 
policy to pursue its own domestic and foreign policy goals.  For students of human 
rights and transnational social movements, this study contends that the Carter 
Administration created an unprecedented, government-sanctioned arena for the human 
rights movement, a development particularly evident in regard to state-sanctioned 
  My goal is to 
contribute to these bodies of scholarship by illuminating the important and largely 
overlooked regional role that Argentina played in the U.S. effort to bolster Latin 
American internal security against the perceived threat of communist insurgency in the 
1960s and early 1970s, shed new light on the significance accorded to Argentina by 
human rights advocates, and break new scholarly ground by situating Argentina at the 
center of Carter’s human rights policy. 
                                                                                                                                            
2006); Joseph S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1990). 
7 Much has been written on the period of Argentine military dictatorship.  See, for example, Martin 
Edwin Anderson, Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty War" 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the 
Legacies of Torture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Daniel Frontalini and Maria Cristina 
Caiati, El Mito de la "Guerra Sucia" (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, 1984); 
Frank Graziano, Divine Violence: Spectacle, Psychosexuality, and Radical Christianity in the Argentine 
"Dirty War" (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Iain Guest, Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's 
Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990); Donald Clark Hodges, Argentina's "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1991); Paul H. Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: the "Dirty War" in 
Argentina (Westport: Praeger, 2002); Marcos Novaro and Vicente Palermo, La Dictadura Militar 
(1976-1983): del Golpe de Estado a la Restauracíon Democrática (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2003); Mark 
Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt: Criminal Consciousness in Argentina's Dirty 
War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); María Seoane and Vicente Muleiro, El Dictador: La 
Historia Secreta y Pública de Jorge Rafael Videla (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2000). 
 6 
violence in Argentina.  Additionally, my work indicates that multifaceted resistance to 
Carter’s human rights policy—not only by the military government in Buenos Aires, 
but also among Washington bureaucrats and the U.S. business community—
significantly constrained the Carter Administration’s ability to elicit human rights 
improvements.  This study, in other words, is intended to add to the existing body of 
scholarship by revealing a unique blurring of the traditional boundaries between state 
policy and non-state advocacy, advancing our understanding of the complex processes 
attendant in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.8
Chapters 1 and 2 examine U.S. policy toward Latin America, and Argentina in 
particular, during the first quarter-century of the Cold War.   In the effort to prevent 
communist inroads in the hemisphere, beginning in the late 1940s, United States 
policymakers actively worked to protect U.S. national security cultivating close ties 
with politically ambitious Latin American militaries.  Despite a longstanding sense of 
rivalry with the United States, Argentina was no exception to this pattern; U.S. 
military training and aid played a defining role in the formulation of the Argentine 
military’s national security doctrine—the blueprint facilitating the systematic use of 
kidnapping, torture, and disappearance of tens of thousands of perceived subversives 
following the 1976 military coup d’état. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the rise of the movement to institutionalize human rights 
in U.S. foreign policy.  Using U.S. policy toward Argentina as the primary case study, 
this chapter traces how human rights advocates and their sympathizers on Capitol Hill 
made unprecedented steps over the course of the late 1960s and 1970s in the effort to 
                                                 
8 On transnational human rights advocacy, see for example, Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human 
Rights Politics in the United States," The Journal of American History 86, no. 3 (December 1999); 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: 
Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2006); Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004).  
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remake the policy prescriptions that had undergirded U.S.-Latin American relations 
since onset of the Cold War.   
Spanning the presidential campaign to mid-1977, chapter 4 examines Jimmy 
Carter’s effort to bring “competence and compassion” to the White House.  Although 
the Carter Administration’s initial support for human rights effectively shifted the 
locus of human rights advocacy in U.S. foreign policy from Capitol Hill to the 
Department of State, the lack of a clear set of guidelines on the role human rights 
should play in U.S. foreign policy, coupled with intense bureaucratic resistance, made 
it clear that the struggle to institutionalize human rights would be long and bitter.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the Carter Administration’s policy toward Argentina during 1977 
and 1978, and traces the Administration’s effort to utilize U.S. security and economic 
assistance as leverage to elicit human rights improvements, with notable success.  
Focusing on resistance to Carter’s human rights policy in the U.S. business 
community and the effects of the President’s increasingly hawkish stance in foreign 
affairs, Chapter 6 illustrates the Carter Administration’s subtle shift away from a 
human rights-driven approach to U.S.-Argentine relations in 1979 and 1980.   
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Chapter 1: 
From Counterinsurgency to State-Sanctioned Terror: 
Waging the Cold War in Latin America 
 
Influence with the military means influence over the course of politics since 
the military establishment continues to be of prime importance in the political 
equations of nearly all Latin American countries. 
—Department of State Memorandum, 19661
 
   
The 1976 Argentine coup d’état was a swift and bloodless affair.  On the 
official television network, the Sunday afternoon soccer match was followed by an 
uninterrupted World War II documentary, and most Argentines were unaware that the 
military had arrested President Isabel Martinez de Perón until the ruling junta was 
firmly ensconced in power.2  When the commanders of the three Argentine service 
branches appeared on the television to gravely announce the inauguration of the 
“National Reorganization Process,” however, few Argentines expressed genuine 
surprise; in the days preceding the coup, it was an open secret that military 
preparations for a political takeover had advanced to the final stage, with meticulous 
orders distributed to units across Argentina.3
A similar sentiment pervaded the U.S. Embassy, where officials had been 
confident of an impending political sea change since the previous autumn.  “At this 
  And after years of political instability, 
economic stagnation, and social upheaval, news that the military had incarcerated 
Perón, disbanded the Congress, and suspended the constitution was widely received 
with quiet relief and hopeful anticipation.    
                                                 
1 Department of State Memorandum, Clare H. Timberlake to Lincoln Gordon, November 8, 1966, Box 
2413, Folder: POL 23 LA 9/11/65, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1965, GRDS, RG 59, Archives 
II.   
2 “During Quiet Coup, TV Offers WWII,” The Washington Post, March 24, 1976, pg. A8. 
3 Juan de Onís, “Argentina is at the Crisis Point,” New York Times, March 20, 1976, pg. 3. 
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point, whether she [Perón] remains as President is a question of almost academic 
interest,” U.S. Ambassador Robert C. Hill cabled Washington in September 1975.  
“There is a power vacuum at the center and it is not she who will fill it; hence, whether 
she remains a figurehead President for yet some time or whether a new government 
[…] takes over from her, Mrs. Perón is no longer at the center of the equation.”4
When the military assumed power on March 24, 1976, Hill offered full and 
unequivocal support.  “This was probably the best executed and most civilized coup in 
Argentine history,” the Ambassador cabled Washington three days after the takeover.  
“Argentina’s best interests, like ours,” he concluded, “lie in the success of the 
moderate government now led by Gen Videla.”
  Like 
much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, Hill looked to the Argentine Generals 
as the best hope for restoring political stability in Argentina.   
5
 
  U.S. policymakers in Washington 
concurred with Hill’s assessment, greeting the coup with extraordinary enthusiasm.  
Immediately after the takeover, Secretary of State Kissinger forwarded a Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR) analysis of U.S.-Argentine relations to all U.S. 
diplomatic posts in the hemisphere. “U.S. interests are not threatened by the present 
military government,” the report bluntly stated.   
The three service commanders are known for their pro-U.S., anti-communist 
attitudes[.  …] Investment problems will be minimized by the junta’s favorable 
attitude toward foreign capital, while the government’s probable intention of 
seeking U.S. aid, tangible and/or moral, to overcome pressing economic 
                                                 
4 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 6087, U.S. Embassy (Hill) to Secretary of State 
(Kissinger), September 10, 1975, Subject: “Analysis of Political Situation Wake of Military Crisis,” 
ADP. 
5 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 2061, U.S. Embassy (Hill) to Secretary of State 
(Kissinger), March 29, 1976, Subject: “Videla’s Moderate Line Prevails,” ADP. 
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problems will provide added insurance against openly anti-U.S. attitudes and 
policies.6
 
   
Dismissing the customary examination period, within 48-hours Washington extended 
formal recognition to the military, while the International Monetary Fund delivered a 
previously-approved $127 million loan.7
On one level, Hill’s consistent support for a military coup in Argentina 
reflected a deep-seated skepticism regarding the possibility of a civilian solution to 
Argentina’s political and economic challenges.  On a deeper level, however, the 
Ambassador’s encouragement of the Argentine military’s political aspirations went 
beyond a simple faith in the generals’ short-term ability to reestablish stability, and 
instead tapped into the visceral anti-communism that had guided U.S. foreign policy 
since the late 1940s, combined with the fear of Latin American leftist insurgencies that 
captivated policymakers in the fiery aftermath of the 1959 Cuban Revolution.  United 
States support for the Argentine military takeover thus exemplified a defining feature 
of U.S. policy toward Latin America during Cold War: quiet cultivation of robust ties 
with politically ambitious Latin American militaries to protect U.S. national security 
by preventing communist inroads.   
   
 
Robert C. Hill’s engagement in Latin American affairs began at the end of the 
1940s when he was appointed Assistant Vice President of W. R. Grace & Co., a major 
shipping firm with strong commercial ties to Latin America.  The position required 
Hill to travel extensively throughout the region, and the young executive immersed 
                                                 
6 Department of State Telegram, Washington (Kissinger) to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, 
February 25, 1976, Subject: “INR Analysis of Development in Argentina,” ADP. 
7 “Argentine Junta Under Army Chief Assumes Control,” New York Times, March 25, 1976, pg. 73; 
“Coup in Argentina,” Washington Post, March 30, 1976, pg. A14. 
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himself in hemispheric affairs.  It was, he later recalled, “the most informative period 
of my life.”8  Hill’s education could hardly have come at a more dynamic moment in 
U.S.-Latin American relations.  While United States military interventions in the 
Circum-Caribbean area dated to the late 19th century, and U.S. military training 
programs had been established throughout the hemisphere in the initial decades of the 
twentieth century, the concerted United States effort to establish military 
predominance in Latin America had begun during the Second World War.  Following 
the United States declaration of war on the Axis powers, Latin America’s strategic 
importance surged as German U-boats prowled the Atlantic with near impunity and 
U.S. military planners considered the possibility of a Nazi invasion launched from 
North Africa.  After securing a series of bi-lateral treaties the United States dispatched 
100,000 soldiers to military bases throughout the region.  More significantly, the size 
and scope of U.S. military training missions in the region increased dramatically and 
Latin American military leaders found themselves awash with $500 million in 
equipment and weapons supplied through the Lend-Lease Act.9
After a short-lived wave of democracy that swept Latin America at mid-
decade, by the time Hill began working for W. R. Grace, the onset of the Cold War at 
the tail-end of the 1940s had once again cast Latin American’s geostrategic 
significance for the United States in sharp relief.   As the United States moved from 
the Truman Doctrine’s March 1947 promise to “free peoples who are resisting 
   
                                                 
8 Robert C. Hill, “What New Hampshire Means to Me in this Bicentennial Year,” Box 1, Folder 24, Hill 
Papers.   
9 Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency 
and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 124. Department of 
State Report, “Latin American Internal Security Programs: Under Mutual Security Act 1960, Foreign 
Assistance Acts, 1961-1965,” Box 2413, Folder: POL 23 Latin America 9/11/65, Central Foreign 
Policy Files, 1964-1966, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
Of the $500 million, roughly 73% went to Brazil, in part to equip a ground force of 25,000 men and an 
air squadron for deployment to Italy.  Mexico, the second largest recipient, received $40 million, 
including equipment for an air squadron later sent to the Philippines.  Department of Defense Report, 
February 25, 1965, Subject: “U.S. Policies Toward Latin American Military Forces,” Box 2, Folder 5: 
Latin America, Volume III, 1/65-6/65, NSF, CF, LBJL.  
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attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures,” to the stark, 
ideologically-charged superpower competition outlined three years later by NSC-68, 
the centralization of power in the hands of Latin America military strongmen came to 
be increasingly perceived by U.S. policymakers as a more stable bulwark against 
Communism than democracy.10  Recognizing the region’s armed forces as a 
significant political force with which the U.S. could cultivate powerful allies in the 
effort to protect the hemisphere from Soviet territorial ambitions, in other words, the 
Truman Administration revived and deepened U.S.-Latin American military ties.11  
“Contact with Latin American military men” as the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted, 
“would in reality mean contact with very strong domestic political leaders.”12
Accordingly, in 1947, the United States successfully lobbied for the signing of 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in Rio de Janeiro, binding the 
twenty Latin American signatories to mutual defense in the event of an external attack 
on the region.
   
13
                                                 
10 “The Truman Doctrine, 1947” reproduced in Thomas G. and Dennis Merrill Paterson, ed., Major 
Problems in American Foreign Relations, fourth ed., vol. II (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and 
Company, 1995), 259.  See also Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the 
Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 485-86. 
  The following year Washington made little protest when elected 
governments were overthrown by staunchly anticommunist military officers in Peru 
and Venezuela, and although Truman’s initial efforts to authorize substantial transfers 
of military equipment to Latin American governments died in the Senate, the outbreak 
of hostilities in Korea galvanized recalcitrant lawmakers on Capitol Hill, and between 
11 As Brazilian historian W. Michael Weiss succinctly writes, beginning in the late 1940s, “U.S. 
military programs with missions, equipment, and training helped keep politically influential military 
elites pro-American.”  W. Michael Weiss, Cold Warriors and Coups D’etat (Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press, 1993), 20. 
12 Quoted in Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and 
the Cold War, 172. 
13 Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 179. 
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1951 and 1952, Congress appropriated nearly $90 million in direct military aid to 
Latin America.14
The close cultivation of U.S.-Latin American military ties was continued under 
the Eisenhower Administration.  By 1955, bilateral U.S. Military Assistance Programs 
(MAP) were operating in eighteen Latin American nations—more than half of which 
were under dictatorial rule—and by the end of the decade, Washington had provided 
$400 million in military assistance to the region.
 
15   Moreover, 800 U.S. military 
personnel were assigned to Latin America, and U.S. military missions crisscrossed the 
continent, establishing close personal and professional relationships with Latin 
American military officers.16  Nearly 8,000 additional Latin American military 
personnel underwent training at U.S. facilities in the Panama Canal Zone or in the 
continental United States between 1945 and 1959.17  The unprecedented degree of 
U.S.-Latin American military cooperation was underscored by the successful initiation 
of an annual Conference of American Armies.   Organized in 1960 by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and 
hosted in the Panama Canal Zone’s Fort Amador, the gathering was attended by top-
ranking officers from seventeen of the hemisphere’s armed services.18
                                                 
14 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 
revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 126.  The United 
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equipment was provided under the Surplus Property Acts of 1920 and 1944.  Department of Defense 
Report, February 25, 1965, Subject: “U.S. Policies Toward Latin American Military Forces,” Box 2, 
Folder 5: Latin America, Volume III, 1/65-6/65, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL. 
   
15 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, Second ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993), 112.   
16 Jack. Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980), 126.  Martin Sicker, The Geopolitics of Security in the Americas: Hemispheric Denial 
from Monroe to Clinton (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 109-13. 
17 Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 72. 
18 J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 48. 
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In its effort to protect the hemisphere against communist incursions by 
deepening U.S.-Latin American military ties, the Eisenhower Administration 
recognized a kindred spirit in Robert C. Hill.  A native of Littleton, Vermont, Hill had 
spent his childhood skiing barrel staves and delivering the Saturday Evening Post.19  
After graduating from a private preparatory school in 1938, Hill was accepted at 
Dartmouth College, where he made a name for himself as an athlete and worked 
digging ditches during vacations.20
As Hill travelled across the hemisphere on behalf of W. R. Grace, the fear of 
communist expansion that permeated the Truman Administration’s Latin America 
policy formed the core of his education in hemispheric affairs.  In fact, by the early 
1950s Hill had established himself in the vanguard of private sector leaders advocating 
the threat of communist machinations toward Latin America.
  Badly injured in a football game, following the 
United States entrance into the Second World War Hill was deemed ineligible for 
military service; having developed an interest in foreign affairs at Dartmouth, after 
graduating in 1942 Hill joined the U.S. Foreign Service and was assigned to Calcutta 
and then as a State Department representative with the rank of Captain at the U.S. 
Army Headquarters in New Delhi.  Returning to the United States in 1946, after 
marrying former Baltimore tennis champion Cecilia Bowdoin, Hill briefly served as 
Staff Assistant to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce before 
accepting the Assistant Vice President position at W. R. Grace.   
21
                                                 
19 Robert C. Hill, “What New Hampshire Means to Me in this Bicentennial Year,” Box 1, Folder 24, 
Hill Papers.   
  The United States, 
20 David Sentner, “Dulles’ Trouble Shooter,” Boston Globe[?], June 1959[?], accessed in Box 1, Folder 
30, Hill Papers, Dartmouth College.  U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination of 
Callaway and Hill: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, May 
8,1973 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).   
21 Robert C. Hill to Robert Kennedy, esq., Confidential Report, Rough Draft, December 14, 1960, Box 
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15 
 
Hill bluntly told Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1953, was “on 
the road to losing Latin America.”22
Dulles demurred.  Hill’s staunch anti-communism and pro-business approach 
to hemispheric affairs fit nicely with the Eisenhower Administration’s approach to 
Latin America, however, and in 1953 the President appointed the young executive 
Ambassador to Costa Rica.  At 33-years-old, Hill was the youngest American 
Ambassador the United States had ever sent abroad.
   
23  Notwithstanding his diplomatic 
inexperience, Hill quickly won praise for developing a close working relationship with 
President José Figueres as well as constructively mediating between the Costa Rican 
government and U.S. private investors, particularly the United Fruit Company.24  
Reassigned to El Salvador in 1954, Hill was one of a small coterie of U.S. diplomats 
assisting in the top-secret CIA mission to oust Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz.25
Despite the successful overthrow of Arbenz, during the Eisenhower 
Administration’s second term in office, top U.S. policymakers increasingly worried 
that Latin America was becoming less secure, and more vulnerable to the spread of 
communism.  In 1958, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon was nearly killed at the 
hands of an angry mob during an official visit to Caracas.  According to the Vice-
President, the rioters were “communists led by Communists, and they had no devotion 
  
                                                 
22 According to Hill, Dulles was unconvinced, firmly telling the young executive that he “was the only 
person who thought so.”  Robert C. Hill, Interview with John T. Mason, Jr., Oral History Research 
Office, Columbia University, October 19, 1972, Box 7, Folder 16, Hill Papers.   
22 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination of Callaway and Hill: Hearing before the 
Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, May 8,1973 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973).   
23 Ibid. 
24 Personal Correspondence, United Fruit President Keneth H. Redmond to Secretary of State Henry 
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to freedom at all.”26  Greater setbacks were yet to come.  In 1959, U.S. policymakers 
were stunned by Fidel Castro’s revolutionary overthrow of Cuban dictator Fulgencio 
Batista, whose credentials as a U.S. client dated to the late 1930s.  By early 1960, 
Castro’s reform agenda—largely targeting U.S. private investment on the island—had 
precipitated an increasingly acrimonious relationship with the United States 
government.   Threatened with the closing of U.S. markets to Cuban exports, 
particularly sugar, in February 1960 Castro dramatically propelled the island nation 
into the Soviet sphere, signing a trade agreement with Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev and intensifying nationalization and expropriation initiatives.  The 
response in Washington was electric; in March 1960 Eisenhower approved a multi-
faceted covert operation to overthrow Castro, and before the end of the year the United 
States had initiated an almost total embargo on U.S. exports to Cuba.27
Few articulated the mix of fear and fury that captivated United States Cold 
Warriors in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution with more intensity than Robert C. 
Hill.  Only three months after the Cuban revolutionaries triumphantly proclaimed 
independence on January 1, 1959, Hill situated himself in the vanguard of Latin 
American hands who perceived the island nation as an immediate threat to U.S. 
national security.  In a three-day conference of U.S. ambassadors assigned to the 
Circum-Caribbean area, Hill—who had succeeded Francis White as U.S. Ambassador 
to Mexico in 1957—demanded a forceful statement regarding revolutionary activities 
in the region, raising the ire of career diplomats advocating a more conciliatory 
 
                                                 
26 Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1978 
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strategy. The meeting became so heated that according to one delegate the threat of 
“resignations were a dime a dozen.”28
Hill’s fierce anticommunism was especially evident in his diplomatic relations 
with the Mexican government.  When Mexican congressional leader Emilio Sanchez 
Piedras declared an “attitude of solidarity” with Cuba in July 1960, Hill spearheaded 
U.S. Department of State demands that the Mexican government retract the statement.   
As tension between the United States and Mexico increased, five thousand Mexican 
students marched past the United States Embassy hurling insults at Ambassador Hill 
and chanting “Cuba yes—Yankees no.”
 
29
Disdained by Mexican progressives, Hill’s strident advocacy of an unyielding 
U.S. position toward Cuba gained credence in Washington in the final months of the 
Eisenhower Administration.  “Loss of any part of the area to Communist control, or 
even its neutralization,” he wrote Robert Kennedy—president-elect John F. Kennedy’s 
brother—in December 1960, “would strike a mortal blow to the defense of the 
Western Hemisphere.”  Hill continued: 
   
Cuba under Castro is no longer a peaceful tropical island but an advance 
landing strip of the Soviet Union and Communist China at our very doorstep.  
It is the Communist take-off field for the penetration and subjugation of 
Mexico, Central America, Panama, and the nearby areas of South America.30
 
   
••• 
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The Kennedy Administration concurred with Hill’s assessment.  With Soviet 
support, John F. Kennedy believed that Castro was embarking on a major effort to 
foment Cuban-style revolutions throughout the hemisphere, a perception strengthened 
by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s championing of “wars of national liberation” 
in his 1961 report to the Moscow conference of Communist Parties.31   With the 
Soviets “in the front rank with the peoples waging such struggles,” as National 
Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow wrote, U.S. efforts to stem the spread of 
communism in the developing world faced unprecedented challenges from the 
“scavengers of the modernization process.”32
As the success of the Cuban revolution dramatically illustrated, guerrilla 
warfare—or internal war, as U.S. policymakers often put it—was particularly 
threatening because it largely neutralized the effectiveness of traditional standing 
armies.  “Conventional military forces are usually essential to deter overt invasion and 
to strengthen the political cohesion of new states,” the State Department Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research reported.  “For meeting guerilla [sic] aggression, however, 
conventional organization, doctrine, equipment, and staff outlook are inappropriate.”
  
33
                                                 
31 See Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War 
Against Cuba," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. 
Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 129-32.   
  
The vast United States nuclear arsenal was also deemed insufficient to stem the spread 
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new strength in nuclear weapons makes them all the more tempted to adventure with 
internal war.”34
Moreover, U.S. policy analysts worried that the Soviets had developed a 
sophisticated internal warfare strategy that far surpassed U.S. counterinsurgency 
capability.   “Soviet techniques in internal warfare have steadily developed, ranging 
today from political subversion to guerrilla aggression,” the INR asserted.  “Western 
techniques for meeting internal warfare, on the other hand, have lagged.”
   
35  The threat 
of communist subversion thus required the U.S. and its allies in the developing world 
to learn how to “adopt the tactics of the guerrillas themselves,” according to the INR, 
“combining courtesy and firmness toward the population with hard-hitting military 
operations.”36
The Kennedy Administration was determined to meet the guerrilla threat head-
on.  As part of a sustained effort to make counterinsurgency top priority for the U.S. 
armed forces, Kennedy established a committee on counterinsurgency in January 
1962, “to assure the use of U.S. resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing 
and resisting subversive insurgency in friendly nations,” and, two months later, the 
President mandated counterinsurgency education programs for all government 
agencies involved in internal security.  Kennedy also worked assiduously to inculcate 
counterinsurgency into the U.S. military curriculum; by 1963, branch officer career 
courses dedicated nearly thirty hours of counterinsurgency instruction, while at West 
    
                                                 
34 Roger Hilsman, “Internal War: the New Communist Tactic,” Military Review Vol. XLII, No. 4 (April 
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Point, students participated in counterinsurgency training exercises in a summer camp, 
as well as sixty-six mandatory lessons in counterinsurgency in the classroom.37
Kennedy also oversaw the expansion of U.S. special forces, increasing U.S. 
guerrilla warfare units to roughly 3,000 soldiers in the first year of his Administration.  
By 1963, the expansion of training facilities at the Special Warfare Center at Fort 
Bragg had produced 5,600 elite counterinsurgency specialists.
    
38  Underscoring his 
concern (and fascination) with guerrilla warfare, the President personally assisted in 
the selection of the elite Green Berets’ state-of-the-art equipment, including canvas 
sneakers with armor plated soles.39
 
   
In the global struggle to contain communist-sponsored insurgencies, the 
Kennedy Administration considered Latin America to constitute a central 
battleground.  Significantly, Kennedy recognized the potential for unrest generated by 
the region’s extreme socio-economic inequality, and with Castro providing an 
unprecedented alternative to the hemispheric status quo the United States could ill 
afford to be perceived as the bulwark of illiberal Latin American regimes.  As Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote the President with characteristic eloquence, “if the 
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possessing classes of Latin America make middle-class revolution impossible, they 
will make a ‘workers-and-peasants’ revolution inevitable.”40
Accordingly, Kennedy responded with a major policy initiative that claimed 
the mantle of Latin American revolution.  Loftily designated the Alliance for Progress, 
it was an initiative, Kennedy promised, that would transform the region’s political and 
socio-economic landscape.   Capturing the sense of possibility—and hubris—at the 
heart of the Alliance, Kennedy eloquently declared at the program’s inauguration:  
  
 
Let us once again transform the American continent into a vast crucible of 
revolutionary ideas and efforts—a tribute to the power of the creative energies 
of free men and women—an example to all the world that liberty and progress 
walk hand in hand.  Let us once again awaken our American revolution until it 
guides the struggle of people everywhere—not with an imperialism of force or 
fear—but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man.41
 
 
The United States, the Kennedy Administration confidently asserted, was capable of 
giving Latin America a dynamic push along the path to development, and, more 
significantly, willing to bear the brunt of the economic and administrative burden.   
At its core, the Alliance for Progress consisted of three facets.  First, in a 
dramatic shift from the close U.S. ties with dictators that marked the Eisenhower era, 
Kennedy pledged to support Latin American constitutional development.  As a State 
Department strategy guidelines paper made clear, “We must disassociate ourselves 
from reactionary forces which decline to respond to the needs of the people, and learn 
                                                 
40 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Summary Guidelines Paper, July 3, 1961, Subject: “Policy Toward Latin 
America” FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XII, accessed online.   
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to discriminate between legitimate expressions of dissatisfaction with the existing 
social order and communist-inspired agitation.”42  Second, the United States pledged 
to underwrite Latin America economic growth.  The Alliance promised $100 billion in 
Latin American investment over a 10-year period, with the United States providing 
twenty percent.  Moreover, in addition to industrialization, land redistribution, and tax 
reform, the Alliance for Progress ambitiously set out to improve Latin American 
health and education systems, leading U.S. policymakers to optimistically predict that 
within a decade, Latin America would experience a lower rate of infant mortality and 
major increases in life expectancy, literacy, and access to primary education.43
It was the third component of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, however, that 
would have the most significant long-term impact on the region: increased U.S. 
military assistance and training programs to enhance Latin American internal security.  
Like his Cold War predecessors, John F. Kennedy believed U.S. national security 
depended on defending Latin America against communist aggression.  As the Cuban 
Revolution made evident, however, the nature of the security threat to the region had 
shifted.  Rather than an externally-based Soviet attack on the hemisphere, in the 1960s 
the primary threat, in the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was “the appearance 
in Cuba of a Marxist-Communist regime committed to promote subversive, Castro-
communist movements throughout Latin America.”
   
44
Internal security was thus the foundation on which U.S. policymakers aimed to 
build the Alliance for Progress.  Although envisioning a region of stable, pro-U.S. 
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democracies fueled by dynamic local economies, in the short-run, U.S. policymakers 
feared the Alliance would create unprecedented susceptibility to communist 
subversion, a “disease of the transition to modernization,” in Rostow’s clinical 
description.45  As Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles informed U.S. Embassies 
in Latin America in mid-1961, the process of social and economic development “will 
take time.  Castro-communism in [the] meantime can be expected to infiltrate and 
subvert established governments and to disrupt positive development program.”  
Underscoring the relationship between the Alliance’s political and socio-economic 
initiatives and internal security, Bowles concluded, “It is essential [to] build up 
defenses against this danger so Latin American countries can get on with development 
plans.”46
More significantly, in addition to preventing communist insurgencies, U.S. 
policymakers anticipated Latin American militaries would advance the goals of the 
Alliance for Progress by assuming a lead role in national socio-economic 
development.  Well aware of Castro’s successful guerrilla campaign in Cuba’s 
sparsely populated Sierra Maestra, U.S. counterinsurgency experts perceived Latin 
America’s underdeveloped rural areas as hotbeds for communist infiltration.  “The 
fields of battle are hunger, inflation, hardship, disease, ignorance, discrimination, and 
unrest,” Army Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Harry F. Walterhouse declared in the April 
1962 edition of Military Review. 
   
 
The enemy is communism which seizes every opportunity to identify itself 
with the fulfillment of the frustrations and yearnings of emerging populations. 
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Communism fans embers of unrest, hinders the assistance and reform efforts of 
legally constituted governments, and incessantly propagandizes its own cure-
all nostrums.47
 
  
Determined to prevent communist inroads while shepherding the region along the path 
to modernization, the Kennedy Administration boldly set out to transform the core 
mission of Latin American militaries.  Henceforth, the United States would assume 
responsibility for defending the hemisphere against external attack, while Latin 
American armed forces would concentrate on “contributing to the defense of the 
hemisphere by maintaining internal security against communist-Castroist guerrilla and 
subversive threats.”48
To convince reluctant Latin American military leaders to establish internal 
security as the primary objective, Kennedy expanded U.S. military assistance, while 
focusing the program on providing equipment considered intrinsic to internal security.  
Beginning with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, this emphasis was evident in the 
Administration’s annual requests of congressional funding for U.S. military assistance 
to Latin America.  Security forces were of “paramount importance,” Brigadier General 
William Enemark testified in 1962.  “If the Alliance for Progress is to have its chance, 
governments must have the effective force required to cope with subversion, prevent 
terrorism, and deal with outbreaks of violence before they reach unmaneageable 
proportions,” Enemark continued.  “They must be able to sustain themselves against 
attacks by the international Communist organization and its indigenous members.
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Despite congressional opposition to repealing the prohibition on aid to Latin 
America for internal security purposes, Kennedy took advantage of a loophole in 
Section 511(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, allowing the Administration to 
furnish internal security assistance to Latin America if the president “promptly reports 
such determination to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives.”  Accordingly, Kennedy authorized a grant of $34.9 
million in military assistance for internal security in Latin America, in 1961, and two 
years later, half of all Latin American military assistance was geared toward internal 
security.50  The Administration had less difficulty obtaining congressional approval 
for Latin American civic action programs.  In addition to Agency for International 
Development (AID) funding, beginning in 1962, Kennedy utilized the Military 
Assistance Program to fund civic action programs, and by FY1963, MAP provided no 
less than $14.1 million for Latin American socio-economic development programs, 
compared to a mere $5 million from AID.51
 In addition to military assistance, the Kennedy Administration sought to 
prioritize internal security in Latin America through U.S. training programs for Latin 
American soldiers.  Accordingly, United States Military Assistance Advisory Groups 
(MAAGs) and Military Missions operating as part of the “country team” at U.S. 
Embassies were instructed to integrate internal security into their daily operations.
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Often responsible for working with the local Department of Defense to prepare a 
military budget and suitable tables of organization and equipment, MAAGs were in a 
unique position to encourage expenditures geared toward internal security.  MAAGs 
also took a lead role in translating U.S. training manuals into Spanish or Portuguese, 
considered by the Department of Defense as a fundamental element in establishing 
internal security as a priority for Latin American military officers.53
 Law enforcement agencies were also recognized by U.S. policymakers as 
playing a key role in maintaining Latin American internal security.  As a Department 
of State memorandum in June 1962 made clear: 
   
 
The rapid increase in the number of civil disturbances in Latin American 
countries resulting from Castro-communist subversion as well as the general 
unrest and rising crime rates brought about by the accelerated economic, 
political, and social evolution in these countries has created the need for giving 
police training of a concentrated type, tailored to fill the particular needs of 
Latin American countries, and administered for key supervisory and instructor 
personnel in relatively far greater numbers than are currently being trained in 
the U.S. and third countries under the ICA participant training program.54
 
 
                                                 
53 At least 40 nations were receiving U.S. military aid in 1961, with about 5,000 U.S. Army personnel 
engaged in providing the assistance.  Praising the program’s potential, General George H. Decker 
asserted that, “Through these agencies the United States is contributing to the battle readiness of allied 
forces that comprise some 80 percent of the Free World’s armies.  They represent the equivalent of 
approximately 200 divisions.  While some of these forces are far from achieving their full combat 
potential, substantial progress is being made.  We must never ignore the fact that by assisting our allies 
to improve their own security, we are contributing to our security.  We are giving substance and 
meaning to our policy of collective security.  We are, in reality, projecting the defense of the United 
States far from our shores.”   Quoted in Samuel T. Williams, “The Practical Demands of the MAAG,” 
Military Review, Vol. XLI, No. 7 (July 1961), 4.   
54 U.S. Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Secret, Subject: “U.S. Policy Toward 
Argentina with Respect to Military and Economic Assistance and Recognition of the New 
Government,” June 29, 1962, DDRS, Document Number: CK3100362878 (accessed December 9, 
2007). 
27 
 
Two weeks later, Kennedy issued NSAM No. 177, mandating that “the U.S. should 
give considerably greater emphasis to police assistance programs in appropriate less 
developed countries where there is an actual or potential threat of internal subversion 
or insurgency.”55  Building on training programs established during the Eisenhower 
Administration, Kennedy directed the founding of Inter-American Police Academy in 
the Panama Canal Zone in 1962.  Relocated the following year to Washington and 
designated the International Police Academy, the institution provided students with 
instruction in “surveillance techniques and intelligence gathering, interrogation 
procedures, methods of conducting raids, and riot and crowd control.”56
 More significantly, the Kennedy Administration dramatically expanded 
training programs for Latin American officers at U.S. military facilities in the Panama 
Canal Zone and the continental United States.   By mid-May 1961, plans were being 
formulated in the Department of Defense to “increase and strengthen the training of 
Latin American military personnel in anti-subversion, anti-guerrilla, and riot control 
techniques.”
   
57  Four months later, Kennedy pressed for more rapid development of 
training programs for regional officers in NSAM No. 88, and requested to know what 
“steps we are taking to increase the intimacy between our Armed Forces and the 
military of Latin America.”58
 At the President’s urging, U.S. training programs for Latin American soldiers 
expanded rapidly, particularly at the U.S. Caribbean School, renamed the School of 
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the Americas (SOA) in 1963.  Located at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone, over 
the course of the decade the institution continuously provided between 350 and 500 
Latin American officers with Spanish-language military instruction in two- to forty-
week courses.59  Counterinsurgency formed the core of the SOA’s curriculum; as the 
authors of an early study on internal security in Latin America noted, the instruction 
covered “every aspect of counterinsurgency: military, paramilitary, political, 
sociological, and psychological.  Stimulation of economic growth by military civic 
action is [also] emphasized.”60
 Latin American officers were also invited to receive military training in the 
continental United States.  A specialized program for Latin American officers was 
established in 1960 at the Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC, with 
instruction focusing on unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and 
psychological-warfare operations.  Additionally, in October 1962, the Inter-American 
Defense College was established at Fort Lesley McNair in Washington.  With courses 
“comparable to that of most advanced military educational institutes,” the College 
targeted students at the rank of colonel who had graduated from advanced command 
or staff schools in Latin America.  By 1963, Inter-American Defense College boasted 
more than one hundred graduates from throughout Latin America.
   
61
The expansion of U.S. military training programs was geared to instill in Latin 
American officers the will to reorient their armed forces’ mission to internal security, 
as well as increasing U.S. leverage in the region by cultivating close personal and 
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professional bonds with future generations of politically-powerful military leaders.   
“Our military schools afford a direct way of reaching this influential element of the 
governments in Latin America,” Kennedy’s military representative, General Maxwell 
Taylor, informed the President in October 1961.62
 
  Similarly, a State Department 
Memo in early 1962 declared:  
In order to align Latin American military establishments with United States 
military policy, and to train and equip them for their contribution to the 
defense of the hemisphere, the United States must be the paramount foreign 
military influence in Latin America. A favorable political orientation on the 
part of the Latin American officer corps is vital to our interests. This calls for 
continuous effort in solidifying the bonds between our military forces and 
those of Latin America.63
 
  
As early as mid-1962, the expansion of U.S. training facilities had largely succeeded 
in drawing the hemisphere’s armed services together under the mantle of U.S. 
hemispheric hegemony.  As veteran reporter Juan de Onís noted in July, “the top 
military leaders of Latin America nearly all know each other personally through the 
conferences for inter-American defense that United States regional service commands 
promote, primarily in Panama.”64
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United States military assistance and training for Latin America continued 
following Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963.  Reflecting an extraordinary 
reliance on career-diplomat Thomas C. Mann, from the outset of his presidency 
Lyndon B. Johnson sought to cut away the fat of Kennedy’s idealistic rhetoric and get 
down to the meat of economic development.  The new president emphasized the need 
for clear goals for the Alliance for Progress, and to streamline the layers of U.S. 
bureaucracy involved in the project.  Moreover, Washington cut back on the 
Alliance’s support for Latin American democracies and promises of rapid socio-
economic development.65
In particular, the perceived threat of Cuban-style insurgencies in the region 
would define the Johnson Administration’s approach to hemispheric affairs.   
Although Johnson curtailed the CIA’s efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro, top U.S. 
policymakers saw the fiery Cuban leader’s influence in nearly every instance of 
political upheaval and social unrest in the region.  “Cuba continues to devote 
considerable effort to assisting subversive groups in the hemisphere,” the Central 
Intelligence Agency warned in 1966.  Citing the Tri-Continental Conference held in 
January 1966 as evidence, the Agency continued, “Propaganda support for revolution 
  Instead, the 1964 “Mann Doctrine” called for a halt to U.S. 
interventionism on behalf of democracy—with nations threatened by communism as 
the major exception, and laid out three factors by which the United States would base 
its political recognition of Latin American governments: fostering of economic 
growth, the protection of U.S. investments abroad, and anti-Communism.   
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in Latin America emanating from Fidel Castro and other high-level Cuban officials 
has again reached the crescendo of the early 1960s.”66
Accordingly, the Johnson Administration maintained the focus on 
counterinsurgency initiated under Kennedy, and expanded U.S. military assistance and 
training programs for Latin American soldiers.
 
67  After resisting a major legislative 
reorientation of U.S. military assistance to Latin America since the final years of the 
Eisenhower Administration, in 1965 the Congress bowed to White House pressure and 
amended the Foreign Assistance Act to expressly include U.S. military assistance 
geared toward internal security.68  Accordingly, in the same fiscal year, the Johnson 
Administration budgeted 52% of MAP funds for “the maintenance of security against 
communist and other threats of violence and subversion, including guerrilla warfare, 
and the movement of armaments and men clandestinely across land, sea and air 
borders for subversive purposes.”69
Increased MAP funding corresponded with hundreds of U.S. military missions 
operating throughout the hemisphere.  By 1964, nearly 900 U.S. military, civilian, and 
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local personnel were assigned to U.S. military missions charged with advising and 
training Latin American soldiers, as well as programming and monitoring MAP 
equipment deliveries.70  An additional 252 individuals served as military attachés, and 
by 1967, the United States had military missions in all Latin American countries 
except Haiti and Mexico.71  The Johnson era also witnessed an increase in U.S.-
funded civic action programs in Latin America.  Glowing reports flowed into 
Washington detailing roadbuilding in rural Brazil, the construction of clinics in Chile, 
potable water projects in Ecuador, and a hot lunch program in Guatemala feeding 
more than 200,000 children in 3,000 schools.72  “U.S. policy in this regard has been an 
almost unqualified success,” a Department of Defense report claimed in early 1965.  
U.S. civic action initiatives, the report continued, “helped give local military forces a 
sense of mission, a greater interest in the welfare of their countries and a better 
relationship with the civil population.”73
United States military training facilities also expanded under the Johnson 
Administration.  By 1968, more than 25,000 Latin American soldiers had trained in 
the United States since the end of World War II, and 30,000 had taken military courses 
in the Panama Canal Zone.
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many as three times a year.  Hundreds of Latin American students also underwent 
training at Fort Sherman’s Jungle Operations Training Center, on the opposite side of 
the Panama Canal.  In such courses, one author wrote in the journal Military Review, 
“Assaults, ambushes, and patrols are carried out both day and night in the thick, 
insect-infested, obstacle-ridden rain forests bordering the Panama Canal.”75
Correspondingly, in the late 1960s Latin American students at the Inter-
American Defense College attended lectures in a 100-seat auditorium featuring 
simultaneous interpretation into Spanish, Portuguese, English, or French via a state-of-
the-art headphone system.  Moreover, in addition to a bachelor’s quarters for nearly 
three dozen officers and a mess hall, the institution had accumulated a library with 
more than 3,000 volumes, an equal number of pamphlets and documents, and held 
subscriptions to roughly 300 periodicals.  By the end of the decade, the College had 
nearly 300 Latin American graduates.
   
76
 
  
By the mid-1960s, extensive transfers of U.S. military equipment and training 
and a shared anti-communist fervor had thus largely succeeded in drawing politically 
ambitious Latin American militaries into an unprecedented hemispheric alliance 
system with the United States at the helm.  “The fact that there are today no significant 
foreign military missions, other than those of the U.S., resident in Latin America is an 
index of the success of the U.S. in establishing itself as the predominant military 
influence in the area,” a Department of Defense Memorandum bluntly asserted in 
1968.  The memo continued: 
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The fact that the military as a whole are probably the least anti-American of 
any political group in Latin America is another indication of this influence.  A 
third indication, not traceable wholly to U.S. policy, is the strong anti-Castro 
and anti-Communist attitude of the military.  The adoption generally in Latin 
America of U.S. military doctrine, tactics, training methods, organization and 
weapons is both a result of and a contribution to continuing predominance of 
U.S. influence.77
 
 
Moreover, U.S. policymakers championed Latin American militaries’ adaptation of 
doctrines of national security linking economic and social development to internal 
security.   At the annual five-day Conference of American Armies in 1964, Lyndon B. 
Johnson praised military representatives from 17 Latin American nations for their 
“sincere desire to benefit—both economically and socially—the people we serve.”78
 
   
U.S. policymakers were not oblivious to the risks inherent in the effort to 
reorient Latin American militaries’ primary mission to internal security.  Indeed, State 
Department memoranda reveal an awareness dating to the initial months of the 
Kennedy Administration that U.S. military training and assistance could whet Latin 
American officers’ appetites for political power.  “Intensive aid and training can give 
the military leaders in these countries a sophistication, skill, influence, and material 
power beyond that of the civilian authorities,” an INR analyst wrote in 1961.  “This 
can create both the conditions and the rationale for a military coup.”  The zealous U.S. 
effort to contain the spread of communism in Third World through military 
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counterinsurgency and civic action programs, the INR asserted, could be understood 
by Latin American military leaders as implicit U.S. support for anti-communist 
military regimes.  The report continued: 
 
Our present training programs may easily—and quite inadvertently—add to 
these difficulties.  Trainees may come to believe that we desire the military to 
take over their governments and to implement social, economic, and military 
reforms.  Emphasis on means of controlling the population, as in the 
antisubversion course at Fort Bragg, may lead officers to believe that we favor 
authoritarian regimes—provided, of course, they are anticommunist. 
 
Staunch support against communist insurgencies notwithstanding, military coups 
d’état, the INR concluded, “have not generally proved to be in our interest.”79
By and large, however, the Kennedy Administration dismissed fears of 
politicizing Latin America’s military leaders.  Instead, top U.S. policymakers 
repeatedly emphasized the positive effects of military training and assistance 
programs.  As Department of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told a 
congressional committee, “the exposure of the military officers of those nations to our 
schools acquaints them with democratic philosophies, democratic ways of thinking, 
which they, in turn, take back to their nations.”
    
80  Similarly, Maxwell Taylor told 
Kennedy that Latin American officers “gain an appreciation and understanding of the 
U.S. more or less by absorption while attending these courses.”81
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The President himself expressed a similar view while discussing the Inter-
American Defense College with Venezuelan Ambassador José Antonio Mayobre.  The 
Ambassador began by boldly informing Kennedy that “to bring senior officers to 
Washington for nontechnical, political training would, in the Latin American climate, 
inevitably stimulate their interest in taking political power.”  The program, Mayobre 
continued, “might establish a mutually supported network of Latin American military 
interested in taking power.”82
Kennedy sharply disagreed.  Military assistance and training programs, the 
President asserted, strengthened U.S. ties with Latin American officers and thus 
increased coordination on hemispheric issues.   Moreover, the U.S. military, Kennedy 
maintained, enhanced Latin American officers’ respect for constitutional democracy.  
Dismissing the Ambassador’s fears, Kennedy “could not help but believe that close 
association with the American military, who understood so well the need to 
subordinate the military power to the civilian, would be helpful in dealing with the 
problem with which the Ambassador was concerned.”
   
83
In fact, the Kennedy Administration’s belief that U.S. military training 
programs would impart increased respect for constitutional democracy on Latin 
American officers bore little relation to reality.  Instead, United States 
counterinsurgency training and aid played a fundamental role in enhancing Latin 
American officers’ belief in their ability to solve Latin American nations’ complex 
socio-economic challenges, thus serving as partial justification for the wave of 
military coups that swept the region over the course of the decade.  More broadly, in 
the zero-sum atmosphere that permeated U.S. Cold War foreign policy, Kennedy’s 
promise to spark a middle-class democratic revolution through the Alliance for 
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Progress was quickly and irreparably undermined by the Administration’s overriding 
fear of “losing” Latin American nations to communist subversion.   As Kennedy 
admitted to his advisors after the assassination of the brutal Dominican dictator—and 
longstanding U.S. client—Rafael Trujillo, “There are three possibilities in descending 
order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, 
or a ‘Castro’ regime.  We ought to aim at the first, but we can’t really renounce the 
second until we are sure that we can avoid the third.”84  Unwilling to risk backing a 
vulnerable democracy, Kennedy not only recognized a non-democratic regime in the 
Dominican Republic in September 1963, but, between 1962 and 1963, extended 
diplomatic recognition to military governments that assumed power by force in 
Argentina (March 1962), Peru (July 1962), Guatemala (March 1963), Ecuador (July 
1963), and Honduras (October 1963).85
The shift away from U.S. support for Latin American democracies accelerated 
in the aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963.  Describing Latin 
American military leaders as, “on the whole, a pretty decent group of people,” and 
dismissing congressional resistance to U.S.-military assistance to the region as “a 
tempest in a teapot,” Thomas C. Mann focused on economic growth and internal 
security and largely ceased to differentiate between democratic and military 
governments.
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increasingly ensconced in the dictatorial rule of repressive military regimes; during the 
1960s, Latin America experienced no less than sixteen military takeovers, led by 
officers who had almost inevitably trained at U.S. facilities.87
 Throughout the decade, however, U.S. policymakers and diplomats repeatedly 
denied that U.S. military predominance in the hemisphere had any deleterious effects 
on Latin American political development.  Responding to a February 1964 State 
Department query, the Country Teams in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and 
Peru uniformly rejected the possibility that U.S. military assistance had played a role 
in facilitating Latin American coups d’état.
   
88  Even the U.S. Embassy in Honduras 
emphasized the positive contribution of U.S. military assistance and aid, despite an 
ongoing cutoff in response to the previous October’s military coup, executed by 
soldiers in U.S. army uniforms, brandishing U.S.-made machine guns, and patrolling 
in troop carriers sporting a sticker “showing the symbolic hands of the United States 
and Latin America clasped in friendship.”89
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furnished [to] forces under [the] Military Asssistance Program.” Although admitting 
that the “ease with which [the] military golpe [was] carried out testifies to improved 
87 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist revolution in 
Latin America, 141-42. 
88 Department of State Telegram, Santiago 702, U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, February 28, 1964; 
Box 1, Folder 8: Latin America, Volume 1, 11/63-6/64, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL; Department of 
State Telegram, Bogota 739, U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, February 28, 1964, Box 6, Folder 7: 
Argentina Volume III, 3/67-12/68, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL; Department of State Telegram, 
Quito 539, U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, February 28, 1964, Box 1, Folder: 8: Latin America, 
Volume 1, 11/63-6/64, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL; Department of State Telegram, Guatemala 480, 
U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, February 26, 1964, Box 1, Folder 8: Latin America, Volume 1, 
11/63-6/64, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL; Department of State Telegram, Lima 1000, U.S. Embassy 
to Secretary of State, February 28, 1964, Box 1, Folder 8: Latin America, Volume 1, 11/63-6/64, NSF, 
CF, Latin America, LBJL.  
89 Bert Quint, “Coup Progress Hinders Alliance,” Washington Post, November 18, 1963, pg. A17. 
39 
 
discipline and ability to plan operations which [are] not unrelated to U.S. training,” the 
Embassy nonetheless maintained, “[it is] undeniable that expert planning and [the] 
rapid transport of troops had [the] effect of reducing bloodshed that might otherwise 
have accompanied military action.”90
Such myopia fed into a subtle naturalization of the pattern of illiberal political 
order in the region.  As Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin 
W. Martin opined in the New York Herald Tribune in October 1963, “In most of Latin 
America there is so little experience with the benefits of political legitimacy that there 
is an insufficient body of opinion, civil or military, which has any reason to know its 
value and hence defend it.”
   
91  Similarly, a Department of Defense report asserted at 
mid-decade, “To the three typical roles of military forces, i.e., to protect the 
sovereignty of the nation, to preserve internal order, and to play a constructive part in 
national development, must be added, in the case of Latin America, a fourth one of 
special significance, namely, to act as political arbiter.”92  Latin America, the report 
concluded, “provides at best an alien soil for constitutional democratic government on 
the Anglo-Saxon model.”93
 
 
Such assertions obscured the role U.S. Cold War policy played in 
strengthening politically ambitious military leaders at the expense of regional 
democracy.  In addition to significantly enhancing security forces’ repressive capacity 
in Central and South American nations ruled by anti-communist dictators like 
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Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza and Paraguay’s Alfredo Stroessner, the United States 
emphasis on internal security contributed to the consolidation of bureaucratic-
authoritarian rule in the Southern Cone: Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), Chile (1973), 
and Uruguay (1973)—“a chain of governments,” the State Department would later 
write, “whose origin was in battle against the extreme left.”94  Exporting a paradigm 
of internal security that extended the military’s purview deep into the realms of social 
and economic policy, the United States made a decisive contribution to the rise of a 
generation of Latin American officers perceiving national security as “the yardstick by 
which all policies are measured, and the beginning and the end of politics.”95    Indeed, 
by 1973, more than 170 graduates of the School of the Americas were Latin American 
government leaders, Cabinet Ministers, military commanders, or intelligence directors.  
Such military training programs, admitted Retired Admiral Gene LaRocque, who 
served as director of the Inter-American Defense College from 1969-1972, 
paradoxically focused on, “training people to more efficiently manage a government, 
without any encouragement for them to take over.”96
Moreover, by significantly increasing security forces’ repressive capacity, 
logistical efficiency, and technical expertise, the United States played a foundational 
role in the establishment of what historian Greg Grandin aptly describes as 
“counterinsurgent terror states”—fiercely anticommunist regimes combining 
sophisticated intelligence gathering technology with extra-legal kidnappings, torture, 
and disappearances of political opponents.
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light weaponry geared toward internal security operations, along with the provision of 
everyday tools of intelligence collection and analysis such as typewriters and 
computerized filing programs, combined with U.S. counterinsurgency instruction 
dramatically enhanced the repressive capacity of security forces vis-à-vis perceived 
anti-government movements and served as a blueprint for harsh repression.   
In the U.S. Army manual “Counterintelligence,” for example, utilized in 
training for Latin American soldiers during the 1960s as part of “Project X,” the U.S. 
Army’s Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, potential targets were defined as 
“local or national political party teams, or parties that have goals, beliefs, or ideologies 
contrary or in opposition to the government.”  Similarly, the manual “Combat 
Intelligence” classified political demonstrations by minority groups and “civilians 
including children who don’t want to associate with U.S. troops or their own country’s 
troops” as indicating an impending guerrilla attack, as well as the “celebration of 
national or religious festivals, or the presence of strangers.”98
Moreover, perceived subversives warranted harsh interrogation methods 
according to U.S. military doctrine.  A 1963 CIA interrogation training manual 
outlined techniques of, “arrest, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary 
confinement or similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened 
suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis, and induced regression,” and included an 
“Interrogator’s Check List” and descriptive bibliography.  Implicitly condoning the 
use of electric shock in interrogations, the manual informed readers, “If a new 
safehouse is to be used as the interrogation site, it should be carefully studied to be 
sure that the total environment can be manipulated as desired.  For example, the 
electric current should be known in advance, so that transformers or other modifying 
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devices will be on hand if needed.”  Although admitting that “coercive manipulation,” 
might “impair the subject’s “ability to make fine distinctions” the manual asserted that 
it “will not alter his ability to answer correctly such gross questions as ‘Are you a 
Soviet agent?  What is your assignment now?  [and] Who is your present case 
officer?’”99  By the late 1960s, the School of the Americas was translating between 
20,000 and 30,000 pages of such manuals into Spanish every year for distribution in 
Latin America.100
In sum, after more than a quarter-century of concerted efforts to cultivate close 
ties with Latin America militaries, by the end of the 1960s the United States could 
boast an unprecedented hemispheric alliance system predicated on U.S. hemispheric 
hegemony, fueled by mutual anti-communism, and sustained through extensive 
transfers of U.S. military equipment and training.  Indeed, in few world regions was 
the imperial nature of U.S. Cold War foreign policy so starkly evident: with tens of 
thousands of Latin American soldiers passing through U.S. training centers every year, 
increasing standardization of security forces’ weaponry and equipment along U.S. 
lines, and thousands of U.S. military personnel engaged in training and equipment 
procurement activities, the United States exerted immense political-military influence 
throughout Latin America.  A core element in the effort to protect U.S. national 
security, the militarized nature of U.S. policy toward Latin America heightened 
regional military leaders’ political ambitions, accelerated the development of Latin 
American doctrines of national security, and increased armed forces’ repressive 
capacity.  Indeed, it was only a small step from the selective repression prescribed by 
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to systematic state-sanctioned terrorism.  As one 
former student at the School of the Americas candidly informed a journalist, military 
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intelligence was based on “captur[ing] a guy without the others finding out, interrogate 
him, kill him, eliminate him, [and] bury him—you understand?”  Underscoring the 
United States complicity in the formation of Latin America’s worst human rights 
violating regimes, the SOA graduate concluded, “That is, to interrogate him while he 
can speak, and once the guy dies, to make him disappear so that the reds don’t find out 
that we have the information.”101
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Chapter 2: 
 
The “Third World War” and U.S.-Argentine Relations 
At the outset of the 1960s, the Kennedy Administration looked to Argentina as 
a model for the democratic stability, economic growth, and internal security 
envisioned by the Alliance for Progress.  The 1958 election of President Arturo 
Frondizi had marked the first democratic transfer of political power since the 
overthrow of Juan Perón, who had been forced into exile by the Argentine military in 
1955 after maintaining near-dictatorial power for eight years.  An Army colonel of 
middle-class origin, Perón’s participation in the successful 1943 military coup d’état 
against President Ramón Castillo had initially garnered the ambitious 48-year-old an 
appointment as Secretary of Labor.  Recognizing the political potential of Argentina’s 
working-class, Perón began systematically cultivating a strong following among 
Argentine labor unions, through worker-friendly government arbitration of labor 
disputes, increases in state-mandated worker benefits—including social security, 
vacations, and housing—and state support for the formation of new unions.1   The 
initiative quickly bore fruit, and Perón’s growing popularity translated into his 
appointment as Vice-President and Minister of War in 1944.  The following year, 
when leery Argentine military leaders forced Perón’s resignation and deposited him in 
the island prison of Martín García, thousands of working-class Argentines occupied 
the Plaza de Mayo, successfully demanding Perón’s release and stimulating the 
military’s decision to hold presidential elections in 1946.2
The Argentine election corresponded with a surge of democracy that swept 
Latin America at the end of World War II. Propelled by the combined effects of the 
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global struggle against fascism, the relative benevolence of U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy, and, to varying degrees in each Latin American 
nation, the rise of an “emerging middle class and urban working class that joined with 
students, intellectuals, and in some cases a militant peasantry,” the region was swept 
by unprecedented demands for democratic reforms.3
Ironically, United States efforts to promote democracy in Argentina by 
derailing Juan Perón’s presidential aspirations played a key role in his sweeping 1946 
election victory.  U.S. policymakers correctly concluded that Perón had been deeply 
impressed with German and Italian fascism during a short military training stint in 
Italy at the outset of the Second World War.
    Accordingly, in 1946, Latin 
America could boast fifteen democracies out of a total of twenty nations—a startling 
figure considering there were only four democracies two years earlier. Significantly, 
the United States actively assisted in the outpouring of Latin American democracy; 
flush with victory over authoritarian regimes in Europe and Asia, in the heady 
aftermath of V-J Day a phalanx of hardheaded U.S. diplomats fanned out across the 
hemisphere, pressuring Latin American authoritarians such as Paraguay’s Higinio 
Morinigo and Guatemala’s Jorge Ubico to hand over the reins of power via democratic 
elections.   
4
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underpinning U.S. policy toward Perón’s political aspirations, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson noted in his memoirs, “Perón was a fascist and a dictator detested by all good 
men—except Argentinians.”5  Accordingly, in a move indicative of both traditional 
hemispheric dominance and a newly acquired status as a global superpower, the 
United States openly attempted to derail Perón’s presidential campaign.  Spearheaded 
by newly-appointed Ambassador Spruille Braden, the U.S. Embassy became a center 
of political opposition, even going so far as to publish a damning account of 
Argentina’s conduct toward the Axis powers only two weeks prior to the election.  To 
the lasting detriment of U.S.-Argentine relations, however, Perón deftly turned the 
ambassador’s campaign to his own advantage, handedly winning the presidency after 
shrewdly marketing his candidacy as one of “Perón versus Braden.”6
Over the next eight years, Perón’s promotion of state corporatism transformed 
Argentina’s political and socio-economic landscape.  Championing “economic 
independence,” Perón deepened the government’s management of the economy and 
enacted far-reaching regulatory legislation while simultaneously carrying-out Latin 
America’s most extensive nationalization program of industry, agriculture, and foreign 
investments—including (with great fanfare) the British-owned railroad system.
  
7
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privileged position in political society by extending civil rights into the socio-
economic arena.  Peronist discourse, writes historian Daniel James, “explicitly 
challenged the legitimacy of a notion of democracy which limited itself to 
participation in formal political rights and […] extended it to include participation in 
the social and economic life of the nation.”8  In practice, Peronism’s effort to cultivate 
the support of Argentine workers translated into sweeping social welfare measures, 
expansive state-organized labor unions, and government arbitration of labor disputes.9
Notwithstanding Perón’s landslide reelection in 1951, over the course of the 
decade his political fortunes declined in the face of a growing economic downturn.  
Dependent on agricultural exports as the primary source of foreign exchange, and with 
a limited capacity to expand production, the investment of state funds in one domestic 
sector inevitably occurred at the expense of other sectors.  In a pattern that would 
continue to dog Argentine leaders in subsequent decades, Perón was unable to avoid 
cycles of economic expansion followed by violent contraction, in which government 
investment initiatives resulted in rising inflation, economic stagnation, and a balance 
of payments deficit.  Combined with Eva Perón’s death in 1952, and, in 1954, a bitter 
  
In turn, Perón engendered enormous loyalty among Argentina’s “descamisados” 
(“shirtless ones”), as he famously referred to members of the working class.  Assisted 
by his wife Eva Duarte—whose rags-to-riches experience, public tirades against the 
Argentine elites, and extensive charity on behalf of Perón created an almost religious 
following—by 1948, Perón had achieved near-dictatorial control.   
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feud with the Catholic Church, Perón’s inability to spearhead sustained economic 
prosperity precipitated a military coup d’état in September 1955.10
  Elected to office in the tense aftermath of Perón’s ouster, Arturo Frondizi 
sought to delicately hew a middle path between Argentina’s competing constituencies.  
It was an unenviable challenge.  Politically, Frondizi’s plan to integrate the mass of 
unreformed Peronists—roughly 30% of the voting public—into the mainstream of 
Argentina’s fragile democracy immediately raised the hackles of anti-Peronists.  
Economically, the President’s effort to stabilize Argentina’s volatile economy by 
implementing economic austerity measures prescribed by international lending 
agencies strained the pocketbook of the working class, while his accommodation of 
foreign investment drew sharp criticism from Argentine nationalists.
   
11
Frondizi looked to the United States for political support and economic 
assistance in order to carry out his reform agenda.  As the Argentine Minister of 
Economy informed Kennedy in May 1961, Frondizi needed “firm assurance, for 
political purposes,” that the Alliance for Progress would provide loans to Argentina 
for fiscally sound projects, such as modernizing the nation’s dilapidated railroad 
system.
   
12
Finally, Frondizi aimed to take advantage of Kennedy’s obsessive animosity 
toward Fidel Castro’s revolutionary regime by establishing Argentina as a mediator 
  Equally significant to Frondizi was U.S. political support for Argentina’s 
fragile democracy.  By exemplifying the democratic tenets of the Alliance, Frondizi 
hoped to stay the insurrectionary designs perpetually percolating in the circulo 
militar—the Argentine officers club.   
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between the United States and Cuba.  Successful mediation, the Argentine President 
hoped, would simultaneously confirm his anticommunist credentials in the eyes of 
Argentine military officers, and belie accusations from across the Argentine political 
spectrum of kowtowing to the United States.13  Accordingly, in January 1962, 
Frondizi ordered the Argentine delegation to abstain from a U.S.-backed resolution to 
exclude Cuba from the Organization of American States at the inter-American foreign 
ministers’ meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay.   Shortly thereafter, reports surfaced of 
a secret meeting between Frondizi and Ernesto “Che” Guevara—the famous Argentine 
national who had served as one of Castro’s top commanders during the Cuban 
Revolution and was acting Minister of Industry.14
The Kennedy Administration supported Frondizi’s aspiration to establish 
Argentina as a model of Alliance for Progress success.  The Argentine President’s 
liberal reform agenda was a far cry from the corporatist Perón-era, which had grated 
against the American postwar vision of a global order based on limited government 
intervention in the economy, liberal capitalism, multilateral trade, and U.S. 
hemispheric hegemony.   Frondizi’s economic initiatives also found a receptive 
audience in Washington.  By late 1961, the United States was supplying half of all 
foreign investment for Frondizi’s industrialization program, and after a private 
meeting with Frondizi in Palm Beach, Florida, in February 1962, Kennedy promised 
an additional $150 million in loans for economic development.
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The United States was far less accommodating to Frondizi’s effort to mediate 
between Kennedy and Castro, and quietly supported Argentine military leaders’ 
inroads into the political arena in the name of anticommunism.  In September 1961, 
the United States forced Frondizi onto the defensive by publicizing a collection of 
documents obtained by a member of the Cuban Embassy staff in Buenos Aires 
alleging Cuban involvement in subversive activities in the Argentina, as well as close 
ties between Cuban and Argentine government officials.16  Five months later, when 
Argentine military commanders—incensed by Frondizi’s decision to abstain from the 
OAS referendum on Cuba—forced the Argentine President to break diplomatic 
relations with the Castro regime, United States policymakers quietly exulted.  
Referring to the sudden reversal in Argentine-Cuban relations, the State Department 
cabled the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, “We welcome foreign policy changes 
brought about by internal pressures mainly from [the] military.”17
While welcoming the Argentine military’s anti-Castro initiatives, U.S. 
policymakers recognized the distinct limits to U.S. leverage.  Although sharing 
Washington’s anticommunist fervor, in the early 1960s, Argentine military leaders 
looked to the French, rather than the Americans, for military assistance and training.  
Recognized as counter-revolutionary experts thanks to their participation in the brutal 
suppression of anti-colonial revolutionary movements in Vietnam and Algeria, in 1957 
French military advisors had been invited to assist in integrating counter-revolutionary 
warfare into the curriculum of the Argentine Superior War College.  The cooperation 
proved fruitful, and in 1961 two French officers of the Organisation de l’Armée 
Secréte—a clandestine counterinsurgency force operating in Algeria—accepted 
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invitations to offer courses in Buenos Aires, while French military treatises, notably 
Col. Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare Les Centurions were 
translated and widely disseminated in Argentine military circles.18
Counter-revolutionary training in Argentina was thus well underway by the 
time John F. Kennedy began promoting internal security as the primary Latin 
American military mission in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution.
   
19
 
  In fact, 
Argentine counter-revolutionary training for regional military officers preceded the 
development of similar U.S. programs focusing on counter-insurgency.  “The Armed 
Forces are definitely anticommunist,” a U.S. assessment team reported in early 1962.   
They recently started a Counter-Revolutionary Course, the first session of 
which was attended by students from fourteen Western Hemisphere nations, 
including the United States.  The Argentines plan to repeat this course at a later 
date, again inviting international participation.  The course covered the theory 
of communism together with strategy and tactics on guerrilla and antiguerrilla 
warfare.  Current advisors for the course were French officers who advocate 
the concepts used in Indo-China and Algeria.  … The instruction is related 
                                                 
18 Martin Edwin Anderson, Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty 
War" (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 133; Donald Clark Hodges, Argentina's "Dirty War": An 
Intellectual Biography (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 134-35; Jean Lartéguy, Les 
Centurions (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1960); Paul H. Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: the "Dirty War" 
in Argentina (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 138-39; Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of 
Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 1964 [2006]).  
19 The Argentine military’s emphasis on counter-revolutionary strategy in the late 1950s and early 
1960s is particularly evident, in the journal of the Circulo Military Argentino (the Military Officer’s 
club).  See, for example, Guillermo San Roman, “La Accion Military en la Guerra Subversiva,” Revista 
Militar, No. 654, Vol. 180-182, Oct.-December (1959);  Osvaldo Amieva Saravia, “Reflexión Sobre El 
Comunismo,” Revista Militar, No. 174-176, No. 652 (1959); Osirus Guillermo Villegas, “Guerra 
Revolucionaria Comunista,” Revista Militar, No. 183-185, No. 655, (1960); Romulo F. Menendez, “El 
Conflicto y su Incidencia en América Latina,” Revista Militar, No. 204-206, No. 662 (1961). 
   
52 
 
primarily to the Argentine situation, but the international participation should 
serve to highlight the importance of internal security.20
 
 
Remarkably, a small contingent of U.S. students also underwent instruction at the 
Argentine course, foreshadowing subsequent use of French counterinsurgency experts 
in military training courses in the United States, notably at the Army Special Warfare 
Center at Fort Bragg.  While U.S. policymakers sought to utilize military assistance 
and training programs to induce Latin American militaries to standardize their arsenals 
and equipment according to U.S. models—thus achieving preeminence over Western 
European and potentially Soviet competition—the mutual objectives served by the 
French in Argentina did not go unnoticed.  When a State Department report in mid-
1962 recommended engaging in efforts to “minimize the present French advisor 
influence in [the] Argentine armed forces,” the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires 
demurred.  “While understanding [the] intent of [the] recommendation,” the Embassy 
cabled Washington, “… we [are] inclined to believe activities such as these 
(concentrated on anti-guerrilla training) tend to complement rather than compete with 
our own efforts.”21
On the whole, although supportive of the Argentine-French anti-communist 
initiative, U.S. policymakers sought to significantly increase U.S. ties with the 
Argentine military, enticing the armed forces more fully into the internal security role 
envisioned by the Alliance for Progress.  At the outset of the decade, however, U.S. 
military influence over Argentina was limited; a training mission existed for each of 
the three Argentine service branches, along with attachés charged with obtaining 
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intelligence, but no U.S. police assistance program had been established, nor had the 
Argentines expressed an interest in a bilateral Military Assistance Agreement.  While 
military assistance could be delivered through a credit assistance program, and the cost 
of U.S. training for Argentine soldiers could be offset by a grant aid program, as the 
State Department reported in January 1962, “The Army Mission has been 
unsuccessful in getting the Argentine Army to accept mobile training teams for 
assistance in counterguerrilla warfare training.  It is difficult to determine whether 
nonacceptance is a matter of pride or lack of interest in this type of training.”22
The U.S. effort to lure the Argentine military into accepting the subordinate 
status envisioned by the Alliance for Progress significantly influenced U.S. 
policymakers’ response to the dramatic showdown between Frondizi and conservative 
Argentine military officers that followed the March 18, 1962 gubernatorial elections.  
Dashing Frondizi’s hopes of a victory for his own Intransigent Party, the Peronists 
handily won nine provincial races, and significantly increased their representation in 
the Congress.  Recognizing that the surge in Peronist political strength would solidify 
the military’s desire to carry out his own ouster, Frondizi immediately ordered an 
interdiction barring the Peronist candidates from assuming office.  Nonetheless, the 
President’s credibility had been irreparably sullied in the eyes of golpista military 
officers, and, in the chaotic 10 days after the election, demands for Frondizi’s 
overthrow gained momentum.   
   
Ironically, by all accounts the election was clean and fair, and, as recently-
appointed U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock incisively noted, the outcome was 
hardly a referendum on Frondizi’s foreign policy.  “These elections were largely 
determined by factors of purely domestic origin and concern,” the Ambassador cabled 
                                                 
22 Department of State Memorandum, Secret, Subject: “Report of Assessment Team on Internal 
Security Situation in South America,” January 10, 1962, reproduced in DDRS, Document Number: 
CK3100112651 (accessed December 8, 2007). 
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Washington.  “The Alliance for Progress was not directly involved nor was Castro 
communism an essential factor in the outcome.”23  Nonetheless, McClintock, one of 
the Department of State’s most experienced Foreign Service Officers, consistently 
advocated avoiding U.S. involvement in preserving Argentine democracy.24  In the 
tense aftermath of the election McClintock assured Frondizi that the United States 
military delegation in Buenos Aires would not encourage the political aspirations of 
their Argentine counterparts.   Despite Frondizi’s entreaties that the U.S. Ambassador 
actively work to dissuade coup-minded Argentine officers, however, McClintock 
refused to actively defend Argentina’s democratically-elected President.25
                                                 
23 “In listing items of discontent with Frondizi,” McClintock continued, “[the] most outstanding feeling 
among the Argentine proletariat was one of mounting fear that his seemingly cold-blooded and 
intellectual program for “development” somehow left the little man out.  There was not much political 
sex appeal in an economically successful arrangement with foreign oil companies to conserve foreign 
exchange on petroleum accounts; there was little political attractiveness to a development program 
which seemed to encourage the prolification of foreign-run automobile factories, while shanty towns 
surrounded the capital city and nothing was done about housing; and despite frequent assertions by 
Frondizi’s administration that the endemic railway problem would be solved nothing effective was 
done.  Most important of all, the little man knew, from the size of his pocketbook in terms of what it 
would bring back from the grocery store, that his real wages were diminishing.” Department of State 
Telegram, Buenos Aires 1699, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, March 21, 1962, Box 
6, Folder “Argentina, 3/16/62-3/31/62,” NSF, CF, JFKL. 
  “I am not 
winding up our own military on what is essentially an Argentine internal problem.  At 
24 Having served under all four geographic bureaus in the Department of State and with United Nations 
Affairs, McClintock had unusually wide range of experience including postings in three Latin American 
Embassies as well as eight posts in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.  Fluent in Spanish, French, 
Italian, Portuguese, and Swedish, McClintock had recently been awarded the State Department’s 
Superior Service Award.  “A spruce, wiry man with carefully combed gray hair, Mr. McClintock stands 
erect and walks briskly,” one journalist wrote after McClintock’s appointment as U.S. Envoy to 
Argentina.  “Aides say he can be as informal as an old shoe, or formal and determined, as the situation 
may require.”  Quote from “R. M. McClintock, Career Man, Next Ambassador to Argentina,” New York 
Times, December 29, 1961, pg. 6.  See also, “McClintock is chosen as Envoy,” Washington Post, 
January 16, 1962, pg. A5; “Biographic Sketch of Ambassador Robert McClintock,” Box 6A, Folder 
“Argentina, General 5/62-6/62,” NSF, CF, JFKL. 
25 Since his arrival on February 6, the Ambassador had repeatedly emphasized to the Argentine 
President that U.S. military personnel were playing no role in Argentina’s political drama.   On 
February 23, McClintock described Frondizi’s assertions of U.S. support for the Argentine military’s 
political aspirations as a “morbid fear.”   Frondizi’s vision of “sinister U.S. forces both in and out of our 
government exercising undue pressures,” McClintock continued,  “borders on fantasy, but it is, 
nevertheless, a political fact in the president’s brain.”  Department of State Telegram, State 1738, Ball 
to U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, March 23, 1962, Box 6, Folder “Argentina, 3/16/62-3/31/62,” NSF, CF, 
JFKL. 
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the same time I have given assurance to Frondizi … of my concern that Argentine 
constitutional safeguards be preserved,” McClintock cabled Washington on March 18.  
The Ambassador concluded, “I think this is a problem Frondizi will have to work out 
for himself.  I want him, however, to think I am on his side.”26
The Kennedy Administration concurred with McClintock’s recommendation to 
avoid U.S. involvement in Argentina’s volatile political situation.   “You were entirely 
right” the Department responded on March 19,  “… in refusing Frondizi request [that] 
you seek [to] exert influence on [Argentine] military in electoral situation created by 
Peronista victory [in] Buenos Aires Province.”
 
27  Although the Department surprised 
McClintock late on March 23 with a declaration that “It is our strong desire and policy 
that Frondizi not … be forced to resign by [the] military and nothing should be done 
that might in anyway encourage the military to take such action,” by March 26 
Washington had concluded that the “best present course for U.S. in Argentina is let 
events take their course.”28
Accordingly, in meetings with Argentine military leaders, McClintock 
encouraged the officers to find a constitutional solution to the crisis, but did not openly 
oppose their impending decision to depose Frondizi.  Moreover, when the armed 
forces finally removed Frondizi from office on March 29 and replaced him with 
conservative Argentine politician José María Guido, McClintock praised the military 
 
                                                 
26 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 1656, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, 
March 18, 1962, Box 6, Folder “Argentina, 3/16/62-3/31/62,” NSF, CF, JFKL.    
27 Department of State Telegram, State 1666, Ball to U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires (McClintock), March 
19, 1962, Box 6, Folder: Argentina, 3/16/62-3/31/62, NSF, CF, JFKL. 
28 Department of State Telegram, State 1738, Ball to U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, March 23, 1962, Box 
6, Folder “Argentina, 3/16/62-3/31/62,” NSF, CF, JFKL.  McClintock received the Department’s 
apparent reversal on March 23 around midnight.  The following morning he responded irritably: “I have 
been working constantly to keep Frondizi in; but Department’s first telegram on this subject, instructing 
me to keep aloof, would not have given impression conveyed belatedly [by State 1738].” Department of 
State Telegram, Buenos Aires 1769, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, March 24, 1962, 
Box 6, Folder “Argentina, 3/16/62-3/31/62,” NSF, CF, JFKL; Department of State Telegram, State 
1767, Ball to U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, March 26, 1962, Box 6, Folder “Argentina, 3/16/62-
3/31/62,” NSF, CF, JFKL.   
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for whitewashing the overthrow by having a new President sworn into office by the 
Argentine Supreme Court and he repeatedly encouraged the State Department to 
recognized the new administration.  The military, McClintock cabled the State 
Department on April 6, “sincerely believed that they have acted with exemplary 
restraint and that they have leaned over backwards to maintain a constitutional 
regime,” a theme he reiterated in subsequent cables.29
The Ambassador’s willingness to accept the military coup underscored the 
importance U.S. policymakers placed on strengthening U.S.-Argentine military ties.  
As McClintock pointed out in an April 13 cable urging Washington to recognize the 
Guido regime, the Argentine officers’ political platform was highly compatible with 
U.S. national security concerns.  The “Only points up to now on which [the] military 
will definitely intervene are [the] threats of [an] increase in Communist strength or a 
return of [the] Peronists to power,” the McClintock wrote.  “In this … their line of 
policy is identical to ours.”
   
30
 
  A few months later the Ambassador went a step further.  
The Argentine military, he argued, are   
friendly to the United States at the present time and find it difficult to 
understand why we should look down our noses at the military who are as 
fervently anti-Communist as we.  The Argentine military, in my judgment 
should be regarded as an asset by the United States (if rightly used) and not as 
a liability as some people in Washington seem to believe.31
 
 
                                                 
29 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 1977, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, 
April 6, 1962, Box 6A, Folder: Argentina, General 4/62, NSF, CF, JFKL. 
30 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 2063, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, 
April 13, 1962, Box 6A, Folder: Argentina, General 4/62, NSF, CF, JFKL. 
31 Letter From the Ambassador to Argentina (McClintock) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs (Martin) Buenos Aires, May 31, 1962, in FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XII, 387-388.    
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The Kennedy Administration concurred with McClintock’s assessment, 
resuming relations with the military-backed government in Argentina on April 19, 
1962.   The decision marked the beginning of the Administration’s shift away from the 
emphasis on regional democracy that Kennedy had loftily proclaimed in the Alliance 
for Progress little more than a year earlier, and precipitated the spiral of Latin 
American militarization—and U.S. sanction—that would characterize the region 
during the remainder of the decade.  Indeed, in early June the Administration reopened 
the aid spigot to Argentina, announcing a grant of $50 million in stand-by credits in 
conjunction with similar credits of $100 million from the International Monetary Fund 
to Argentina’s military-backed government.32  The decision, taken only days before 
the Presidential election in Peru, elicited a swift response from the politically-
ambitious Peruvian military.  On July 18, Peruvian President Manuel Prado was 
dragged out of bed by a U.S. trained Peruvian special forces officer and deposed after 
a Sherman tank—provided to Peru by the U.S. Military Assistance Program—
smashed through the gates of the Presidential residence.33
 
  Moreover, although the 
United States initially severed diplomatic relations and cancelled economic and 
military assistance, Kennedy’s decision to  restore relations with the Andean nation 
less than a month later following the military’s promise to hold free elections did little 
to dissuade similar plans elsewhere in the hemisphere.  As Robert McClintock cabled 
the State Department from Buenos Aires in August 1962:  
In view of our recent recognition of [the] Peruvian junta, none of [the] would-
be [Argentine] golpistas are at all concerned as to [the] U.S. attitude toward 
withholding recognition from a de facto regime here, it being regarded as 
                                                 
32 Tad Szulc, “U.S. Renewing Financial Aid to Argentina,” New York Times, June 7, 1962, pg. 18.   
33 Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance 
for Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 80-83. 
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inevitable that, to forestall an ultimate Castro-Communist take-over, [the] U.S. 
will eventually have to recognize and probably also to resume economic and 
financial support of whatever regime is in power in Argentina as long as it is 
anti-Communist.34
 
 
••• 
 
Although Frondizi’s overthrow struck a serious blow to the Alliance for 
Progress, the United States succeeded in drawing Argentina more closely into a U.S.-
led hemispheric anti-communist alliance.  In October 1962 the Argentine Navy took 
the lead among Latin American nations participating in the Cuban Missile crisis 
blockade, and the following month, the Argentine military requested U.S. training for 
an elite brigade.  Emphasizing the Argentine armed services’ previous “reluctance 
even to contemplate hemispheric cooperation,” the U.S. Embassy described the 
request as “a decisive turn in attitude.”  “In our opinion we have [a] unique 
opportunity not only to consolidate new lines of cooperation with [the] Argentine 
Army but to accomplish strategic and policy objectives” Ambassador McClintock 
enthused.35
                                                 
34 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 557, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, 
August 22, 1962, Box 7, Folder: Argentina, General 8/62, NSF, CF, JFKL. 
  By January 1963, the United States had made significant progress in 
reversing the pattern of Argentine military resistance to U.S. hemispheric hegemony, 
and had made unprecedented gains in luring the Argentine military away from 
European—predominately French—influence.  “U.S.-Argentine military relations are 
better now than they have been at any time during modern history,” the Department of 
State exulted in January.  “Argentine military leaders have indicated the belief that the 
35 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 1304, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, 
November 20, 1962, Box 7, Folder: Argentina, General 11/62-12/62, NSF, CF, JFKL. 
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national interests of the country are inextricably entwined with the efforts of the U.S. 
to combat communist imperialism.”36
As elsewhere in the hemisphere, the Kennedy Administration hoped that by 
facilitating the professionalization of Argentina’s armed services, the United States 
could assist in establishing an apolitical military dedicated to internal security.  
Accordingly, over the course of 1963, the United States worked assiduously to 
cultivate a close relationship with Argentine Army Commander in Chief Juan Carlos 
Onganía.  Of humble origin, Onganía cut a less than charismatic figure; a confidential 
U.S. biographical report described the General as “somewhat austere and cold,” who, 
out of uniform, “has the tweedy appearance of a British country squire.”
 
37  
Nonetheless, Onganía’s opposition to an abortive coup attempt in August 1962 
established his reputation as a staunch constitutionalist—a “legalist” in the patois of 
Buenos Aires military circles.  As a Department of State memorandum made clear, 
“An important objective of our proposed military program in Argentina … is to help 
General Onganía and the constitutionalist military with their aim of turning the 
Argentine armed forces away from politics toward a normal role for the military in a 
democratic society.”38
Onganía also impressed Washington with his perceived willingness to embrace 
the United States as the hemispheric leader—a welcome shift away from “the 
traditional neutral policy of Argentina in two World Wars and the vacillating and on 
occasion neutralist policy of the Frondizi regime.”
   
39
                                                 
36 Department of State Background Paper, Argentine Visit of Foreign Minister Muñiz, January 21-24, 
1963, Subject: “U.S. Military Relations with Argentina,” January 18, 1963, Box 7, Folder: U.S. Policy 
Statements and Objectives, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Office of East Coast Affairs, Records 
Relating to Argentina, 1956-1964, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
  Granted, practical considerations 
37 Department of Defense Bibliographic Data, May 1965, Box 6, Folder: 5: Argentina Volume II, 
Memos, 9/64-2/67, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL.  
38 Department of State Memorandum, Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy, August 3, 1963, Subject: 
“Military Assistance Program for Argentina,” Box 3712, Folder: Def Defense Affairs ARG 2/1/63, 
Central Foreign Policy Files, 1963, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
39 Ibid. 
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played no small role in the Argentine General’s support for equipment modernization 
according to U.S. standards; in 1963 the Argentine Army arsenal offered a geography 
lesson in the major arms producers of Western Europe: rifles and carbines from 
Germany, Dutch machine-guns, Belgian automatic rifles and sub-machine guns, and 
mortars from France.40  By the same token, the Kennedy Administration’s emphasis 
on the hemispheric threat posed by the Cuban Revolution resonated with the fiercely 
anti-communist Onganía.  Aiming to strengthen control over Argentina’s armed forces 
by establishing more vertical lines of command while simultaneously expanding the 
military’s purview into the social and economic realms, the Argentine General looked 
to U.S. military assistance as a necessary step en route to the establishment of a 
uniquely Argentine doctrine of national security.41
Accordingly, Washington plied Onganía with offers of an expanded training 
program and the benefits of signing a formal U.S. military assistance agreement.  In an 
effort to impresss the Argentine General with U.S. military technology, in May 1963 
Onganía was invited on an official visit to the United States for an inspection of Army 
installations.  At the end of the tour, U.S. officials decorated Onganía with the Legion 
of Merit Award, citing his support for “civil government, constituted by free elections 
in accordance with the constitutions of the country.”  Surprised by the unexpected 
decoration, Onganía, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff happily reported, was “touched 
with deep emotion.”
   
42
                                                 
40 Enrique Martínez Codó, “The Military Problems in Latin America,” Military Review, Vol XLIV, No. 
8, (August 1964), 13. 
  Underscoring the importance Washington attached to 
expanding military ties with Argentina, despite a near complete cut-off of U.S. 
41 See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernization and Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons, and the 
Argentine Case," in Armies and Politics in Latin America, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel 
Fitch (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1986), 103. 
42 Department of Defense Telegram, No. 11192, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Wheeler to U.S. Embassy 
Buenos Aires (McClintock), March 11, 1963, Box 7, Folder: Argentina, General 2/63-3/63, NSF, CF, 
JFKL. 
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economic aid in response to President Arturo Illia’s refusal to compensate U.S. oil 
companies (whose contracts Illia had revoked in late 1963), military negotiations 
between the two nations continued uninterrupted through mid-decade.43
Critics of Washington’s military policy were quick to question the depth of 
Onganía’s respect for constitutional democracy, and worried that U.S. support would 
encourage praetorian tendencies.   “Washington does not see in him what it does not 
want to see—the leader of fascist and brutal militarism which split a democratic 
regime, and ousted a legally and freely elected president and installed uniformed 
autocracy.  But that is not important,” the Brazilian newspaper Diario de Noticias 
complained when the Kennedy Administration decorated Onganía with the Legion of 
Merit.  “General Onganía is a friend,” the editorial concluded, “which is to say that 
General Onganía proposes to mobilize all forces whenever the hour for the invasion of 
Cuba comes.”
 
44  Arturo Illia—who had won the 1963 presidential election with only 
one-quarter of the electorate thanks to the military’s ban on Peronism—expressed 
similar concerns.45  In an October 1963 meeting with Assistance Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs Edwin M. Martin, the Argentine President asserted that the 
U.S. military had “perhaps oversold their Latin American counterparts on [the] one 
and only danger of communism,” with the result that the “Latin American military 
seemed prone to exculpate their subsequent action[s] on [the] ground [that] they were 
working against communism.”  When Martin inquired whether this was the case in 
Argentina, Illia—no doubt highly cognizant of his own political dependence on the 
military—demurred.46
                                                 
43 Henry Raymont, “U.S. Arms Aid Due for Argentines,” New York Times, August 28, 1965, pg. 5. 
 
44 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 1674, U.S. Embassy (Mein) to Secretary of State, 
March 8, 1963, Box 7, Folder: Argentina, General 2/63-3/63, NSF, CF, JFKL. 
45 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 34. 
46 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 654, U.S. Embassy (McClintock) to Secretary of State, 
October 14, 1963, Box 7A, Folder: Argentina General 8/63-9/63, NSF, CF, JFKL. 
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In the short-run, U.S. policymakers could confidently dismiss such criticism as 
groundless.   Given that Argentina was the last Latin American nation to agree to a 
Military Assistance Agreement, for U.S. policymakers the quiet signing ceremony on 
May 10, 1964 marked a defining step on the road to integrating Argentina into a U.S.-
led hemispheric anti-communist alliance.47  As elsewhere in the region, Washington 
anticipated that U.S. military assistance and training would cultivate a new generation 
of Argentine officers whose professionalism—a product of U.S. tutelage—would 
allow them to “find the new game more engrossing than the old one of ‘throw out the 
president,’” in the words of a mid-1960s study of U.S. military policy toward Latin 
America, while also providing the tools to “successfully distinguish the revolutionary 
guerrilla (badly infected with alien ideology) from the protestor against injustice and 
oppression (a goodly agrarian reformer).”48
Early returns on the United States military investment in Argentina appeared 
highly promising.  Under Onganía’s leadership, professionalization of the Argentine 
armed forces continued apace, and as military relations between the U.S. and 
Argentina deepened, French counter-revolutionary doctrine was increasingly 
supplanted by U.S. military counterinsurgency manuals.   The United States “has 
maintained its post-World War II position as the predominant foreign military 
influence in Argentina,” a State Department report claimed in April 1966.  The report 
continued: 
   
 
The Argentine armed forces have not turned away from us and toward third 
countries for their doctrine, equipment and training.  On the contrary, they 
                                                 
47 Liliana De Riz, La Política en Suspenso: 1966-1976 (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2000), 33-34. 
Department of State Telegram, USCINCSO to RUEKDA, July 30, 1964, Box 6, Folder: 1: Argentina 
Volume I, Cables, 11/63-8/64, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL. 
48 Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency 
and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), viii. 
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have concentrated on modernization and professionalization under U.S. 
guidance and have participated to a limited extent in combined multi-national 
exercises under U.S. auspices.   
 
Although admitting that the Argentine military continued to refuse to make internal 
security their primary mission and citing limited counterinsurgency coordination 
between Argentine police and military forces, the Department could nonetheless claim 
significant success in its policy toward the fiercely independent South American 
nation.  “In brief, while the record is not earthshaking,” the report concluded, “it is on 
the whole gratifying, especially when one compares it to situations elsewhere in the 
hemisphere and keeps in mind what it is reasonable to expect from Argentina.”49
 
   
Two months later, on June 28, 1966, a bloodless military coup d’état swept 
President Illia from power and installed General Onganía as head of the successor 
government.  The new President proceeded to dismiss the Argentine Congress, the 
Supreme Court, and all provincial governments, including all appointed or elected 
officials.50  Dispensing with the mechanisms of democracy, Onganía issued the 
“Statute of the Revolution,” a decree superseding the constitution and providing the 
Executive branch the power to rule by decree.  Moreover, in an unprecedented break 
with the Argentine military’s previous forays into the political realm, Onganía 
anticipated at least a decade of military rule.51
                                                 
49 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires A-826, U.S. Embassy (Martin) to Secretary of State, 
April 27, 1966, Subject: “Political-Economic Assessment,” Box 6, Folder: 1: Argentina Volume I, 
Cables, 11/63-8/64, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL.  
  “It is almost certain” the U.S. Embassy 
50 Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, Current Intelligence Weekly Special Report, 
November 4, 1966, Subject: “Outlook for the Onganía  Regime in Argentina,” Box 6, Folder: 5: 
Argentina Volume II, Memos, 9/64-2/67, NSF, CF, Latin America, LBJL. 
51 María José Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 13. 
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cabled Washington in the immediate aftermath of the coup, that the “Onganía 
government will not give assurances of free elections in near future.”52
Anti-communism held a central position in Onganía’s expansive notion of 
national security.  Under Presidential decree, activities interpreted as Communist 
resulted in severe penalties, and less than two months after assuming power, Onganía 
ordered a major intervention in the state-run university system to eradicate 
“communist penetration of classrooms and facilities.”  When students in Buenos Aires 
refused to vacate campuses, police quickly resorted to clubs and tear gas, resulting in 
nearly three dozen hospitalizations and more than 200 arrests.  In the aftermath of the 
“Night of the Long Batons,” as the intervention became known, the President of the 
University of Buenos Aires, eight deans, and 184 professors resigned, leading to a 
prolonged academic crisis that remained unresolved two months later.
 
53
Onganía also spearheaded an increasingly repressive government campaign of 
press censorship.  Initially focusing on radio and television, rising popular discontent 
with the Onganía regime led to heavy-handed government control over the content of 
Argentine magazines and provincial newspapers, primarily by threatening editors, 
publishers, or reporters with disrespect for authority (“desacato”), a criminal offense.  
By 1970, Onganía’s “strong bent to prudishness,” as the CIA put it, resulted in the 
extension of government censorship to books, plays, and films deemed indecent.
 
54
                                                 
52 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 35, U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, July 3, 1966, 
Box 1896, Folder: POL-Political Aff. And Rel, ARG-U.S., 1/1/64, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-
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Communist infiltration, however, remained the President’s primarily concern; “If a 
free press would make it possible for Communists to take over Argentina,” Onganía 
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told a representative of the Inter-American Press Association, “then I would be proud 
to say that there is no free press in Argentina.”55
U.S. policymakers publicly lamented the setback to Argentine democracy 
precipitated by the 1966 military coup, and immediately suspended diplomatic 
recognition of the military regime.  Yet if the coup shattered the illusion that U.S. 
military assistance and training could inculcate respect among Argentine military 
leaders for constitutional democracy, it nevertheless illuminated the extent to which 
the U.S. emphasis on internal security had influenced the Argentine armed forces.   By 
redefining the military’s mission to encompass virtually all aspects of Argentine life, 
and elevating anti-communism to the center of his Administration’s agenda, Onganía’s 
doctrine of national security bore the unmistakable influence of the U.S. military’s 
imperial auspices.    
 
Indeed, the deterioration of Onganía’s constitutionalism corresponded with the 
rise in U.S.-Argentine military cooperation.  At the fifth annual Conference of 
American Armies at West Point, New York, in August 1964, Onganía emphasized that 
the armed services “cannot passively nor blindly follow established authority.”56
                                                 
55 “Press in Argentina Leads a Risky Life,” New York Times, May 31, 1970, pg. 121.  On Onganía, see 
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  A 
few months later, the influence of U.S. counterinsurgency policy was unmistakable in 
Onganía’s declaration of a doctrine of “ideological borders,” extending the military’s 
traditional role of defending against external attack to include defense against “exotic 
ideologies.”  Likewise, the Argentine General’s decision to unveil the policy during a 
formal visit to Brazil shortly after the military’s overthrow of President President João 
Goulart served as an unmistakable display of support for the U.S.-backed 
56 Speech reprinted in Geopolitica, No. 25, Vol. VII, 61-66.  See also Robert Potash, The Army & 
Politics in Argentina, 1962-1973: From Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration (Stanford: Stanford 
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authoritarian-bureaucratic regime.57  Indeed, Brazil’s subsequent decision to make a 
token troop contribution to the U.S.-led OAS military intervention in the Dominican 
Republic in April 1965 to prevent alleged communist subversion decisively 
contributed to Onganía’s disillusionment with Arturo Illia, whose refusal to participate 
in the operation catalyzed the Argentine General’s decision to resign as Commander 
of the Army in November 1965.58
Handed the helm of state eight months later, Onganía grandly proclaimed the 
beginning of an “Argentine Revolution” in which he promised to carry out dramatic 
economic, political, and social development, while eradicating communist efforts at 
subversion.  Underscoring the significance of U.S. Cold War policy for Onganía, in 
the immediate aftermath of the coup the Argentine leader was reportedly perplexed by 
the U.S. decision to suspend diplomatic relations.  “We thought the Pentagon favored 
a grand anti-Communist alliance between the military governments of Brazil and 
Argentina,” a government house aid blithely told reporters.
   
59
Onganía need not have worried.  The coup plotters had informed the U.S. of 
their intentions well in advance, and although Edwin Martin—appointed U.S. 
Ambassador to Argentina in early 1964—had consistently advocated respect for 
constitutional democracy in his meetings with Argentine military and political leaders, 
the Johnson Administration had no intention of denying recognition to the staunchly 
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anti-communist Argentine military regime.60  As the CIA later put it, despite 
Onganía’s refusal to provide a timetable for future elections, his “anti-communist 
leanings, will continue to be a force for close cooperation with the U.S.”61  
Accordingly, after suspending diplomatic recognition for a mere 17 days, Lyndon 
Johnson recognized the Onganía regime on July 15, 1966, and quietly resumed 
economic assistance to the South American nation the following month.62
The United States was not responsible for the 1966 Argentine coup; domestic 
considerations—spiraling inflation, increasing labor unrest, and the threat of a Peronist 
victory in the scheduled 1967 elections—were the primary catalysts of the military 
overthrow.  Nor did the United States simply implant anti-communism onto the 
complex Argentine political landscape.  Military involvement in modern Argentine 
politics dated to the early 1930s, as did police surveillance, control and repression of 
perceived communists, anarchists, and “foreign” subversives.  Moreover, the Western 
European influence on Argentina’s military evolution should not be overlooked; in 
addition to a legacy of German and Italian political and military influence in the first-
half of the twentieth century, beginning in the late 1950s, the French played an 
important role in the development of the Argentine military’s counter-revolution 
strategy.
   
63
Nonetheless, United States military assistance and training over the course of 
the 1960s significantly enhanced the Argentine military’s repressive capacity against 
perceived subversives and facilitated the development of a distinctly Argentine 
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doctrine of national security.  In a 1967 Argentine Intelligence School guide on 
counter-subversion, for example, U.S. military manuals and course materials 
constituted nearly one-third of the sources cited.64  Likewise, by the end of the 1960s, 
dozens of federal police officers and nearly 4,000 military officers had been trained at 
U.S. facilities in the Canal Zone or in the continental United States, and, between 1963 
and 1967, the United States supplied Argentina with $60 million worth of arms and 
equipment through grant and sales agreements.65
 
  As General Ramón Camps, who 
would emerge as a principal architect of dirty war tactics following the military’s 
return to power in 1976, made clear, 
In Argentina we were influenced first by the French and then by the United 
States. We used their methods separately at first and then together, until the 
United States’ ideas finally predominated. France and the United States were 
our main sources of counterinsurgency training. They organized centres for 
teaching counterinsurgency techniques (especially in the U.S.) and sent out 
instructors, observers, and an enormous amount of literature.66
 
 
Argentina’s integration into the U.S. Cold War alliance system also decisively 
contributed to the formulation of the distinctly Argentine doctrine of national security, 
emerging at the onset of the Onganiato and evolving over the following decade into a 
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radically militaristic dogma with messianic overtones.67  As elsewhere in South 
America, the United States’ emphasis on internal security sharpened Argentine 
military officers’ belief in their own capacity to resolve Argentina’s complex political, 
economic, and social issues, while also providing justification for the bureaucratic-
authoritarian designs of golpista military officers and their conservative political 
allies.  U.S. efforts to professionalize the Argentine military, in other words, not only 
failed to steer the armed forces away from a deep engagement in national politics, but 
facilitated, as Guillermo O’Donnell asserted in a pioneering analysis, “a much more 
comprehensive military intervention directed toward the establishment of much more 
complete domination.”68
As the United States became increasingly embroiled in the Vietnam War, U.S. 
policy toward Argentina—and Latin America as a whole—shifted increasingly away 
from even rhetorically supporting democracy, and instead championed stability and 
anti-communism.
   
69 As the Johnson Administration entered its final year, the U.S. 
Embassy in Buenos Aires discarded outright making the “return to Constitutional 
government in the immediate future” an objective of U.S. policy toward Argentina.  
“The GOA is making a serious attempt to correct some important distortions in the 
economic and social field,” the Embassy asserted, “and it should be given a chance to 
succeed.”70
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U.S. support for stable, anticommunist client regimes deepened under Richard 
Nixon, whose deep disinterest in the region led to an overriding effort to maintain the 
political status quo.  “Long as we’ve been in it, people don’t give one damn about 
Latin America,” Nixon once told a staff member.71  Henry Kissinger, who dominated 
United States foreign policy in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, took an even 
more trivializing view of Latin America.  A staunch believer in realpolitik, Kissinger’s 
tenure in the Nixon White House was defined by an emphasis on big power relations, 
particularly the effort to triangulate between the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
China.  The Developing World, in Kissinger’s view, warranted sustained U.S. 
attention only when it impinged on the Cold War; with U.S. power in the international 
arena increasingly constrained in the face of an intractable war in Vietnam, growing 
balance of trade deficits, and the rising assertiveness of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Nixon Administration relied heavily on 
pro-U.S., right-wing dictators to maintain regional stability.72   Accordingly, with the 
significant exception of extensive covert efforts to destabilize the democratically-
elected government of Chilean leftist Salvador Allende, Kissinger demonstrated an 
almost total disinterest in hemispheric affairs.73
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Kissinger told a startled Chilean Foreign Minister in 1969.  “History has never been 
produced in the South,” he continued.  “The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to 
Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo.  What happens in the 
South is of no importance.”74
With its foreign policy priorities elsewhere, the Nixon Administration 
consistently worked to maintain strong relations with Latin American militaries.  
“U.S.-style democracy won’t work here,” Nixon maintained during an 11-day tour of 
South American in mid-1967.  “I wish it would.”
   
75  After conferring with Onganía, 
Nixon described the Argentine President to reporters as, “one of the best leaders I have 
known.”  Onganía, Nixon concluded, was “the right man for Argentina at this moment 
in its destiny.”76   When Nelson A. Rockefeller presented the President with a detailed 
report on Latin America, Nixon predictably ignored the recommendation for 
“reorganization of the United States government’s foreign policy structure, 
fundamental changes of U.S. trade and lending policies, renegotiation of foreign debts, 
and a more realistic division of labor in the hemisphere.”77
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onto Rockefeller’s low-key affirmation of the Mann Doctrine, which emphasized the 
need to avoid U.S. military interventions in the hemisphere and offered praise for the 
“new type of military man” that had emerged in Latin America, “prepared to adapt his 
authoritarian tradition to the goals of social and economic progress.”78
Accordingly, in 1970, the National Security Council explicitly directed U.S. 
Embassies to deepen ties with regional armed forces; in practical terms for the U.S. 
Country Team in Argentina, with the military occupying the Casa Rosada, the 
directive implied a strengthening of relations with the government.  “In the case of 
Argentina,” the Embassy responded, “we are fortunate that at this critical juncture in 
Latin American affairs there is a government in Argentina increasingly disposed to 
perceive a mutuality of interests and to cooperate with us in hemisphere affairs.”
   
79  
The following year, although a decrease in MAP funding due to congressional 
opposition had prompted the Argentine military to resume buying arms from Europe, 
the U.S. Embassy described relations with Argentina’s military government as “quite 
good,” and in May 1973, the U.S. Ambassador characterized U.S.-Argentine military 
cooperation as “reasonably unrestrained.”80
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  Indeed, although the Argentine military’s 
reluctant decision in 1973 to retreat from the political stage in favor of a return to 
constitutional democracy clearly demonstrated the near-total failure of Onganía’s 
“Argentine Revolution,” Washington nonetheless continued to look to the military as a 
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significant political ally.  Emphasizing the importance of increased military sales to 
Argentina in order to draw the South American nation more fully into the U.S. orbit, 
for example, the U.S. Embassy maintained in mid-May 1973 that “the military are 
then far more likely to act as a brake on any inclinations the new GOA [Government 
of Argentina] may have to align itself with governments hostile to us.”81
In fact, Washington’s emphasis on stability in the final years of the 1960s 
translated into the continuous maintenance of close U.S.-Argentine military ties 
despite the Onganía Administration’s exacerbation of Argentina’s political, economic, 
and social problems.  As early as 1966, many Argentines were bitterly complaining 
that the Onganía government “no anda” (is not getting anywhere), and only two 
months after Nixon’s 1968 visit to Argentina, a public opinion poll indicated that the 
majority of Argentines felt Onganía had accomplished “nothing good.”
   
82   Similarly, 
as early as December 1967 the CIA predicted that Onganía would not be able “to keep 
Argentine political problems on the shelf.”83
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  The Agency’s skepticism proved 
prescient; the military government was incapable of creating sustainable economic 
growth by reducing Argentina’s economic dependence on agricultural exports, and 
failed to either co-opt or destroy the continued affiliation of the bulk of Argentina’s 
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of political reform, the Onganía dictatorship accelerated the rise of violent 
revolutionary movements, including distinctly Peronist groups as well as left-wing 
organizations inspired by Castro’s Cuba.  Correspondingly, in mid-1969 popular 
disillusionment with stagnating wages and a rising cost of living boiled over in a wave 
of violent protests in a half a dozen Argentine cities.  Not only did the protests lead to 
Onganía’s overthrow by a military coup d’état the following year, but set in motion a 
clumsy transition to democracy that culminated in the triumphant return of Juan Perón 
to the presidency after eighteen years in exile.84
 
   
By the time Robert C. Hill was appointed as U.S. Ambassador in November 
1973, Argentina was a nation adrift in chaos.  A staunch Republican, Hill spent the 
Kennedy-Johnson years tending to his extensive investments and serving out a brief 
tenure in the New Hampshire Legislature.  Throughout the decade, he remained an 
inveterate Cold Warrior; as chairman of the Republican Coordinating Committee’s 
task force on foreign policy, in 1966 Hill accused the Johnson Administration of 
diplomatic ineptitude, and advocated a more strident effort to battle communism.85
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And as rumors of a high-profile diplomatic appointment for Hill circulated in the 
aftermath of Nixon’s victory in the November 1968 election, veteran Washington Post 
correspondent John M. Goshko reported Latin American progressives criticizing Hill 
for being an “ultra-conservative” with “one overriding interest—advocacy of a tough 
anti-communist and anti-Castro policy.” Hill’s appointment, Goshko concluded, 
“would be regarded all over Latin America as a negation of Nixon’s own statement 
that the United States should offer ‘a handshake to the dictators and an abrazo to the 
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democrats.’”86
The assignment, the 56-year-old Hill declared, was “the climax of my 
career.”
  Nonetheless, underscoring the pro-business, anticommunist fervor that 
characterized his Administration’s Latin America policy, Nixon pressed Hill into 
diplomatic service.  After a brief stint as an Assistant Secretary in the Department of 
Defense and nearly two years as U.S. Ambassador to Spain, the Vermont native was 
appointed Envoy to Argentina in November 1973.   
87  Hill’s enthusiasm was tempered, however, when a human body was thrown 
into the road by left-wing terrorists directly in front of the Ambassador’s car less than 
a week after his arrival.88  The grisly incident, along with biting attacks in left-wing 
Buenos Aires newspapers that greeted Hill’s arrival, made brutally clear the 
extraordinary challenges the new Ambassador would face.89  On one end of the 
spectrum, Hill’s arrival corresponded with the zenith of revolutionary terrorism, “a 
wild assortment,” in the Ambassador’s words, “… of Maoists, Marxists, [and] 
Leninists, that would like to overthrow this government.” 90   Led by the People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ERP), the military arm of the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary 
Workers Party, and the Montoneros, an offshoot of the Peronist Youth Movement, by 
1973 left-wing revolutionary groups were engaged in a concerted and sophisticated 
campaign to destabilize the Argentine government.  Estimates of the guerrillas’ 
strength ranged from a few hundred to as many as 35,000 soldiers, while their 
finances—procured primarily through the kidnapping and ransom of multinational 
corporate executives—stood at over $100 million.91
                                                 
86 John M. Goshko, “Latins Anxious About Nixon,” Washington Post, December 8, 1968, pg. A29. 
   
87 “Ambassador Hill Arrives,” undated, Box 1, Folder 30, Hill Papers.   
88 Public Broadcasting Service, Firing Line, hosted by William F. Buckley, Jr, with Guests Robert C. 
Hill and Eduardo Roca, taped in Buenos Aires, Argentina on January 31, 1977, Subject: “Should the 
U.S. Pressure Argentina?” transcript, Box 3, Folder 34, Hill Papers.   
89 See “An Uphill Task for Mr. Hill?” Buenos Aires Herald, Editorial, February 9, 1974, page unknown, 
Box 1, Folder 30, Hill Papers.  
90 Public Broadcasting Service, Firing Line, January 31, 1977.  
91 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: the "Dirty War" in Argentina, 46-47.  
   
76 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, state-sanctioned violence in response to the 
guerrilla threat deepened the fissures in Argentine society.  Thoroughly disgraced by 
its inability to resolve Argentine’s pressing problems, the military had retreated from 
political power in 1973 and ended the electoral proscription on Peronism.  In the 
subsequent national elections, Peronist candidate Héctor Cámpora won 52 percent of 
the vote, then resigned after holding office less than two months to facilitate Juan 
Perón’s return to the presidency on October 12, 1973.  Having attained an almost 
myth-like status after deftly directing the Peronist movement from exile in Spain for 
nearly two decades, in the early 1970s Perón had played a key role in encouraging 
popular resistance against the Argentine military, describing the Montoneros in 
particular as “that marvelous youth that struggles against military dictatorship with 
weapons in their hands and who know how to give their lives for the fatherland.”  
Once Perón was firmly ensconced in the Casa Rosada, however, he pursued a 
decidedly conservative agenda, and his support for radical youth groups quickly 
turned to harsh repudiation.  Culminating in Perón’s public dismissal of the 
Montoneros in May 1974 as “beardless wonders” and “pernicious elements,” by 
summer many young Peronists had resolved to resume clandestine armed struggle 
against the government.92
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  With political violence increasing and no end in sight to 
Argentina’s economic crisis, Perón’s death in July 1974 boded poorly for Argentina’s 
future; not only was Perón’s running-mate (and wife), Isabel Martinez de Perón 
politically inexperienced, but her dependence on advisors—particularly Social 
Welfare Minister José López Rega, an occultist referred to as “the Wizard”—was 
widely known.   
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Officially, Isabel Perón’s declaration of a state of siege following the murder 
of Federal Police Chief Alberto Villar in early November 1974 resulted in the 
incarceration of thousands of suspected subversives, held indefinitely and without 
charges “at the disposition of the executive power.”  Unofficially, reports quickly 
surfaced of widespread application of the “ley de fuga”—the killing of suspected left-
wing terrorists by law enforcement officers who invariably claimed that the victims 
had resisted arrest.93  Moreover, in late 1974, right-wing extremist organizations such 
as the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (known as the Triple A, or AAA) began 
retaliating against perceived left-wing subversives.  Linked to López Rega, complicity 
in Triple A violence reached the highest levels of the Argentine government.  As the 
U.S. Embassy cabled Washington in early April 1975, President Perón “is now either 
the direct accomplice of the AAA murders or at least their accessory after the fact.”94
The bloodletting pushed Argentina to what the U.S. State Department 
described as “near civil-war dimensions.”
   
95  In the first 351 days of Isabel Perón’s  
presidency, 503 political deaths were recorded.  By early 1975, it was clear that far 
more violence was perpetrated by the Triple A than by their counterparts on the far 
left; of twenty-five political murders recorded throughout Argentina in the forty-eight 
hour period of March 20 and 21, for example, two-thirds were victims of right-wing 
terrorism.  “The bodies of young leftists turn up daily” Ambassador Hill cabled 
Washington in late March, “and are at least twice as frequent as the victims of left-ist 
terrorists.”96
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Not surprisingly, Argentina’s political woes spilled over into the economic 
arena.  The beleaguered nation’s inflation rate—estimated to be as high as 700 
percent—was considered to be the worst in the world, and in 1975 alone productivity 
declined by one-half.97  Moreover, Argentine efforts to attract new capital, as the U.S. 
State Department bluntly asserted, “will be to little avail if the government cannot 
guarantee the security of lives and property.”98 Indeed, threatened by left-wing 
terrorist kidnappings, many business executives were operating under siege-like 
conditions.  “Those firms that did not close up shop and leave Argentina” one 
journalist wrote, “surrounded their officials with squads of bodyguards armed with 
grenades and even flame throwers.99
Similar conditions existed at the U.S. Embassy, a fortified compound 
consuming roughly one million dollars per year, with the bulk earmarked for 
security.
   
100  In April 1975, the State Department warned that the ERP was initiating a 
terror campaign against U.S. government personnel as part of a broad effort to 
eliminate the U.S. presence in Argentina.101  It was not a threat to be taken lightly; in 
1973 left-wing terrorists attacked a U.S. Embassy residence with rockets, and in 
February 1975 U.S. Consular Agent John Patrick Egan was kidnapped and brutally 
murdered by left-wing terrorists in Córdoba.102
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For Ambassador Robert C. Hill the experience was especially difficult.  With 
its historic neighborhoods and distinctively European ambiance, Buenos Aires boasted 
more than 300 theaters and cinemas, and only Paris was said to have more art 
exhibitions.103
 
  Widely-recognized among porteños, Hill, however, was rarely able to 
even enjoy a quiet dinner out.  Indeed, on one occasion Hill and his wife, “tired of 
being cooped up in the Embassy residence,” dismissed the objections of the security 
chief and decided to eat at a popular local restaurant.  But, as the Buenos Aires Herald 
reported, 
when they sat down, the other diners began to get up.  And as they were 
recognized, people began leaving the restaurant, until it was almost empty.  
Realizing that the restaurant was emptying because out of the fear that the 
ambassador’s presence might provoke a terrorist attack, Mr. and Mrs. Hill are 
said to have gone up to the restaurant proprietor and said, “Don’t worry, we’ll 
go.”   
 
The Ambassador and his wife, the Herald sympathetically concluded, resigned 
themselves to yet another quiet repast at their residence.104
Significantly, Hill looked to the Argentine military as the best option for 
restoring political stability in Argentina.  The U.S. Ambassador was not oblivious to 
the potential human rights violations that might occur in the event of a military coup in 
Argentina.  In the chaotic months leading up to the military takeover on March 24, 
1976, however, Hill turned a blind eye to troubling evidence of impending state-
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sanctioned violence on the part of the Argentine military.  On February 13, for 
example, Diego Medus, Chief of the North American Desk at the Argentine Foreign 
Ministry informed his counterparts at the U.S. Embassy that the Argentine Military 
Planning Group had requested that he prepare a study on how the future military 
government could avoid human rights problems with the United States.  When Medus 
responded by saying “they will have trouble if they start executing people,” the 
officers openly admitted their intention to engage in illegal violence, telling Medus 
“they intend to carry forward an all-out war on the terrorists and that some executions 
would therefore probably be necessary.”  In his recapitulation of the incident in a 
subsequent cable to Washington, however, Hill nonetheless praised the Argentine 
military’s apparent awareness of the significance of human rights in U.S. foreign 
policy.  “It is encouraging to note that the Argentine military are aware of the 
problem” the Ambassador commented at the bottom of the page, “and are already 
focusing on ways to avoid letting human rights issues become an irritant in U.S.-
Argentine relations.”105
Hill’s support for the Argentine military’s political aspirations went beyond a 
simple faith in the generals’ ability to bring about political and economic stability, and 
tapped into the visceral anti-communism that had guided his approach to U.S.-Latin 
American affairs since the Truman-era.  Like much of the Washington foreign policy 
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establishment, Hill’s abiding fear of leftist insurgencies in the aftermath of the Cuban 
Revolution led to a conception of U.S. national security rooted in the close cultivation 
of U.S.-Latin American military ties.  Accordingly, by 1975, Hill considered the 
military the best hope for Argentina’s future.   “The Argentine military have changed,” 
Hill wrote in September.  “Either they are more democratically minded and dedicated 
to the Constitution than they were ten years ago, or they are more politically astute, or 
both.”106  Privately, Hill was more explicit.  “At last the military are cracking down,” 
he wrote an old friend in his native Vermont the following month.  “Hopefully then 
Argentina can move forward.”107
 
 
In fact, the Argentine military had changed in the ten years since the Onganía 
coup, though not in a moderate direction.  The final stage in the development of the 
Argentine military’s national security doctrine—evolving in tandem with the 
cataclysm of guerrilla violence and the return of Perón—culminated at mid-decade, 
with Argentine military hardliners openly asserting that Argentina stood on the front 
lines of the “Third World War” in which “Western civilization” was locked in a death 
struggle with global communism.  Combining U.S. internal security doctrine with 
lessons gained from the French anti-subversive campaign in Algeria—along with a 
potent dose of Argentine nationalism and radically conservative Catholicism—by the 
early 1970s, influential Argentine officers such as General Ramón Camps were 
extending the national security doctrine to facilitate the systematic use of kidnapping, 
torture, and disappearance of tens of thousands of perceived subversives.108
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years of evolution under the influence of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, a 
distinctly Argentine national security doctrine “came of age” in 1975, as Camps later 
maintained, allowing the Argentine military to achieve “victory against the armed 
subversion.”109
A systematic use of state-sanctioned terror lay at the heart of the doctrine.     In 
early 1974, Argentine security personnel initiated contact with military representatives 
from Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia in the effort to establish a covert 
transnational counter-subversive organization, and the following September the 
Argentine military assisted Chilean agents assassinate General Carlos Prats, exiled 
former Commander in Chief of Chile’s armed forces and a harsh critic of Augusto 
Pinochet.  By mid-1975, cooperation among the Southern Cone military regimes had 
evolved into Operation Condor, a formal apparatus geared toward facilitating 
intelligence exchange and cross-border operations in Latin America, Western Europe, 
and the United States.
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Union (East). God’s will required that the military preserve the “natural order” manifest in the Western 
and Christian civilization to which Argentina is integral, but the East had organized a massive 
international conspiracy to subvert that civilization by restructuring society in accordance with the 
seditious and atheistic doctrine of communism. Stress was placed on the imminent doom of “our way of 
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province of northwestern Argentina.  Presaging the tactics that would become standard 
operating procedure during the military dictatorship, Operation Independence 
introduced the widespread application of abduction, secret detention, torture, and 
clandestine murder of perceived subversives.111
With plans for the Argentine military’s return to political power solidifying, in 
late 1975 top ranking Argentine officers swore a secret oath of allegiance to the 
national security doctrine—including the use of disappearances—and made extra-legal 
repression the centerpiece of their design to radically transform Argentine society.  
The basic premise behind the “National Reorganization Process,” however, was 
openly proclaimed: “If the Argentine situation demands it,” Army Commander Jorge 
Videla declared in October 1975 at the eleventh annual Conference of American 
Armies in Montevideo, “all necessary persons must die to achieve the security of the 
country.”
   
112
 
   
Indeed, less than two months after the Argentine military coup on March 24, 
1976, Hill was beginning to have serious doubts regarding the validity of the military 
junta’s self-proclaimed “moderate line.”  Although the Ambassador, along with most 
Argentines, continued to view Videla as a moderate, Hill was disturbed by reports of 
the three armed service branches operating independently of each other and engaging 
in widespread arbitrary arrests.  According to Perónist party estimates, over 4,000 
individuals had been imprisoned since the coup, and many were being held 
incommunicado.  The result, Hill cabled Washington, “is [an] extremely confused and 
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arbitrary environment in which many are beginning to wonder if they have any 
protection under the law.”113
Indications of systematic human rights violations left the U.S. Ambassador 
deeply conflicted.  On the one hand, with anti-communist credentials dating to 
Truman Administration, Hill fully backed the Argentine military’s campaign to 
eradicate left-wing subversives.   On the other hand, the Ambassador felt a deep 
sympathy for innocent victims of the military’s counterinsurgency net.  Indeed, Hill’s 
forays into the Foreign Service had been defined by a rare willingness to engage 
ordinary Latin Americans—as Hill’s wife Cecilia once told a journalist, his hobbies 
were “people and foreign affairs.”
 
114  At the end of his tenure as Ambassador to Costa 
Rica in 1955, for example, Hill accepted then-Vice-President Richard Nixon’s 
suggestion that he and Cecilia—along with their 18-month-old baby—return to 
Washington by car along the recently-completed Pan-American Highway.115  “We had 
been advised to carry firearms but we decided instead to fly a small American flag on 
our front bumper,” Hill subsequently wrote in an op-ed piece in the New York Times.  
“This created considerable interest, and in the back country of Guatemala we received 
many a ‘Viva los Estados Unidos.’  When we stopped for gas the car would be 
surrounded by curious, friendly Indians who asked many questions about our trip.”116
Similarly, Hill’s tenure in Mexico reflected an abiding interest in local people 
unusual in the insular culture of the U.S. Foreign Service.  Hill made headlines, for 
example, by being the first U.S. Ambassador to visit each of Mexico’s 31 states.  The 
Ambassador also raised eyebrows among the diplomatic by community by extending 
 
                                                 
113 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 3142, U.S. Embassy (Hill) to Secretary of State 
(Kissinger), May 11, 1975, Subject: “Junta’s Moderate Line in Doubt,” ADP. 
114 Dorothy McCardle, “‘So Thrilled Over Going to Spain,’” Washington Post, April 20, 1969, pg. 131. 
115 Robert C. Hill, Interview with John T. Mason, Jr., Oral History Research Office, Columbia 
University, October 19, 1972, Box 7, Folder 16, Hill Papers.   
116 Robert C. Hill, “Driving Up From Salvador,” New York Times, April 17, 1955, pg. 21. 
   
85 
 
invitations to an “open house” to all Embassy personnel—including Mexican 
citizens—resulting in an unusual mix of more than 500 attendees ranging “from top 
diplomats to charwomen,” as one journalist put it.117  On another occasion, when a 
Mexican campesino family arrived at the U.S. Embassy with a gift of a hand-woven 
serape for the Ambassador, Hill personally greeted the visitors, unwrapped the 
package, and subsequently invited them to a formal lunch with his own family.118
More than a decade later, from his vantage point at the U.S. Embassy in 
Buenos Aries, Hill was deeply disturbed by the growing number of reports of state-
sanctioned kidnappings, the widespread use of torture, and clandestine murder.   
Although the Embassy had little idea of the thousands of victims being swept up in the 
Argentine military’s counterinsurgency campaign, a growing body of evidence 
indicated a concerted campaign of political repression.  “They questioned me, but it 
was more just give it to her,” Gwenda Mae Loken informed the U.S. Embassy after 
her release from a clandestine detention center.  A U.S. citizen, Loken was abducted in 
April 1976 by Argentine security forces for distributing anti-government pamphlets 
and subjected to electro-shock torture.  “They said they’d fix me so I couldn’t have 
children,” she later testified.
   
119
 
  Similarly, Patricia Erb, the 19-year-old daughter of 
U.S. missionaries in Argentina, informed the U.S. Embassy of extensive torture and 
extreme privation at the hands of Argentine military personnel.   
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I was conducted as were many others, to rooms which we called “the torture 
house”.  There, men dressed in civilian clothing, would begin interrogations, 
using torture … That torture took various forms: beating with clubs, fists, 
kicking, immersing in water or in fecal substances to almost the drowning 
point and applying “La Picana” (electric machine) … to the most sensitive 
parts of the body, like [the] mouth, eyes, nose, ears, vagina, breast, penis, feet, 
and hands. … After these interrogations we were conducted again to the 
“barn”[.  …] By night our sleep was accompanied by rats that run over and 
around our bodies.  We were also at the mercy of being raped by the sub-
officials.120
 
 
Confronted with a growing body of evidence indicating state security forces’ 
systematic use of kidnappings, torture, and disappearances, in the months following 
the 1976 coup, Hill made a remarkable transition from staunch junta supporter to an 
adamant critic of the military junta’s dirty war tactics.  Throughout the second-half of 
1976 and early 1977, the Ambassador led Embassy efforts to protest through private 
diplomatic channels the Argentine military’s incorporation of right-wing death squads 
and widespread utilization of illegal repressive measures.   Not surprisingly, the 
Embassy’s efforts were most effective in the handful of cases in which American 
citizens were illegally detained by military or paramilitary forces.  Between September 
1, 1976 and January 6, 1977, Embassy officials made thirty-five human rights 
representations to the Argentine government, 31 of which dealt with American 
citizens caught in the military’s scattershot assault on perceived anti-subversives.121
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After learning of the September 14 abduction of Patricia Erb, for example, 
Ambassador Hill immediately raised the case with the Argentine police and military 
on September 15, directed U.S. Embassy personnel to attempt to ascertain Erb’s 
whereabouts by utilizing Argentine contacts, and made a formal appeal to the 
Argentine government.122  Underscoring his growing involvement in human rights 
advocacy, Hill personally discussed the cases of Gwenda Mae Loken and Patricia Erb 
directly with President Jorge Videla on September 21.123
Through immediate and sustained communication with a wide range of 
contacts in the Argentine government, the U.S. Embassy could reasonably hope to 
procure the release of American nationals; one former kidnap victim of a self-
described “combined police and military command” recalled her captors complaining 
that the American Embassy was “driving us crazy trying to find out where she was 
being held.”  For Hill, the incident no doubt evoked a certain degree of grim 
satisfaction; having endured two days of interrogation, threats, and physical abuse, the 
woman “stated that her life was saved only by quick intervention of [the] Embassy and 
her relatives.”
   
124
Hill also spearheaded broader efforts to pressure the Argentine junta to curtail 
human rights violations.  On May 28, 1976, the Ambassador personally delivered a 
warning to Foreign Minister Cesar Guzzetti that U.S.-Argentine relations would be 
seriously impaired without improvements in human rights.  Although he judged the 
meeting to be largely ineffectual, Hill was undeterred.  “Though Guzzetti indicated his 
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understanding of the problem, I did not have the impression that he really got the 
point,” the Ambassador cabled Washington.  “We will keep working on him and 
others in [the] GOA [government of Argentina].”125
Ambassador Hill’s attempt to pressure the Argentine junta to curtail human 
rights violations were stymied, however, by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s 
realpolitik approach to U.S.-Argentine relations.  Recognizing the significant role top-
level U.S. political pressure could play in curbing the Argentine dirty war, Hill made 
arrangements for a visit by the Secretary of State to Argentina on seven separate 
occasions.  Each time Kissinger cancelled.  Finally, at an Organization of American 
States meeting in Santiago, Chile, Kissinger met personally with Guzzetti.  According 
to Hill, the Argentines “were very worried that Kissinger would lecture them on 
human rights.”
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  To Guzzetti’s surprise, Kissinger did not broach the issue.  When 
the perplexed Argentines finally requested the Secretary of State’s opinion on human 
rights, Kissinger personally dismissed the issue as an obstacle in U.S.-Argentine 
relations.  “Look, our basic attitude is that we would like you to succeed,” Kissinger 
told the Foreign Minister. The Secretary of State continued: 
I have an old-fashioned view that friends ought to be supported.  What is not 
understood in the United States is that you have a civil war.  We read about 
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human rights problems but not the context.  The quicker you succeed the 
better.127
 
 
Accordingly, when Guzzetti asserted that the military government would “clean up the 
problem” by the end of the year, Kissinger gave his approval.128
Reflecting the significance of U.S. official sanction, after unexpectedly 
receiving Kissinger’s blessing Guzzetti returned to Buenos Aires in what Hill 
described as a “state of jubilation.”  To the Ambassador’s dismay, the foreign minister 
was “convinced that there is no real problem” with the United States government over 
the human rights issue.  Hill continued:  
 
 
Based on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the GOA, it must now believe 
that if it has any problems with the U.S. over human rights, they are confined 
to certain elements of Congress and what it regards as biased and/or 
uninformed minor segments of public opinion. While that conviction lasts it 
will be unrealistic and unbelievable for this embassy to press representations to 
the GOA over human rights violations.129
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 Undermined by his superiors in Washington, the effectiveness of Hill’s human 
rights advocacy was dramatically constrained.  Remarkably, Hill detailed his lonely 
efforts to protect human rights in Argentina to Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian on her first trip to Buenos Aires 
following Jimmy Carter’s electoral victory over Gerald Ford.   “Kissinger gave the 
Argentines the green light,” the Ambassador bluntly concluded.130   In a recent 
interview, Derian remembered sensing that Hill’s experience in Argentina had shaken 
his core political beliefs.  “After that happened I think he realized the whole weight 
and horror of what was going on,” she recalled, “and that we [in the United States] 
were complicit in it.”131
Kissinger’s support for the Argentine junta was hardly revolutionary; rather, 
the Secretary of State’s refusal to condemn widespread state-sanctioned human rights 
abuses was merely a continuation of a historical process rooted in the early years of 
the Cold War: U.S. support for anti-communist Latin American military 
establishments.
 
132
Months after finishing his ambassadorship, Kissinger’s callous dismissal of 
state-sanctioned violence in Argentina continued to grate against Robert C. Hill.  
When he read in the Buenos Aires Herald in July 1978 that the then-former Secretary 
of State had blandly informed an Argentine journalist, “I’m supposed to be an expert 
  Hill’s frustration, however, clearly revealed the fundamental flaw 
in Kissinger’s “quiet diplomacy”: with little or no accountability, the Secretary of 
State could publicly pay lip service to the importance of human rights while secretly 
offering U.S. support for the Argentine military junta’s anti-subversive terror 
campaign.   
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in international affairs, but I hadn’t been in touch with what’s been happening in 
Argentina in the last 10 years,” Hill highlighted the paragraph and angrily wrote 
“Really Bull,” in the margin.133
It was a dilemma that would remain unresolved.  At times, Hill was still an 
unapologetic Cold Warrior, criticizing human rights as interfering with U.S. ties to an 
anti-communist ally.  “As Americans we want to see the Carter Administration a 
success, yet in their desire to change the world—old relationships should not be 
trampled on,” Hill told the Pan-America Society of New York in June 1977, shortly 
after concluding his ambassadorship in Argentina.  “Human rights is a worthy 
objective,” he continued, “but its orchestration and application have to be 
accomplished quietly to be effective.
  Yet despite his horror at the Argentine military’s 
terror campaign and frustration with Kissinger’s quiet complicity, as the budding 
human rights movement in the United States blossomed into a major political force 
following the 1976 election of Jimmy Carter, Hill could never fully reconcile 
diplomatic advocacy on behalf of the victims of state-sanctioned violence with his 
lifelong affiliation with the policy prescriptions of Cold War.   
134  Similarly, in an address to the Argentine-
American Chamber of Commerce Hill emphasized the extent of the guerrilla threat in 
the early 1970s, and counseled U.S. “patience” toward Argentina, advising the Carter 
Administration to keep a tight rein on human rights advocacy “before it embarrasses 
itself further and humiliates a friend of the United States.”135
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Yet Hill could not escape the fact that his abiding frustration with Kissinger 
underscored the need for a strong U.S. commitment to human rights in foreign policy.  
Indeed, at the height of the dirty war, Hill had quietly embraced nascent U.S. human 
rights legislation—in an “eyes only” memorandum to Kissinger in September 1976, he 
recommended that the Secretary vote against an International Development Bank 
(IDB) loan to Argentina, citing recently-enacted congressional legislation that linked 
U.S. foreign aid to human rights.  When Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman personally 
warned that if he sent the memo Kissinger “might fire Hill,” the Ambassador told 
Shlaudeman to send it anyway.  (Kissinger ignored the memo and voted in favor of the 
loan.)136
The contradictory impulses guiding Hill’s political thought were most clearly 
evident in an interview with William F. Buckley, Jr. on Firing Line in January 1977.  
Asked if he supported sanctions on human rights grounds, Hill responded, “I believe 
that it should be discussed at the United Nations, and I believe it should be discussed 
by the powers, the powerful countries in the world—an exchange of ideas.”  When 
Buckley pointed out that the Security Council veto system made enacting U.N. 
sanctions practically impossible, Hill equivocated.  “I think they should discuss it and 
I think that the United Nations should then try through their means, even facing the 
veto, to moralize the issue which you raised a short time ago, and hopefully some of 
the countries will do something about it,” he awkwardly replied.  Most importantly, 
the Ambassador added, the United States and its allies should avoid unilateral human 
rights-based initiatives, “because all they’ll do is create enemies for their countries.”   
   
Recognizing the inconsistency between advocating support for the protection 
of human rights yet refusing to take action, the ever-incisive Buckley pressed the 
                                                 
136 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, March 1977[?], Patricia Derian and Robert C. 
Hill, American Embassy Buenos Aires, Derian Papers.   
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Ambassador.  “This seems to be a counsel of despair,” he told Hill.  Unable to balance 
fierce anti-communism with a desire to protect the thousands of victims swept up in 
the Argentine military’s terror campaign, Hill could only acquiesce.  “It is,” the 
Ambassador dejectedly concluded.137
 
 
                                                 
137 Public Broadcasting Service, Firing Line, January 31, 1977.  
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Chapter 3: 
“Human Rights is Suddenly Chic”: 
The Rise of The Movement, 1970-1976 
 
I have never believed in the domino theory, but, well, maybe I have come 
around to believe it in reverse.  If the domino theory can work that way, why 
can’t it work the other way?  Why can’t we do something in those countries 
where we have an influence, where we can make a change, such as Latin 
America, and start the dominos going?  Let’s pick up one country there and 
pick up another country there and make at least the Western hemisphere a 
model of human rights and respect in the world community.  Then we can use 
that as a domino theory and start doing something about other countries 
outside our own hemisphere.   
—Representative Tom Harkin (D-IA), 19781
  
 
News of Olga Talamante’s kidnapping reached her parents by telephone in 
mid-November 1974.  The call, dialed by a friend of a friend in Azul, Argentina to the 
elder Talamantes’ residence in Salinas, California was brief, the details agonizingly 
vague.  There had been a gathering, a classic Argentine asado, a day-long barbecue 
held as a kind of despedida for Talamante as she prepared to return to the United 
States and pursue graduate studies.  Late in the evening, as Talamante and a group of 
friends started to leave, an unidentified car pulled up to the curb and a man identifying 
himself as a policeman, demanded that they accompany him for questioning.  When 
Talamante refused, the man revealed a handgun, forcing them into the vehicle.  Olga 
Talamante’s whereabouts, the caller concluded, along with a dozen others who had 
attended the asado, were unknown.2
                                                 
1 U.S. Policy on Human Rights in the Latin America (Southern Cone): A Congressional Conference on 
Capitol Hill (New York: Fund for New Priorities in America, 1978), 77. 
    
2 “Affidavit of Olga Talamante,” October 12, 1976, ADP; Alan Eladio Gómez, "Feminism, Torture, 
and the Politics of Chicana/Third World Solidarity: An Interview with Olga Talamante," Radical 
Historical Review, no. 101 (Spring 2008): 171-72. 
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For Don Lalo and Doña Cuca, as Talamante’s parents Eduardo and Refugio 
were known in the local Latino community, news of their daughter’s disappearance 
came as a terrifying, debilitating shock.  What could be done?  Immigrants from 
Mexico, the Talamantes had raised Olga and her two brothers in an agricultural labor 
camp in Gilroy, California.  For nearly a decade the family had lived in a single room 
with no furniture, stove, or refrigerator in an old warehouse that had been divided up 
to house laborers.  From the long hours in the fields to the irregular pay to discourage 
worker transience, it was a hard, grinding existence rooted in exploitation emblematic 
of immigrant experience in rural California.3  Having endured for years the weekly 
indignity of waiting in line with other farm laborers for the patrones to dispense a 
meager allotment of cash, the possibility of successfully lobbying on Olga’s behalf, of 
harnessing enough political leverage in Washington to influence the Argentine 
government—if, indeed, she was held captive by the state—was an endeavor of 
extraordinary magnitude.4
Yet Olga Talamante was no ordinary young woman.  After spending roughly 
the first decade of her life in Mexico, she had accompanied her parents to the United 
States in 1961.  Unable to speak English, Talamante was initially classified as 
mentally retarded by primary school officials, and placed in a classroom with younger 
students.
  
5
                                                 
3 For a good overview of the experience of Mexican Americans in rural California, see Zaragosa 
Vargas, Labor Rights Are Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers in Twentieth Century America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).  For a pioneering study of Mexican Americans’ 
engagement with U.S. foreign policy, see Stephen Pitti, "Chicano Cold Warriors: César Chavez, 
Mexican American Politics, and California Farmworkers," in In From the Cold: Latin America's New 
Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008). 
  After only one year, however, she had mastered the language sufficiently to 
move directly from fourth to sixth grade.  In high school, Talamante’s stellar 
4 Details from the Talamantes’ life from Sally Todd Thomas, "Dirty Wars: On the Unacceptability of 
Torture--A Conversation With Olga Talamante," Social Justice 33, no. 1 (2006): 4. 
5 Carol Pogash, “Friends Remember Argentine Prisoner,” San Francisco Examiner, December 5, 1975.   
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performance in the classroom and participation in extracurricular activities set her 
apart from peers.  She was elected president of her sophomore class, acted as both 
secretary and vice president of the honor society, led the local chapter of an 
international student exchange program, served as president of a student-run advisory 
council on school reform, and earned a letter in girls’ hockey.  Receiving the 
“Outstanding Student of the Year” award at her high school graduation, Talamante—
whose parents had not completed elementary school—set her sights on a college 
education, and with the assistance of several academic scholarships she enrolled in the 
fall of 1969 at the University of California, Santa Cruz, where she majored in Latin 
American Studies.6
Talamante graduated from UC Santa Cruz with honors in 1973, shortly after 
obtaining U.S. citizenship.  She spent the summer working in the garlic fields of 
Gilroy until she had saved enough money to buy a plane ticket for Argentina, where 
she intended to teach English and possibly attend the University of Buenos Aires for a 
semester before returning to the United States to pursue graduate studies.  In early 
November 1974, Talamante wrote her family that she had purchased a return plane 
ticket and would be returning home on the twenty-fourth.  Eduardo and Refugio’s 
daughter, however, never arrived.   
   
The Talamantes immediately began working to ascertain what had happened, 
frantically contacting local elected representatives in California and Washington, as 
well as Olga’s associates and friends in Gilroy and at UC Santa Cruz.  It was an 
arduous, seemingly fruitless endeavor, particularly since the Department of State 
initially could provide no information on Olga Talamante’s case.  Officers in the 
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) dutifully contacted the U.S. Embassy in 
Buenos Aires, however, and by the end of the month it was confirmed that Talamante 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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had been arrested five days after President Isabel Perón had enacted “State of Siege” 
provisions to crack-down on left-wing political violence.  The U.S. Embassy further 
ascertained that Talamante was being held in a government prison in Azul for alleged 
possession of “subversive literature” and handguns, and that she would remain in 
detention until the case was adjudicated by the Argentine justice system.7
 
   Perhaps 
more importantly for her worried parents, a U.S. consular visit allowed Olga the 
chance to write her family.  “What happened is that I have been arrested along with 
some friends, under the charge of having arms and of being in opposition to the 
government,” Talamante wrote on November 27.  She continued:  
I don’t know if you remember, Mama, of the times I wrote you telling you that 
here the young men and women that I know help people a lot, especially the 
humble people, those in need.  That is why I tell you there is confusion, 
because none of us attempted to do more than this. 
Mama, more than anything else what hurts me most is the pain I may 
have caused you and am causing you and Papa now.  I would give anything to 
avoid this suffering, but the circumstances are not determined by us.  I know 
that you will be strong and that together we will have faith in a rapid solution.  
You receive all my love.  I love you very much.8
 
 
No doubt overjoyed to learn that their daughter was alive, Olga Talamante’s 
parents were nonetheless horrified by word of Olga’s having been tortured by 
members of the Argentine security services, and by the continued gravity of her 
situation.  Recognizing that Olga’s academic achievements and extracurricular 
                                                 
7 Congressional Correspondence, Michael J. Harrington to Henry Kissinger, March 12, 1976, ADP.   
8 Personal Letter, Olga Talamante to her parents and brothers, November 27, 1974, Box 10, Folder 7, 
Lister Papers. 
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activism had cultivated supporters in both the white and Latino communities, the 
Talamantes redoubled their efforts to generate support for her release.  In early 
December, with assistance from Olga’s friends in Gilroy and at UC Santa Cruz, they 
formed the Olga Talamante Defense Committee (OTDC) and began a grassroots 
campaign on her behalf, including vigils, letter-writing campaigns, and picket lines.9
In subsequent months, the Talamantes’ unflagging dedication to securing 
Olga’s release propelled the OTDC into a full-fledged social movement.  With support 
from Ed McLaughan and Peter Baird, editors at the North American Congress on 
Latin America (NACLA), a left-wing, non-profit organization dedicated to social 
justice in hemispheric affairs, the committee eventually cobbled together a broad 
coalition of support from a diverse range of organizations, including the United Farm 
Workers Union, the National Council of Churches, the United Auto Workers, and the 
National Women’s Political Caucus.
   
10  Although Talamante remained in prison 
throughout 1975, by mid-March, Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA)—House Representative 
for the Talamantes’ congressional district—informed the State Department, “It is rare 
that a day passes without an inquiry from a friend, relative, or school acquaintance 
regarding her trial’s progress.11
 
   
The initial support garnered by the Olga Talamante Defense Committee was 
indicative of the widespread respect in Gilroy and at UC Santa Cruz for Olga’s 
extraordinary success in overcoming linguistic, racial, and cultural barriers.  The 
                                                 
9 Thomas, "Dirty Wars: On the Unacceptability of Torture--A Conversation With Olga Talamante," 
118. 
10 Ibid: 117. On NACLA’s role in the Talamante case, see for example, “Free Olga Talamante,” NACLA 
Report on the Americas, vol. 9, issue 6, September 1, 1975.   
11 Official Correspondence, Norman Y. Mineta to Robert C. Felder, March 12, 1975, Box 10, Folder 7, 
Lister Papers.  Mineta had personal experience with unjust incarceration.  Born in San Jose, California 
to Japanese immigrant parents, Mineta had been interned in the Heart Mountain Relocation Camp near 
Cody, WY along with thousands of other Japanese-Americans during the Second World War. 
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immense outpouring of solidarity the OTDC eventually generated, however, not only 
among thousands of petition-signers in the San Francisco Bay Area, but also among 
religious, church, and labor groups nationwide, reflected the rising support for human 
rights in U.S. society and politics.12
On one level, internationally-focused human rights groups in the United States 
worked to raise public awareness and generate popular opprobrium of repressive 
regimes overseas.  Spearheaded by the U.S. affiliate of Amnesty International, human 
rights groups utilizing the “populist” approach sought to elicit human rights 
improvements abroad through mass mobilization campaigns; utilizing petitions and 
letter-writing campaigns on behalf of political prisoners, such efforts sought to shame 
  Rooted in the struggle for Civil Rights and the 
anti-Vietnam War movement, the effort to institutionalize human rights in U.S. 
foreign policy and, correspondingly, to improve the protection of human rights 
overseas, blossomed in the United States in the early 1970s thanks to widespread 
disillusionment with U.S. support for dictatorial regimes, as well as revelations of U.S. 
involvement in unsavory practices overseas—such as the violent 1973 military 
overthrow of Chilean president Salvador Allende—and gained momentum in the 
aftermath of the Watergate scandal.  
                                                 
12 Since the late 1960s, the term “human rights” has been applied to diverse local, regional, and national 
movements advocating a wide-range of political, economic, and/or social and cultural issues.  The 
elasticity of “human rights” was—and remains—both a strength and a weakness for human rights 
advocates; on the one hand, calls to promote human rights garnered widespread support from a broad-
based constituency, and could be applied to a variety of local contexts.  On the other hand, by the end of 
the 1970s, the use of human rights to describe struggles ranging from gay activism in California to 
opposition to Cuba’s command economy denied the human rights movement a clearly-defined agenda 
and prevented a tight-organizational structure.  In the period covered by this chapter, “human rights” 
meant different things to different groups at different times—a theme that is discussed in detail in 
chapter 4.  For the sake of clarity, in this chapter, the “human rights movement” refers to the effort to a) 
elevate moral and ethical considerations in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign 
policy; and b) to promote the protection of human rights overseas.  The term “human rights” defies a 
single definition in the historical context of the late 1960s and 1970s given the diverse political leanings 
of human rights advocates, but is broadly construed as a) freedom from government violation of the 
integrity of the person; b) economic and social rights, such as food, shelter, and education; and c) civil 
and political rights.   
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the leaders of rogue nations into compliance with international norms.  “We assumed 
that all governments wanted to be accepted in the family of civilized nations and that 
by publicizing information that was not generally known, we would bring the force of 
world opinion to bear on them,” writes Jeri Laber, who acquired a reputation as a 
hard-hitting human rights advocate after joining Amnesty in the early 1970s.  “By 
shedding light on hidden atrocities, we would make governments sensitive to the 
image they projected to the outside world,” Laber continues.  “Publicity was our 
primary tool.”13
On another level, a growing coterie of U.S. human rights groups focused their 
efforts entirely on influencing Washington’s policymaking elite.  In a novel 
“postpopulist” approach that eschewed a mass base—hallmarks of the Civil Rights 
and anti-Vietnam War movements—organizations such as the International League for 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Internet focused their energies on lobbying for 
more stringent congressional control over foreign aid funding to halt U.S. support for 
human rights violating regimes.  In turn, such efforts were increasingly well-received 
by liberal lawmakers on Capitol Hill, who viewed the human rights movement as an 
extension of congressional efforts to curtail U.S. military intervention in Southeast 
Asia and halt U.S. support for repressive right-wing regimes in the Developing World. 
 
Put broadly, grassroots human rights organizers, “postpopulist” lobbyists, and 
sympathetic members of Congress thus consciously embodied a counter-movement to 
the maintenance of close U.S. ties to staunchly anti-communist, authoritarian 
governments—a defining feature of U.S. Cold War policy, particularly toward Latin 
America.  Over the course of the 1970s, in other words, the blossoming human rights 
                                                 
13 Jeri Laber, The Courage of Strangers: Coming of Age with the Human Rights Movement (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2002), 73-74. 
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movement vied for primacy with the policy prescriptions that had undergirded U.S.-
Latin American military relations since the Second World War.   
 
Although human rights language was written into the United Nations Charter 
in June 1945 and the international humanitarian law enshrined in the Geneva 
Conventions gained near-universal acceptance four years later, over the course of the 
subsequent quarter-century human rights took a back seat in U.S. foreign policy to the 
perceived exigencies of the Cold War.14  Divided into ideologically-charged voting 
blocs and unwilling to accept criticism, from its founding the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission openly abdicated the power to “take any action in regard to any 
complaints concerning human rights.”  As historian Geoffrey Robertson writes, “The 
best that can be said for Cold War law was that superpowers felt obliged to resort to 
such fictions, covering up as best they could the atrocities committed by their own 
allies in order to accuse more loudly the other side.”15
By the late 1960s, however, increasing disaffection with the rising costs of 
U.S. military intervention in South East Asia among both non-governmental anti-war 
advocates and their liberal allies in Congress stimulated a broad reevaluation of United 
States foreign policy.  Latin America was widely seen as a particularly egregious 
illustration of the illiberal nature of U.S. Cold War policymaking.  Less than a decade 
earlier, John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress had cultivated enormous hope in the 
region for a flowering of representative democracy, enhanced internal security, and 
dynamic economic growth.  Instead, by the late 1960s, most of the region was ruled by 
 
                                                 
14 On U.S. foreign policy and human rights in the early post-war era, see, for example, Elizabeth 
Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005); Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 91-85. 
15 Geoffrey Roberts, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (New York: New Press, 
2006), 48-49.  See also, Clair Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy: A Paradoxical 
Legacy (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
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U.S.-backed right-wing military regimes; as former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Ralph 
Dungan informed the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs in mid-1969, “the basic defect in the stability counterinsurgency 
tactic as perceived by the U.S. military is that somehow stability is an end in itself and 
that it matters little in whose hands or under what condition stability exists—or what 
means are used to obtain it.”16
Dungan’s assessment received a warm reception from Subcommittee 
Chairman Frank Church (D-ID) who, along with Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-AK), had emerged in the final years of the decade 
as one of the most outspoken critics of the predominant role accorded to the Pentagon 
in U.S. foreign policy.  Indeed, for more than a decade, Church had worked to place 
restrictions on U.S. military assistance programs, albeit with little success.  “Against 
the combined opposition of the State Department, the Pentagon, and most often the 
White House, it is not easy to accomplish,” the Idaho senator bluntly responded when 
Dungan suggested stopping assistance programs to Latin American militaries.  The 
Washington bureaucracy, Church wearily concluded, “is like a hydraheaded 
monster.”
   
17
Church’s effort to rein in the role of military assistance in U.S. foreign policy 
was by no means the only crack in the Washington Cold War consensus, particularly 
in regard to Latin America.  During the Kennedy Administration, Senator Wayne 
Morse (D-OR), Church’s predecessor on the Senate Subcommittee, had adamantly 
resisted White House efforts to repeal the congressional prohibition on military 
assistance to Latin America for internal security purposes, out of a conviction that “aid 
 
                                                 
16 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, “United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America,” Ninety-First Congress, First 
Session, June 24 and July 8, 1969, Committee Print (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1969), 6. 
17 Ibid, 39. 
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to nondemocratic Latin American regimes to assist the maintenance of internal 
security will be equivalent to the maintenance in power of harsh and repressive 
regimes.”18  The following year, along with Fulbright, Morse expressed “great alarm” 
at the prospect of maintaining Alliance for Progress aid to Argentina following the 
Argentine military coup against Arturo Frondizi.19  Although by no means 
representative of the legislative branch as a whole, such resistance forced the Kennedy 
Administration to justify its approach to hemispheric affairs—undercutting the lofty 
rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress.  As Secretary of State Dean Rusk speciously 
asserted in a letter to Morse in September 1962, “the Latin American military have in 
general been a force for good and have played a leading and often decisive role in 
unseating dictators and helping to maintain political stability against revolutionary 
efforts to impose totalitarian regimes.”20
Congressional resistance to the close maintenance of U.S.-Latin American 
military ties increased during the Johnson Administration.  Along with Senator Hubert 
Humphrey (D-MN), in 1964 Morse denounced the Mann Doctrine’s shift away from 
democracy as a core U.S. policy goal in Latin America.
 
21  More concretely, following 
the 1966 Argentine coup, Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) rattled White House 
officials by proposing an addition to the foreign aid bill prohibiting Alliance for 
Progress aid to Latin American countries run by military regimes.22
                                                 
18 Department of State Memorandum, Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Assistance (Bell) to Secretary of 
State Rusk, June 26,1961, Subject: “Proposed Presidential Determination under Section 105 (b)(4) and 
451 (a) of the MSA of 1954, as amended, permitting the use of funds to furnish military assistance to 
Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Haiti,” FRUS, Vol. XII, 
accessed online.  
  The “mischievous 
19 Telecon, George W. Ball to Edwin Martin, March 29, 1962, 3:15 p.m., Box 149, Folder 2, Ball 
Papers. 
20 Letter from Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republic 
Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Morse) Washington, September 15, 1962, FRUS, 
1961-1963, Vol. XII, accessed online.  
21 Telephone Conversation Between Lyndon B. Johnson and Thomas C. Mann, March 19, 1964, FRUS, 
1964-1968, Vol. XXXI, 28-29. 
22 “Javits Asks Curb on Alliance Aid,” New York Times, July 18, 1966, pg. 9. 
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amendment,” in the words of National Security Council staff member William G. 
Bowdler, threatened to put “the President personally and the U.S. government across a 
barrel.”  Foreshadowing future debates over human rights initiatives in U.S. foreign 
policy, Bowdler continued: 
 
One thing is to tie aid to economic actions by the Latinos […] which they 
understand even if they don’t like it.  Tieing aid to internal political 
developments is quite another matter [sic].  The President by omission or 
commission will be passing personal judgment on each coup.23
 
   
Although the bill failed to pass muster, in 1967 Congress succeeded in placing a 
“ceiling” of $75 million on all arms grants or credit-term sales to Latin America (plus 
an additional $12 million for training), denied a Pentagon naval request for Latin 
America, and extended the revolving fund used by the Department of Defense for 
arms sales for only one year.24
Bolstered by the groundswell of opposition to the Vietnam War, by the time 
Richard Nixon entered the Oval Office, U.S. military assistance and training programs 
were receiving unprecedented scrutiny on Capitol Hill.  “Do you have no question in 
your mind that something is wrong with our relations with most of Latin America 
except for your favorite dictators?” Fulbright demanded of Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer during the 1969 Church Subcommittee 
hearings on U.S. military programs in Latin America.  “Mr. Duvalier is the only one 
who seems to be enthusiastic about you,” Fulbright acidly concluded, referring to 
   
                                                 
23 White House Memorandum, W. G. Bowdler to W. W. Rostow, October 14, 1966, Box 1, folder: “5: 
Bowdler Memos” NSF, Name File, LBJL. 
24 “Benjamin Welles, “The Latin Military: A Dilemma for Washington,” New York Times, December 
22, 1968, pg. E5; James Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1981), 245. 
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recent newspaper photos of the Haitian dictator and presidential envoy Nelson 
Rockefeller.25  A few minutes later, when G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs, described the amount of U.S. military 
assistance to Latin America as insignificant, Church responded by citing a study 
conducted for the Subcommittee by University of New Mexico professor Edwin L. 
Lieuwen, asserting that U.S. arms assistance supplemented the amount Latin 
American militaries spent on arms by “more than 50 percent, and by more than 90 
percent in some of the smaller countries.”26
In his refusal to accept the shibboleths of U.S. Cold War foreign policy, 
Church challenged the Nixon Administration to redefine U.S.-Latin American 
relations.  Dismissing Rockefeller’s recommendation for the maintenance of U.S. 
military assistance to the region in his 1969 Report on the Americas, Church instead 
asserted, “We should bring home our military missions, end our grant-in-aid and 
training programs, and sever the intimate connections we have sought to form with the 
Latin military establishments.” Noting that U.S. arms had been utilized by both sides 
in the 1969 conflict between El Salvador and Honduras, Church told his Senate 
colleagues, “This is a shabby business for us to mix in.”
 
27
With Church and Fulbright in the vanguard, during Nixon’s first term in office 
the Congress took an increasingly active role in shaping U.S. foreign policy.  Indeed, 
in the four year period between 1968 and 1971, the Senate held an average of more 
   
                                                 
25 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, “United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America,” Ninety-First Congress, First 
Session, June 24 and July 8, 1969, Committee Print (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1969), 6; A. D. Horne, “Military Aid to Latin America is Backed by Administration,” Washington Post, 
July 9, 1969, pg. B7. 
26 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, “United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America,” Ninety-First Congress, First 
Session, June 24 and July 8, 1969, Committee Print (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1969), 73. 
27 Frank Church, “Toward a New Policy for Latin America,” address to the United States Senate, April 
10, 1970, Box 29, Folder 8, Lister Papers. 
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than 20 roll call votes on defense bills each year—a dramatic increase from previous 
decade’s average of one vote every two years.28  Moreover, successive congressional 
amendments placed increasingly stringent limits on U.S security assistance, 
particularly the grant-based Military Assistance Program (MAP).  In 1970, the 
Congress limited the number of military trainees brought to the United States under 
MAP to the number of foreign students studying in the United States during the 
previous fiscal year under the Hayes-Fulbright Act.29  Two years later, the Congress 
successfully terminated the presence of U.S. military groups overseas unless 
specifically authorized by the Congress, and by 1974, MAP had declined to $885 
million from the $1.2 billion earmarked for the program in 1967.30
Seeking to maintain U.S. support for stable, anti-communist clients, in 
response to congressional restrictions on grant-in-aid military assistance, Nixon 
significantly increased arms sales to U.S. allies abroad.  Recognizing the relatively 
limited congressional oversight of the international arms trade, and aiming to offset a 
serious balance-of-payments problem, the President waived the Congress-imposed 
ceiling on arms transfers to Latin America, and more than doubled arms sales to the 
region in fiscal year 1971 over the annual average of $30 million during the previous 
decade.
 
31
                                                 
28 Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
179. 
  Yet as evidence emerged of Nixon’s secret expansion of the Vietnam War 
into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, opposition to what Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
famously referred to as the “imperial presidency” hardened.  The result, as 
29 The amendment was section 510 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1970 (the Mutual Education and 
Cultural Exchange Act). “From MAP to FMS: Security on a Cash Basis,” NACLA’s Latin America and 
Empire Report, Vol. X, No. 1, (January 1976), 8. 
30 The MAP figure included the transfer of excess defense articles.  Jack. Child, Unequal Alliance: The 
Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 211. “From MAP to 
FMS: Security on a Cash Basis,” NACLA’s Latin America and Empire Report, Vol. X, No. 1, (January 
1976), 8. 
31 Ibid, 9. 
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Representative Robert F. Drinan (D-MA) declared in February 1971, was “a 
movement for a new Congress.”32  “People sent me here to stop this war,” Drinan 
asserted a few weeks after his election to the ninety-second Congress.  “The essence of 
the whole movement for a new Congress is to restore the decency and the dignity of 
this House—to once again assert its constitutional power to declare war and to finance 
a war.”33
During a visit to South Vietnam in mid-1969, Drinan had been horrified by the 
extent of U.S.-sponsored violence and destruction.  The experience, he told his 
congressional peers, “caused me to change the whole course of my life.”  As the first 
Roman Catholic priest elected as a voting member to the House of Representatives, 
Drinan’s personal austerity—he resided in a simple dormitory in Washington with a 
group of fellow Jesuits—and fiercely liberal brand of politics reportedly gained him 
the reputation in his native Massachusetts as “Our Father who art incongruous.”
   
34
                                                 
32 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).  On Nixon’s 
Cambodia campaign, see, for example, John M. Shaw, The Cambodia Campaign: The 1970 Offensive 
and America's Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); William Shawcross, 
Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, New ed. (London: Hogarth Press, 
1986); Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: HarperPerennial, 1991). On U.S.-
Chilean relations during the Allende presidency see, for example, John Dinges, The Condor Years: How 
Pinochet and his Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New York: New Press, 2005); Jonathan 
Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende's Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide (New 
York: Verso, 2005); Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and 
Accountability (New York: The New Press, 2003). 
  
Drinan’s tenacious determination to halt U.S. intervention in South East Asia and to 
insert a heavy dose of morality into U.S. foreign policy as a whole, however, 
exemplified the increasingly widespread rejection of the Cold War consensus on 
Capitol Hill.  “Each of us must recognize that when this war eventually passes into 
33 Robert F. Drinan, Congressional Record, February 4, 1971, pg. 454. 
34 Tribute to Robert F. Drinan,” Congressional Record, June 11, 1980, pg. H4813.  Rev. Gabriel 
Richard, also a Catholic priest, served in Congress from 1823-25, but only as a nonvoting delegate from 
the Michigan Territory.  Four years after Father Drinan’s retirement, the Rev. Robert John Cornell (D-
WI) served two terms in the House of Representatives.  See “Robert Drinan Dies at 86: Pioneer as 
Lawmaker Priest,” New York Times, January 30, 2007, accessed online (December 18, 2008) at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/obituaries/30drinan.html. 
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history, historians will reflect on the impotence of the Congress in a time of crisis, just 
as they now reflect on the omnipotence of Congress in the Wilson era,” Drinan 
asserted in October 1971.  He continued: 
 
Historians will note our Indochina policies were abetted by the inaction of the 
representatives of the people, an inaction largely facilitated by the personal 
influence of the President, not by the expressed desire of the people.   
 And historians will note, it grieves me to state, that in 1971 we did not 
end the war, we merely turned to yet another of its interminable phases while 
fewer American men died in a war their Nation knew was wrong.35
 
 
The following April, Drinan described Nixon’s decision to bomb the North 
Vietnamese cities of Hanoi and Haiphon as “tactically disastrous and unspeakably 
immoral,” and in May 1973, Drinan and four colleagues initiated impeachment 
proceedings against Nixon for ordering the covert U.S. military operation in 
Cambodia.36  Although Drinan’s impeachment effort failed, the Congress successfully 
passed the War Powers Resolution six months later, requiring congressional review of 
any attempt to deploy U.S. military forces overseas and providing the legislative 
branch with the authority to enact a troop withdrawal after deployment.37
                                                 
35 Robert F. Drinan, Congressional Record, October 19, 1971, pg. 9723-4. 
   Praised by 
liberal supporters for his outspoken opposition to the Nixon Administration, Drinan 
ruffled the feathers of Cold Warriors across the aisle.  As conservative Republican 
36 Robert F. Drinan, Congressional Record, April 17, 1972, pg. 3175; Drinan, “Drinan versus Nixon,” 
Congressional Record, May 8, 1973, pg. E3016. 
37 Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993 
(University Park, PA: Pensylvania State University Press, 1993), 9. 
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freshman Trent Lott griped to a journalist in mid-1973, “If he’s a priest, I’m the 
Pope.”38
 
   
Out of the maelstrom of popular protest against the Vietnam War and the 
increasingly widespread belief in the need for an infusion of morality in U.S. foreign 
policy emerged the human rights movement.  “There was a real malaise in the 
country,” recalled Roberta Cohen, who served as Executive Director of the 
International League for Human Rights (ILHR) throughout the first half of the 1970s.  
“To my mind that is why international human rights really took.”39   Founded during 
the Second World War by American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Director Roger 
Baldwin on the pattern of the French inter-war International Federation of Human 
Rights Leagues, the ILHR’s effort to implement internationally recognized human 
rights had languished in the post-war era.40  “The broader subject of caring whether 
somebody gets tortured in Paraguay or whether so-and-so is put in jail in Indonesia, 
these were places that were very far away,” Cohen remembered in a recent interview.  
“This was before globalization, so to speak.”41  At the dawn of the 1970s, the League 
consisted of a mere handful of dedicated advocates working out of a tiny New York 
office, along with affiliations with more prominent civil liberties organizations, such 
as the ACLU and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP
More broadly, the ILHR had few peer-organizations, underscoring the limits to 
international human rights advocacy in the 1950s and 1960s.   Amnesty International, 
founded in 1961 by British lawyer Peter Benenson as a one-year campaign on behalf 
). 
                                                 
38 Kenneth B. Dalecki, “Cong. Drinan: Great Guy; ‘Devil in Priest’s Clothing,’” Fitchburg Sentinel, 
August 13, 1973, pg. 15. 
39 Personal Interview with Roberta Cohen, May 1, 2008, Washington, D.C.   
40 Memorandum, Roberta Cohen, undated, Personal Papers of Roberta Cohen, Washington, D.C.   
41 Personal Interview with Roberta Cohen, May 1, 2008, Washington, D.C.   
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of two political prisoners in Portugal, had subsequently developed into a full-time 
voluntary human rights organization focusing on obtaining the release of international 
prisoners of conscience and using popular pressure to encourage governments to 
adhere to international standards governing their treatment.42  During the 1960s, 
however, Amnesty’s influence, as one journalist accurately put it, was “almost 
imperceptible.”43  Similarly, the two Geneva-based human rights organizations, the 
International Commission of Jurists (focusing on the promotion of the rule of law), 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (advocating the protection of 
prisoners of war and other victims of armed conflict) achieved little impact on the 
significance of human rights in international affairs beyond the insular diplomatic 
world of the United Nations.44
The immense outpouring of popular opposition to the Vietnam War, however, 
catapulted human rights advocacy into the national spotlight.  Revelations of broader 
U.S. involvement in shadowy dealings abroad, particularly the Nixon Administration’s 
“invisible blockade” against Chilean socialist president Salvador Allende and 
corresponding U.S. support for the golpista military officers who violently seized 
political power on September 11, 1973, further fueled popular disaffection with U.S. 
foreign policy.
   
45
                                                 
42 Robert F. Drinan S.J., Cry of the Oppressed: The History and Hope of the Human Rights Revolution 
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 153.  
  As Philip Agee concluded in a fiercely critical memoir of his 
experiences at the Central Intelligence Agency, “Publicly at no time since World War 
43 David B. Ottaway, “The Growing Lobby for Human Rights: Time for Action,” Washington Post, 
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II have the American people had such an opportunity as now to examine how and why 
succeeding U.S. administrations have chosen, as in Vietnam, to back minority, 
oppressive and doomed regimes.”46
On Capitol Hill, the rising significance of human rights was clearly evident in 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.  In a nonbinding “sense of Congress” declaration, 
legislators asserted that “the President should deny any economic or military 
assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or 
imprisonment of that country’s citizens for political purposes.”  Additionally, the 
Congress requested that Nixon encourage the recently-installed Chilean military junta 
to protect the human rights of its citizens, and, more concretely, required that the 
foreign police training program operated by the Agency for International 
Development’s Office of Public Safety (OPS) be shut down.
   
47
More significantly, human rights advocacy took a major step at the beginning 
of August 1973, when Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) utilized his 
chairmanship of House International Relations Subcommittee on International 
Organizations and Movements to initiate an unprecedented series of hearings on the 
international protection of human rights.
 
48  In a four-month period, Fraser held 15 
hearings with more than 40 witnesses, including U.S. government officials, Congress 
members, scholars, lawyers, and representatives from non-governmental 
organizations.49
                                                 
46 Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Penguin, 1975), 598. 
  The following March, Fraser published a landmark report on the 
hearings, Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership.  
47 Jo Marie Griesgraber, Implementation by the Carter Administration of Human Rights Legislation 
Affecting Latin America (PhD Dissertation, 1983), 37-38.  Fearing an investigation of all OPS activities, 
the Ford administration shuttered the organization in 1974.  See Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing: 
The United States and Latin America (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 195. 
48 Fraser’s Subcommittee was later renamed the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International 
Organizations. 
49 George Lister, Interview with Radio Pacifica, September 11, 1975, transcript, Box 18, Folder 22, 
Lister Papers.  
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Including 29 specific recommendations for integrating human rights into U.S. foreign 
policy, Fraser notably called for the creation of a Department of State Bureau of 
Human Rights, as well as the assignment of a human rights officer to each regional 
bureau in the State Department.  Fraser also lobbied for annual human rights country 
reports, and emphasized the need to link U.S. foreign aid to human rights conditions.50
Eventually conducting 150 hearings over five years on U.S. relations with 
governments across the globe, and involving more than 500 witnesses, Fraser’s 
subcommittee played a critical role in raising human rights awareness, integrating 
human rights NGOs into the policymaking process, and institutionalizing human 
rights in U.S. foreign policy.  From the outset, the Fraser Subcommittee hearings 
reflected a remarkable degree of coordination with the close-knit community of non-
governmental human rights advocates.  Fraser aide John Salzberg—the primary author 
of Human Rights in the World Community—joined the Congressman after serving as 
Representative of the International Commission of Jurists at the United Nations, where 
he had shared an office building with Roberta Cohen’s International League for 
Human Rights.
   
51
If Fraser personified state-level human rights advocacy, WOLA embodied the 
surge of popular support for institutionalizing human rights in U.S. foreign policy that 
defined the mid-1970s.  Founded in 1974 in Washington, D. C. by a group of liberal 
  Salzberg not only played a key role in situating Fraser’s effort to 
make U.S. foreign policy consistent with the U.N. human rights covenants to which 
the United States was a signatory, but was also particularly influential in establishing a 
close working relationship with human rights-focused NGOs such as the Washington 
Office on Latin America (WOLA). 
                                                 
50 U.S. Congress, Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership, A Report of the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974). 
51 Personal Interview with John Salzberg, May 6, 2008, Washington, D.C. 
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American Seminarians who had been forced to leave Chile following the military 
coup, WOLA was launched out of “indignation and anger at the United States 
government,” in the words of co-founder Rev. Joe Eldridge, then a young Methodist 
preacher from Eastern Tennessee.  Raised in a deeply religious home, Eldridge 
became politically active in the Civil Rights movement in the late 1960s while 
attending seminary in Dallas, Texas.  Despite a near-total lack of knowledge about 
Latin America, in 1970 he accepted an offer to join a group of Christian missionaries 
in Chile.  Arriving in Santiago with no Spanish-language ability, “for the first year I 
didn’t know what was up,” Eldridge recalled.  He continued: 
 
But after the first year I began to get it, and I began to realize that the United 
States was deeply involved in efforts to overthrow the Allende government, 
and so I became involved with a number of Christians representing a lot of 
different congregations [...] and we started to investigate, to do research and 
write pastoral letters and do everything we could to inform the constituencies 
that were responsible for us being in Chile about what was taking place in 
Chile and to urge our sending bodies to pressure the U.S. government to stop 
intervening.   
 
After narrowly avoiding arrest and detention following the September 1973 military 
coup, Eldridge and a group of colleagues returned to the United States and founded 
WOLA out of deep disillusionment with United States foreign policy.  Quickly 
recognizing, however, that “indignation is not sustainable,” WOLA evolved into a 
bridge organization, linking Latin American solidarity groups, exiles, and human 
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rights organizations with official Washington in the effort to raise awareness of human 
rights conditions in Latin America and influence U.S. policy toward the region.52
The Fraser Subcommittee hearings provided an unprecedented venue for 
groups such as WOLA to advocate on behalf of human rights in Latin America.  As 
Eldridge recalled in a recent interview, 
 
 
I would go to John [Salzberg] and say, ‘I think you need a hearing on 
Argentina,’ or ‘I think you need a hearing on Uruguay, and here’s who I think 
should testify.’  [...] I’d say, ‘these are authentic, democratic, dissident voices, 
they speak with great credibility, and it would do an enormous amount for the 
opposition in this country if you would invite these guys to testify.’  John 
would say ‘ok.’  He’d go to Don Fraser, and Fraser would say ‘ok.’  All we 
would try to do is make sure that the Congress knew the pedigrees, the 
credentials, of these people, so that we weren’t deceiving anybody[. …] The 
last thing we wanted was to do any harm to Don Fraser’s credibility, so we 
wanted only authentic, genuine, democratic voices.53
 
   
Moreover, the hearings stimulated groups such as WOLA to become increasingly 
effective at collecting, analyzing, and distributing reliable human rights data, both as a 
means to generate wider participation in the human rights movement and to lobby 
members of Congress, while also encouraging the formation of additional region- and 
country-specific human rights organizations.  “Congress became the critical point that 
brought it all together,” recalled Roberta Cohen.  The Fraser Subcommittee, she 
continued, “brought together all the different groups that were interested [in human 
                                                 
52 Personal interview with Rev. Joe Eldridge, May 4, 2008, Washington, D.C.   
53 Ibid.   
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rights], and suddenly people were forming groups on South Korea, the Philippines, 
Latin America, and general human rights.”54
Fraser’s Human Rights in the World Community was also instrumental in 
setting the stage for an unprecedented wave of congressional human rights legislation.  
When the Nixon Administration ignored a letter formally presented by Fraser and 
signed by more than 100 congress members warning that congressional approval of 
the President’s foreign policy decisions would be contingent on the promotion of 
human rights, in November 1974 Fraser successfully introduced a “sense of Congress” 
amendment (Section 502B) to the Foreign Assistance Act.   Patterned on the U.N. 
language utilized in Human Rights in the World Community, 502B explicitly linked 
human rights to U.S. security assistance, asserting that: 
   
 
except in extraordinary circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce 
or terminate security assistance to any government which engages in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment; prolonged detention without charges; or other flagrant denials of 
the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.”55
 
 
Although the non-binding nature of 502B, along with vague terminology such as 
“gross violations” quickly proved problematic, Fraser’s amendment nonetheless 
provided a foundation for subsequent efforts to institutionalize human rights in U.S. 
foreign policy.   
                                                 
54 Personal Interview with Roberta Cohen, May 1, 2008, Washington, D.C.   
55 Quoted in Stephen B. Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices," 
Journal of International Law 76 (1982): 251. 
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The immense popular outcry accompanied the Watergate scandal—
culminating in Nixon’s resignation in August 1974—further fueled the human rights 
movement.  In the November 1974 congressional elections, 75 new Democrats joined 
the 94th Congress, the largest freshman class since 1948.56  Intent on enacting major 
legislative reform and expanding the power of the Congress, the “Watergate Babies” 
embraced the nascent human rights legislation while working to cut Department of 
Defense expenditures.57  Accordingly, the Congress increasingly attached country-
specific legislation to military assistance authorization bills—an approach initiated the 
previous year—including limits on U.S. military aid to Turkey, Angola, South Korea, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, and Indonesia.58
From the outset, congressional human rights initiatives were fiercely resisted 
by the Nixon and Ford Administrations.  With his close adherence to realpolitik, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger consistently dismissed human rights as a viable 
U.S. foreign policy goal.  “Human Rights advocates in Congress accused the 
Administration of moving on human rights only in response to pressure,” Kissinger 
recalled in his memoirs.  “We, in turn, believed that Congress was reflecting single-
issue ideological and political agendas, pushed to a point that the administration 
considered inimical to broader United States strategic or geopolitical interests, or 
oblivious to them.”  Reflecting on the issue more than two decades later, Kissinger 
conceded that “There was a measure of merit in both views.”
   
59
                                                 
56 Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993, 9-10. 
  In the mid-1970s, 
however, the Secretary of State’s near-total dismissal of human rights infuriated 
liberal members of Congress.  “To describe the relationship between Congress and the 
57 Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, 205. 
58 Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices," 254.  See also Arnson, 
Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993, 10. 
59 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 755. 
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Executive Branch at that time as adversarial would be an understatement,” Robert 
Cohen recalled years later.  “It was an out and out war.”60
Ironically, Kissinger’s refusal to mollify congressional concerns over human 
rights strengthened legislators’ resolve to enact binding legislation.  Indeed, in a recent 
interview, Rev. Eldridge recalled a conversation with Donald Fraser in which the latter 
attributed Kissinger’s opposition to the solidification of a fragile congressional 
consensus on human rights.  “Henry Kissinger has claimed credit for every major 
foreign policy success of the past decade,” Fraser told Eldridge.  He continued:  
   
 
You know there’s something he deserves credit for that he hasn’t claimed ... 
the human rights policy.  Because if Henry Kissinger had been a little less 
arrogant and a little less haughty vis-à-vis the Congress, and a little more 
willing to descend to the level of Congress he could have handed off all this 
legislation—it wouldn’t have been legislation.61
 
  
Instead, by mid-decade, growing support for human rights in Congress forced a 
rearguard action in the State Department to head-off further legislative action.  In a 
classified memo summarizing a human rights meeting on September 12, 1974, Deputy 
Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll informed Kissinger “the general consensus, was 
that, if the Department did not place itself ahead of the curve on this issue, Congress 
would take the matter out of the Department’s hands.”62
                                                 
60 Roberta Cohen, “Integrating Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: the History, the Challenges, and 
the Criteria for an Effective Policy,” statement at the Foreign Service Institute, 2008, accessed online 
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  In response, the State 
Department named human rights officers to each of the five geographic bureaus, 
began requesting U.S. Embassies in countries affected by congressional human rights 
61 Personal interview with Rev. Joe Eldridge, May 4, 2008, Washington, D.C.   
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legislation to prepare human rights reports, and, in 1975, established an Office of 
Humanitarian Affairs.63
Notwithstanding the Ford Administration’s tentative steps toward integrating 
human rights into the machinery of U.S. foreign policy, human rights advocates 
continued to press the issue.   An amendment by Donald Fraser in November 1975 
added teeth to 502B, replacing the “sense of Congress” language with a legally 
binding stipulation denying U.S. security assistance to gross human rights violators.  
Although President Ford vetoed the foreign authorization bill in May 1976, human 
rights considerations nonetheless gained prominence in a watered-down version 
signed by the President in July.
 
64
More significantly, in September 1975 Representative Tom Harkin (D-IA) 
successfully offered an amendment to the International Development and Food 
Assistance section of the Foreign Assistance Act, stipulating that no U.S. aid be 
provided “to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of 
gross violations of international recognized human rights,” unless it could be shown 
that the aid would benefit the “poor and needy.”
   
65
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  Particularly in Latin America, the 
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Rights Coordinator James M. Wilson, Jr. lamented to the Secretary in an internal 
memo, “We will get no respite from the Harkin Amendment.”66
 
 
By the time the Olga Talamante Defense Committee began mobilizing to 
secure Talamante’s release from Argentine government custody, human rights had 
thus emerged as a major political issue in Washington.  Indeed, only two weeks after 
the OTDC initiated its campaign on December 5, 1974, a small group of congressmen 
led by Donald Fraser held a tense meeting with Henry Kissinger over the role of 
human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  “Basically we feel it’s very difficult to continue 
to support foreign assistance programs to governments which oppress their own 
people,” Fraser bluntly told the Secretary.  “We feel that the United States should be 
putting stronger emphasis on human rights issues in countries around the world.”67
In response, Kissinger expressed a willingness to discuss human rights with the 
Congress.  Nonetheless, the Secretary emphasized that “there are a number of 
problems.”  Quiet diplomatic discussions, Kissinger asserted, rather than 
congressional legislation, should constitute the core of U.S. human rights policy.  “The 
thing that I’m most allergic to is the obligatory statutes,” Kissinger declared.  “I don’t 
mind requirements for reports of periodic progress, but I feel very strongly that 
obligatory requirements are counterproductive.”  When Alan Cranston (D-CA), 
pressed Kissinger to discuss foreign aid, which the California Senator described as 
frequently politically-motivated, military-focused, and “seems to serve the people who 
are already powerful,” the Secretary responded coldly.  “This has been a very 
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interesting session,” he abruptly informed the assembled members of congress.  
“Could we perhaps arrange a meeting again in late January?”68
Despite Kissinger’s resistance, the State Department could not ignore the 
OTDC’s intensive lobbying effort.  In all, nearly three dozen members of Congress 
wrote the Department on Olga Talamante’s behalf.  “Considering the leftist nature of 
the charges against her” Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-MA) wrote Kissinger in a 
representative letter, “[...] the rapid deterioration of the political situation in Argentina, 
and the imminent threat of a right-wing coup, it is imperative that Ms. Talamante’s 
human rights be restored and her release be effected immediately.”
 
69  Human rights 
advocates and their congressional allies also targeted the U.S. Embassy in Buenos 
Aires, flooding U.S. Ambassador Robert C. Hill with letters he described as “depicting 
Miss Talamante as being in a ‘fascist’ prison.”70
Forced onto the defensive by the wave of human rights legislation on Capitol 
Hill, Secretary of State Kissinger hoped to resolve the Talamante case as quickly and 
quietly as possible.  Indeed, in a February 1975 cable to all U.S. Embassies in Latin 
America, Kissinger informed U.S. Ambassadors that “Human Rights issues in Latin 
America, especially with respect to [the] treatment of U.S. nationals, host country 
nationals and others, receive a high priority in U.S. policy formulation and 
implementation.”  In particular, the Secretary wrote, “an immediate and clear concern 
is the welfare of arrested, detained, and imprisoned Americans abroad.”  Emphasizing 
the need for consular officers to immediately seek access to U.S. nationals held under 
such conditions, Kissinger instructed U.S. Foreign Service Officers to determine 
prisoners’ physical and mental health, document evidence of mistreatment, and 
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provide “appropriate humanitarian assistance,” and recommended that U.S. nationals 
be advised of their rights under international law.71
Underscoring the significance of the human rights movement in forcing the 
issue to the forefront of U.S. diplomacy, Kissinger further asserted that, “Failure to act 
promptly in protection cases may not only endanger the rights of the American 
nationals involved but also can prove most detrimental to the Department’s relations 
with the public, the information media and with the Congress.”  Perhaps referring to 
the Olga Talamante Defense Committee, Kissinger continued: 
   
 
The Department recognizes the limitations, both in legal authority and 
resources, that handicap posts in dealing with these problems.  But it should be 
kept in mind that complaints of U.S. nationals alleging inadequate Embassy 
protection, particularly when accompanied by claims of torture and/or other 
mistreatment by host government authorities, can produce explosive publicity.  
This is true regardless of the validity of such claims and allegations.  Such 
incidents often result in a flood of public mail, congressional inquiries to the 
Department, requests for detailed chronologies of events, GAO [Government 
Accountability Office] investigations, appearances of the complaining U.S. 
nationals on nation-wide TV shows and at congressional hearings, etc.   
 
Further illustrating the impact of the human rights movement on the formulation of 
U.S. foreign policy, Kissinger concluded that, “Conversely, quick and effective 
protection can be very helpful to all—the U.S. national, the Department and the field,” 
and appended a transcript of a Fraser Subcommittee hearing on human rights in Brazil, 
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in which a U.S. national recently released from a Recife prison praised prompt U.S. 
diplomatic efforts on his behalf.72
From the outset, however, the Talamante case failed to fit the pattern of 
consular assistance for U.S. nationals imprisoned overseas.  Indeed, the Embassy was 
heavily criticized by human rights advocates on Capitol Hill, notably Senators Edward 
M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Alan Cranston (D-CA), for failing to meet with Talamante 
until December 4, 1974—nearly a month after her arrest.  Such criticism was an 
unwelcome irritant for U.S. Ambassador Hill; Talamante, the Ambassador reported to 
Washington, had made no effort to contact the Embassy, and when news of her arrest 
finally reached the Ambassador on November 25, it came from the young woman’s 
supporters in California by way of human rights advocates in Washington.  Piqued by 
the bad publicity, Hill nonetheless dispatched consular officers to visit Talamante in 
Azul—nearly 200 miles from Buenos Aires—more than a dozen times over the course 
of 1975, and took up the case himself with the Argentine Foreign Minister.  “I 
emphasized the need to resolve this case quickly by having Miss Talamante leave 
Argentina as soon as possible before this case poisoned the good relations between the 
United States and Argentina,” Hill cabled Washington in July.
 
73
Once Talamante’s case had been adjudicated, Hill hoped to secure the young 
woman’s expulsion from Argentina regardless of the judge’s ruling because of her 
status as a U.S. national.  Conflicting reports on the case’s progress, however, 
complicated the Embassy’s efforts.  In September, Talamante and her co-defendants 
were found guilty as charged and given a three-year prison sentence.  Word 
subsequently reached the Embassy that Talamante had initiated an appeal, then, a few 
days later, that she had dismissed her publicly-appointed attorney.  As congressional 
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pressure on the State Department to secure Talamante’s release continued unabaited, 
in early October Secretary of State Kissinger signed off on a cable from ARA Bureau 
chief William D. Rogers, instructing Ambassador Hill to “assume personal charge of 
this case in effort to obtain [the] earliest solution [...] This will ensure that we are 
provided accurate and complete information on all pertinent developments as they 
occur in Talamante case.”74
Frustrated by Talamante’s seemingly erratic decision making and shocked by a 
threatening cable directed to him by one of Talamante’s supporters, Hill reluctantly 
accepted responsibility for the case.  In a meeting with the Argentine Minister of 
Interior on October 15, Hill reiterated the importance of Talamante’s release, asserting 
that the young woman’s expulsion would “avoid an orchestrated publicity campaign 
that could cause the GOA embarrassment if the Talamante case were allowed to 
become a cause célèbre.”
   
75  The following month, however, Hill’s efforts were 
stymied by Talamante’s decision to continue to appeal the case, thus making it 
impossible for her to leave Argentina until a verdict was handed down.76
  
   
Olga Talamante’s decision to maintain solidarity with her co-defendants 
resulted in her continued incarceration for the duration of Isabel Perón’s fraught 
presidency, which came to an abrupt end following the military coup on March 24, 
1976.  In a prepared statement broadcast over the radio the following evening, the 
three service chiefs solemnly declared the beginning of the National Reorganization 
Process.  Promising to govern according to “clearly-defined standards” and fostering 
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the “total observance of ethical and moral principles,” the generals pledged harsh 
measures against subversives.  “The armed forces have assumed control of the 
republic,” the communiqué concluded.  “And we want the entire country to understand 
the profound and unequivocal meaning of our actions so that the responsibility and the 
collective efforts accompanying this undertaking, which seeks the common good, will 
bring about, with the help of God, complete national recovery.”77
 Within a few months, it would become clear that the March 1976 coup d’état 
had initiated an unprecedented state-sanctioned terror campaign against perceived 
subversives.  In the immediate aftermath of the military takeover, however, the 
Argentine military’s effort to promote an image of protecting human rights, and, 
correspondingly, to cultivate U.S. support provided U.S. Ambassador Hill with a 
window of opportunity to resolve the Talamante case—the only known instance of a 
U.S. citizen incarcerated in Argentina.  The case had already dragged on for nearly a 
year-and-a-half, and—thanks to ongoing political pressure by the OTDC—threatened 
to sour the newly installed Argentine government’s relationship with the United 
States.   
 
Accordingly, only two days after the coup, a group of soldiers entered the cell 
occupied by the female political prisoners at the Azul prison.  After an extensive 
search, the women were ordered to line up against a wall.  “Who is the Talamante 
woman?” demanded one of the guards.  “I stepped forward and identified myself,” 
Talamante recalled years later.  “The officer looked at me and spat out, ‘So you’re the 
one that Kissinger wants released.’”78
                                                 
77 “The Armed Forces’ Decision to Assume the Direction of the State, 1976,” reprinted in Brian  
Loveman and Jr. Davies, Thomas M., eds., The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America, 2 
ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 158-60. 
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Less than 48 hours later a Pan American Airways jetliner touched down in 
New York with a stunned Talamante on board.  Welcomed by members of the Olga 
Talamante Defense Committee, she immediately boarded a flight to California, where 
she was greeted by a teeming throng of supporters and journalists.  Three years after 
departing for Argentina, including 16 months as a political prisoner, Talamante—the 
first foreign national to be expelled by the Argentine military junta—was finally 
reunited with her family.79
 
 
The Talamantes’ long-awaited reunion, however, would prove short-lived.  For 
Olga, the suddenness of her release and the continued incarceration of close friends 
offered little peace of mind.  “Although we had always talked about how a political 
prisoner’s first and foremost goal was to be free to continue doing political work and I 
knew that my comrades were cheering me on, I felt torn,” Talamante would later 
recall.  “Instead of relief, I felt like my heart had been split in two.”80
Indeed, Talamante’s arrest, interrogation, and incarceration served as a grim 
capstone in her extraordinary process of intellectual development, rooted in her 
experiences as an immigrant in rural California.  For Talamante, growing up in the 
labor camp, and working for local whites created a foundational understanding of the 
deep-rooted disparities endemic in rural California.   “During the winter I babysat for 
the ranchers,” Talamante remembered, “so I was poignantly aware of how our 
‘homes’ did not have heat in the winter or air conditioning in the summer, as theirs 
did.  It was my first awareness of class differences, you might say.”
   
81
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As she passed through adolescence, Talamante’s crude sense of racial and 
class inequalities developed into a nascent political consciousness.  At the 
encouragement of her high school’s only Latina teacher, in 1967 and 1968 Talamante 
attended an American Friends Service Committee summer program on non-violence 
and civil disobedience, an experience that pushed her to situate the Latino experience 
within the broader context of civil rights activism in the late 1960s.  “After hearing the 
description of the voter registration drives in the South,” Talamante remembered, “I 
became convinced that if you wanted to effect change, you had to take action, you had 
to take a stand and be true to it.”82
Enrolling at the University of California, Santa Cruz, in 1969, Talamante was 
immediately swept up in the intense outpouring of New Left political activism that 
characterized the late 1960s.  For a budding activist, it was a dynamic, exhilarating, 
and frightening moment, with the anti-Vietnam War movement nearing its apogee, 
stirrings of second-wave feminism, and, particularly in California, an outburst of 
Latino and Chicano political activism.  Talamante quickly became deeply involved 
with the Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Azatlán (MeCHA), a Chicano student 
organization, and soon identified herself as a Chicana activist.  She also served as a 
field organizer for the United Farm Workers (UFW) in the struggle to win higher 
wages for farm laborers working in the grape and lettuce industries, organizing picket 
lines, food drives, and awareness-raising events at UC Santa Cruz.  In the summer of 
1973, having survived dangerous confrontations with thugs hired by teamsters, 
Talamante proudly introduced UFW leader César Chávez to a cheering crowd of more 
than one thousand people.
  
83
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  Such experiences inculcated in Talamante a hard-nosed 
dedication to personal activism.  “[T]here was a growing realization on my part that if 
83 Carol Pogash, “Friends Remember Argentine Prisoner,” San Francisco Examiner, December 5, 1975. 
 127 
 
you are going to take action to create change, and you are going to take a stand, that’s 
what you need to do if that’s what you stand for,” Talamante remembered, along with 
a recognition that, “there may be consequences and repercussions.”84
Talamante’s sense of political awareness expanded dramatically during a 
study-abroad program in Mexico during the summer of her junior year.  Falling in 
with a pair of leftist Argentine documentary filmmakers and eventually travelling 
through much of Central America and Mexico, Talamante began to map her 
dedication to Chicana activism onto the broader pattern of hemispheric relations.  
After witnessing the repressive tactics of the Mexican security forces against left-wing 
activists, Talamante recalled feeling a sense of shock that “Mexicans in power are 
being just as brutal and just as repressive and just as autocratic as gringos were to 
Mexicanos in the U.S.  So it doesn’t only depend on the color of your skin and your 
origin, but it depends on who is in power.”
 
85  Underscoring her growing sense of a 
broad-based struggle that transcended traditional boundaries, upon returning to UCSC 
in the fall Talamante worked to establish alliances between MeCHA and African 
American, Asian, and Native American student groups.86
Reunited with her filmmaker friends in Buenos Aires in August 1973, 
Talamante was swept up in the heady sense of expectation held by many young 
Peronists following the return to civilian government in 1973.  In addition to teaching 
English, the 24-year-old Talamante began volunteering at a community center in Azul 
that offered basic social services such as legal aid and tutoring to the residents of a 
poor neighborhood.
 
87
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May Day in 1974, however, Talamante’s work at the center became increasingly 
difficult as municipal funding dried up and political violence on both ends of the 
political spectrum increased, a trend that accelerated in the chaotic aftermath of 
Perón’s death on July 1, 1974.88
Arrested only days before her departure, Talamante was taken to a police 
station and forced to stand with her hands against a wall for more than 12 hours before 
being hooded and deposited, hands bound, in a holding cell.  “The burlap bag felt 
rough and scratchy against my cheek, but it also smelled earthy and deceptively 
comforting.  Thick tape already covered my eyes, so the bag's only purpose was to 
frighten me,” Talamante later recalled.  “And it worked. I knew I had entered another 
dimension.”  Accused of participating in a left-wing terrorist attack on an Azul police 
station the previous week, Talamante was subsequently stripped, bound, and subjected 
to electro-shock torture.
  By early November, with daily reports of terrorist 
killings and a military coup widely anticipated, Talamante made the decision to return 
to California.   
89
 
   
All I could do was scream.  The terror came after.  They are going to do it 
again, I thought.  Someone shoved a pillow over my face to muffle my 
screams.  I panicked.  To survive, I must be able to breathe and scream. 
After about the third time the electric current surged, I figured out a 
brilliant maneuver.  Right before the hands holding the pillow pushed down 
again, I turned my head sideways and took a breath.  The timing of this took 
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complete focus.  It was a project.  New reasoning kicked in: As long as I could 
get the timing right, I would survive.90
 
 
Talamante arrived at the Azul prison physically and mentally weak but lucky 
to be alive.  There, in a 20- by 25-foot cell with human waste leaking down one wall 
from a broken sewer pipe, crowded with two dozen female political prisoners, 
Talamante underwent a further stage in her intellectual maturation.  Guided by a sense 
of alienation from the United States government, Talamante refused to call the U.S. 
Embassy for assistance, relying instead on her family and friends to agitate on her 
behalf.  Counseled by her cell-mates, increasingly cognizant of her family and friends’ 
unflagging efforts on her behalf in the United States, and witness to prisoners taken 
from their cells and never seen again, over subsequent months Talamante came to 
visualize her own experience as part of a far larger, transnational struggle.  “I know 
that we are presently being punished for having the courage and determination to rise 
against the injustice and exploitation allowed by a system which feeds and survives on 
those things,” she wrote to a supporter on January 29, 1975, “but I also know that your 
courage and hard work are the rewards of our efforts.”91
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myself in relation to my countless hungry brothers and sisters.  And I learn once more 
that my imprisonment is but a small part of this historical yearning for freedom.”92
Unexpectedly released from prison in March 1976, and acutely aware of the 
extent of state-sanctioned violence in Argentina, Talamante felt incapable of 
remaining with her family in California.  Transforming the Olga Talamante Defense 
Committee into the Argentine Human Rights Commission (Comisión Argentina por 
Derechos Humanos [CADHU]), Talamante established an office in Washington, D.C., 
and set out to draw upon the OTDC’s infrastructure to raise awareness of political 
conditions in Argentina and generate popular outcry against U.S. military assistance to 
the Argentine junta.   
 
 
Talamante’s arrival in Washington corresponded with a heady moment in the 
development of the human rights movement.  On Capitol Hill, Senators such as 
Edward Kennedy and Alan Cranston and Representatives such as Donald Fraser and 
Rev. Richard Drinan had made major advances in the effort to institutionalize human 
rights in U.S. foreign policy.  Revealing the dramatic rise in human rights awareness 
since the outset of the decade, in September 1976, 102 incumbent members of the 
House and Senate and more than two dozen contenders in the upcoming congressional 
election signed a statement encouraging candidates for public office to promote human 
rights in U.S. foreign policy.  More concretely, over the course of 1976, the Congress 
significantly strengthened human rights legislation, cutting off bilateral U.S. security 
assistance to Uruguay and Chile, and, through the Humphrey-Cranston Amendment, 
replacing the non-binding “sense of Congress” language in Section 502B with a legal 
obligation that the Executive terminate security aid to gross violators of internationally 
recognized human rights, and providing congressional legislators with the right to 
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overrule the president.  Similarly, Section 301 of the International Security Assistance 
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (PL 94-329) reiterated the restriction on 
security assistance to human rights violators, and also required the State Department to 
draw up human rights reports on every nation receiving U.S. security assistance.93
Finally, throughout 1976, Fraser’s wide-ranging Subcommittee hearings 
continued to frustrate Washington bureaucrats unwilling to embrace the call for an 
infusion of morality in U.S. foreign policy.  As one Foreign Service Officer wrote in a 
memo in mid-July, “there are some hearings coming up […] which will undoubtedly 
result in adverse publicity, possibly be embarrassing to Departmental officers who 
testify, and almost certainly will be the forerunner to adverse actions under the new 
Foreign Assistance Legislation.”
   
94
 
  The completion of the first half of the hearings in 
question a few weeks later only served to deepen the dour mood in Foggy Bottom.  
Underscoring the tension between Kissinger and congressional human rights 
advocates, State Department Human Rights Coordinator James M. Wilson, Jr. wrote in 
early August: 
Public witnesses effectively painted a dark picture of human rights in Paraguay 
and Uruguay.  The Department will have to appear on these two countries in 
early August and must provide a straightforward response if we are to avoid 
the mauling we took in the Central American hearings in June.  The 
Subcommittee also plans to hear witnesses on human rights in Iran in August, 
adhering to the now familiar pattern of calling hostile non-governmental 
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witnesses first to establish a negative record for Departmental witnesses to 
grapple with in later testimony.95
 
 
Raising the hackles of the Foreign Service, Fraser’s Subcommittee thus continued to 
serve as a key point on the expanding human rights spectrum.  As one human rights 
advocate asserted during the hearings on Argentina the following month, “It seems to 
me that the kind of attention, whatever it is, that is attributed to human rights today is 
partly a result of the hearings of this very committee, [and] that it does indicate a 
sustained interest in this question, that it will be weighed throughout the policy 
process[.]”96
 By 1976 non-governmental interest in human rights advocacy had blossomed 
into a major political movement.  Consisting of perhaps one hundred organizations, an 
“amorphous yet multifaceted aggregate” as one early study aptly put it, the movement 
ranged from faith-based groups (such as the National Council of Churches), to 
organizations dedicated to raising awareness (such as the Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs), as well as solidarity organizations advocating on behalf of particular nations, 
ranging from Chile to the Philippines.
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human rights advocates, “we are absolutely dependent on you for information.   We 
are basically all generalists, and we depend upon you for information, for the trends, 
the movements, the opportunities for congressional action.”98
The surge of popular interest also dramatically affected the handful of 
longstanding human rights organizations.  At the International League for Human 
Rights, Roberta Cohen was nearly overwhelmed by a wave of volunteers.  “Having 
been in this tiny office where it was so hard to find anybody to pay any attention, in 
the course of several years suddenly I began getting telephone calls and walk-ins […] 
from so many people, many of them prominent writers and scientists and publishers,” 
recalled Cohen in a recent interview.  Indeed, in a matter of months, some fifty 
lawyers had offered to assist the ILHR on human rights cases pro bono, making it 
possible for Cohen to establish a parallel organization, the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights.
  
99  “Human rights is suddenly chic,” Cohen told the New York Times in 
early 1977.  “For years we were preachers, cockeyed idealists, or busybodies and now 
we are respectable.”100
A similar process occurred at the U.S. affiliate of Amnesty International.  In 
1973, Amnesty’s groundbreaking Report on Torture had established the organization’s 
credibility as a global human rights watchdog.
 
101  Three years later, Amnesty 
International USA boasted thousands of members across the nation, offices in 
Washington, D.C., New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles, and was operating on 
an annual budget of nearly $1 million.102
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told a journalist in December.  “The interest in Amnesty has just absolutely 
boomed.”103
In addition to serving as a frequent participant in congressional hearings, by 
mid-decade Amnesty was continuously feeding information to between 40 and 50 
members of Congress, significantly enhancing legislators’ ability to pressure the State 
Department to fulfill the requirements of the growing body of human rights 
legislation.  Indeed, following the completion of the first-round of State Department 
human rights reports on nations receiving U.S. security assistance, in an internal 
memo to U.S. Embassies in Latin America, ARA Bureau chief Harry W. Shlaudeman 
noted the “high credibility Amnesty and others have with Congress”  and requested 
that Embassy personnel “go rather carefully through recent Amnesty and other reports 
and extract the references to individuals or specific legal situations (e.g. ‘fair trials are 
not available’),” and provide Washington updated information on each issue.  
Shlaudeman further requested that Embassies maintain detailed chronologies of 
“discussions, representations, programs on the subject of human rights.”  
Underscoring the important role accorded to Amnesty International by legislators, he 
concluded: 
 
 
I know how much time many of you are already devoting to this subject, but 
we simply have to establish—to congressional satisfaction—that we are paying 
detailed attention to it, that we are familiar with what Amnesty and others are 
reporting and that we are active.  Then, and only then, can we hope to get 
discussions of this subject with Congress on what I consider the right track: 
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what, as a society, are we trying to accomplish; what can we hope to 
accomplish; and how should we go about it?104
 
 
 Since the March military coup, Amnesty had kept a particularly close watch on 
the deteriorating human rights situation in Argentina.  Over the course of the late 
spring and summer of 1976, grim reports of the military junta’s campaign against 
perceived subversives had begun to filter into the United States media with increasing 
frequency.  On May 11, Robert Cox, the courageous editor of the English-language 
Buenos Aires Herald, reported in the Washington Post that since the military coup 
more than 204 persons had been killed in the government’s anti-subversive campaign 
(an estimate that would later prove far lower than the actual number slain by security 
forces).105
A few weeks later Cox reported that lines were forming at the entrance to the 
Government House as early as 1 am to receive appointments when the building 
opened six hours later to inquire into the fate of missing or detained relatives.  “Most 
Argentines expected that the death squads would be abolished by the armed forces 
after the military takeover,” Cox wrote, noting that the military had assumed control of 
all security forces, including the police.  “But this has not happened.  Bodies have 
continued to appear, although many are not reported because of press self-censorship 
and police secrecy.”
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petitions since April 1, many for persons who had disappeared after being arrested by 
security forces.107
 Amnesty International’s own coverage of Argentina corroborated the intrepid 
reporting of journalists like Cox and de Onís.   Over the course of 1976, Amnesty 
published a series of press releases and short reports on human rights issues in 
Argentina including the number of political deaths reported in the international press 
since the military coup, academic freedom, and detained or missing refugees.
 
108
Unwilling to risk the negative publicity a refusal would undoubtedly generate, 
the Argentine military government reluctantly accepted an AI delegation.  
Accordingly, on November 5, three dedicated human rights advocates arrived in 
Buenos Aires to conduct an 11-day study: Amnesty International Secretariat member 
Tricia Feeney, Lord Eric Avebury, and Rep. Robert M. Drinan.  Quick to denounce 
Amnesty for intervening in their country’s internal affairs, Argentine military officers 
were especially distrustful of Father Drinan, who had established himself in the House 
of Representatives as a fierce critic of Argentina’s human rights situation.  In fact, on 
July 2, Drinan had declared before Congress that “in recent months, right-wing ‘death 
squads’ have been murdering and terrorizing supposed leftists,” a theme he reiterated 
  The 
scale of the state-sanctioned violence against perceived subversives in the South 
American nation, however, inspired Amnesty to dramatically extend its reporting by 
taking the unprecedented step of organizing a “mission” to Argentina, with the explicit 
intention of documenting first-hand human rights violations committed by the 
Argentine military government.   
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the following month.  In both instances, the Massachusetts Congressman attempted to 
garner support for legislation to parole endangered South American refugees residing 
in Argentina into the United States.109
From the moment the group arrived in Buenos Aires on November 5, 1976, it 
was subjected to intense surveillance by Argentine military and police forces.  Nearly 
two dozen plainclothes police officers shadowed the mission at all times, frequently 
detaining and questioning individuals with whom the delegation met.  Indeed, on the 
morning of November 15, the group received a desperate telephone call from the 
mother 25-year old Josefa Martinez, a student who had gone missing after meeting 
with the AI group the previous evening in Córdoba.  Martinez’s disappearance, Drinan 
later wrote, “caused me anguish as if a member of my own family had met such a 
fate.”  Immediately alerting the U.S. Embassy, Drinan also made a personal appeal to 
the Papal Nuncio to intervene, and continued to advocate on Martinez’s behalf after 
returning to Washington.
 
110  Like thousands of other Argentines swept up in what 
editor Robert Cox plaintively described as a “terrible black night, that may well be 
getting blacker,” Martinez failed to reappear.111
Notwithstanding the military’s effort to deter cooperation with the Amnesty 
mission, more than one hundred Argentines met with the delegation to declare arrested 
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or disappeared friends or relatives or to deliver personal testimony regarding 
violations of human rights at the hands of security service personnel.  As a result, 
Amnesty’s mission report, released in March 1977, revealed in unprecedented detail 
the extent of human rights violations in Argentina.112  Estimating that more than 
15,000 Argentines had disappeared or been abducted since mid-1974, the report 
asserted that the Argentine government had “permitted widespread torture of political 
prisoners, and engaged in abductions of its own citizens.”113  Setting a remarkably 
high standard in human rights reporting, the 92-page document, as social scientist Lars 
Schoultz asserted in a pioneering study of human rights shortly thereafter, constituted 
a “masterpiece of the genre, possibly the most comprehensive public evidence ever 
assembled by a NGO on human rights violations by any Latin American 
government.”114
 
  Solidifying Amnesty International’s reputation as a reliable and 
courageous human rights watchdog, and underscoring the extraordinary rise in human 
rights awareness, nine months after the report’s release Amnesty was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize. 
Arriving in Washington with little more than a suitcase, Talamante and 
CADHU co-founder Gino Lofredo “scraped by”—staying with friends and relying on 
donations to rent a tiny office in Washington’s relatively inexpensive Dupont Circle 
district.  “We lived very, very meagerly,” Talamante recalled in a recent interview.115
                                                 
112 Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Argentina, 6-15 November 1976 (London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 1977). 
  
Limited resources notwithstanding, Talamante quickly established CADHU as a 
leading voice among non-governmental human rights organizations engaged in U.S.-
113 “Statement of Congressman Robert F. Drinan Upon Release of the Report of an Amnesty 
International Mission to Argentina,” March 23, 1977,” Box 392, Folder: Subject HR, ARG, Drinan 
Papers. 
114 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America, 84. 
115 Telephone Interview with Olga Talamante, March 28, 2008. 
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Argentine relations.  In addition to working closely with the Washington Office on 
Latin America, CADHU established close ties with other Latin American national 
solidarity committees including Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, and Peru.  Talamante also 
became an outspoken member of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, 
an umbrella organization with roots in the Vietnam War protest movement 
representing 35 religious, political, trade union, and human rights organizations.116  
Congressional lobbying, however, remained CADHU’s primary mission.  “The first 
thing we started doing was documenting what was happening,” Talamante recalled.  
“We put together information packets and walked the halls of Congress.”117
It was a heady moment to be engaged in human rights work on Capitol Hill.  
By early 1977, the human rights movement had emerged as a defining feature on the 
U.S. political landscape, a rising counter-movement to the maintenance of close U.S. 
ties to staunchly anti-communist, right-wing military regimes.  Indeed, it was a 
development most clearly evident in Jimmy Carter’s electoral victory over the 
incumbent Ford Administration.  A Washington outsider, Carter had repeatedly 
emphasized the need for an infusion of morality in U.S. foreign policy during the 
campaign, and, underscoring how far human rights advocates had shifted the U.S. 
political debate since the outset of the decade, in his inauguration address on January 
20 Carter asserted that “our commitment to human rights must be absolute,” and 
“because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”
   
118
Cognizant of Carter’s political inexperience and embrace of the human rights 
issue late in the presidential campaign, human rights advocates and their sympathizers 
in the Congress nonetheless welcomed the opportunity the new Administration 
   
                                                 
116 Argentine Commission for Human Rights, Press Release, November 10, 1977, Box 73, folder: 
Human Rights 12/76-11/77, Office of Public Liaison, Margaret (Midge) Costanza, JCL. 
117 Telephone Interview with Olga Talamante, March 28, 2008. 
118 Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1977, accessed online (October 8, 2009), at 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/inaugadd.phtml. 
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presented for dramatically accelerating the institutionalization of human rights in U.S. 
foreign policy.  As Roberta Cohen recalled, “I was thrilled that here was a president 
who was interested in human rights.”119  Indeed, in comparison with Nixon and Ford 
Administration’s fierce resistance to human rights initiatives, the Carter team 
demonstrated a remarkable willingness to engage the non-governmental human rights 
community.    In early February, for example, the International League for Human 
Rights convened a conference on implementing human rights in U.S. foreign policy at 
the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  More than 50 
human rights experts attended—unmistakable evidence, League director Jerome J. 
Shestack subsequently wrote Carter, “of the widespread support your advocacy is 
generating throughout the world.120  Underscoring his support for human rights, after 
receiving a copy of the extensive report, Carter sent a handwritten letter of thanks and 
subsequently offered Shestack the position of U.S. delegate to the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission.121
Similarly, congressional human rights supporters relished Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance’s recognition of human rights as a U.S. foreign policy goal, and his 
willingness to engage non-governmental advocates.  In April 1977, for example, 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher emphasized the importance of meeting 
with members of the human rights community in an internal memorandum to Vance.  
“Since there is an increasingly active, vocal, and influential human rights lobby 
 
                                                 
119 Personal Interview with Roberta Cohen, May 1, 2008, Washington, D.C.   
120 Jerome J. Shestack to Jimmy Carter, March 2, 1977, box: 4, folder: Foreign Policy and Human 
Rights, 1/77-3/77, Office of Public Liaison, Margaret (Midge) Costanza, JCL.   
121 “I appreciate your organization’s contribution to an area in which I have a deep, personal concern,” 
Carter wrote Shestack.  White House Correspondence, Jimmy Carter to Jerome J. Shestack, March 9, 
1977, Box: 4, Folder: Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 1/77-3/77, Office of Public Liaison, Margaret 
(Midge) Costanza, JCL.  Shestack turned down the U.N. position in 1977 due to commitments in the 
non-governmental sector.  Offered the position again two years later, Shestack accepted and served as 
the U.S. delegate to the 1980 Commission.  See Iain Guest, Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's 
Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990), 190-91. 
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operating on the Hill, the Department should complement its efforts with the Congress 
with efforts to meet and talk with representatives of the more important human rights 
organizations in town,” Christopher wrote, emphasizing in particular WOLA, the 
National Catholic Conference, and the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military 
Policy.122
 
  Although human rights advocates quickly recognized that Secretary 
Vance’s conception of the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy was far from 
“absolute,” few could deny the dramatic shift in congressional relations with the State 
Department.  When a newly-elected member of Congress asked Rep. Tom Harkin’s 
opinion of Vance following a meeting between the Secretary a group of Congress 
members, the veteran human rights advocate responded, “You should have been here 
when Kissinger was Secretary of State.”  Harkin continued: 
First of all, he would never have come down here to meet with us.  Secondly, 
he probably never would have condescended to answer our questions, except 
in only the most general and non-committal way.  And thirdly, if he had spent 
15 minutes with us, it would have been amazing in itself.  So as far as I am 
concerned, Secretary Vance is indeed a breath of fresh air in that position.”123
 
 
The Carter Administration’s apparent interest in human rights notwithstanding, 
non-governmental human rights groups continued to actively lobby liberal members of 
Congress to expand the existing body of human rights legislation.  As the hemispheres 
worst human rights violator, Argentina took center stage in the debate, and Olga 
                                                 
122 Department of  State Memorandum, Warren Christopher to Cyrus Vance, April 14, 1977, Subject: 
“U.S. Foreign Policy on Human Rights: A Status Report,” Box 2, Folder: TL 4/1-4/15, Policy and 
Planning Staff, Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, GRDS, RG 59, Archives 
II.   
123 Congressional Official Correspondence, Tom Harkin to Cyrus Vance, November 11, 1977, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.  
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Talamante became a leading voice in the effort to convince congressional lawmakers 
to curtail U.S. security transfers to the South American nation.  As Olga Talamante 
told participants at a symposium on U.S. foreign policy in April, “for the past 15 years 
the United States has explicitly supported the role of the Armed Forces in Argentina as 
in the rest of Latin America.”  Notwithstanding the Argentine military junta’s 
“apparent strength, fervent anti-communism and identification with the United States,” 
Talamante continued, “the current military regime in Argentina is actually deeply 
vulnerable, unstable and weak.”  Faced with an “embarrassing and undesirable ally” 
Talamante concluded, the United States, “must have the courage to recognize its past 
mistakes and firmly disassociate itself from the Argentine Military.”124
Human rights advocates were heartened by the Carter Administration’s 
unprecedented February decision to reduce Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to 
Argentina for fiscal year 1978 from $30 to $15 million on human rights grounds.  
Although the Argentine military junta subsequently rejected the remaining FMS quota, 
the U.S. government reduction did not affect $750,000 in 
 
International Military 
Education and Training (IMET)—a credit program for foreign soldiers to train at U.S. 
military institutions—and Argentina retained access to U.S. government and 
commercial cash sales of military hardware.125
                                                 
124 Argentine Commission for Human Rights, “Statement Prepared for the International Symposium on 
Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, April 27-30, 1977, University of Notre Dame, box: 74, 
folder: Human Rights: Argentina and Chile 1/76-11/77, OPLMC, JCL.  
  Accordingly, in the late spring non-
governmental human rights advocates’ lobbying efforts for a complete arms cutoff to 
Argentina intensified.  “I visited office after office every Senator or Representative for 
a period of three months,” recalled Patricia Erb, a U.S. citizen who had survived 
125 Jo Marie Griesgraber, Implementation by the Carter administration of human rights legislation 
affecting Latin America (PhD Dissertation, 1983), 71. 
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abduction and torture by Argentine security forces in 1976.126  Similarly, capturing the 
sense of urgency that guided her efforts, in a letter to President Carter in early June, 
Talamante quoted General Iberico Saint Jean, the Governor of Buenos Aires Province.  
“First we will kill all the subversives;” the General had recently asserted, “then we 
will kill their collaborators; then … their sympathizers; then … those who remain 
indifferent; and, finally, we will kill those who are timid.”  In a three-page letter 
detailing the extreme brutality of the Argentine military government, Talamante 
concluded by calling upon Carter to “join the United States Congress on this issue and 
support its initiatives to terminate all forms of military aid to Argentina.”127
The debate over U.S. policy toward Argentina culminated in September 1977.  
In deliberations over the Senate’s military aid authorization bill, staunch-human rights 
supporter Edward Kennedy introduced an amendment cutting off all U.S. military and 
commercial sales to Argentina.  With the support of Senator Church, and clear support 
in the House of Representatives—a similar proposal by Representative Gerry Studds 
(D-MA) had been defeated by a mere 13 votes—the amendment appeared destined to 
pass muster.
 
128
                                                 
126 Patricia Erb, “A mis Compañeros y Compañeras les Regalé mi Voz,” in Jorge E. Taiana, ed., 
Testimonios de la Solidaridad Internacional (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 
Comercio Internacional y Culto, 2007), 143. 
  At the twelfth hour of negotiations, however, the Carter 
Administration suddenly entered into the debate.  Fearing the bill’s passage would 
prevent the President from offering the Argentine military junta incentives for 
improvements in human rights, Carter requested Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) to 
negotiate a postponement of the cutoff date.  Incensed by Carter’s apparent 
127 Olga Talamante and Horacio D. Lofredo to Jimmy Carter, June 3, 1977, box: 74, folder: Human 
Rights: Argentina and Chile 1/76-11/77, OPLMC, JCL.   
128 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America, 259-60. 
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unwillingness to enforce tough human rights sanctions, Kennedy nonetheless 
pragmatically agreed to postpone the cutoff until September 30, 1978.129
 
 
Notwithstanding the delayed implementation date, the successful passage of 
the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment constituted a defining moment in the effort to 
institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  A counter-movement to the 
maintenance of close U.S. ties to anti-communist, right-wing military regimes, over 
the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s, human rights advocates sought to uproot 
the policy prescriptions that had undergirded U.S. Cold War policy over the previous 
quarter-century.  As the successful passage of the arms cutoff to Argentina made clear, 
by the end of 1977, non-governmental human rights advocates and their sympathizers 
in the Congress had created a strong grassroots base, established a powerful presence 
in Washington, and could effectively mobilize on behalf of human rights issues. 
For Talamante, in particular, the successful congressional cutoff was a defining 
triumph in her own fierce struggle to cast international opprobrium on the Argentine 
military junta.  Having personally experienced the horrors of state-sanctioned violence 
in Argentina, Talamante had developed into a tenacious advocate on behalf of human 
rights, and following the successful passage of the arms cutoff, Talamante shifted 
from CADHU to a position with the American Friends Service Committee focusing on 
global human rights-related issues.  Yet as state-sanctioned violence continued in 
Argentina, Talamante would find little peace of mind.  Capturing the lasting imprint of 
her experiences in Argentina, in a poem inspired by the annual round-trip migration of 
swallows from Argentina to California, Talamante later wrote:  
 
I, swallow, 
                                                 
129 Burton I. Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., 2nd, Revised ed. 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 52.  
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my tears 
not of resignation 
not of contemplation 
not of anguish 
or defeat 
 
I, swallow, 
my tears 
of sadness 
of historic rage 
of senseless reality 
of crushed humanity 
of boundless hope 
 
I, swallow, 
my tears 
of determination 
of commitment 
of memories and images 
now put to rest 
 
I, swallow, 
my tears on the shores of a new ocean 
I am no longer a swallow 
I will not make the 6,000-mile trip 
every other beat of my heart 
I will no longer swallow my tears and smile unhappily 
I will now cry happily in my sadness130
 
 
                                                 
130 From Gómez, "Feminism, Torture, and the Politics of Chicana/Third World Solidarity: An Interview 
with Olga Talamante," 119. 
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Chapter 4: 
“Total Immersion in All the Horrors of the World”: 
the Carter Administration and Human Rights, 1977-1978 
 
Three days after the first anniversary of the Argentine military coup against 
Isabel Perón, a passenger jet carrying Patricia Derian touched down on the tarmac at 
Ezeiza International Airport.  Met by U.S. officials and ushered into an Embassy car, 
President Jimmy Carter’s newly-appointed Department of State Coordinator for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was whisked to the United States Embassy, 
where Ambassador Robert C. Hill was awaiting her arrival.  Sparing Derian a long-
winded greeting, Hill went straight to the point.  “I’m going to tell you a secret, you 
have to promise not to tell anyone,” he began.  Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the 
ambassador confided, “came down and he said that they didn’t need to worry about 
human rights issues anymore.”1  Despite his insistent efforts to convince Kissinger to 
make a strong statement on behalf of human rights in Argentina, Hill continued, the 
Secretary had personally informed the Argentine Foreign Minister in mid-1976 that he 
hoped Argentina would “finish its terrorist problem” by the time the U.S. Congress 
reconvened in January 1977.  Appalled at the rising number of extra-legal killings, by 
September Hill sensed that the architects of Argentina’s dirty war against perceived 
left-wing subversives were following the Secretary of State’s advice.  “Kissinger gave 
the Argentines the green light,” the Ambassador bluntly concluded.2
It was a remarkable introduction for the untested Human Rights Coordinator 
into the legacy of U.S. support for anti-communist Latin American military 
 
                                                 
1 Patricia Derian, interview on “The Current,” Radio Broadcast, March 24, 2006, Canadian 
Broadcasting Company, accessed online (May 8, 2006) at  
http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/2006/200603/20060324.html.  
2 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, March 1977[?], Patricia Derian and Robert C. 
Hill, American Embassy Buenos Aires, Derian Papers.  
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establishments over the previous quarter-century.  Not surprisingly, although Derian 
found an unlikely ally in Robert C. Hill, her visit to Argentina also starkly 
demonstrated that the Ambassador’s quiet support for human rights was by no means 
shared by all U.S. Embassy personnel.  To the contrary, Derian sensed almost 
complete opposition to Carter’s nascent human rights policy among the U.S. Foreign 
Service Officers posted in Buenos Aires.  Underscoring the longstanding military ties 
that had largely defined U.S.-Argentine relations over the course of the Cold War, in 
one well-attended meeting at the Embassy, Derian’s discussion of the Carter 
Administration’s commitment to the promotion of human rights was interrupted by the 
U.S. Defense Attaché, who stood up and loudly demanded “what the hell does that 
mean?”3  “Well, we’re not going to sell them thumbscrews anymore, if that’s what 
you mean,” Derian responded.4
Similarly, Argentine Foreign Ministry officials brooked no criticism of state 
repression, dismissing Derian’s human rights concerns as a peripheral consideration in 
their struggle against left-wing extremists.  Derian’s meetings with Argentine officials, 
Fred Rondon wrote Ambassador Hill, were “almost beside the point.”  On the one 
hand, Derian was uncompromising, emphasizing that the nature of Argentine relations 
with the United States would henceforth be contingent on the government’s protection 
of human rights.  On the other hand, even Rondon—a thirty-year veteran of the 
Foreign Service currently serving as ARA Deputy Director, Office of East Coast 
Affairs—was shocked by the extremism of the Foreign Ministry, who seemed to be 
 
                                                 
3 Personal Interview with Patricia Derian, March 3, 2008, Chapel Hill, NC.  The documentary record 
indicates this was Col. Paul A. Coughlin, then serving as Army and Defense Attaché at the U.S. 
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“in another world.”  “I really sympathize for those on your staff who deal with this 
Alice in Wonderland character,” Rondon confided to Hill, presumably referring to the 
Argentine Foreign Minister, Vice Admiral César Guzzetti.”5
By far the most significant moment in Derian’s visit to Buenos Aires, however, 
was the glimpse into the quotidian terror of the so-called Argentine dirty war provided 
by human rights advocates and relatives of victims of state-sanctioned violence.  The 
situation in Argentina was “barbaric,” ninety-year-old Alicia Moreau de Justo told 
Derian during a meeting with the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights.  Less than 
two weeks before, de Justo asserted, a group of armed men had invaded the home of 
an elderly grandmother, mother, and daughter, ransacking the house and kidnapping 
the mother and daughter.  Blindfolded and transported to a clandestine detention 
center, where she was forced to listen to her daughter being tortured in an adjacent 
room, the mother was subsequently released.  “To this day,” de Justo concluded, “she 
is desperately trying to locate her daughter, who, to her knowledge, is guilty of no 
subversive activity.”
   
6  Encouraged by de Justo’s outrage, other participants weighed 
in, flooding Derian with stories of the thousands of Habeas Corpus petitions gathering 
dust in government files; of the disappearance of journalists who reported on state-
sanctioned violence; of the body of a daughter, recovered with great difficulty from 
secret detention, in which an autopsy later revealed that “two live rats had been sewn 
into the girl’s vagina and had torn her body apart as they tried to get out.”7
Derian left the meeting profoundly shaken and filled with moral outrage.  
Coupled with her meetings with Embassy officials and Argentine military leaders, 
Derian’s March 1977 visit to Argentina served as an exhausting introduction into the 
   
                                                 
5 Department of State General Correspondence, Fernando E. Rondon to Robert C. Hill, April 7, 1977, 
ADP. 
6 Ibid.   
7 Ibid. 
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challenges of international human rights advocacy, which the former civil rights 
activist would pursue with remarkable zeal over the subsequent four years.  Horrified 
by the extent of the Argentine military’s human rights violations, upon her return to 
Washington, Derian set out to make the South American nation a defining test-case for 
the Carter Administration’s human rights policy; in effect, utilizing the leverage 
vested in her office, Derian set out to dramatically redefine the U.S. Cold War 
relationship with Argentina by publicly denouncing dirty war violence and 
consistently opposing U.S. economic and security assistance.   
 
Ironically, although Derian’s human rights advocacy would make her one of 
the most widely recognized—and in many instances reviled—Carter Administration 
appointees, she had been a late convert to the Carter campaign.  In fact, Derian’s 
decision to support the Georgia governor’s presidential bid had not been based on a 
desire to promote human rights abroad, but rather on regional political considerations 
linked to her longstanding civil rights activism in Mississippi.  Trained as a psychiatric 
nurse in Virginia, in 1959 Derian had accompanied her husband—an orthopedic 
doctor—to Jackson, Mississippi, where she quickly established a reputation in the 
local community for assisting African American acquaintances confront the quotidian 
inequalities of southern segregation.8   It was an unlikely pursuit for a white woman in 
the Deep South, but Derian refused to abide practices such as the local telephone 
company’s use of courtesy titles on white clients’ bills, but not on those of blacks.  “I 
got into it at the beginning on a one-to-one basis,” Derian told an interviewer years 
later. “I’m no hero.  They were just people I cared about.”9
                                                 
8 Derian subsequently divorced, remarrying in 1978 Mississippi journalist and fellow civil rights 
activist Hodding Carter III.  Carter served as Jimmy Carter’s (no relation) Assistant Secretary of State 
for Public Affairs and spokesman for the Department of State.  
 
9 Karen De Witt, “On-the-Job Human Rightist,” Washington Post, August 11, 1977, pg. B1. 
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Yet as the Civil Rights Movement increasingly took national stage in the early 
1960s, Derian’s involvement in the struggle blossomed into a dynamic leadership role.  
By the time Freedom Riders protesting interstate bus segregation were 
unceremoniously delivered to the Jackson City Jail, Derian had begun touring 
Mississippi prisons to assess the facilities, treatment of prisoners, and adherence to 
due process, and was working to bring about improvements through conferences with 
sheriffs, local and state legislators, and the press.  When National Guardsmen forced 
the University of Mississippi to accept its first African American student in 1963, 
Derian was in the vanguard of efforts to integrate Mississippi’s schools, having 
founded Mississippians for Public Education, a grass-roots organization promoting 
school desegregation.10   Derian was also active in registering African American 
voters, and, in 1964, organized the campaign to have Lyndon B. Johnson’s name on 
the Mississippi presidential ballot.11
At the epicenter of southern resistance to black integration, civil rights work 
bore few successes and was always dangerous; the brutal murder of three young 
activists less than two hours from Jackson in early August 1964 made starkly evident 
the risks of undermining the racial status quo.  Yet Derian was not one to back down 
from a challenge.  Born on the eve of the Great Depression as the only child of liberal, 
socialite parents who, by her own admission, “were almost totally absorbed in their 
own lives,” Derian developed into a self-sufficient, fiercely-independent youngster.  
By the time she entered into adolescence, Derian had little regard for the confining 
gender mores of the mid-twentieth century.  “I’m 13, I smoke, and I’m not going to 
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curtsey anymore!” she bluntly informed her parents on one memorable occasion.  Far 
from rebuking their precocious daughter, the Derians were delighted; as Patt Derian 
recalled in a recent interview, “my father’s lifetime message to me was ‘You live your 
life so that you can look any man in the eye and tell him to go to hell!’”12
It was a lesson that guided Derian’s civil rights activism.  Despite threats from 
the Klu Klux Klan, Derian increased her political activity in the aftermath of the 1964 
presidential election, in which Republican Party candidate Barry Goldwater swept 
Mississippi with almost 90 percent of the vote.
  
13  After four years of unsuccessful 
efforts to convince the all-white Mississippi Democratic Party to accept participation 
by African Americans, in 1968 Derian played a central role in founding the “Loyalist” 
Mississippi Democratic Party, organizing an alternative delegating system at the 
precinct, county, regional, and state levels.  With African American civil rights activist 
Charles Evers as National Committeeman and herself as National Committeewoman, 
Derian successfully challenged the seating and recognition of the Mississippi 
“Regulars” at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago.14
Despite their success in drawing national media attention to the Regulars’ 
intransigence on the race issue, for Derian and her Loyalist colleagues the prospect of 
a perpetually divided Democratic party in Mississippi boded poorly for their goal of 
making concrete advances in the field of civil rights.  Scorned by their Democratic 
colleagues, the stunned Regulars had cast their ballots for independent candidate 
George Wallace, whose unabashedly racist views and vitriolic diatribes against the 
   
                                                 
12 Patricia Derian, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 12,1996, transcript, the Foreign 
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New Left were well received among pro-segregationists in the Magnolia State.15  
Accordingly, during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, Derian spearheaded efforts 
to unite the Mississippi Democratic Party, a feat that was finally achieved through a 
co-chairman arrangement in early 1976.  Derian’s decision to support Jimmy Carter’s 
bid for the Democratic nomination a few weeks later reflected similarly local 
concerns: with Wallace yet again vying for president—and this time on the 
Democratic ticket—Derian gambled that Carter’s southern roots, fiscal conservatism, 
and progressive stance on race could unite the divided Mississippi Democratic Party 
and edge out Wallace in the upcoming state primary.  It was, Derian later told a 
journalist with characteristic candor, “really the first, cold decision I have ever made 
for strictly pragmatic reasons” since in her view Carter initially appeared to be “soft 
on race and bad on women.”16
The strategy was a success, and after finishing a distant third in the Mississippi 
Democratic primary Wallace officially endorsed Carter in mid-June, bringing his 
delegates to the Carter camp and papering over the rift that had divided the Mississippi 
Democratic Party for more than a decade.  More significantly, as the campaign 
progressed Derian became an avid backer of Jimmy Carter, particularly citing his 
support for racial integration in the south.  In March, Derian became a full-time Carter 
campaign worker, and, following Carter’s successful nomination at the Democratic 
Convention in July, she accepted the position of Deputy Director of the Carter-
Mondale campaign.    
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In turn, the Carter campaign found a valuable asset in Patricia Derian.  
Although in subsequent years journalists would almost invariably define Derian as a 
“former civil rights activist,” the breadth of her leadership on behalf of racial equality, 
education, and health care defied a shorthand definition.  By 1976, Derian had 
established herself not only as a key player in Mississippi politics, but as a leading 
liberal voice in the American South.  In addition to serving as President of the 
Southern Regional Council, a multi-million dollar foundation dedicated to racial 
justice with operations in 11 states, Derian sat on the Board of Directors at the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the National Prison Project, and the Democratic 
Forum.  She also served as a consultant to more than a hundred organizations ranging 
from the Council on Negro Women to the Carnegie Council on Children, and oversaw 
the management of a 25-county educational pilot project in Mississippi.  Indeed, the 
editors of the exclusive “Who’s Who” register not only included Derian on the 
“American Politics” and “American Women” lists, but on their global inventory of the 
“World’s Who’s Who of Women” as well.17
Recognizing Derian’s political experience and contribution to the campaign, in 
the hectic weeks following Carter’s electoral victory over the incumbent Ford 
Administration, the president-elect’s transition team hit upon a political appointment 
that seemed a nice fit given her experience in the civil rights arena: the recently 
established position of Department of State Coordinator for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs.  By her own account, Derian knew relatively little about the 
effort to institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy; indeed she had not been 
aware that the Coordinator position even existed.
 
18
                                                 
17 Patricia Derian, Resume, accessed in Box 16, Folder: Human Rights—Early Efforts, RWC, ODS, 
GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
  After a long talk with newly-
appointed Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, however, Derian accepted 
18 Barbara Gamarekian, “Human Rights Spokeswoman,” New York Times, June 23, 1977, pg. 43. 
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the position, in part since “it was a job that really had never been done,” and partly on 
the assumption that her experiences as a civil rights activist would provide a 
foundation for human rights advocacy.19  “After all,” she later told the Washington 
Post, “it is my line of work.”20
 
   
Like Derian, to a considerable extent Jimmy Carter viewed the human rights 
issue through the lens of the Civil Rights movement.  Although the promotion of 
human rights in U.S. foreign policy would arguably constitute the centerpiece of 
Carter’s presidential legacy, the one-term Georgia Governor discovered the issue late 
in the 1976 campaign.  The previous year, Carter had opposed the Helsinki Accords 
with the Soviet Union on the basis of nonintervention, despite the agreement’s 
unprecedented human rights guarantees, and in early 1976, the Carter campaign barely 
mentioned human rights in the lead-up to the Democratic National Convention.21  It 
was not until the second presidential debate in San Francisco on October 6—less than 
a month before Election Day—that the majority of American voters first associated 
Jimmy Carter with the effort to institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy.   
In a heated give-and-take, Carter castigated the incumbent Administration for 
“supporting dictatorships,” and “ignoring human rights,” and asserted that because of 
such policies, “we are weak and the rest of the world knows it.”22
Overshadowed in the press by Ford’s infamous gaff denying the Soviet 
Union’s control over Eastern Europe, Carter’s unexpected invocation of human rights 
nonetheless electrified Americans searching for an alternative to the perceived 
   
                                                 
19 Patricia Derian, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 12,1996, transcript, Derian Papers. 
20 Barbara Gamarekian, “Human Rights Spokeswoman,” New York Times, June 23, 1977, pg. 43. 
21 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "Human Rights and the American Tradition," Foreign Affairs 57 (1978-
1979): 513. 
22 The Second Presidential Debate, Palace of Fine Arts Theater, San Francisco, October 6, 1976, 9:30 
p.m., reprinted in Sidney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1979), 486. 
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immorality of the Nixon and Ford Administrations.  “I still remember hearing Carter 
talk about human rights in one of his televised preelection debates with Gerald Ford,” 
Amnesty International activist Jeri Laber recalls in her memoirs.  “Is he talking about 
what we’re doing? I asked myself, incredulous.”  Underscoring the significance of the 
San Francisco debate, “within a short time,” Laber concludes, “the words ‘human 
rights’ seemed to be on everyone’s lips.”23
To be sure, the role of morality in U.S. policy—both at home and abroad—was 
a founding principle of the Carter campaign.  On one level, Carter’s embrace of the 
human rights issue was a clear outgrowth of his support for the Civil Rights 
Movement.  Institutionalized racial inequality, Carter had asserted in his 1975 
campaign booster Why Not the Best?, “hung like a millstone around our necks under 
the label of ‘separate but equal.’”
   
24  Similarly, sounding a theme he often used on the 
campaign stump, in a town hall meeting in Yazoo City, Mississippi, Carter declared 
the civil rights movement “the best thing that ever happened to the South in my 
lifetime.”    Asked whether his “southern heritage” contributed to a concern for human 
rights overseas, Carter responded, “I would not be here as President had it not been for 
the Civil Rights Act,” and further asserted that the civil rights struggle had “made the 
human rights issue very vivid for me.”25
On a deeper level, Carter’s call for more government transparency, less 
intrusion into the lives of its citizens, and a return to the ethical principles of an 
idealized American past was a savvy recognition of the national mood in the post-
Vietnam, post-Watergate era.  “Disgruntled Americans sought new ideas, fresh faces, 
 
                                                 
23 Italics original. Jeri Laber, The Courage of Strangers: Coming of Age with the Human Rights 
Movement (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002), 80. 
24 Jimmy Carter, Why Not the Best? (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1975), 35. 
25 Jimmy Carter, Remarks and a Question and Answer Session at a public meeting in Yazoo City, Miss, 
July 21, 1977, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter: 1977, vol. 2 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 1328-1329. 
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and a style of leadership predicated on openness, truthfulness, and public 
responsiveness,” historians Burton Kaufman and Scott Kaufman write.  “Indeed, 
morality was the emerging keynote of the campaign—a desire to restore a sense of 
purpose, trust, fairness, and civic responsibility to American life.”26  Correspondingly, 
in the realm of foreign policy, although Carter’s limited experience led him to rely 
heavily on fellow Trilateral Commission member Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Georgia 
Governor’s personal philosophy nonetheless set the tone.  Jimmy Carter, Brzezinski 
concluded in his memoirs, “came to the Presidency with a determination to make U.S. 
foreign policy more humane and moral.”27
In fact, Carter recognized to a remarkable extent the illiberal nature of U.S. 
policy toward much of the developing world and he refused to blindly adhere to the 
Cold War shibboleths that had guided U.S. foreign policymaking over the previous 
quarter-century.  As a result of U.S.-Soviet competition, “a dominant factor in our 
dealings with foreign countries became whether they espoused an anti-communist 
line,” Carter wrote in his memoirs.  “There were times when right-wing monarchs and 
military dictators were automatically immune from any criticism of their oppressive 
actions.”
   
28  Instead, Carter emphasized the need to balance support for authoritarian 
allies with the promotion of human rights reflected a major shift in U.S. foreign 
relations.29
                                                 
26 Burton I. Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., 2nd, Revised ed. 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 16. 
  “I was familiar with the widely accepted arguments that we had to choose 
between idealism and realism, or between morality and the exertion of power; but I 
rejected those claims,” Carter later maintained.  “To me, the demonstration of 
American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral 
27 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 48. 
28 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 142-43. 
29 See Douglas Brinkley, "Bernath Lecture: The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The "Hands on" Legacy 
of Our Thirty-ninth President," Diplomatic History 20, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 522. 
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principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American power and 
influence.”30
Carter’s ardent denunciations of the lack of morality during the Nixon-Ford 
era, epitomized by what he referred to as Henry Kissinger’s secret, “Lone Ranger” 
diplomacy, comprised a common refrain over the course of the campaign.
 
31  “There 
has been a deep sense of alienation of people from our government and a sense of 
disappointment, a sense of embarrassment—sometimes even a sense of shame,” Carter 
told listeners in August 1976.  Pointedly referencing the Vietnam War, CIA covert 
operations, and U.S. involvement in Angola, Carter described himself—as a populist 
political outsider—as having a distinct advantage over the Washington Establishment.  
“I have always felt that, to the extent that government in all its forms can equal the 
character of the American people—to that extent, our wrongs can be redressed, our 
mistakes corrected,” he asserted.32
Although Carter repeatedly championed the need for an infusion of morality in 
U.S. foreign policy over the course of the presidential campaign, his invocation of 
human rights in late 1976 served more as shorthand for his own broadly 
conceptualized reform agenda than a clear show of support for either grassroots 
human rights organizations or the legislative initiatives of the so-called “human rights 
lobby” and their liberal supporters in the U.S. Congress.   Whereas since the early 
1970s human rights advocates led by Representative Donald R. Fraser (D-MN) had 
worked to legally bind U.S. foreign aid to the human rights protections enshrined in 
international covenants to which the United States was a signatory, Carter’s 
foundation for moral leadership invoked an idealized national past.  The shortcomings 
of U.S. policy during the Cold War, he intoned in his memoirs, were the failure “to 
 
                                                 
30 Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, 143. 
31 Quote from the San Francisco debate; see Kraus, ed., The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976. 
32 Bill Adler, ed., The Wit and Wisdom of Jimmy Carter (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1977), 113. 
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exhibit as an American characteristic the idealism of Jefferson or Wilson,” leading the 
United States to forfeit “one of our most effective ways to meet threats from 
totalitarian ideologies and arouse the spirit of our own people.”33  It was a notion 
shared by Carter’s top advisors.  Secretary of State Cyrus Vance would later describe 
the Administration’s human rights policy as “one of the fundamental values that is our 
heritage,” and on the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Brzezinski rather ironically struck a decidedly exceptionalist tone, describing the 
United States, as “the first country ever in the history of mankind to consciously come 
together and shape itself around a central philosophical idea, namely the freedom and 
independence of man.”34
If Carter’s promotion of human rights through the lens of Wilsonian 
exceptionalism exhibited few links to the internationalist-focus of the U.S. human 
rights movement, Carter was nonetheless able to reap significant political dividends by 
utilizing the lexicon of human rights.  In the aftermath of the San Francisco debate, 
Carter campaign managers were elated by an unexpected outpouring of support for his 
human rights initiative, and Carter pounced on the theme in the final countdown to 
Election Day.  It was “a beautiful campaign issue,” a Carter foreign policy adviser told 
veteran political commentator Elizabeth Drew, “an issue on which there was a real 
degree of public opinion hostile to the [Ford] Administration.  That’s actually how it 
started for Carter.”
 
35
In fact, the effectiveness of human rights in the 1976 campaign was its appeal 
to both liberal internationalists and Cold Warriors.  For liberals, Carter’s open 
 
                                                 
33 Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, 142-43.   
34 “Secretary Vance’s News Conference of March 4,” March 4, 1977, reprinted in Department of State 
Bulletin, vol. 76, (1977), 277; Zbigniew Brzezinski, remarks at the White House Commemoration of the 
30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 6, 1978, box: 48, folder: 
Human Rights Day, 12/6/78, Staff Offices, Assistant for Communications—Press Events, Rafshoon, 
JCL.   
35 Elizabeth Drew, “A Reporter at Large: Human Rights,” The New Yorker, July 18, 1977, 36-62.  
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criticism of U.S. Cold War policymaking represented an extraordinary opportunity in 
the ongoing struggle to weave human rights into the fabric of U.S. foreign policy.   By 
1976, the wave of interest in human rights that had swept across the nation over the 
course of the decade was nearing its peak; at the grassroots level, membership with the 
U.S. affiliate of Amnesty International, for example, had increased by an average of 
roughly 10,000 new members per year between 1970 and 1976, facilitating the 
expansion of branch offices in San Francisco, California, Chicago, Illinois, Colorado, 
and Washington, D.C.36  Likewise, by late 1976, more than one hundred human rights 
lobby groups had taken up residence in the nation’s capital, and sympathetic 
lawmakers had succeeded in passing nearly a dozen pieces of legislation binding U.S. 
actions in the international arena to the promotion of human rights.37
Carter’s jump onto the human rights bandwagon was also welcomed by Cold 
Warriors such as Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan (D-NY) as a means to indict the communist world for its oppression of 
subject peoples.  Jackson’s successful co-sponsorship of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment in 1974—placing limits on U.S. trade with nations with restrictive 
emigration policies and command economies—coupled with his fierce opposition to 
the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), had constituted a 
  Finally, 
although recognizing that Carter’s inchoate moralism bore little resemblance to their 
own increasingly sophisticated legal expertise in linking U.S. foreign aid to the 
protection of human rights, many liberal human rights sympathizers in the Congress 
nonetheless welcomed the possibility Carter presented for shifting the locus of human 
rights advocacy from Capitol Hill to the White House.     
                                                 
36 Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States," The Journal of 
American History 86, no. 3 (December 1999). 
37 Laurie S. Wiseberg and Harry M. Scoble, "Monitoring Human Rights Violations: The Role of 
Nongovernmental Organizations," in Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Donald P. Kommers 
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major impediment to Henry Kissinger’s effort to deepen détente with the Soviet 
Union.38  By contrast, Carter’s newfound willingness to broach the human rights issue 
in U.S.-Soviet relations—particularly evident in his open criticism of Gerald Ford’s 
refusal to meet with Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1975—won plaudits 
from Jackson and his fellow congressional hawks.  Jackson and Carter, the Senator 
from Washington told the press in mid-1976, had the “same approach” on human 
rights, since both believed that “over the long pull there must be more freedom in the 
world.”39
In sum, human rights was “the perfect unifying principle” for the Carter 
campaign, as historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. concluded in an early assessment, 
tapping into “the most acute contemporary concerns as well as the finest American 
traditions.”
  
40  Appealing to a broad, bipartisan constituency—albeit for very different 
reasons—Carter effectively utilized the rhetoric of human rights to distance himself 
from the Ford Administration, narrowly edging out his opponent on Election Day by a 
mere 2 million votes.41  Indeed, the significance of Carter’s human rights rhetoric in 
the 1976 campaign became increasingly clear in the aftermath of his slim victory.  
“Judging from news articles and direct communications from the American people to 
me during the first few months of my administration, human rights had become the 
central theme of our foreign policy in the minds of the press and public,” Carter later 
wrote.  “It seemed that a spark had been ignited, and I had no inclination to douse the 
growing flames.”42
                                                 
38 On Jackson and détente, see for example, Robert Gordon Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in 
Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 242-60; Anna Kasten Nelson, "Senator Henry 
Jackson and the Demise of Détente," in The Real Policy Makers: Shaping American Foreign Policy 
From 1947 to the Present, ed. Nelson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 83-106. 
 
39 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Secretary of State Scoop Jackson?” Washington Post, June 18, 1976, pg. A27. 
40 Schlesinger Jr., "Human Rights and the American Tradition," 515. 
41 Kaufman and Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., 19. 
42 Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, 145. 
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Exactly how the new administration intended to implement human rights in 
U.S. foreign policy, however, was far from clear in early 1977.  After loftily declaring 
in his inauguration speech that “our commitment to human rights must be absolute,” 
Carter maintained a steady emphasis on the issue in the initial weeks of his presidency, 
criticizing political repression in Czechoslovakia and Cuba, informing the startled 
Soviet Ambassador that he would “not back down” from defending human rights 
abroad, and personally responding to a letter from Soviet dissident (and Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate) Andrei Sakharov.43  Carter also revealed a willingness to discuss 
human rights beyond the boundaries of the communist world; at a press conference in 
mid-February the President expressed concern for political prisoners in South Korea 
and several Latin American nations.44  Given the President’s constant stream of 
human rights commentary in early 1977, few political observers could deny Carter’s 
personal commitment to making the United States “the focal point for the preservation 
and protection of human rights[.]”45
A far greater challenge facing the Carter Administration, however, was how to 
convert the President’s human rights rhetoric into practical policy initiatives.  Having 
picked up the banner of human rights late in the presidential campaign, the Carter 
Administration, as one advisor later admitted, took office with “no specific planning 
for a particular human rights campaign or program.”
   
46
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Carter’s inauguration, newly-appointed National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski told the National Security Council (NSC) the Administration needed to 
find a “constructive way to infuse human rights into foreign policy.”47  Two days 
later, State Department Director of Policy Planning Anthony Lake informed Cyrus 
Vance that successful implementation of a human rights policy, “depends on our 
designing an overall strategy—with a coherent set of goals, sense of priorities, and 
assessment of U.S. leverage.”  The State Department, Lake observed, “now lacks such 
a strategy.”  Emphasizing the lack of intra-departmental coordination on pending 
human rights problems, Lake continued, “There is no focal point for considering 
future initiatives or establishing a general context that could reduce the need for tough 
decisions in other areas under crisis conditions.” 48
Accordingly, in the following weeks the Policy Planning team scrambled to 
generate a foundational human rights strategy.  By February 18, however, little 
concrete progress had been made, with top U.S. policymakers merely agreeing on 
scheduling a formal review of human rights and U.S. foreign policy.
 
49  As NSC staff 
member Jessica Tuchman admitted to U.S. News and World Report, “I think it must be 
fairly obvious that we hadn’t got our act together in those first few weeks.”50
                                                 
47 Department of State Action Memorandum, Anthony Lake to Cyrus Vance, February 4, 1977, Subject: 
“Human Rights,” Box 2, Folder: TL 2/1-15/77, Policy and Planning Staff, Office of the Director, 
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Nonetheless, by the end of the month, Vance had taken a handful of ad hoc steps 
toward creating a policy framework for the promotion of human rights, establishing an 
informal Human Rights Coordinating Committee at the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
level to synchronize human rights policymaking within the State Department, 
48 Department of State Action Memorandum, Anthony Lake to Cyrus Vance, February 4, 1977, Subject: 
“Human Rights,” Box 2, Folder: TL 2/1-15/77, Policy and Planning Staff, Office of the Director, 
Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
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requesting the geographic bureaus to develop human rights strategy papers, and, in the 
first week of March, appointing Patricia Derian as the Department’s Human Rights 
Coordinator.51
By far the most contentious initiative, however, was Vance’s announcement of 
reductions in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to three U.S. allies on human rights 
grounds: Argentina, Ethiopia, and Uruguay.
   
52
Predictably, although mollifying complaints from Moscow that Carter was 
using human rights to publicly pillory the Soviets in the international court of opinion, 
the aid reduction sparked heated criticism from U.S. Cold War hawks determined to 
maintain close ties to anti-communist allies, repressive domestic policies 
notwithstanding.  “On Argentina and Uruguay aid, Carter made a mistake,” ultra-
conservative North Carolina Republican Jessie Helms groused to a journalist.  “I’ve 
visited those countries and they are absolutely anti-Communist.  It is wrong to try to 
undermine those governments.”
  A watershed moment in Carter’s 
presidency, the decision was a clear, public disavowal of Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik 
approach to foreign affairs, and, more generally, of the overarching U.S. approach 
toward the developing world since the onset of the Cold War.  Moreover, the public 
airing of the decision—solemnly announced by the Secretary of State during a 
February 25 press conference—was a clear shift from Kissinger’s much-touted “quiet 
diplomacy”—a practice human rights sympathizers in the Congress had accurately 
criticized as a none-too-subtle means of evading legislative initiatives.   
53
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human rights advocates.  Citing the Administration’s unwillingness to cut U.S. aid to 
authoritarian allies with greater geostrategic significance for the United States, such as 
South Korea, the Philippines, and Iran, Cold War doves such as Representatives Tom 
Harkin (D-IA) and Herman Badillo (D-NY) were quick to criticize Carter’s perceived 
inconsistency.54
In fact, in the absence of a clearly-defined human rights policy, the State 
Department’s deliberation over which nations to sanction on human rights grounds 
had been a disorganized and unsystematic affair.  “What happened,” one State 
Department official admitted, “was that if anyone, including one of the regional 
Assistant Secretaries … put up a strong argument against zapping any of these 
countries, he won.”
   
55  As a result, the Administration settled on what the New York 
Times dismissively categorized as “the easy ones.”56  Regarding Ethiopia and 
Uruguay, the Administration was especially hard-pressed to deny the validity of such 
criticism.  The reduction in aid to the socialist regime ensconced in Addis Ababa was 
a mere $1.1 million since the U.S. Congress had already legislated a full military aid 
cut-off to take effect at the end of September.  Likewise, sanctioning the 
extraordinarily repressive right-wing military regime in tiny Uruguay was “a 
throwaway case” as one official put it, since congressional lawmakers had informed 
the White House shortly after the inauguration that any efforts to earmark U.S. foreign 
aid—which had been banned since 1976—would be fiercely resisted.57
Finally, Foreign Military Sales credits constituted a relatively small portion of 
the total U.S. foreign aid, and in the case of Argentina, only four out of fifteen 
   
                                                 
54 Robert Keatley, “Human Rights and Diplomatic Pitfalls, Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1977, pg. 22; 
see also Sandy Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights 
Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), 139. 
55 Elizabeth Drew, “A Reporter at Large: Human Rights,” The New Yorker, July 18, 1977, 36-62.  
56 “Human Rights at Different Weights,” New York Times, Feb 27, 1977, pg. 133. 
57 Patrick Breslin, “Human Rights: Rhetoric or Action,” Washington Post, February 27, 1977, pg. 33. 
165 
 
channels for U.S. aid fell into the category of “U.S. foreign assistance” affected by the 
aid reduction—a mere 7% in fiscal year 1976 of the $518.5 million in U.S. military 
assistance, Export-Import Bank financing, and loans from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  In light of the fact 
that the United States supplied more capital to both the IDB and the IMF than any 
other nation, the FMS credit reduction was hardly a major economic blow to the 
Argentine military junta.58
Nonetheless, to Carter’s credit, Argentina was a far more challenging case than 
either Ethiopia or Uruguay.  As successive U.S. Embassy cables demonstrated in grim 
detail, as many as 20,000 people had been disappeared in the horrific wave of state-
sanctioned violence that followed the military coup d’état the previous March.
 
59  Yet 
with its advanced nuclear technology program, substantial agricultural export sector, 
and extensive reserves of crude oil, Argentina had the potential—as U.S. Ambassador 
Robert C. Hill pointed out in late January—to be “a major force for stability in the 
Southern Cone, and in the rest of Latin America.”60  Economically, in addition to $1.4 
billion in U.S. investment, the United States enjoyed a $250 annual million trade 
surplus with Argentina, and the South American nation owed U.S. banks roughly $3 
billion.61
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anti-communist military junta unmistakably sought to maintain longstanding ties with 
Washington.  Finding itself “caught between its desire to support Argentina’s struggle 
for economic recovery, while disassociating ourselves from human rights abuses,” 
Carter’s decision to slash FMS credits to Argentina from $32 to $15 million thus 
constituted an unprecedented—albeit limited—Executive initiative that would serve as 
a defining test case for the development of the Administration’s human rights policy 
as a whole.62
  
  
Patricia Derian arrived at the Department of State in early March to find an 
atmosphere highly-charged by the Carter Administration’s opening human rights 
initiatives.  From the outset, despite her almost total lack of experience in the 
formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, Derian was determined to 
spearhead a dynamic human rights policy.   Indeed, Derian had accepted the position 
as Department of State Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs only 
after securing Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s assurances that she 
would wield a good deal of political clout vis-à-vis other Department bureaus.  “I 
don’t want to come here if you want a magnolia to make it look good,” Derian told the 
Deputy Secretary, “… I’m not going to come here if I’m going to lose every time.”   
When Christopher asked if she had to win every battle, Derian responded, “No … but 
I have to win most of them.”63
Simply mastering the topography of the human rights landscape, however, 
proved a daunting task.  On one level, Derian had to familiarize herself with the State 
Department’s unique institutional culture, in which career foreign service officers 
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typically looked askance at political appointees, and human rights advocacy in 
particular was widely considered peripheral—if not antithetical—to the interests of the 
U.S. diplomatic corps.64  As one foreign service officer bluntly put it in February, “it 
doesn’t help in the State Department to be for human rights.  If you’re concerned 
about it, you sort of get labeled a bleeding heart.”65  Recognizing that any significant 
exertion of influence within the Department would require access to information, 
Derian began working to link her office into the flow of correspondence running 
between U.S. Embassies overseas and the geographic and “functional bureaus” on the 
sixth floor of “New State,” as political insiders referred to the lackluster, two-block 
building a short walk from the Washington Mall.66  The Department’s seemingly 
myriad back channels and unwritten rules, however, proved an enduring obstacle, and 
in the opening months of the Carter presidency the Human Rights Office repeatedly 
became aware of foreign policy decisions with human rights implications only after a 
position had been drafted by the geographic bureaus and delivered to the Secretary.67
                                                 
64 Arriving at her office on her first day, Derian found it still occupied by Jim Wilson, acting Human 
Rights Coordinator under Henry Kissinger.  When Derian learned that Wilson would probably have to 
“walk the hall” until receiving another assignment—a rather notorious element of the State 
Department’s personnel system—she refused to humiliate Wilson by asking him to leave.  Although 
Derian was able to temporarily occupy an office in Warren Christopher’s suite, her difficulties 
continued: on her first day “someone walked in with a stack of paper about 14 inches high and said, ‘the 
Secretary wants you to read this,” Derian later recalled.  After dutifully reading the massive document, 
entitled “Law of the Sea,” Derian walked into Christopher’s office and told the surprised Deputy 
Secretary, “I don’t think this belongs to me.  I think it belongs to you.”  Derian’s sympathy for Wilson 
eventually waned; weeks after her appointment, she was surprised to learn that the former human rights 
coordinator had conveniently “forgotten” to hand over the parking permit reserved in her name at the 
Department.  Confronting Wilson in his office, Derian was blunt: “you pack up and put it on the desk,” 
she told him.  “I don’t like games like this.”  Ibid. 
   
65 Patrick Breslin, “Human Rights: Rhetoric or Action,” Washington Post, February 27, 1977, pg. 33. 
66 The functional bureaus perform administrative tasks or analysis in areas such as economics, politico-
military, consular, and human rights.  Prior to the New State’s completion during the Kennedy 
Administration, the operations of the Department had been dispersed among nearly three dozen 
buildings distributed throughout the capital.  See Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1989), 1-2. 
67 See Caleb Rossiter, "Human Rights: The Carter Record, the Reagan Reaction," in International 
Policy Report (September 1984), 5. 
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On a deeper level, at the outset of her tenure Derian had little idea what 
activities the State Department Human Rights Coordinator was supposed to perform, 
and as a result, much of her first month was spent in intensive study.  Working 15 
hours a day, at times Derian struggled to maintain a healthy sense of perspective; on 
one occasion, after staying up late reading an Amnesty International report detailing 
electroshock torture of the gums, in the early hours of the morning Derian awoke 
terrified.  “I ran my tongue over my teeth and they felt like they were all broken and 
fractured,” she recalled years later.  “I knew it was a dream but I couldn’t shake the 
feeling.” Thinking back on her first initial weeks as Human Rights Coordinator, 
Derian concluded, “It was really total immersion in all the horrors of the world.”68
From the outset of Derian’s grim tour d’horizon of human rights violators, 
Argentina stood in the foreground.   As Derian later remembered, “one of the first 
things I started learning was about Argentina and the unbelievably calamitous events 
there.”
 
69  Moreover, as a result of Secretary Vance’s reduction of FMS credits, from 
the outset of Derian’s tenure at the Department tension between Washington and 
Buenos Aires was high.  The decision to reduce U.S. foreign aid had left Argentine 
military leaders “shaken, disappointed, and angry,” Ambassador Hill reported, and in 
the face of the perceived threat of left-wing terrorism, Argentine military leaders 
deeply resented the U.S. refusal to accept their justification for “special tactics” and 
“final solutions”70
                                                 
68 Patricia Derian, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, March 12,1996, transcript, Derian Papers. 
  Accordingly, less than a week after the announcement of the U.S. 
aid reduction, the military junta rejected the remaining $15 million earmarked for 
Argentina, on the grounds that, “no state, whatever its ideology or power, can set itself 
69 Ibid. 
70 State Department Telegram, Buenos Aires 2053, U.S. Embassy (Hill) to Secretary of State (Vance), 
March 17, 1977, Subject: “Argentine Reactions to Human Rights Issue,” ADP. 
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up as a court of international justice, interfering in the domestic life of other 
countries.”71
For Derian, such complaints rang hollow in the context of the military junta’s 
systematic campaign of kidnapping, torture, and murder—a sentiment reinforced by 
the Amnesty International  report on Argentina, released shortly after she arrived at 
the State Department.
   
72  With her extensive civil rights experience utilizing public 
criticism to shame transgressors into enacting improvements, Derian fully concurred 
with Rep. Robert. F. Drinan’s call for a strong U.S. stance on human rights vis-à-vis 
the Argentine military junta.  “By speaking out forcefully and consistently, we risk the 
temporary loss of influence in certain nations.  But by failing to speak out, we risk the 
permanent betrayal of our most cherished principles,” Drinan—who had served as a 
member of the Amnesty mission the previous November—told his congressional 
colleagues following the report’s release.  Couching the issue in moralistic terms that 
Derian would subsequently echo almost verbatim, Drinan concluded, “Our human 
rights policy must always concern itself with the question, ‘What is most effective?’  
But we must not permit that concern to obscure the even more important question, 
‘What is right?’”73
Accordingly, when newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Terence Todman invited Derian to make an informal visit to 
Argentina a mere three weeks after her appointment, Derian perceived the offer as a 
personal challenge.  A 20-year veteran of the foreign service, Todman’s appointment 
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had been heatedly opposed by liberal activists focused on Latin America, who cited 
his limited experience in the region (two years as Ambassador to Costa Rica) and 
scant evidence of an abiding concern for human rights.74  Moreover, Todman’s 
subsequent resistance to human rights initiatives in Latin America quickly garnered 
the Assistant Secretary a reputation for protecting right-wing U.S. “clients” in Latin 
America; from the outset of the Carter Administration, Todman’s stewardship of ARA 
led the Bureau to oppose Derian, “on almost every human rights issue affecting Latin 
America,” recalled Policy Planning Director Anthony Lake.75
In fact, Todman was not opposed to the notion of improving human rights 
protection in Latin America, particularly Argentina.  Rather, like many career foreign 
service officers, although concerned by the reports of state-sanctioned violence, 
Todman conceptualized the human rights policy as simply one of a number of 
diplomatic issues under consideration by Washington and Buenos Aires.  “Our policy 
was not based on whether we approved or disapproved of the Argentine government,” 
recalled Fred Rondon, who worked closely with Todman from his position as ARA 
Deputy Director, Office of East Coast Affairs.  “ARA did not accept the thesis that a 
single issue should govern all relationships with a particular country;” Rondon 
continued, since “there were other issues that had to be discussed with Argentina.”
   
76
Moreover, like much of the Foreign Service Corps, Todman was also deeply 
skeptical of both the stridency of Derian’s human rights advocacy and her use of the 
public arena to cast opprobrium on repressive regimes.  “There were a number of 
people around who believed that the answer to everything was a great deal of 
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76 Interview with Fernando E. Rondon, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, June 4, 1997, transcript, 
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shouting. And it seemed to me that the consideration was what was going to make 
them feel good,” Todman recalled in a recent interview.  He continued:  
 
And, quite frankly, I resented that, because my concern was suffering people 
and I wanted to see things done that would ease the suffering. I recognized that 
sometimes this is a whisper in the ear, sometimes it's a poke with your finger, 
it’s different things. And I don't think that it's possible to say that the same 
kind of approach would work in every situation. And I found that in many 
cases there were people who were not willing to be nuanced in dealing with the 
issues.77
 
 
Thus although Todman considered himself a quiet supporter of human rights, his 
opposition to Derian’s public approach and her overriding emphasis on human rights 
issues, combined with his strongly-held belief that existing U.S. military and 
economic programs in Latin America should be maintained, made a confrontation 
with the human rights office all but inevitable.78
Indeed, for Derian, the extreme nature of state-sanctioned violence in the South 
American nation, coupled with her own struggle to gain institutional standing in 
Washington overrode all other foreign policy considerations.  Accordingly, despite 
feeling ill-prepared to undertake a high-profile visit to Argentina, Derian immediately 
accepted Todman’s invitation.  “I didn’t want to go because I didn’t think I was ready” 
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the Human Rights Coordinator recalled years later, “but I realized that if I didn’t I 
would make a terrible mistake within the bureaucracy.”79
If Todman calculated that a visit to Buenos Aires would dilute the Human 
Rights Coordinator’s moralistic fervor, the plan backfired almost immediately.  
Derian’s secret meeting with Ambassador Hill, clashes with U.S. military personnel, 
and the horrifying accounts of state-sanctioned violence voiced by relatives of 
desaparecidos galvanized the former civil rights activist.  As a result, upon her return 
to Washington Derian played an active role in State Department’s April 1977 
disapproval of a series of small arms sales to Argentina on human rights grounds, and 
by the end of May, the Human Rights Office was holding up virtually all new arms 
transfer applications earmarked for the military junta in Buenos Aires.
 
80
 
   
As Derian’s struggle to promote human rights in U.S.-Argentine relations 
intensified over the spring of 1977, Carter Administration officials were hammering 
out an overarching policy framework for Latin America.  The priority accorded the 
process no doubt reflected Jimmy Carter’s personal interest in the region—arguably 
greater than any Cold War president since John F. Kennedy.  In a striking shift from 
the anticommunism that had guided his predecessors’ approach to Latin America, 
Carter recognized that U.S. Cold War policymaking had wrought damage throughout 
the region, and from the outset of his presidency he looked to Latin America as a 
potential showcase in his effort to chart a new path in North-South relations.81
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  “The 
people of the Western Hemisphere share a common past and a common future,” Carter 
told listeners in Caracas on Pan-America Day in March.  “As friends and neighbors we 
80 Department of State Chronology, May 17, 1978, Subject: “Argentine Human Rights Chronology,” 
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have an obligation to help one another, in order to promote our common good and to 
solve the problems of each nation, and advance our mutual interest in global solutions 
to problems that confront all of mankind.”82
Carter’s interest in Latin America was welcomed by Robert Pastor, Director of 
Latin American and Caribbean Affairs at the National Security Council.  Not quite 30-
years-old when he was tapped by Zbigniew Brzezinski to join the NSC, Pastor was the 
former Staff Director for the Linowitz Commision, a bipartisan group founded in 1974 
with the aim of integrating U.S. policy toward Latin American into a general North-
South framework.
   
83  Echoing the Commission’s recommendations, “the idea of Latin 
America as a region is a myth because composed of diverse nations with diverse 
economies,” Pastor wrote Brzezinski in mid-March, “…In terms of the objective 
realities,” he continued,  “we do not need a Latin American policy, and I hope that in 
the future, we will not have one.”84  Brzezinski concurred with Pastor’s assessment, 
and at a top-level Policy Review Committee Meeting on Latin America three days 
after Carter’s Pan America Day speech, the National Security Advisor rejected the 
notion of a “special relationship” between the United States and Latin America as 
“ahistorical.”85
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expectations and then having to live with the subsequent disappointments.”  The 
Monroe Doctrine, Brzezinski continued, “is no longer valid.  It represents an 
imperialistic legacy which has embittered our relationships.”86  To promote healthier 
U.S.-Latin American relations, the National Security Advisor concluded, the United 
States needed to put its southern neighbors, “on a more equal footing.”87
The majority of the gathered assembly concurred with Brzezinski’s call for a 
more global approach to Latin America, including top U.S. policymakers from State, 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, Treasury, the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, Commerce and the NSC—although both the Department of 
Defense and ARA openly lamented the decline of the U.S. “special relationship” 
toward the region.  Equally significant was the shared belief that the promotion of 
human rights could play a major role in shaping U.S. bilateral relations with the 
nations of the region.  The consensus, Brzezinski subsequently wrote Carter, was to 
cultivate “warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations 
with nonrepressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive 
governments.”  The human rights policy, the group concluded, should be projected 
toward Latin America in the same manner as any other geographic region.
 
88
Underscoring the importance Carter placed on U.S.-Latin American relations, 
the President detailed the PRM’s conclusions in a major foreign policy address at the 
Organization of American States on April 14.  The United States, Carter asserted, 
would henceforth adhere to three guiding policy principles for the hemisphere: U.S. 
non-intervention; a willingness to work with Latin American leaders on global 
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economic issues; and a commitment to promoting human rights and an expansion of 
democracy throughout the region.89  Proudly mentioning that both he and his wife, 
Rosalyn Carter, were Spanish-language speakers and had visited Mexico and parts of 
Central and South America, Carter loftily concluded, “Simón Bolívar believed that we 
would reach our goals only with our peoples free and our governments working in 
harmony.  I hope the steps I have outlined will move us toward those goals.”90
Less than three months into his presidency, the Carter Administration had thus 
laid the groundwork for a dramatic reshaping of U.S.-Latin American relations.  
Granted, the relative absence of pressing Cold War threats toward the region allowed 
Carter considerable diplomatic leeway; with the waning of Cuban attempts to foster 
foco-style agrarian revolutions in the hemisphere in the late 1960s, the muzzling of 
democratic socialists in the aftermath of Chilean President Salvador Allende’s brutal 
overthrow in 1973, and little chance of an alliance between any of the fifteen military 
regimes in the hemisphere and the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration had a 
relatively free hand to formulate a new approach to hemispheric affairs.
   
91
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Nonetheless, the unfurling of Carter’s Latin America policy in 1977 reflected a degree 
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Progress.92  As one State Department official exulted, “We have dealt ourselves back 
into the game, politically, in the Western Hemisphere.”93
 
    
Unlike the relatively rapid formulation of the Latin America policy, the Carter 
Administration struggled through the late spring of 1977 to generate an overarching 
human rights policy.  Following the precedent set by U.S. congressional human rights 
legislation, by mid-March the Administration began augmenting exceptionalist 
rhetoric defining traditional United States heritage and traditions as the basis for the 
promotion of human rights overseas with an emphasis on upholding international 
agreements.  “All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged themselves to 
observe and to respect basic human rights,” Carter told the United Nations General 
Assembly on March 19.  “Thus no member of the United Nations can claim that 
mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business.  Equally, no member can avoid 
its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwanted deprivation occurs 
in any part of the world.”94  Underscoring the importance President attached to human 
rights, Secretary of State Vance subsequently cabled the text of Carter’s U.N. speech 
to all United States diplomatic posts overseas.95
Throughout early 1977, however, Carter’s emphasis on promoting human 
rights seemed to raise more questions than answers.  “The world now knows that 
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Jimmy Carter thinks human rights are important,” Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher wrote Cyrus Vance a few weeks after Carter’s U.N. speech.  Nonetheless, 
Christopher continued, “Many—not just representatives of foreign governments and 
journalists, but also our own personnel—do not know what he means by 
‘internationally recognized human rights,’ which human rights are to get priority U.S. 
attention, and what criteria we plan to apply in individual cases.”  Accordingly, 
Christopher recommended embracing more fully the internationalist—rather than 
exceptionalist—approach to the human rights issue by connecting Carter’s policy 
more concretely within the protections afforded by articles 1, 55, and 56 of the U.N. 
Charter and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.96
If Carter hoped to alleviate criticism of U.S. intervention in the domestic 
affairs of sovereign nations by linking the U.S. promotion of human rights to widely-
accepted international human rights charters, the Administration would nonetheless 
need to articulate exactly which rights the U.S. should—or could—effectively 
encourage overseas.  Indeed, the very elasticity of the phrase “human rights”—which 
had served Carter well during the 1976 Presidential campaign—impeded the effort to 
formulate a clear and manageable policy in the first-half of 1977.   A general 
consensus on both sides of the political spectrum recognized that torture, political 
imprisonment, and murder constituted violations of individual human rights; 
defining—and defending—political liberty and socio-economic rights, however, 
proved far more contentious.  On one side, congressional hawks such as Senator 
Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson fiercely denounced the communist world for political 
repression—particularly the Kremlin’s refusal to provide emigration rights to Russian 
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Jews.  On the other, for decades the Soviets themselves had publicly censured the 
United States for failing to protect the social welfare of its citizens, a criticism not 
infrequently echoed in the 1970s by left-wing U.S. human rights groups.  Having 
boldly set out to promote human rights abroad, in the tangle of competing demands the 
Carter Administration now struggled to find its way; as one Administration official 
grumbled, “you get into arguments about trade-offs: liberty versus having a job.”97
Finally, the Carter Administration faced a difficult decision regarding how far 
to cast the human rights net.  As the discussions leading up to the March FMS credit 
reductions to Argentina, Ethiopia, and Uruguay had made clear, attempting to project 
a strident human rights policy beyond the world’s worst offenders would garner fierce 
resistance throughout Washington’s policymaking bureaucracy.  Nonetheless, 
focusing solely on a country “hit list” would undoubtedly generate criticisms of 
inconsistency both at home and abroad.  “It would not reflect the 
 
universal dimension 
of our policy—i.e., general concern for all rights everywhere and working with all 
nations,” Christopher asserted to Secretary Vance.  “And, it might be 
counterproductive—i.e., needlessly antagonize some nations, while giving others a 
free ride.”  Underscoring the challenges inherent in the issue, however, Christopher 
somewhat contradictorily admitted that the United States “would inevitably focus on 
some nations more than others.”98
Compounding the Carter Administration’s difficulties were congressional 
efforts to extend human rights conditionality to U.S. votes on International Finance 
Institution (IFI) loans.  In late March, during the House floor debate over a $5.2 billion 
authorization bill to the World Bank and the Asian and African Development Banks, 
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human rights advocates Tom Harkin and Herman Badillo sponsored an amendment 
that would require United States representatives to vote against loans to any nation 
engaging in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights.”99  Recognizing that the bill’s passage would significantly limit the 
President’s flexibility in the IFIs, the Carter Administration quickly voiced its 
opposition, actively lobbying lawmakers on Capitol Hill that the amendment presented 
too “wooden an approach to the problems it addresses,” and was inconsistent with 
Carter’s belief “that the means for dealing with specific human rights issues must vary 
depending upon the circumstances of each particular situation.”100
The Carter Administration’s effort to derail the congressional amendment 
stemmed at least in part from a belief that rigid legal constraints on the executive 
would limit the effectiveness of the human rights policy.  As Warren Christopher 
advised Cyrus Vance in an inter-departmental memorandum, “Flexibility is in order—
both for defining the 
 
continuum of countries of most concern to us and in discerning 
what approaches (public or private, bilateral or multilateral, symbolic or substantive, 
positive or reactive, etc.) could be most useful.”101
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rights,” Harkin griped to the Wall Street Journal, “the first time the measure comes up 
the administration’s trying to retreat.”102
Far worse than none-too-subtle comparisons with the Ford Administration, 
despite the Carter team’s efforts the Badillo amendment successfully passed in the 
House on April 6.  By all counts, it was a ugly defeat for the President; after initially 
opposing any human rights provision in the IFI bill, the Administration had belatedly 
supported a less-stringent alternative authored by House Banking Committee 
Chairman Henry Reuss (D-WI), who proposed replacing the mandatory vote in the 
IFIs with a requirement that the U.S. merely seek to direct assistance to regimes with 
positive human rights records.  In the lead-up to the vote, no less than four top-
Administration officials—Zbigniew Brzezinski, Warren Christopher, Terence 
Todman, and Patricia Derian—were drafted into lobbying on behalf of the Reuss 
amendment, and President Carter himself appealed to lawmakers in a personal 
letter.
  
103  House members, however, refused to yield—in fact, adding insult to injury, 
Badillo invoked Carter’s own human rights rhetoric to support the bill’s passage: “If 
we should now retreat,” he asserted during the two-hour floor debate, “it would be a 
signal to the world that the words of President Carter have no meaning.”104
Strong Executive lobbying ultimately resulted in Senate passage of a 
significantly watered-down version of the original bill—the bruising battle in the 
House, however, clearly demonstrated the limits of Carter’s influence over a Congress 
adamantly resurgent in the realm of U.S. foreign policymaking.  Indeed, although 
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Carter’s “outsider” status had contributed in no small part to his successful bid for 
Executive Office, by largely eschewing traditional party politics, the former Georgia 
Governor arrived in Washington with relatively little clout over congressional 
Democrats—a situation made more difficult thanks to intra-Party rivalries and an 
increasing dispersal of legislative power beyond the once-dominant Committee 
heads.105  More to the point, the Carter Administration’s rear-guard effort to head off 
the Badillo Amendment revealed the lack of a clear Executive policy that could shift 
the momentum of human rights promotion from Capitol Hill to the White House.   As 
Zbigniew Brzezinski informed the President on April 13 regarding the upcoming IFI 
debate in the Senate, “We face a real dilemma: while we don’t like any of the 
amendments, we must voice support for the more flexible amendments … or we will 
appear to be weakening our strong human rights position.”106
 Accordingly, in an effort to bolster his human rights credentials, Carter 
significantly ratcheted up the human rights rhetoric in a commencement speech at 
Notre Dame University on May 22.  Evocatively dressed in the traditional cap and 
gown, complete with the purple and gold cowl symbolizing an honorary doctor of law 
degree, and accompanied by human rights leaders from Rhodesia, Brazil, and South 
Korea, the President explicitly rejected previous administrations’ realpolitik approach 
to Cold War policymaking.
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joined us in that fear.”  Having lost its moral bearings in the struggle to contain Soviet 
expansionism, Carter continued, the U.S. had adopted “the flawed and erroneous 
principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for 
theirs,” an approach painfully evident in the “intellectual and moral poverty” of the 
Vietnam War.108  By contrast, Carter asserted that his own administration had 
“reaffirmed America’s commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our 
foreign policy.”  As a result, “We can already see dramatic, worldwide advances in the 
protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state,” Carter concluded.  
While ignoring this pattern would result in the dissipation of U.S. global influence and 
moral authority, “to lead it will be to regain the moral stature that we once had.”109
Hailed by human rights advocates as a watershed moment in the effort to 
institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy, Carter’s Notre Dame speech 
constituted an eloquent rhetorical rejection of the Cold War consensus that had 
dominated U.S. foreign policymaking over the course of the previous quarter-century.  
Compared to its predecessors, the Carter Administration, journalist Bernard 
Gwertzman asserted shortly after Carter’s Notre Dame speech, “is more idealistic, 
more open, more moralistic, and more willing to compromise with the developing 
countries.”
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requesting that U.S. Ambassadors “continue to give human rights matters your 
personal attention.”111
If Carter’s lofty rhetoric at Notre Dame successfully regained moral high 
ground lost in the fracas surrounding the Badillo Amendment, it did little to settle the 
debate over which human rights the U.S. intended to promote, and how the effort 
would be integrated into U.S. foreign policy.  That task fell to Secretary Vance.  
Having served for nearly two decades in the upper-echelons of Washington 
policymaking, Vance emerged as a staunch supporter of Carter’s emphasis on human 
rights as a centerpiece of the Administration’s effort to reconnect with traditional U.S. 
values in foreign policy—particularly as part of the effort to reshape relations with the 
Third World.
   
112   A consummate diplomat, Vance preferred avoiding the public 
spotlight when engaging in human rights diplomacy.  “We will speak frankly about 
injustice both at home and abroad,” the methodic West Virginia native told reporters 
in January 1977.  “We do not intend, however, to be strident or polemical,” he 
continued, “but we do believe that an abiding respect for human rights is a human 
value of fundamental importance and that it must be nourished. We will not comment 
on each and every issue, but we will from time to time comment when we see a threat 
to human rights, when we believe it is constructive to do so.”113
Spurred on by the President, Vance offered a more comprehensive definition 
of the U.S. human rights policy in a commencement address at the University of 
George School of Law on April 30.  Echoing the recommendations of the Department 
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of State Policy Planning team, Vance outlined three basic human rights that the Carter 
Administration intended to promote: first, the right to be free from government 
violation of the integrity of the person, i.e. torture, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, 
and denial of habeas corpus; second, economic and social rights, including food, 
shelter, health care, and education; and third, civil and political rights, including 
“freedom of thought,  of religion, of assembly; freedom of the speech; freedom of the 
press; freedom of movement both within and outside one’s own country; [and] 
freedom to take part in government.”114  Although Vance admitted that the most 
significant human rights advances would most likely be achieved in combating 
violations of personal integrity, the Secretary emphasized that all three rights were 
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and would all be included 
in the Carter Administration’s human rights policy.115
Significantly, in sharp contrast to Carter’s declaration at the inauguration that 
the Administration’s commitment to human rights would be “absolute,” in his Law 
Day address Vance emphasized the need for a case-by-case approach to human rights 
issues.  Emphasizing the need to “be realistic,” the Secretary methodically listed no 
less than sixteen questions that would need to be addressed in each human rights case 
in order to accurately assess the nature of the human rights violations, the prospects 
for successful U.S. action, and how that action would fit within the broader pattern of 
U.S. diplomacy.  “In the end, a decision whether and how to act in the cause of human 
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rights is a matter for informed and careful judgment,” Vance pragmatically concluded.  
“No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer.”116
Although it established a rough foundation for the Carter Administration’s 
human rights advocacy, Vance’s Law Day speech left the final shape of the policy far 
from clear.  As the Washington Post noted shortly after Vance returned from Georgia, 
“We read the Secretary’s words as the attempt of a good lawyer to refine and focus a 
presidential position.   That position is a courageous and valuable one but, at the 
moment, it seems to mean something a bit different to each person who hears it.”
 
117  
Indeed, a lack of consensus in Washington on how the United States should approach 
the human rights issue continued to impede the formulation of a clearly-defined policy 
throughout the second-half of 1977.  Underscoring the challenge human rights 
presented U.S. policymakers, after reviewing a draft of a Policy Review Memorandum 
(PRM) on human rights authored by Warren Christopher’s Special Assistant Steven 
Oxman, Anthony Lake complained to the Deputy Secretary in late June that the 
document failed to provide “a clear consensus on what we mean by human rights or a 
clear sense of where differences exist.”  Citing a cleavage within the Department 
between those who favored Vance’s emphasis on promoting all three basic human 
rights and supporters of a policy focusing entirely on crimes against the security of the 
person, Lake emphasized the need to clearly identify “that philosophical and practical 
divergence.” 118
Moreover, U.S. policymakers struggled to outline the relationship between the 
human rights policy and broader U.S. foreign policy goals.  “What will pressing for 
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[the] promotion of human rights mean in the short- and long-term for certain bilateral 
relations, security interests, dealings with the Congress, etc.?”  Lake wrote Christopher 
after reviewing the PRM draft.  “Conversely, how might a well-managed human rights 
program in fact reinforce goals in the North-South dialogue?”119  If Oxman left such 
key questions unanswered, it was not due to the PRM’s brevity—underscoring the 
challenge human rights posed for U.S. policymakers, by the end of June the draft 
version had already ballooned to 127 pages.  “Whew!  Why hadn’t I signed up for the 
President’s speed reading course?” Policy Planning Staff Member Sandy Vogelgesang 
quipped to Lake after she finished reading the draft.  Noting that the PRM’s original 
goal was to formulate “specific programs for action,” Vogelgesang concluded, “The 
document has grown like Topsy—to the extent many may never read what should be 
considered a significant point of policy reference.”120
The lack of consensus among policy planners at State and at the NSC on the 
role human rights should play in U.S. policy proved a major obstacle in the effort to 
establish a clear set of guidelines.  It was not until February 17, 1978—more than a 
year after entering the Oval Office—that Carter issued a Presidential Directive (NSC-
30) mandating human rights as a “major objective of U.S. foreign policy.”
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social and cultural contexts.”122  More concretely, without a clearly-defined human 
rights policy, in the latter half of 1977 U.S. policymakers came to rely on the general 
outline of the U.S. human rights policy presented by Cyrus Vance in his Georgia Law 
Day speech; Carter’s Presidential Directive on the subject was little more than a 
reiteration of the Secretary’s broadly-construed emphasis on promoting the protection 
of individual integrity, economic and social rights, and political liberties.  As 
congressional staffer on arms control and foreign policy Caleb S. Rossiter later 
asserted, “rather than acting as a starting point for the formulation of policy,” Vance’s 
speech “came to represent the policy itself.”123
 
    
The absence of a detailed set of policy guidelines impeded Patricia Derian’s 
effort to institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy, and contributed to 
mounting resistance to the Human Rights Office throughout the Washington 
bureaucracy.   Given that the primary mission of the geographic bureaus was to 
maintain a close working relationship with their foreign counterparts, from the outset 
an assertive human rights office was bound to raise the hackles of career diplomats.  
As an early congressional study pointed out, “rather than offering to the regional 
bureaus potential benefits that could facilitate bilateral relations—such as economic or 
security assistance programs or food aid—the human rights operation promoted a 
series of efforts that would, for the most part, complicate and strain bilateral and 
multilateral relations.”124
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the geographic bureaus’ resistance to Derian’s human rights initiatives had shifted into 
high-gear by mid-1977.  “The desk officers think of their countries as clients,” one 
Senate staff member griped to a journalist, “and their attitude is: ‘Don’t insult my 
client.’”125
The initial tension between the Human Rights Office and the geographic and 
functional bureaus was exacerbated by Derian’s nonconformist style of leadership and 
the uncompromising nature of her human rights advocacy.  Derian’s office, recalled 
Laurent E. Morin, a career Foreign Service Officer who worked with Derian, “was the 
most relaxed one I have ever been in.”  Morin continued, “She was very informal.  
Everyone was approachable, you just walked in the door.  Everyone was on a first 
name basis.”
   
126  On one occasion, EA Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke 
inadvertently sent a response to a human rights memo to “Patrick Derian.” “With great 
enthusiasm,” remembered Foreign Service Officer Kenneth Rogers in a recent 
interview, Derian took a green pen and wrote on the memo, “Try the Irish embassy. 
No Patricks here” and returned it to Holbrooke.  “I thought that was a great show of 
charm and good humor,” Rogers concluded.127
 If Derian’s management style garnered extra-ordinary loyalty from her 
subordinates in the human rights office, her strident advocacy on behalf of human 
rights engendered intense antipathy throughout the Department.  Derian was described 
as a “bully” and “idiotic,” and her efforts to promote human rights “blunt, 
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undiplomatic, and even hysterical.”128
 
  More concretely, Derian was widely perceived 
by the Foreign Service Corps as a liberal activist rather than a diplomat.  As John 
Bushnell, then serving as the senior Deputy Secretary in the Latin America Bureau, 
recalled in a recent interview: 
The problem I had with Derian and with the other human rights activists was 
that they were driven much more by making sure that our human rights actions 
were seen by their domestic constituencies and that strong human rights 
precedents were set than with progress in a particular country. I had sort of a 
foreign constituency that I was focused on, trying to get progress on human 
rights performance. They were much more domestically focused in making 
sure that their domestic constituency saw that human rights was driving our 
policy toward Country A, so visibility drive became more important than 
accomplishment drive.129
 
 
Similarly, Foreign Service Officer Paul M. Cleveland described Derian as a “strong 
liberal, if not a radical,” who was “well remembered for the fervor with which she 
pursued human rights violations—actual and alleged.”  According to Cleveland, 
Derian’s approach was so polemical as to hinder effective decisionmaking.  “I can 
remember meetings chaired by Warren Christopher,” Cleveland recalled, “… when he 
would have to ask Derian to restrain herself, particularly when she advocated actions 
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that may have seemed justified from her human rights’ point of view, but would have 
caused severe damage to US interests in some foreign country.”130
Derian’s status as a Washington outsider further exacerbated tension with 
career Foreign Service Officers, who accused the Human Rights Coordinator of 
projecting a one-dimensional view of foreign affairs that failed to account for the 
multiplicity of U.S. interests abroad.  On one level, Derian’s limited knowledge of 
Latin American history and culture were roundly criticized.  News correspondents 
covering one of Derian’s visits to Argentina were “struck somewhat dumb by her 
unique analogies,” syndicated columnist Georgie Ann Geyer asserted in a 
representative critique.  According to Geyer, Derian told the assembled group that the 
United States was going to “force” the Argentines to observe human rights, “just like 
we did in Mississippi.”  When one of the journalists skeptically asked Derian “And 
where is the Supreme Court?”  Derian admitted that it was a “good question,” then 
proceeded to draw questionable comparisons between the Argentine working class and 
blacks in South Africa living under the apartheid system.  “Virtually all of the 
strengths and weaknesses of Carter’s human-rights policies in Latin America are 
incorporated in that all-too-typical exchange” Geyer subsequently wrote, “idealism, 
total self-confidence, self-righteousness, an absence of any historic understanding and 
… an appalling ignorance.”
   
131
On a deeper level, Foreign Service Officers recoiled from Derian’s abrasive 
approach to human rights advocacy, which was widely interpreted in Foggy Bottom as 
detrimental to the overarching effort to a maintain close working relations with foreign 
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governments.  Instead, career diplomats such as Bushnell advocated the use of “quiet 
diplomacy”—raising the human rights issue with foreign leaders in private—as the 
most effective means of eliciting human rights improvements and maintaining 
diplomatic ties.   By contrast, Derian, Bushnell recalled, preferred the “bully pulpit.”   
 
It was impossible to convince her that one would get better human rights 
improvements […] by quiet diplomacy than with going public and making a 
lot of noise and condemning the leadership.  She said to me once, “You can't 
get anywhere negotiating with the devil.”  I pointed out that I had spent years 
at the NSC with Kissinger who spent a majority of his time negotiating with 
North Vietnam, China, and Russia.  All I thought qualified as devils, even on 
human rights grounds.  I thought Kissinger had made quite a bit of progress 
although not every negotiation was a success.  She replied that human rights 
was not what he was negotiating.132
 
 
Like the majority of U.S. Foreign Service Officers, Bushnell thus criticized Derian’s 
strident rhetoric and preference for public forums to cast opprobrium on human rights 
violating regimes as antithetical to the maintenance of smooth diplomatic relations and 
rarely successful in eliciting policy changes.   
For Derian, such criticism sidestepped the central issue: that Kissinger’s “quiet 
diplomacy” was in effect shorthand for U.S. diplomatic silence on human rights 
issues.  Without question, Derian’s understanding of Latin American history was 
limited.  Regarding Argentina, for example, on one occasion Derian admitted to 
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having no knowledge of Spruille Braden’s 1946 effort to prevent Juan Perón’s election 
as President—arguably the nadir of U.S.-Argentine relations prior to Jimmy Carter’s 
election.133  That Derian would have benefited from a stronger sense of Latin 
American history and culture is undeniable; it is worth noting, however, that in the late 
1970s the same could be said for the bulk of the State Department—and the 
Washington bureaucracy in general—in regard to the international human rights 
charters to which the United States was a signatory.  Indeed, one former staff member 
of the Bureau of Human Rights recalled feeling a sense of shock during a conversation 
with a career Foreign Service Officer when she realized that the individual had never 
heard of the Nuremberg War Crimes trials.134
More to the point, for Derian, criticism of her approach to the promotion of 
human rights as overly assertive failed to address the central issue: that it was her 
congressionally-mandated responsibility to demonstrate U.S. concern over human 
rights violations.  In this endeavor, there was no room, in Derian’s view, for the 
cautious, discrete lexicon of traditional diplomacy.  “All countries say that they are 
great defenders of and believers in human rights,” Derian asserted at a 1978 
congressional conference.  “Refusing to admit a systematic violation of human rights, 
Derian continued, “they explain their crisis, which threatens their society, and next say 
that as soon as they get on the other side of this crisis they will begin to observe 
human rights again, but during this interval it is necessary for them to take 
extraordinary measures.”  Derian continued: 
   
 
Then I talk respectfully about what they mean by extraordinary 
measures.  There is ordinarily a great breakthrough because I use the word 
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“torture” in places where this is applicable and it is applicable in far too many 
places.  I talk about the specific kinds that they do, the names of places where 
people are detained, the names of people who are missing, the names of people 
who are no longer in detention […] who have suffered various kinds of abuses 
and mistreatment.   
Then we come to a kind of reality facing.  Mostly an explanation that 
they are not responsible, that we have to understand things are so terrible and 
intense in the place that people at a lower level are moved by their own 
overriding emotions to take these actions on their own.  Then I talk about 
responsibility.  If you hold high office you must take the full responsibility and 
the blame.  Then we generally start all over again and go through the whole 
thing again.  That is generally the end of the first encounter.135
 
  
For Derian, the fulfillment of the responsibilities vested in her position thus 
necessarily entailed eschewing “quiet diplomacy” and instead adopting a forthright 
approach that unmistakably indicated U.S. awareness and condemnation of human 
rights violations.   
By mid-1977, the focal point for bureaucratic infighting between the Human 
Rights Office and the geographic bureaus centered on the Inter-agency Group on 
Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.  Commonly referred to as the Christopher 
Group, the body was an outgrowth of informal meetings between Warren Christopher 
and representatives from the geographic and functional bureaus—particularly the 
Human Rights Office—that began in February 1977 to discuss specific actions on 
foreign aid proposals.136
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involving the “interrelationship between human rights and our foreign assistance 
program,” in early April Zbigniew Brzezinski had suggested that Vance formalize the 
process by establishing an interagency group “to examine our bilateral and multilateral 
aid decisions as they relate to human rights, to provide guidance regarding specific 
decisions on bilateral and multilateral loans and to ensure proper coordination of a 
unified Administration position.”137  Concurring with Brzezinski’s request, Vance 
promptly asked the Deputy Secretary to serve as coordinator.138  Christopher agreed—
though not without some reservations: “The answer is yes—(but I am not sure an 
inter-agency group is necessary or desirable, but will be glad to head up if Secy 
[Secretary] thinks it is inevitable),” he responded.139  Accordingly, in early May the 
Christopher Group convened with representatives in attendance from numerous State 
Department Offices and Bureaus, as well as the departments of Treasury, Defense, 
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, the NSC, and the Export-Import Bank.140
With its focus on human rights and foreign assistance—rather than U.S. 
foreign policy as a whole—the Christopher Group’s impact on the broader contours of 
U.S. policy planning was constrained from the outset.  With little U.S. foreign 
assistance directed to the Communist world, the Human Rights Office necessarily 
focused its efforts on sanctioning right-wing authoritarian regimes with reprehensible 
human rights records.   The Carter Administration’s geostrategic considerations 
further constrained the Office’s room to maneuver, effectively insulating most of the 
Middle East from U.S. foreign assistance limitations on human rights grounds and 
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providing fodder for Assistance Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
(EA) Richard Holbrook’s fervent resistance to human rights sanctions toward South 
Korea or the Philippines.   
As a result, in addition to limited initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa, the majority 
of the Human Rights Office’s advocacy on the Christopher Committee came to focus 
on Latin America, a region dominated by repressive right-wing military regimes that, 
at the outset of the Carter presidency, appeared to pose little threat of moving into the 
Soviet camp.  Predictably, the seemingly inordinate emphasis on hemispheric affairs 
brought swift protest from the Latin America Bureau.  “There’s certainly an argument 
that if you have a human rights policy that’s dominant it ought to be decisive in all 
countries,” John Bushnell recalled.  “But of course it can’t be decisive in all countries, 
because in some countries you have other interests that are much more dominant and 
therefore you’re not going to pay as much attention to human rights.”  The Human 
Rights Office emphasized Latin America, Bushnell concluded, “because they couldn’t 
get anywhere with Eastern Europe or the Middle East.”141
Corresponding with the narrowing of the Human Right’s Office’s geographic 
scope, fierce bureaucratic resistance over the course of 1977 led to a dramatic 
reduction of the Christopher Group’s purview.  Perceiving the Group as infringing on 
her bureaucratic turf, by threatening to resign Undersecretary of State for Security 
Assistance Lucy Benson successfully gained exemption from the Human Rights 
Office’s oversight for the two largest U.S. aid programs: military assistance (cash, 
credit, and grant transfers of arms and training) and Security Supporting Assistance 
(cash, grants, and loans geared toward nations facing major economic challenges).  
Although the Human Rights Office could appeal military aid and security decisions to 
Warren Christopher by way of its membership on the Arms Export Control Board and 
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its subsidiary, the Security Assistance Advisory Group, Benson’s success in limiting 
the purview of the Human Rights Office established a precedent that was successfully 
emulated by the Department of Agriculture regarding food export programs.  More 
significantly, thanks to the lobbying efforts of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury G. 
Fred Bergsten, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—the largest and most powerful 
International Financial Institution—won exemption from Christopher Group as 
well.142
The activities of the Export-Import Bank (Exim) and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) also eluded regular appraisal by the Christopher 
Group.  Both agencies were designed to assist U.S. corporations; the former by 
insuring commercial transactions that would otherwise deter private sector investors 
and providing low-interest export financing, and the latter by insuring U.S. 
corporations in the Developing World against expropriation, currency inconvertibility, 
and loss due to political unrest.
   
143  Although congressional human rights law required 
the Eximbank to take human rights into account beginning in October 1977, and 
covered OPIC the following year, Warren Christopher interpreted the law “to allow 
programming in countries violating human rights if it either benefited the needy or 
was not channeled through the government of that country.”  Accordingly, only in 
exceptional cases would the Christopher group review programs involving the two 
agencies.144
The spate of exemptions left only one major channel of U.S. assistance within 
the Christopher Group’s purview: the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), an 
assortment of International Finance Institutions (IFIs) that had been a focal point of 
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congressional legislation during the Ford Administration linking U.S. votes in the 
institutions to human rights.145
Finally, Christopher’s decisionmaking process impeded the establishment of a 
clear set of guidelines on which human rights cases would be decided.  A quiet 
supporter of the human rights initiative, Christopher had worked closely with Cyrus 
Vance during the Johnson Administration and enjoyed the full trust and confidence of 
the Secretary of State.  Christopher, “was strong and imperturbable under pressure,” 
Vance later wrote, “with a keen, analytic mind and a selflessness all too rare in 
government.”
  In a bitter irony for the Human Rights Office, in the 
overall spectrum of U.S. foreign aid, the United States had the least amount of control 
over the MDBs—although voting power was distributed according to economic 
strength, the United States had only marginal sway over other voting members.   
146   In particular, Christopher’s willingness—and ability—to examine 
complex issues from multiple perspectives quickly garnered the reserved North 
Dakota-native a reputation in Washington.   Christopher was “the kind of lawyer 
you’d like to be your wife’s divorce lawyer,” Representative Charlie Wilson (D-TX) 
would later tell a journalist with characteristic aplomb, “always seeing the other side, 
always going the extra mile.”147
When the task of coordinating foreign assistance and human rights 
unexpectedly fell into his lap, Christopher characteristically established a case-by-case 
decisionmaking approach, allowing the Deputy Secretary to decide each case on its 
own merits.  Correspondingly, Christopher elected to open the Committee to a broad 
constituency of interested parties, including State Department geographic and 
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functional bureaus, the National Security Council, as well as the Departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Labor, and Treasury.148  Despite the unwieldy 
number of participants, Christopher placed a premium on the ability to hear a variety 
of opinions.  “I have a lot more confidence in my own judgment after I’ve heard a 
disparate group of people,” he later asserted.149
Although demonstrating the Deputy Secretary’s desire to examine the 
complexity of each case individually—and garnering Christopher the nickname “Mr. 
Human Rights” in the process—significantly, the case-by-case approach failed to 
establish human rights precedents that could be integrating into subsequent 
policymaking.  As Patricia Derian succinctly put it, “I never really understood 
Christopher’s mode of decision.”
  
150  Indeed, the inability to predict Christopher’s 
rulings, coupled with the size of the body—between 25 and 40 participants convened 
at each meeting—accentuated intra- and inter-Departmental tension and hamstrung 
cooperation between competing bureaus; in the resulting “tennis match” the Human 
Rights Office and the geographic and functional bureaus came to rely on almost 
identical arguments at successive meetings, leading one weary participant to wryly 
suggest that the opposing factions “save time by simply numbering their standard 
arguments and calling them out during deliberations.”151
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Despite the Christopher Group’s shortcomings, reviews of the IFIs provided 
the Human Rights Office with an unprecedented venue for advancing human rights in 
U.S. foreign policy.  By September 1, the Christopher Group had reviewed 56 loans 
over the course of five meetings, and had recommended 6 U.S. abstentions, along with 
23 demarches emphasizing the need for human rights improvements to avoid U.S. 
censure.  Moreover, the prospect of a U.S. “no” vote resulted in 10 additional loans 
being withdrawn or delayed by human rights violators.152
In the face of widespread bureaucratic resistance, such piecemeal victories for 
the Human Rights Office underscored the support Derian enjoyed in the White House 
and on Capitol Hill in the opening months of the Carter Presidency.  First, Jimmy 
Carter’s own advocacy over the course of 1977 demonstrated a clear commitment to 
human rights.  In mid-June, Carter decided to hold the swearing-in ceremony for 
Derian at the White House, an unmistakable show of support for her efforts on behalf 
of human rights.  “It’s a bit unusual to have a White House ceremony for that level 
appointment,” veteran Foreign Service Officer Frank Sieverts told journalist.  “I think 
  Without question, such 
victories for Patricia Derian’s office constituted very small steps in the effort to 
institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  By the same token, the very 
existence of the Christopher Group constituted a major shift from the almost-total 
dismissal of human rights that had characterized the Kissinger-era; and, more broadly, 
the Deputy Secretary’s willingness to sanction human rights violating regimes 
overseas—although indisputably limited—nonetheless indicated an emphasis on 
human rights unprecedented in United States foreign policy during the post-World 
War II era.  
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it is a testament to the President’s commitment to human rights.”153  Indeed, during 
the ceremony, Carter described the Human Rights Coordinator as “a very major 
position” in the United States government.  The President also praised Derian’s civil 
rights activism, asserting that “there were just a few people in our part of the country 
in years gone by who had the deep commitment and the intense demonstration of 
courage to be almost alone in a community and say the time has come for the black 
people of our region to have a chance to vote, to own property, to hold a job, to go in 
public places, to be educated on an equal basis with whites.”  Patricia Derian, the 
President concluded, “was one of those very rare people who had the commitment and 
the courage to do so.”154
More concretely, although Carter’s closely-watched efforts to promote human 
rights in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union during his first six months in office 
failed to bear fruit, the President achieved notable, if largely symbolic, successes in 
Latin America.
 
155  On June 1, Carter signed the American Convention on Human 
Rights at a gathering of the Organization of American States, and, thanks to the 
Administration’s lobbying efforts, the convention went into effect in July.156
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Colombia—or, as in the case of such as Peru and Ecuador, nations recognized as 
undergoing a transition from military rule to democracy.157  Additionally, by early fall 
the President had expressed strong support for congressional ratification of the 
Genocide Convention and the Covenant Against Racial Discrimination, and had 
signed both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights—international documents that 
the United States had refused to endorse for almost a decade.158
Second, Derian benefited from strong allies on Capitol Hill and among non-
governmental human rights advocates.  Nine months after the Human Rights 
Coordinator arrived at the Department of State, congressional human rights advocates 
led by Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) successfully passed legislation elevating the Human 
Rights Office to the bureau-level, promoting Derian to the position of Assistant 
Secretary of State at the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA).  
Mandating an increase in Derian’s staff and resources and requiring full-time human 
rights officers be appointed in each of the State Department bureaus, the legislation 
dramatically enhanced Derian’s clout in the Department and integrated the Human 
Rights Office more fully into the diplomatic information flow.
 
159
                                                 
157 Robert Pastor, “Accomplishments in the First Six Months: U.S. Policy to Latin America” July 15, 
1977, box 27, folder: Goals/Initiative: 6/77-12/78, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, 
Subject File, JCL.   
  Most significantly, 
the congressional legislation provided HA with the bureaucratic “standing” to partake 
in all decisions on U.S. security assistance, and, in the event of a disagreement with 
the geographic or functional bureaus, to use the human rights provisions of the Harkin 
Amendment (section 502B) as a legal basis to elevate the issue to Secretary of State 
158 Mark L. Schneider, testimony before the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, Committee on 
International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, October 25, 1977, accessed in 
box: 74, folder: Human Rights Reports3/77-11/77, OPLMC, JCL.   
159 Mark L. Schneider, testimony before the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, Committee on 
International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations, October 25, 1977, accessed in 
box: 74, folder: Human Rights Reports3/77-11/77, OPLMC, JCL.   
202 
 
Vance, who made a decision based on “action memoranda” drafted by all interested 
bureaus.160  “HA is continuing to approach most human rights disputes with the 
bureaus as negotiations in which it pays to go high so that when the dispute is resolved 
by 7th floor principals, HA at least gets half a loaf which is better than none,” Steven 
Oxman later wrote Warren Christopher.  “This approach” he added, “drives the 
bureaus up the wall.”161
Corresponding with strong congressional support, Derian found a particularly 
valuable ally in Mark Schneider, whom she hired as Deputy Coordinator.  A former 
Peace Corps volunteer in El Salvador, Schneider had acquired extensive experience in 
human rights advocacy as a staff member for Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA).  
Brushing aside his disappointment at not being chosen for the Coordinator position 
himself, Schneider proved an invaluable member of the fledgling Human Rights 
Office, balancing Derian’s hard-nosed advocacy with an insider’s knowledge of the 
policymaking process and extensive contacts on Capitol Hill, among the press, and 
within the non-governmental human rights community.
 
162  Indeed, in the face of fierce 
bureaucratic resistance, Schneider viewed such “backstairs lobbying” as a necessary 
tactic to insure the Human Rights Office’s continued existence.  Not surprisingly, 
utilizing informal channels to advance HA’s interests only added to the geographic 
bureaus’ antipathy towards Derian’s office.  Backstairs lobbying, combined with HA’s 
aggressive emphasis on action memoranda, Oxman wrote Christopher, “drives the 
regional bureaus from the wall to the ceiling.”163
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Finally, at the State Department, the effort to institutionalize human rights 
received support from Cyrus Vance.  “Vance was a great help to me,” Derian recalled 
in a recent interview.  “I met with him pretty regularly and he was wonderful.”164  
Although preferring private rather than public negotiations over human rights, and 
emphasizing the need for a case-by-case decisionmaking process, the Secretary 
believed that “a nation that saw itself as a ‘beacon on the hill’ for the rest of mankind 
could not content itself with power politics alone.  It could not properly ignore the 
growing demands of individuals around the world for the fulfillment of their rights.”  
As Vance later recalled in his memoirs, “these aspirations were producing new or 
strengthened democratic institutions in many nations, and that America would flourish 
in a world where freedom flourishes.”  Underscoring his commitment to human rights, 
by October 1977 Vance had reportedly broached the human rights issue with more 
than 80 leaders.165
  
 
By the fall of 1977, the Carter Administration had made the promotion of 
human rights in U.S. foreign policy a core objective.  Indeed, Jimmy Carter’s embrace 
of human rights had played a decisive role in the one-term Georgia governor’s 
successful bid for the White House, and Carter’s continued association with the issue 
bolstered the President’s popularity throughout his first year in office.  “Of our 
numerous foreign policy initiatives,” advisor Hamilton Jordan wrote the President in 
December, “it is the only one that has a broad base of support among the American 
people and is not considered ‘liberal.’”166
More significantly, Carter could claim notable successes in the effort to 
institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  The Administration’s high-profile 
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advocacy on behalf of human rights had created an enormous impact on popular and 
governmental awareness of the relationship between human rights and foreign policy.  
As Amnesty International’s David Hawk later asserted, “Anyone who worked in the 
field of human rights before Carter became president can appreciate the difference he 
makes.”  Carter’s approach, Hawk continued, “has made human rights a front-ranking 
issue in international affairs.  That in itself is Carter’s primary contribution to the 
promotion of international human rights.”167  Similarly, in testimony before the House 
Sub-committee on International Relations in late October, Mark Schneider asserted 
that the promotion of human rights, “is no longer a stranger to the front pages of 
newspapers across the globe,” resulting in repressive governments beginning to 
“weigh the costs of repression for the first time.”  Underscoring the dynamic shift 
from the Cold War-focus of previous administrations embodied by Carter’s human 
rights policy, Schneider concluded, “For too long we had become identified with 
regimes which denied human rights, rather than with the victims whose rights were 
violated.  Now I believe this new policy helps to return us to a position of leadership, 
one which is in conformity with a more traditional perception of the United States as a 
nation that received and welcomed two centuries of dissidents.”168
By the same token, the lack of a clear set of guidelines on the role human 
rights should play in U.S. foreign policy, coupled with the intense resistance HA’s 
initiatives generated throughout the Washington bureaucracy made it clear that the 
struggle to institutionalize human rights would be long and bitter.  Ten months after 
the Carter Administration took office, Derian was still clamoring for greater 
involvement in high level meetings with foreign officials.  “I think she is feeling a bit 
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frozen out,” Steven Oxman wrote Warren Christopher in October 1977.  “My 
impression is that HA needs about all the bureaucratic help it can get.”169  A few 
months later, veteran diplomat Lars Holman Hydle captured the mood at the annual 
Awards Presentation of the American Foreign Service Association by informing the 
assembled listeners that the members of the Human Rights Bureau regarded “criticism 
of the human rights policy or caveats about its implementation as bordering on 
immorality or disloyalty to the Administration.”  In an unmistakable allusion to 
McCarthyism, Hydle acidly concluded, “It is difficult to have a serious conversation 
with someone who thinks you are immoral, and we hoped we had seen the last of 
demands, implicity or explicit, for ‘positive loyalty.’”170
For Derian, such criticism masked the geographic bureaus’ close-ties with 
human rights violating regimes.   By autumn, the Assistant Secretary had established a 
firm-foothold within the State Department, and had no intention of retreating.   “It 
boils down to an intra-building struggle,” Derian told the Washington Post in late 
October.  “Some parts of the bureaucracy say our concern for human rights will pass,” 
Derian continued.  “But they are going to have to think again.”
   
171
In the coming months, Argentina, in particular, would serve as the defining 
test-case for Derian’s effort to promote human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  In a 
fitting dénouement to the intense period of learning and adjustment that characterized 
Derian’s initial months at the State Department, the human rights coordinator returned 
to Argentina for a second visit in mid-August.  With a newfound knowledge of human 
rights advocacy forged in hundreds of internecine bureaucratic struggles over the 
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previous 5 months, Derian’s meetings with Argentine officials pushed the boundaries 
of diplomatic propriety.  Fred Rondon, who accompanied Derian on her visit, recalls 
having to physically restrain Derian during her August 10 conversation with the 
Minister of Interior, General Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy: 
 
I will never forget the moment during the conversation when Patt and the 
Minister [of Interior] … seemed about ready to stand up to trade blows when 
both interpreters put their hands on their respective boss’ shoulders; it was an 
instinctive reflex action by both of us to try to stop matters before they really 
got out of hand.  Then the conversation continued.  I must say that Derian was 
not afraid to call “a spade a spade”; she was very clear about her views—even 
to the point of being undiplomatic.  There was no question about her 
dedication to human rights.172
 
 
Derian was similarly unequivocal in her meeting with de facto President and 
junta member General Jorge Rafael Videla.173  “He told me years later that he'd never 
been spoken to by anybody, let alone a woman, like she spoke to him,” John Bushnell 
recalled.  “Had it been a man, he would have challenged him to a duel on the spot.”174
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By far the most heated exchange, however, occurred during Derian’s meeting 
at the Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (Naval Mechanics School [ESMA]), with junta 
member Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, a known “hardliner” linked to extensive 
extra-legal violence.  Dismissing Massera’s claim that Argentina was in the process of 
normalization, Derian bluntly changed the subject.  “Let’s talk about the bottom floor 
of this building,” she began.  “Yes, it’s a big building,” the Admiral responded 
blandly.  “It’s also a place of torture,” Derian bluntly asserted.  Taken aback, Massera 
quickly denied the charge, but Derian was undeterred.  “I know that you are torturing 
people there, downstairs,” she repeated, and when Massera continued to deny any 
complicity in extra-legal violence, the human rights coordinator upped the ante.  
“Well, you give me a piece of paper and I’ll draw a diagram,” she told Massera.  “I’ll 
outline every room and what happens in it.”  It was a brazen gamble; in mid-1977 
Derian had little knowledge of the inner workings of the ESMA.  Yet Massera was 
apparently taken in; after a pause, the Admiral smiled and gestured as if washing his 
hands.  “Well, you remember the story of Pontius Pilate,” he concluded.175
After meeting with Argentine officials, U.S. Embassy personnel, and 
Argentine human rights advocates, Derian returned to Washington with an 
unshakeable certainty that stronger U.S. economic and military sanctions on the 
Argentine military junta were needed in order to curtail extra-legal violence.  Whether 
HA’s highly-visible advocacy could induce improvements in the protection of human 
rights in the South American nation, however, was by no means clear.  On the one 
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hand, for much of Washington’s policymaking elite and the business community, the 
policy shift represented by Derian’s highly-visible human rights advocacy reflected a 
major—and unwanted—rupture with the previous three decades of U.S. Cold War 
foreign policy toward Latin America.  Indeed, less than a week after Derian’s visit to 
Argentina, ARA Bureau Chief Terrence Todman made his own official visit to the 
South American nation, and after a round of talks with Argentine officials and human 
rights groups, returned to Washington advocating strong U.S. support for Argentina’s 
perceived military moderates, led by Jorge Videla.176
Similarly, exemplifying the widely-felt skepticism regarding the Carter 
Administration’s human rights policy rooted in three decades of close U.S.-Argentine 
military ties, when the Argentine delegate to the Inter-American Defense Board 
(IADB) asserted in mid-March that the initiative threatened to drive a wedge between 
the United States and its allies and thus create opportunities for communist expansion 
in the hemisphere, U.S. Lieutenant General (Ret) Vernon Walters agreed whole-
heartedly, responding, “Let’s hope that this will not last long.”  Although conceding 
that the intentions of the human rights advocates were “understandable,” Walters, who 
had served as Deputy Director for Central Intelligence for most of the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations, nonetheless asserted that “reality is reality.  And the idea that friends 
can be changed into enemies is for them [the communists] a very attractive 
concept.”
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On the other hand, the Carter Administration’s limited leverage over the 
Argentine military junta insured that eliciting human rights improvements from 
Buenos Aires would be no easy task.  Without question, the military junta exhibited a 
“strong desire for understanding from the U.S. and a sense of frustration and confusion 
as to why the U.S., whom they regard as the leader of the free world, does not openly 
applaud Argentina’s efforts against Marxist expansion,” reported Lieutenant General 
Gordon Sumner, Chairman of the IADB, following a formal visit to Argentina in mid-
April.  Nonetheless, Sumner ominously concluded, “It was equally clear, that the 
GOA is determined to continue its fight against subversion with or without U.S. 
support.”178
 
   
                                                                                                                                            
longstanding support for right-wing regimes in Latin America, following Juan Perón’s election in 1973, 
then-Deputy Director of the CIA Walters made a secret visit to Buenos Aires to underscore U.S. 
apprehension regarding a possible political shift to the left.  Martin Edwin Anderson, Dossier Secreto: 
Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty War" (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 108.   
178 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 2595, U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, April 11, 
1977, Subject: “Visit to Argentina of LTG Gordon Sumner, Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board 
(IADB),” ADP. 
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Chapter 5: 
On the Offensive: 
Human Rights in U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1978-1979 
 
In the fall of 1977, a tall, gregarious junior Foreign Service Officer hailing 
from West Texas arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires.  Selected to serve as 
the Embassy’s external affairs officer, Franklin A. “Tex” Harris had attended briefings 
in Washington, D. C. on issues such as nuclear proliferation, Argentine actions in the 
United Nations, and the disputed Falkland/Malvinas Islands.  Shortly after his arrival 
in Argentina, however, Harris was asked if he would switch positions with the 
Embassy’s internal affairs officer, whose basket of assignments centered on 
monitoring the status of human rights.  Lacking expertise on the issue, Harris agreed 
to the change on one unprecedented condition: that ordinary Argentines be allowed to 
enter the U.S. Embassy to report acts of political violence.  Recognizing the 
importance of first-hand testimony, the Ambassador approved the request, and Harris 
soon found himself at the forefront of the Embassy’s effort to penetrate the layers of 
secrecy surrounding the Argentine military junta’s dirty war against perceived 
subversives.  
Operating in the Western Hemisphere’s worst human rights violator, Tex 
Harris had little guidance on how to fulfill the responsibilities of a largely-untested 
position.  Accordingly, he focused his energies on meeting three overarching goals, 
“to know what is going on, to be responsive, and to report accurately.”  It was a task to 
which the convivial diplomat was uniquely suited.  As the Embassy’s Political 
Counselor later wrote, “Harris meets people easily, impresses them indelibly, seeks 
them repeatedly—all the while expanding his circles of friendship and acquaintance to 
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the point that his professional and personal contacts are enormous.”1
As a result, the volume and incisiveness of Harris’s human rights reporting 
made the United States Embassy in Buenos Aires unique among U.S. diplomatic posts 
overseas, and constituted a crucial element in Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian’s struggle to curtail U.S. economic 
and security assistance to the Argentine military junta.  Indeed, in late 1977 and 1978 
the Human Rights Bureau (HA) spearheaded a remarkably extensive U.S. effort to 
convince the military junta to end its brutal campaign of extra-legal violence.  
Culminating in the successful U.S. orchestration of a formal visit to Argentina by the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), Derian’s advocacy constituted 
a remarkable shift from the previous quarter-century of U.S. Cold War policy.   
  Indeed, in 
succeeding months, Harris would establish an extraordinary web of sources, including 
hundreds of relatives of victims, members of the international press, and human rights 
advocates in Argentina and the United States.  
Advances in the human rights arena, however, came at a heavy cost.  Although 
Harris’s willingness to investigate Argentine state-sanctioned violence and his 
irrepressible energy in documenting grim discoveries endeared him to human rights 
advocates, from the outset of his tenure in Buenos Aires Harris encountered fierce 
resistance from his Foreign Service colleagues.  In the face of accusations that he was 
“grandstanding” and failing to be a “team player,” by mid-1978 Harris had become a 
virtual pariah in the Embassy.  Similarly, in Washington, Patricia Derian’s effort to 
cast international opprobrium on the Argentine military junta confronted enormous 
opposition from much of Washington’s byzantine bureaucracy, U.S. business leaders, 
and top-ranking members of the Carter Administration.   
                                                 
1 Department of State Officer Evaluation Report, F. Allen Harris, Period Covered: July 31, 1977-April 
15, 1978, Derian Papers. 
   
 
212 
 
 
Of the thousands of Argentines who passed through one or more of the 364 
clandestine concentration camps the U.S. Embassy in mid-1977 was aware of only a 
tiny fraction.  Nonetheless, by the time Harris took up residence in Buenos Aires, the 
basic characteristics of the military’s counter-subversive campaign were clear to U.S. 
Embassy personnel.  Thousands of desaparecidos—“disappeared persons”—were 
being “sucked up” (chupado) by the ruling military junta’s unbridled campaign to 
eradicate perceived subversives.2  Kidnapped by groups of heavily-armed men, 
victims were driven blindfolded and bound in one of the Argentine security forces’ 
ubiquitous Ford Falcons to a clandestine detention facility.  At such sites, the torturers 
and guards operated with almost total impunity, and detainees endured frequent torture 
sessions and extreme privation.  “You don’t exist,” one victim recalled his torturers 
repeating on a daily basis.  “We are everything for you.  We are justice.  We are 
God.”3
Few desaparecidos reappeared, and for thousands of Argentines the 
extraordinary cruelty of the military government’s dirty war was the simple inability 
to determine the fate of victims.  Police and military officials refused to provide 
information regarding abductions, and writs of habeas corpus were scrupulously 
ignored by government officials.  Moreover, with the exception of the English-
language newspaper The Buenos Aires Herald, a combination of government 
repression and self-censorship stifled press reporting on military human rights abuses.
 
4
                                                 
2 Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, 1st American ed. 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1986), 2. 
  
3 Ibid, 25. 
4 “Journalism is the one profession where, faced with mass murder, the apology ‘I didn’t know’ is either 
a demonstration of professional ineptitude or cowardice,” writes journalist Martin Edwin Anderson, 
who reported on the trials of the Argentine military leaders in 1985 for Newsweek and the Washington 
Post.  “Yet an endless number of media members contributed to the disinformation campaign launched 
by the armed forces. The press, like the country’s political, union, and religious leadership, knew what 
was going on; the failure to do its job helped ensure that the rest of the population did not. Martin 
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More broadly, in the immediate aftermath of the March 1976 coup, the military had 
emasculated the legislative and judicial branches of government—disbanding the 
Congress, purging the Supreme Court, and replacing the Prosecutor General and the 
majority of federal judges.5  Denied the pillars of civil society, relatives of 
desaparecidos had little legal recourse.  “In less than one year a whole family has 
disappeared,” one Argentine mother grieved in late 1977.  “Nobody has told me what 
they are accused of, or where they are.  I don’t know if they are sick, if they are being 
tortured, if they are alive or dead.”  Capturing the peculiar sense of anger and 
helplessness felt by family members of desaparecidos, she concluded, “If they are 
prisoners, I know that this horror of misinformation and doubts is one of the weapons 
employed by the government of my country in this so called “war” in which the lists 
of arrested people are not made public.”6
At a political level, it was clear to U.S. Embassy officials that for Argentine 
military hardliners, the National Reorganization Process—referred to by Argentines 
simply as el Proceso—was predicated on a radical vision of Argentina’s role in the 
Cold War.  Rooted in a deep tradition of nationalism and conservative Catholicism, 
combined with French and especially U.S. Cold War doctrine, by the mid-1970s 
military leaders had developed a radical vision of Argentina’s central role in the global 
anti-communist struggle.  As Navy Commander (and junta member) Admiral Eduardo 
Emilio Massera told listeners on May 15, the roots of left-wing terrorist violence in 
Argentina lay in the thirty-year third world war against the “destructive gospel of 
totalitarianism.”  Rising moral indolence had left the Western World, “intoxicated 
with indifference,” Massera continued, leaving Argentina on the front line of a grim 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Edwin Anderson, Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty War" 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 215.   
5 Iain Guest, Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United 
Nations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 26. 
6 Matilde Herrera, Statement, November 1, 1977[?], ADP.  
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struggle with global ramifications.  The following day the Argentine Marine Corps 
Commandant took a similar, albeit less colorful approach.  “It’s either them or us,” he 
bluntly declared to a U.S. Embassy official.7
Moreover, it was evident that the members of the Argentine military junta were 
united in their support for harsh counter-terrorist tactics.
 
8  Although the post-coup 
division of political power between the armed service chiefs had exacerbated a 
decades-long intra-service struggle—particularly between the Army and the Navy—in 
the fight against left-wing terrorism, “there appears to be no dispute,” the U.S. 
Embassy concluded in June.  Granted, de facto President and Army Commander Jorge 
Rafael Videla had acknowledged “excesses in repression by the forces of order,” in 
the local press, leading the U.S. Embassy to speculate that the General imparted a 
restraining influence that was ameliorating human rights abuses by security forces.9  
Such thinking was tempered, however, by clear indications of Videla’s own expansive 
notion of counter-terror; in December 1977, the characteristically taciturn General 
informed journalists that “a terrorist is not only someone who kills with a gun or 
plants bombs, but anyone who encourages their use by others through ideas contrary 
to our Western, Christian civilization.”10
Most significantly, by the time Harris arrived U.S. Embassy officials clearly 
recognized that the quotidian horror of the National Reorganization Process was 
proceeding unabated.  “In general, the methods adopted by the security forces in the 
anti-subversive campaign remain arbitrary and harsh,” an Embassy cable asserted in 
  
                                                 
7Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 3627, U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, May 16, 1977, 
Subject: “Admiral Massera Sees Terrorism as Part of World War,” ADP.   
8 The Argentine military junta was comprised of the chiefs of the three Argentine military service 
branches, Jorge Rafael Videla (Army), Eduardo Emilio Massera (Navy), and Orlando Ramon Agosti 
(Air Force).   
9 State Department Telegram, Buenos Aires 4443, U.S. Embassy (Chaplin) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), June 14, 1977, Subject: “Argentine Human Rights Situation; A General Review,” ADP. 
10 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 9843, U.S. Embassy (Castro) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), December 23, 1977, Subject: “Human Rights Roundup,” ADP.   
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June 1977.  “Persons continue to be abducted by armed men claiming to be police and 
military officials.  Families are rarely or only belatedly informed about the 
whereabouts and status of their detained relatives.”   Although the military junta’s 
decision to divide the nation into military zones had created dozens of mini-fiefdoms 
run by local commanders with significant autonomy, extra-legal repression was no 
longer being carried out by right-wing terrorist cells operating without official 
oversight.  “The security forces appear to have assumed complete control of the 
counter-terrorism effort,” the Embassy concluded in June 1977, “and the military 
government must be considered fully responsible for internal security efficiency and 
practices.”11
As the Embassy liaison for human rights issues, Harris immediately set out to 
establish a broad base of contacts.  Able to deal with people “with extraordinary skill 
and without tiring,” as a State Department evaluation later asserted, Harris’s pool of 
sources expanded dramatically over the summer and fall of 1977.
 
12
                                                 
11 State Department Telegram, Buenos Aires 4443, U.S. Embassy (Chaplin) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), June 14, 1977, Subject: “Argentine Human Rights Situation; A General Review,” ADP.  The 
military junta initially divided Argentina into 4 military zones corresponding with the jurisdiction of 
each Army corps.  A fifth zone was later added.  Wolfgang S. Heinz and Frühling Hugo, Determinants 
of Gross Human Rights Violations by State and State-sponsored Actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and 
Argentina, 1960-1990 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 681. 
  In addition to 
establishing a strong working relationship with the official organs of the Argentine 
government—particularly the Argentine Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the Navy—Harris met regularly with members of the 
international press, and organized lunch gatherings with representatives from other 
Embassies.  Meeting in a cavernous Portuguese restaurant named the Basque, where 
the limited risk of eavesdropping Argentine security personnel compensated for 
mediocre cuisine, the diplomats traded information on human rights cases of 
12 Department of State Officer Evaluation Report, F. Allen Harris, Period Covered: July 31, 1977-April 
15, 1978, Derian Papers. 
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international interest and worked to keep abreast of the evolving political situation on 
the ground.13
Significantly, Harris also established strong ties with Argentine human rights 
advocates, particularly Emilio Fermín Mignone, whose daughter Monica had been 
abducted by state security forces the previous May.  A lawyer by training, Mignone 
had spent half-a-decade in the United States while working at the Organization of 
American States and later served as founding rector of a university in Lujan, 
Argentina.
   
14
Harris also made contact with the Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo), a group of Argentine women whose children were among the 
desaparecidos.  Despite the Argentine military’s ban on political organizing, at great 
personal risk the Madres had begun weekly marches in the Plaza—directly in front of 
the presidential palace—in April 1977, both to share information with one another and 
to draw public attention to the military junta’s human rights violations.
  Like many relatives of desaparecidos, for months following their 
daughter’s disappearance, Mignone and his wife had desperately sought to ascertain 
her whereabouts through official channels.  Outraged by continuous bureaucratic 
stonewalling in the weeks following his daughter’s disappearance, Mignone joined the 
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, where by mid-1977 he had risen to a position 
of leadership.  From his vantage point at the Permanent Assembly, Mignone was thus 
in a unique position to gauge the extent of human rights violations in Argentina, and 
he quickly became one of Tex Harris’s most trusted sources. 
15
                                                 
13 Personal Interview with F. A. Harris, October 9, 2007, Washington, D.C.; Guest, Behind the 
Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations, 168. 
  Dismissed 
by the Argentine military officials as las locas (the madwomen), the Madres were one 
of the few visible signs of popular protest toward the military’s campaign of state-
14 Ulises Gorini, La Rebelión de las Madres (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2006), 109. 
15 On the Madres see Jo Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared (London: Zed, 1989); Gorini, La Rebelión 
de las Madres.  
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sanctioned violence.  “When everyone was terrorized we didn’t stay at home crying—
we went to the streets to confront them directly,” Madres member Aída de Suárez 
recalled.  Capturing the women’s irrepressible courage, Suárez concluded, “We were 
mad but it was the only way to stay sane.”16
With government repression stifling nearly all forms of civil dissent, blanket 
censorship of the press, and an emasculated judicial system, Harris immediately 
recognized the importance of obtaining testimony from members of the Madres.  
Visiting the Plaza during the Mothers’ weekly gathering, Harris handed out dozens of 
business cards with his name and Embassy office number and informed the women 
that the U.S. Embassy would offer assistance in petitioning the Argentine government 
to disclose the whereabouts of their children.
 
17
The effort to obtain data from relatives and friends of desaparecidos quickly 
bore fruit, and the corridor outside Tex Harris’s office was soon crowded each 
afternoon from 2 to 4 o’clock with Argentines waiting to offer testimony on 
disappeared loved ones.
   
18  Within a few months, Harris was receiving dozens of 
reports.  “The number of people who will actually come to the American Embassy to 
report a disappearance must be fairly small,” Harris acknowledged in a missive to 
Washington in mid-1978.  “However,” he continued, “it does speak well as an 
indication that our policy is really understood and known to the population here in 
Argentina […]”19
Extensive first-hand testimony also provided Harris with a unique source of 
data with which to gauge the extent of state-sanctioned violence in Argentina.  To 
   
                                                 
16 Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, 60. 
17 Personal interview with F. A. Harris, October 9, 2007. 
18 F. A. Harris, transcribed discussion in Cynthia J. Arnson, ed., Argentina-United States Bilateral 
Relations: An Historical Perspective and Future Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 2003), 50.  
19 Department of State Transcript of One-Way Recorded Telephone Message, F. A. Harris to Michele 
[Bova], Patt [Derian], and Mark [Schneider], March[?] 1978, ADP. 
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manage the rising influx of cases Harris implemented a system in which his assistant, 
Blanca Vollenweider—an Argentine citizen working at the Embassy—would meet 
with victims’ family members to record personal information and the circumstances 
surrounding the disappearance, after which Harris would enter to discuss the case in 
greater detail.  In this manner, “each of the innumerable visitors are seen, often by 
shuttling back and forth between rooms like a busy dentist,” Harris later wrote.20  
Expediting his meetings with Argentine visitors not only increased the number of 
individuals from whom Harris could receive testimony; drawing on Vollenweider’s 
eye for organization, Harris established a card-file system on each human rights case, 
thus creating a unique data set with which to analyze the breadth and depth of state-
sanctioned human rights violations in Argentina.21
Simply responding to human rights inquiries arriving on a daily basis from 
Washington, however, required a daunting amount of Harris’s attention.  “The 
congressional letters were absolutely flooding the Department and each letter had to 
be answered,” recalled Fred Rondon, then serving in the State Department as the 
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) Deputy Director, Office of East Coast 
Affairs.  “Often there was a stock answer because you could only say so many things 
about an individual who had disappeared, but very often you also had to acknowledge 
receipt of the letter and send an inquiry to the Embassy in Buenos Aires.  And of 
course we were flooding them with requests for information.”
   
22
                                                 
20 Department of State Officer Evaluation Report, F. Allen Harris, Period Covered: July 31, 1977-April 
15, 1978, Derian Papers. 
  As a result, in his first 
nine months in Buenos Aires, Harris answered hundreds of “special interest” inquiries 
from U.S. citizens regarding Argentines caught up in the military junta’s 
counterinsurgency net, as well as roughly 150 pieces of congressional correspondence 
21 Personal interview with F. A. Harris, October 9, 2007. 
22 Personal Interview with Fred Rondon, May 8, 2008, Falls Church, VA.   
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pertaining to human rights.23  “It is an impossible position in terms of workload—the 
‘in-box’ has become the ‘in-drawer,” Harris later admitted in a State Department 
evaluation.  “Lack of time and energy—physical and emotional—become daily tests 
of self.”24
Nonetheless, Harris managed to churn out a prodigious volume of human 
rights reporting, drafting dozens of cables to Washington each month.  Moreover, 
drawing on a growing array of contacts, Harris was able to provide Washington with 
near-real time reporting on human rights unrivaled among U.S. Embassies.  In the 
effort to track the flow of violence, daily testimony from relatives of desaparecidos 
proved particularly valuable.  “We were producing weekly ‘temperature charts,’ as we 
called them,” Harris recalled years later, “[…] showing to Washington a graphic 
depiction of the repression, based on what the people who came to the Embassy told 
us.”  By late 1977, Harris’s remarkable understanding of the human rights situation in 
Argentina made his policy recommendations into the foundational reference for 
Christopher Committee deliberations on Argentina—including decisions on 
International Finance Institution (IFI) Loans to Argentina, Export-Import Bank 
transactions, and security transfer requests.  “As usual I reiterate my request for more 
frequent human rights roundups,” Rondon wrote Harris in early 1978.   Underscoring 
the importance of Harris’s reporting, Rondon concluded, “there’s no other way to 
inject order into the human rights information monster.”
 
25
 
  
By the time Tex Harris’s memoranda on human rights began to filter into the 
State Department in the fall of 1977, the bureaucratic struggle to define the nature of 
                                                 
23 Department of State Officer Evaluation Report, F. Allen Harris, Period Covered: July 31, 1977-April 
15, 1978, Derian Papers. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Department of State General Correspondence, Fred Rondon to F. A. Harris, January 31, 1978, ADP.  
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U.S. policy toward the Argentine military junta was in full swing.  With the United 
States required by congressional legislation to take human rights factors into 
consideration on votes in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), throughout the late 
spring and summer of 1977 Patricia Derian’s Human Rights Office had looked to the 
International Finance Institutions (IFIs) as a key source of leverage for eliciting human 
rights improvements in Argentina.  Indeed, the Argentines’ acute sensitivity to U.S. 
IFI actions appeared to demonstrate that a carefully calibrated U.S. voting policy 
could advance U.S. interests in the human rights arena; when U.S. Ambassador Robert 
C. Hill informed the Argentines (without Kissinger’s approval) in September 1976 
that the Harkin Amendment’s human rights provisions would make it unlikely that the 
U.S. could support future loans to Argentina in the Inter-American Development Bank 
that did not support the needy, the military junta had deliberately kept certain loans out 
of the IDB, including a $30 million loan for industrial credits in December.26  Three 
months later, the U.S. representative to the World Bank Board elicited an “angry 
reaction” from the Argentine delegate by making a statement on human rights 
regarding a $105 million highway project in the IBRD.  Underscoring the Argentines 
sensitivity to U.S. economic sanctions, despite the U.S. vote in favor of the loan, the 
Argentine official bitingly accused the United States of politicizing the IFIs.27
Despite apparent Argentine responsiveness to initial U.S. economic actions on 
human rights grounds, Derian’s effort to harness the IFIs as a means to systematically 
sanction the military junta elicited sharp resistance from her colleagues on the 
Christopher Committee.  Notwithstanding a consensus that the situation in Argentina 
was deplorable, along with a “grudging agreement that something should be done,” 
 
                                                 
26 Department of State Miscellaneous, May 4 1977, Subject: “Multilateral Assistance to Argentina in 
IDB and IBRD,” ADP. 
27 State Department Miscellaneous, May 23, 1977, Subject: “Argentina—Human Rights,” ADP. 
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according to Steven Oxman, the Committee’s meeting on May 18 revealed an 
“undercurrent of great dissatisfaction with the whole idea of seeking to implement 
human rights through the IFIs.”  Underscoring the key position of Argentina in the 
overall development of the Administration’s human rights policy, Oxman, Warren 
Christopher’s Special Assistant for human rights issues, emphasized that the question 
of how to deal with economic assistance to Argentina brought the United States to 
“the Rubicon on the question of whether we really mean to seek to implement our 
human rights policy in part through the IFIs.”28
In the resulting debate, battle lines were drawn between HA and the 
geographic and functional bureaus that would remain largely unaltered for the duration 
of the Carter Administration.  The Latin America Bureau—like the vast majority of 
the State Department as a whole—sought to avoid a major showdown over human 
rights with any of its foreign counterparts, including Buenos Aires.  “We may wish to 
oppose these loans if the Argentines force them to a vote,” a Department 
memorandum noted in late May.  Revealing the Diplomatic Corps’ overriding 
emphasis on maintaining smooth relations abroad, however, the memo added, “It is 
not in our or the GOA’s interest to provoke an open confrontation.  Rather our 
approach should be to attempt to persuade the Argentines to postpone those loans 
which give us the most difficulty.”
 
29
By contrast, for Derian, the IFIs provided a key means to cast international 
opprobrium on the Argentine military junta, potentially extracting human rights 
concessions in the process.  Warren Christopher’s decision on the June IBRD 
industrial credits loan seemed to substantiate Derian’s position; when the Argentine 
 
                                                 
28 Department of State Memorandum, Steven Oxman to Warren Christopher, May 18, 1977, Subject: 
“Results of Today’s Meeting re Upcoming IFI Loans,” Box 16, Folder: Human Rights—Foreign 
Assistance, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
29 State Department Miscellaneous, May 23, 1977, Subject: “Argentina—Human Rights,” ADP. 
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political counselor was informed that the United States intended to abstain on the loan 
based on the human rights situation in Argentina, he immediately “asked if it was too 
late for Argentine developments to influence [the] U.S. vote.”  The U.S. response—
emphasizing the need to halt disappearances, end the use of torture, publish a list of all 
government-held prisoners, implement habeas corpus, and reinstate the “right of 
option” allowing individuals held without charges under the state-of-siege provisions 
to opt for voluntary exile—revealed just how far the Carter Administration had moved 
away from the traditionally warm U.S. Cold War policy toward anti-communist Latin 
American military regimes.  And although the military junta balked at U.S. demands 
for political normalization, Buenos Aires did enact a small number of much-publicized 
steps to improve its human rights image abroad.  While “the initiative is hollow from 
the substantive side,” the U.S. Embassy noted the following week, it was nonetheless 
“interesting and encouraging in what it demonstrates about rising Argentine 
bureaucratic sensitivity concerning the seriousness of the U.S. human rights 
position.”30
Nonetheless, Christopher’s decision to abstain on the IBRD loan raised hackles 
throughout the Foreign Service bureaucracy.  “The human rights people are getting 
pretty uppity these days, and they’re sitting on a bunch of things,” one unnamed U.S. 
official told the Christian Science Monitor in late June.  Imbued with a moralistic zeal 
antithetical to the art of diplomacy, the official continued, Derian and her supporters, 
“live in a sort of separate world from the rest of the State Department.”
 
31
                                                 
30 State Department Telegram, Buenos Aires 4368, U.S. Embassy (Chaplin) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), June 22, 1977, Subject: “GOA Notes Human Rights Improvements,” ADP. 
  Such 
resistance to linking human rights to the IFIs was not limited to Washington 
bureaucrats.  The U.S. decision to abstain on the June IBRD loan to Argentina 
31 Daniel Southerland, “State Department Rights Proponents Flex Muscles,” Christian Science Monitor, 
June 27, 1977. 
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garnered sharply critical responses from nearly all the voting members of the World 
Bank Board.  The IBRD, the Dominican Republic’s representative hotly asserted 
following the U.S. statement of abstention, “is not the appropriate forum for the 
discussion of issues other than economic and financial ones and that projects should be 
considered in accordance with the Articles of Agreement.”  The Dutch, Indian and 
Egyptian delegates concurred; capturing the mood, the Egyptian delegate informed his 
United States counterpart that “although human rights are important, discussing them 
could lead the Board into an unhelpful debate.” 32  As anticipated, despite the U.S. 
abstention the loan was approved.  Nonetheless, the Board members’ criticism of the 
decision clearly demonstrated the limits to U.S. moral suasion in the international 
sphere, raising the ire of human rights sympathizers at the State Department.  “By 
their ‘rationale,’ loans to Nazi Germany would have received pro forma approval so 
long as they were economically viable,” Oxman angrily wrote Christopher.  
“Somewhere the line has got to be drawn.”33
 
 
Exactly where the line should be drawn in U.S.-Argentine relations, however, 
proved an enduring challenge for U.S. policymakers over the course of 1977.  
Corresponding with the debate over U.S. votes in the IFIs, a hotly contested dispute 
flared up in the summer between Patricia Derian’s office and the geographic and 
functional bureaus over U.S. military assistance to the Argentine military junta.  The 
previous year, congressional lawmakers had successfully added Section 502B to the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, asserting that “except in extraordinary circumstances, 
the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any 
                                                 
32 Department of State Memorandum, M. E. Gonzales to Files, June 20, 1977, Subject: “Board 
Discussion of the $100 Million Industrial Credit to Argentina, June 16, 1977,” Box 17, Folder: Human 
Rights—Interagency Group IV, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
33 Ibid. 
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government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights.”34  Whereas the Ford Administration had offered almost 
total-resistance to the legislation, under Carter the Human Rights Bureau was included 
in all decisions on security assistance, primarily through membership on the Arms 
Export Control Board and its subsidiary, the Security Assistance Advisory Group.  
Significantly, HA could formally oppose security assistance transfer cases, thus 
elevating the case in question to Cyrus Vance’s office for resolution based on action 
memoranda drafted by each interested party.35
From the outset of the Carter’s tenure, Argentina was recognized as a 
particularly egregious human rights violator.  Indeed, less than two months after 
entering the Oval Office, Carter had made a clear showing of disapproval of the 
military junta in Buenos Aires by slashing Foreign Military Sales credits to Argentina 
from $32 million to $15 million, and by mid-1977, nearly all arms transfer requests 
from Buenos Aires were being rejected on human rights grounds.  Nonetheless, to 
avoid locking the Executive into a restrictive policy framework, the Administration 
avoided formally designating Argentina—or any other nation—as a gross violator of 
internationally recognized human rights under Section 502B.  Accordingly, like the 
Christopher Committee’s review of IFI proposals, security assistance transfer cases 
were reviewed by the Deputy Secretary on a case by case basis—resulting in a series 
of clashes between Derian’s office and both the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and 
the Security Assistance Bureau, and leaving the Administration to vulnerable to 
criticism that the human rights policy lacked consistency and coherence. 
 
                                                 
34 Quoted in Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 252-53. 
35 Stephen B. Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices," Journal of 
International Law 76 (1982): 261-62. 
   
 
225 
 
The contentious nature of security assistance cases was particularly evident 
regarding a proposed $15 million sale of eight Bell-Textron UH-1H helicopters to the 
Argentine military junta.  According to Bell-Textron, a division of the Fort Worth-
based Textron Corporation, the sale was purely commercial, with two of the 
helicopters intended for use by the Argentine executive, and the other six for Antarctic 
exploration.   Accepting Bell-Textron’s emphasis on the commercial nature of the 
transaction at face value, ARA offered strong backing for the sale, while also opining 
that in light of the growing number of recently denied security assistance transfer 
cases to Argentina, “a limited goodwill gesture will demonstrate a token of faith that 
the Argentine armed forces will turn the human rights situation around.”  Likewise, 
the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs (PM) gave the proposal a green light, 
noting that although the helicopters would be equipped with machine gun mounts and 
armor plating, “almost any helicopter can be armed, but this does not make it an 
efficient weapon in an urban environment.”36
At the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian 
strongly objected to the sale, arguing that the Argentine government’s human rights 
violations warranted an unconditional U.S. refusal.  Barring an outright rejection, HA 
recommended authorizing only two armor-plated helicopters (to be used by the 
Argentine Executive), and removing the machine gun mounts from all eight.  
Additionally, in light of evidence from the U.S. Embassy that Argentine security 
services were utilizing helicopters in anti-subversive operations, Derian proposed 
making the sale contingent on the military government’s assurance that the vehicles 
would not be used for internal security.
 
37
                                                 
36 Department of State Memorandum, William P. Stedman, Jr., Patricia Derian, and Leslie M. Gelb 
through Lucy Wilson Benson to Cyrus Vance, August 19, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—
Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
   
37 On evidence of the Argentine military government’s use of helicopters, see State Department 
Telegram, Buenos Aires 4072, U.S. Embassy (Chaplin) to Secretary of State (Vance), June 2, 1977, 
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HA’s strident resistance to the sale brought Undersecretary of State for 
Security Assistance Lucy Benson into the debate.  Citing nuclear non-proliferation as 
the most important U.S. objective vis-à-vis Argentina, Benson recommended that the 
U.S. sell the helicopters according to HA’s prescription, minus the assurances.  “We 
do not need assurances for what amounts to a commercial transport helicopter to 
justify the sale on the Hill,” Benson wrote Cyrus Vance.  “And we risk a good deal, 
particularly on non-proliferation, for a marginal return, since we have no way of 
verifying compliance of any assurances we might be given.”38
Caught in the crossfire of competing demands, Warren Christopher struggled 
to reach a compromise that would be consistent with the broader human rights policy.  
As Stephen Oxman noted on August 20, “to urge the Argentines to withdraw IFI loan 
applications, while at the same time permitting them to buy American helicopters 
without making any commitment to us as to their intended use, sends very mixed 
messages[.]”  By the same token, denying the sale would have little more than 
symbolic value; similar aircraft were readily available on the European market, and an 
Argentine delegation’s conspicuous attendance at Paris aircraft exposition in June 
clearly indicated that the South American nation was not dependent on United States 
imports.  Moreover, lobbying by Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Jr. (D-TX) and 
Representative Jim Wright (D-TX) ensured that an outright rejection of the proposed 
sale would spark criticism on Capitol Hill that the Carter Administration’s human 
rights policy was hurting U.S. manufacturers.
   
39
                                                                                                                                            
Subject: “Possible Use of U.S. Helicopters in GOA Anti-Subversion Activities,” ADP.  On HA’s 
recommendation regarding the Bell-Textron sale, see Department of State Memorandum, William P. 
Stedman, Jr., Patricia Derian, and Leslie M. Gelb through Lucy Wilson Benson to Cyrus Vance, August 
19, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
   
38 Department of State Memorandum, Lucy Benson to Cyrus Vance, August 19, 1977, Box 13, Folder: 
Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
39 Department of State Memorandum, Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. to Terence Todman and Lucy Wilson 
Benson, September 29, 1977, Subject: “Bell Helicopter Sale to Argentina,” Box 13, Folder: Human 
Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II; Senate Correspondence, Lloyd Bentsen 
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Seven weeks after the State Department began reviewing the proposed sale, on 
September 3, 1977 Argentine Ambassador Jorge A. Aja Espil received Warren 
Christopher’s decision: the Bell-Textron sale would be approved.  No machine gun 
mounts would be included, however, only two helicopters would include armor, and 
assurances that the machines would not be used in counterinsurgency operations 
would be required.40  Despite reflecting the Deputy Secretary’s best effort to find a 
middle ground between the competing voices on the case, the Argentine government’s 
response—curtly informing the United States that it could “forget the sale”—elicited a 
predictably angry reaction from proponents of the transfer.41  “While I understand and 
applaud the Administration’s concern with human rights, I sincerely question whether 
the six aircraft in question would be used to infringe [on] the rights of the Argentine 
people,” Senator Bentsen asserted to Cyrus Vance in early October.  Not only were the 
majority of the aircraft intended for use in the Antarctic, Bentsen concluded, but the 
very premise of the Carter Administration’s attempt to link the sale to human rights 
was flawed.  “While it is theoretically possible that the helicopters could be used to 
transport political prisoners,” Bentsen concluded, “the same arguments could be used 
to bar the sale of a truck or taxicab to Argentina.”42
For Patricia Derian, Christopher’s decision—and the subsequent Argentine 
refusal—marked a small, yet not insignificant victory for the embattled Human Rights 
Bureau.  Indeed, not only Derian’s office had played a critical role in linking the 
proposed transfer to Section 502B, but there was strong evidence belying Bell-
   
                                                                                                                                            
to Cyrus Vance, October 5, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, 
RG 59, Archives II. 
40 Department of State Cable, State 211744, Warren Christopher to American Embassy Buenos Aires, 
September 3, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives 
II. 
41 Department of State Memorandum, Douglas J. Bennet, Jr. to Terence Todman and Lucy Wilson 
Benson, September 29, 1977, Subject: “Bell Helicopter Sale to Argentina,” Box 13, Folder: Human 
Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
42 Senate Correspondence, Lloyd Bentsen to Cyrus Vance, October 5, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human 
Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
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Textron’s claim to the U.S. government that the majority of the helicopters would be 
utilized in the Antarctic.  At the twelfth hour of deliberations on the case, Stephen 
Oxman came across a previously overlooked cable from Bell-Textron noting that all 
eight helicopters were expected to spend a considerable amount of time flying over 
Buenos Aires.  More disconcerting for human rights advocates was the provision, 
buried in the proposed contract, that Bell-Textron “assist the Buyer in making 
ammunition boxes, support mounts and electrical connections needed for the 
installation immediately of a flexible machine gun on each side of the [six non-
executive] Helicopters,” as well as deliver detailed plans on helicopters’ armament 
electrical system.43
Nonetheless, repeated lobbying by the Human Rights Bureau to institute a full 
embargo on U.S. sales to Argentina failed to bear fruit.  Despite being sympathetic 
with Derian’s effort to institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy, Warren 
Christopher concurred with the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance on the 
impracticality of across-the-board sanctions on the Argentine military junta.  “An 
embargo is strong medicine—if applied to Argentina, why not others?” Benson 
asserted in a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary on September 20.   “Consistency 
may be the hobgoblin of small minds,” Benson concluded, “but there will be strong 
domestic political pressure to be even-handed.”
  
44
More broadly, despite the weeks of wrangling over the proposed Bell-Textron 
sale, Christopher’s case-by-case approach ensured that the decision would not provide 
a precedent for subsequent arms transfer proposals.  Instead, the absence of a clearly 
defined set of ground rules for decisions on U.S. security assistance to Argentina 
 
                                                 
43 Department of State Memorandum, Stephen Oxman to Warren Christopher, August 20, 1977, Box 
13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
44 Department of State Memorandum, Lucy Wilson Benson through Warren Christopher to Cyrus 
Vance, September 20, 1977, Subject: “Argentine Arms Transfers,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—
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opened the Administration to domestic political pressure of a different kind: special-
interest lobbying on behalf of U.S. manufacturers.  In September, Speaker of the 
House Thomas P. O’Neil, Jr. (D-MA) and Representative Silvio R. Conte (R-MA) 
wrote Secretary Vance emphasizing the importance of a proposed $4.4 million sale of 
submarine periscopes to the Argentine Navy from the Massachusetts-based firm 
Kollmorgen.  The sale, the Congressmen asserted, “will mean a great deal to the local 
economy which is suffering from high unemployment.  Kollmorgen is a vital key to 
the recovery of the area.”45  Moreover, submarine periscopes were hardly tools of 
internal security, Edward W. Brooke (R-MA) informed Undersecretary Benson.  Since 
the submarines would not be delivered for five years, Brooke added, “it is difficult to 
envision the nature of the regime that will be in power in Argentina then.”46
Similarly, a proposed $24 million sale of three Boeing Vertol helicopters to the 
Argentine Air Force also brought heavy lobbying from the Pennsylvania contingent on 
Capitol Hill, including Senators Richard S. Schweiker (R) and Henry J. Heinz, III, 
along with Representatives Robert W. Edgar (D) and Gus Yatron (D).
  
47
                                                 
45 Congressional Correspondence, Silvio O. Conte and Thomas P. O’Neil, Jr. to Cyrus Vance, October 
5, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
  Noting the 
high unemployment affecting Pennsylvania’s Delaware County, and emphasizing that 
two recently lost bids on Department of Defense contracts had resulted in layoffs of 
2,000 employees over the past year-and-a-half, the Pennsylvania Congressional 
Delegation Steering Committee informed Cyrus Vance that “if approval of the 
Argentine orders is not forthcoming, Boeing Vertol will be forced to suspend its 
46 Senate Correspondence, Edward W. Brooke to Lucy Wilson Benson, October 7, 1977, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
47 Department of State Memorandum, Fred Rondon to Mr. Arellano, October 13, 1977, Subject: “Arms 
Transfers to Argentina: Congressional Interest,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, 
ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
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helicopter production line, and to lay off more highly skilled workers who would be 
difficult to rehire because of their job opportunities in other sections of the country.”48
In both the Kollmorgen and Boeing Vertol cases, concerted lobbying efforts 
had a major impact on State Department decisionmaking.   As one Department official 
admitted to the Washington Post regarding the proposed Boeing transfer, “You have 
no idea of the pressure.”
 
49  Indeed, Warren Christopher alluded to the influence of the 
domestic political lobby in his recommendation to Secretary Vance that both cases be 
approved.  “They are non-concessional, they are arguably ‘non-lethal,’ and they have 
considerable Congressional support from sensitive quarters,” Christopher wrote.50  
Vance concurred with his Deputy Secretary, approving the sales on November 3.51
 
   
Despite such concessions to domestic political interests, top officials in the 
Carter Administration took an active role in promoting human rights in U.S.-Argentine 
relations over the fall of 1977.  During consultations with Latin America leaders in 
Washington regarding the impending Panama Canal Treaty, Jimmy Carter personally 
emphasized the importance of human rights with de facto President and junta member 
General Jorge Rafael Videla.  Although human rights advocates subsequently 
criticized Carter for meeting with the heads of the hemisphere’s worst human rights 
violating regimes, in fact, in his meeting with Videla, Carter firmly sought to elicit 
promises from the Argentine leader of pending advances in the protection of human 
rights.52
                                                 
48 Pennsylvania Congressional Delegation Steering Committee to Cyrus Vance, April 27, 1978, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Argentina III, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
   In a particularly dramatic show of support for the work of non-governmental 
49 Karen DeYoung and Charles A. Krause, “Our Mixed Signals on Human Rights in Argentina,” The 
Washington Post, Oct 29, 1978, pg. A1 
50 Department of State Memorandum, Warren Christopher to Cyrus Vance, October 26, 1977, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Argentina IV, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
51 Karen DeYoung and Charles A. Krause, “Our Mixed Signals on Human Rights in Argentina,” The 
Washington Post, Oct 29, 1978, pg. A1 
52 As Washington Office on Latin America Director Rev. Joe Eldridge asserted in a congressional 
conference the following year, “The administration has also demonstrated of late a certain insensitivity 
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human rights advocacy groups, Carter informed Videla that a list of roughly 3,500 
human rights cases had been compiled by the Argentine Committee on Human Rights 
in Washington.  Although admitting that the United States government could not 
vouch for the accuracy of the list, Carter nonetheless asserted that, “it was of concern 
to the U.S.” and would be delivered to the Argentine Foreign Minister the following 
month.53
In addition to emphasizing human rights concerns, by meeting with Videla, 
Carter hoped to send a clear show of support for perceived military “moderates” in 
Argentina who seemed to hold the promise of eventual political liberalization.  
Although U.S. intelligence analysts recognized that Videla brooked no opposition to 
severe measures against alleged leftist subversives, in comparison with strident 
advocates of indefinite military rule guided by harsh repression, such as Generals 
Carlos Suárez Mason and Luciano Menéndez, or military populists such as Admiral 
Massera—Videla appeared to U.S. policymakers as cautiously working to conciliate 
fierce inter- and intra-service strife while charting a moderate path.
   
54  Indeed, in a 
meeting with President Carter shortly after Videla’s departure, Secretary Vance’s 
handwritten notes underscored the U.S. effort to support Argentina’s military 
moderates. “Hope that strength of V[idela]’s gov[ernmen]t will lead to action in H.R. 
[human rights] field,” the Secretary scribbled on White House stationery.55
                                                                                                                                            
to the power of symbolic action. The most disturbing setback was the series of tét-a-tét meetings 
between Latin America’s most notorious violators of human rights and President Carter, following the 
signing of the Panama Canal treaties.” U.S. Policy on Human Rights in the Latin America (Southern 
Cone): A Congressional Conference on Capitol Hill (New York: Fund for New Priorities in America, 
1978), 5. 
 
53 State Department Telegram, State AL-160, Secretary of State (Vance) to U.S. Embassy Buenos 
Aires, September 26, 1977, Subject: “List of Political Detainees,” ADP; State Department 
Miscellaneous, October 12, 1977, Subject: “Aide Memoire,” ADP. 
54 On the factions within the Argentine military see David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish 
Colonization to the Falklands War, Revised ed. (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1985), 370-
71. 
55 Cyrus Vance, handwritten notes, September 12, 1977, box 10, folder 27, Vance Papers.  
   
 
232 
 
Carter’s meeting with Videla initially appeared to be an important step toward 
Argentina’s normalization.  In what Carter described as “one of the most productive 
and most frank discussions I’ve had with any leader,” the Argentine leader promised 
to accept a formal fact-finding visit from an international human rights group.  Videla 
also pledged that Argentina’s detainee problem would be resolved by Christmas.56  
“President Videla was very frank with me about pointing out the problems that have 
existed in Argentina and his commitment to make very rapid progress in the next few 
months,” Carter told reporters after the meeting.  “He wants Argentina to be judged 
not on his words alone, but on the demonstrable progress that he stated would be 
made.”57
Moreover, by the end of month, Videla’s meeting with Carter seemed to have 
bolstered his institutional standing vis-à-vis Argentine hardliners.  In a White House 
memo to the President on September 29, National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski asserted that the visit to Washington had “enhanced the image of 
Argentina, as well as Videla.”  According to U.S. intelligence, Brzezinski continued, 
“one result of Videla’s diplomatic success is that it will permit him to continue with 
his policy of a slow, but sincere, effort to reestablish human rights in Argentina.
 
58
Finally, Carter’s meeting with Videla facilitated a series of subsequent top-
level diplomatic communications regarding human rights.  In addition to the delivery 
of the list human rights cases on October 12, Carter personally wrote Videla on 
November 3 to remind the Argentine leader of his promise to achieve significant 
   
                                                 
56 Department of State Telegram, State 262832, Secretary of State (Vance) to U.S. Embassy Buenos 
Aires, Subject: “Letter to President Videla from President Carter,” November 3, 1977, ADP. 
57 Jimmy Carter meeting with Jorge Rafael Videla, September 9, 1977, Remarks to reporters following 
the meeting, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter: 1977, vol. 2 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 1555.  For original video footage of 
Carter’s meeting with Videla, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdtIH1qy3LY. 
58 White House Memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, September 29, 1977, Subject: 
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progress by the end of the year.  Carter also sought to engage Videla in personal 
diplomacy; when the Argentine leader sent Carter a selection of recordings by the 
Buenos Aires chamber ensemble La Camerata Bariloche, Carter responded with a 
personal thank-you note.59
More concretely, the Panama Canal meeting paved the way for a formal visit 
to Argentina by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in November.  On a tour of South 
America that included stops in Brazil and Venezuela, Vance arrived in Buenos Aires 
flanked by Patricia Derian and ARA Chief Terrence Todman.
   
60  In separate meetings 
with the members of the Argentine military junta, Secretary Vance clearly 
underscored the importance the Carter Administration placed upon the protection of 
human rights; speaking with Admiral Massera, for example, Vance firmly asserted 
that “the only way to restore [U.S.-Argentine] military cooperation would be to 
resolve the human rights problem.”61  In an unmistakable show of support for the State 
Department’s Human Rights Bureau, Vance also presented his hosts with an expanded 
list of individuals allegedly missing or imprisoned by state security personnel.62
                                                 
59 White House Correspondence, Jimmy Carter to Jorge R. Videla, December 1, 1977, box: CO-10, 
folder: CO-8, 1/20/77-1/20/81, White House Central File, Subject File, Countries, JCL.  For a rather 
humorous discussion of Carter’s passion for classical music, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and 
Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 
1983), 23. 
  
Although the Secretary of State informed the Argentine military leaders that he could 
not verify the accuracy of the list—containing 7,500 names compiled by the Argentine 
Commission on Human Rights and signed by representatives of numerous non-
governmental human rights organizations—he informed his hosts that “excesses 
60 “Vance Arrives in Argentina,” The Washington Post, Nov 21, 1977, pg. A16. 
61 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, November 21, 1977, Subject: “Courtesy Call on 
Admiral Massera,” Box: “FOIA, Mick 1949-1973,” Folder: “1977,” Martin Edwin Anderson 
Collection, NSA.  
62 Lewis H. Diuguid, “Vance to Take Rights Roster to Argentina,” Washington Post, November 13, 
1977; George Gedda, “Vance Departs Today on 3-Nation Latin Tour,” Washington Post, November 20, 
1977, pg. 21. 
   
 
234 
 
committed in combating terrorism cannot be justified.”63  Lastly, Vance reiterated 
U.S. support for human rights advocates in Argentina by hosting representatives from 
the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights at the U.S. Embassy.64
Over the course of fall 1978, top-U.S. policymakers thus took an active role in 
promoting human rights in Argentina.  In comparison with preceding U.S. 
administrations’ U.S. Cold War policy toward the South American nation—and 
indeed, Latin America as a whole—Carter’s attention to human rights in Argentina 
embodied a dynamic policy shift.  In particular, the President’s decision to submit lists 
of desaparecidos to the Argentine military junta constituted a signal moment in the 
evolution of the U.S. human rights policy; although the United States had little 
recourse in protecting the lives of foreign citizens, by giving the lists its formal 
imprimatur the Carter Administration clearly indicated that the United States sought to 
promote the rights not only of U.S. citizens, but Argentines as well. 
 
 
The brutal kidnapping by Argentine state security personnel of nearly a dozen 
members of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, along with two French nuns assisting in 
human rights advocacy in early December 1977 dispelled Carter Administration 
officials’ optimism that the Argentine human rights crisis would be resolved by the 
end of year.  In fact, the raid had been carefully orchestrated by Argentine security 
personnel to disrupt the Madres plans to pressure Videla to fulfill his promise of 
curtailing hostilities by Christmas through two major demonstrations and a prominent 
advertisement in the Argentine daily La Nación.   Although Videla publicly professed 
no knowledge of the perpetrators of the raid, and notwithstanding the emergence of a 
                                                 
63 Department of State Telegram, State 282605, Secretary of State (Vance) to U.S. Embassy Buenos 
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64 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, November 21, 1977, Subject: “Human Rights 
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highly implausible press package blaming the left-wing Montoneros, the grim 
undertaking bore all the hallmarks of state-sanctioned violence.65
Indeed, weeks earlier, Navy Captain Alfredo Astiz had successfully infiltrated 
the Madres by posing as a desperate relative of a desaparecido under the pseudonym 
Gustavo Niño.  Known by his peers as the “Angel of Death,” thanks to his youthful 
appearance and extra-ordinary brutality, Astiz led Task Force 3.3.2, one of several 
contingents of dirty war operatives based at the Naval Mechanics School (ESMA).
    
66
 
  
On Thursday, December 8, as the Madres filtered onto the street after a meeting to 
collect signatures and funds for the advertisement in the Santa Cruz church—located 
in the heavily-populated Buenos Aires neighborhood of San Cristóbal—a half-dozen 
unmarked cars swarmed the entrance to the building and the women were set upon by 
plainclothes security personnel.   As Madre María del Rosario later recalled:  
Suddenly two men appeared and took one of the Mothers in front. They 
dragged her to the side and when she began to shout other men appeared and 
took the Mother beside me. […]  They threw me against the wall and told me 
not to move, saying it was a drugs raid. So I screamed to the other Mothers 
walking behind, “They’re taking us! They’re taking us!” and they [the 
Mothers] came towards us, thinking someone wanted to give us a lift in a car. 
Another man appeared, in shirtsleeves, and he pushed us away shouting “Move 
on! Move on!” and we ran and hid in the church. The people were beginning to 
leave the mass so we mingled in with them, scared to death.67
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Ten women were abducted from Santa Cruz; three others were picked up 
shortly thereafter, including Asucena Villaflor de Vicenti on December 10, the 
founder of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo.68
 
 
Word of the kidnappings reached the United States Embassy in Buenos Aires 
almost immediately.  In addition to coverage of the event in the local media, on 
Sunday, December 11 a group of distraught Madres made a personal appeal to U.S. 
Ambassador Raul Castro, who sent a hurried cable to Washington the following 
morning.69  The news shocked State Department officials, who recognized that the 
Madres and French nuns had been peacefully engaged in civil protest, and Secretary 
Vance immediately ordered Castro to raise the matter with top-ranking Argentine 
military officials.  In subsequent weeks, the Ambassador repeatedly discussed the 
abductions with members of the military junta, as well as the Minister of Economics, 
the Defense Minister, and Videla’s second-in-command, General Roberto Viola.70
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The whereabouts of the 13 women remained undetermined, however, and although 
Videla reportedly ordered the Argentine Army and federal police to locate the women 
and “cough them up,” the U.S. Embassy offered Washington few details.  “Our 
findings are contradictory and inconclusive,” Castro cabled Washington on January 
20.  “Our sources agree that the operation was carried out by some arm of the security 
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forces,” the Ambassador continued, “but which specific group and the level of 
responsibility is unclear.”71   
Steady United States pressure on the Argentines regarding the women’s 
disappearance throughout the month of February was equally unproductive.  On 
February 1, Castro informed the Deputy Foreign Minister that “this episode could be 
the straw that breaks the camel’s back” in U.S.-Argentine relations.72  Two weeks 
later, underscoring the importance the State Department placed on the women’s 
abduction, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance ordered the Ambassador to “make known 
to all levels of the Argentine government and to the public the seriousness with which 
the U.S. views continuing human rights violations, making clear that an improvement 
in our relations, particularly the provision of military and economic assistance, 
depends upon improvements in the Argentine human rights situation.”73
In fact, the Madres and the two nuns had been quickly killed and disposed of 
by Argentine Navy personnel—most likely before the end of December.  Like 
thousands of Argentines who passed through the Naval Mechanics School, under a 
shroud of official secrecy the women had been transported to the ESMA, tortured, and 
eventually thrown from a Navy airplane into the South Atlantic.
  The women, 
however, remained desaparecidas.   
74
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Human Rights, Right of Option and Beagle Channel with DEP FONMIN Allara,” ADP. 
73 Department of State Cable, State 37632, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Buenos Aires, February 
13, 1978, Subject: “Ambassador’s Goals and Objectives,” box 17, Folder: TL Sensitive 1/1-3/31/78, 
Policy and Planning Staff, Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, GRDS, RG 59, 
Archives II. 
74 An estimated 5,000 individuals were killed by Naval personnel operating at the ESMA.  See 
“Generals Object to Torture Museum,” BBC News, March 25, 2004, accessed online (October 2, 2009) 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3568795.stm. 
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Navy from the nearby bases, which they see frequently from the area,” Emilio 
Mignone, Vice-President of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, wrote in 
March after three dozen bodies were tossed by the ocean onto a stretch of beach just 
south of the capital. “Some neighbors” Mignone continued, “affirmed having seen 
bundles falling from the aircraft.”75 Along with two of her fellow advocates, Azucena 
Villaflor’s mutilated body washed up on Atlantic coastline and was buried in an 
anonymous grave.76
Villaflor’s remains would not be positively identified for more than three 
decades; information did surface, however, regarding the fate of the two French nuns 
and five of the disappeared Madres.  More than three months after the women’s 
disappearance, on March 30 Ambassador Castro reported that a reliable source in the 
Argentine government had confidentially confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that 
Argentine security forces had indeed abducted the women.  The mutilated bodies of 
the Madres and the two nuns, Alicia Doman and Renee Duguet, the source revealed, 
had washed ashore weeks earlier on the Atlantic coast near Mar Del Plata.
   
77
 
   
Confirmation of the kidnapping and murder of the Madres and the French nuns 
sparked a major shift in United States policy toward Argentina.  Despite the December 
abductions, in the first three months of 1978, the U.S. approach had continued to 
reflect the hope that Jorge Videla was slowly pushing a moderate agenda; although at 
                                                 
75 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 1919, US Embassy (Castro) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), March 15, 1978, Subject: “Rumors of Bodies Disposed at Sea,” ADP.  Corroborating 
Mignone’s report, nearly two decades later Retired Navy Officer Francisco Scilingo revealed to 
investigative journalist Horacio Verbitsky that between fifteen and twenty victims had been thrown 
from Navy airplanes into the Atlantic on a weekly basis for two years.  Horacio Verbitsky, The Flight: 
Confessions of an Argentine Dirty Warrior (New York: New Press, 1996), 51. 
76 Exhumed in 1984, the bodies of Villaflor, Esther Ballestrino de Careaga and María Ponce de Bianco 
were positively identified in 2005.  See Nora Cortiñas, “Que los Culpables Vayan a Cárceles 
Communes,” Pagina 12, accessed online (May 7, 2006) at  
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/12/12/conexiones/azucena.htm.   
77 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 02346, U.S. Embassy (Castro) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), March 30, 1978, Subject: “Report of Nuns Death,” ADP. 
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the end of the year Videla had publicly denied his September promise to Jimmy Carter 
that state-sanctioned violence would be curtailed by Christmas, the Argentine 
government made small yet not insignificant advances in the first three months of the 
new year: restoring the “right of option” (allowing prisoners held under state-of-siege 
provisions to petition for exile), publishing a list of 3,600 prisoners held under 
Executive Privilege and releasing 387, and showing an increasing responsiveness 
regarding U.S. high-interest cases.78  In response, in February Warren Christopher had 
switched from “no” votes to abstentions on International Finance Institution loans to 
Argentina and approved the sale of a limited amount of military equipment.79
The tragic dénouement of the Santa Cruz kidnapping arrested the tentative 
warming of relations between the United States and Argentina.  Ordered to explicitly 
express U.S. “outrage” over the incident, Ambassador Castro met with Videla on April 
10, accompanied by the head of U.S. Southern Command General Dennis P. 
McAuliffe—an unmistakable symbol of U.S. military support for Carter’s human 
rights policy.
   
80
                                                 
78 Regarding the Christmas promise, Videla told the press, “For our part, we hope for peace this 
Christmas; but if the other part, the subversives, do not want to coexist in peace, they will get the 
rightful response.  Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 9843, U.S. Embassy (Castro) to 
Secretary of State (Vance), December 23, 1977, Subject: “Human Rights Roundup,” ADP.  On 
advancing the moderate agenda, see Department of State Transcript of One-Way Recorded Telephone 
Message, F. A. Harris to Michele [?], Patt [Derian], and Mark [Schneider], March[?] 1978, ADP; 
Department of State Report, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, April 5, 1978, Subject: “INR Weekly 
Highlights of Developments in Human Rights” No. 51, ADP.  
  More significantly, the episode hardened top-Washington 
policymakers’ attitude toward Jorge Videla.  Since the previous year, Washington 
intelligence analysts had been struggling to ascertain whether the Army Commander 
was genuinely a cautious moderate beleaguered by military hardliners, or if he was 
79 Department of State Telegram, State 027853, Secretary of State (Vance) to U.S. Embassy Buenos 
Aires, April 7, 1978, Subject: “Report of Nuns Death,” ADP.  
80 Department of State Telegram, Buenos Aires 2663, U.S. Embassy (Castro) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), April 10, 1978, Subject: “Conversation with President Videla on Nuns Death,” ADP. Gen. 
Dennis P. McAuliffe was the son of the late Gen. Anthony McAuliffe, who had rejected German 
surrender demands at Bastogne with the memorable response “nuts.”  On the younger McAuliffe’s 
actions on behalf of human rights during the Carter administration, see Jack Anderson, “Human Rights 
in Latin America,” The Washington Post , Feb 23, 1978, p. A15 
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adeptly masking his own fealty to the military’s terror campaign by paying lip-service 
to the liberal concerns of the international community.   No consensus had been 
reached: while the State Department’s Latin America Bureau strongly supported 
Videla as Argentina’s best hope for eventual political liberalization, far less optimistic 
analyses were also aired, primarily, but not exclusively by the Human Rights Bureau.  
Prior to Secretary Vance’s November 1977 visit to Argentina, for example, the 
Treasury Department’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs 
submitted an intelligence analysis entitled, “President Videla: An Alternative View.”  
In addition to detailing Videla’s ties to the austere economic policies of the Minister of 
Economy Martínez de Hoz, the memo contended that although Videla and other 
moderates had probably prevented military hardliners from extending the 
counterinsurgency net to include “intellectual and economic subversion,” the number 
of victims “are so high as to have directly touched a large percentage of Argentine 
families.”81
In fact, although a veil of secrecy effectively insulated Videla’s role in 
overseeing state-sanctioned violence from outside scrutiny, the taciturn commander 
was a central architect of the Argentine military’s terror campaign.  Unlike fellow 
junta-member Emilio Massera, Jorge Videla did not personally participate in 
operations against perceived subversives, nor did he actively engage in torture 
sessions.
   
82
                                                 
81 Department of State Briefing Memorandum, Richard Feinberg to Cyrus Vance, November 19,1977, 
Subject: “President Videla: An Alternative View,” Box 3, Folder: TL 11/16-30/77, Policy and Planning 
Staff, Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
  And as the debate in U.S. policymaking circles in 1977 and 1978 made 
clear, to a remarkable degree, the decentralized nature of the Proceso allowed Videla 
to appear disassociated from the systematic abduction, torture, and murder of 
thousands of Argentines: a cautious, well-intentioned leader unable to curb the abuses 
82 Massera participated in secret operations under the alias “Black” or “Zero.” See Nunca Más: The 
Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, 122-23. 
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of extremist subordinates.  As Videla declared to journalists María Seoane and Vicente 
Muleiro in an interview many years later, “I never killed or tortured anyone.”83
In the aftermath of the military dictatorship, however, a growing body of 
evidence would belie Videla’s claims of non-involvement.  The discovery of secret 
orders bearing Videla’s signature, such as the “Directives from the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army No. 504/77” issued on April 20, 1977 and providing procedural 
information on clandestine actions, conclusively linked Videla to the orchestration of 
the dirty war.  As Argentine General Santiago Omar Riveros later attested, “We waged 
this war with our doctrine in our hands.  With the written orders of each high 
command.”
   
84
 
  More broadly, revelations regarding the enormous bureaucratic 
structure that undergirded Argentine military repression made Videla’s claims of non-
involvement thoroughly unbelievable.  “Orders came down through the chain of 
command until reaching those entrusted with carrying out the actions, the so-called 
Task Groups—principally young military officers, along with some noncommissioned 
officers, civilians, and off-duty police—who also had their own organization,” 
Historian Luis Alberto Romero writes.  He continues:  
The execution of their acts required a complex administrative apparatus 
because they were supposed to follow the movement—the entries, moves, and 
departures—of a vast array of people. Anyone arrested, from the moment he or 
                                                 
83 María Seoane and Vicente Muleiro, El Dictador: La Historia Secreta y Pública de Jorge Rafael 
Videla (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2000), 240. 
84 Riveros, testifying at the Inter-American Defense Junta on January 24, 1980, quoted in Nunca Más: 
The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, 2.  Similarly, the military 
junta’s “Statute” issued on April 28, 1983 asserted that “All anti-subversive and anti-terrorist operations 
under-taken by the armed forces and by the Security, Police, and Penitentiary Services under 
operational control and in fulfillment of Decrees 2770, 2771 and 2772/75 were carried out in 
accordance with plans approved and supervised by the official high commands of the armed forces and 
by the military junta from the time it was constituted.”  Quoted in Amnesty International, Argentina: 
the Military Juntas and Human Rights, Report of the Trial of Former Junta Members (London: 
Amnesty International, 1987), 39. 
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she entered the list of suspects, was assigned his or her own number and file, 
with a follow-up, an evaluation of the case, after which a final decision would 
be taken, which always was the preserve of the highest levels of the military. 
The repression was, in sum, a systematic action carried out by the state.85
 
 
Further underscoring Videla’s complicity in extra-legal repression, the former-
commander-in-chief would be sentenced to life in prison at the trial of the military 
junta in 1984.86
In the spring of 1978, however, U.S. policymakers were only beginning to 
recognize the hollow-nature of Jorge Videla’s “moderate-line”.  “Videla’s response, 
while sympathetic, is like the responses he always gives,” Stephen Oxman wrote 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher following Castro’s April meeting with 
the Argentine leader regarding the Santa Cruz abductions, “and it does not really 
change anything.”
   
87
 
  Noting that the trend since the previous fall had been 
characterized by “modest improvements punctuated by major retrograde developments 
such as the murder of the nuns,” and with the congressionally-mandated arms-cutoff to 
Argentina due to take effect in six months, Oxman argued for increasing pressure on 
the military junta by tightening restrictions on U.S. transfers to Argentina.  Oxman 
continued:  
                                                 
85 Luis Alberto Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 216.  On this point, see also Seoane and Muleiro, El 
Dictador: La Historia Secreta y Pública de Jorge Rafael Videla, 231. 
86 Amnesty International, Argentina: the Military Juntas and Human Rights, Report of the Trial of 
Former Junta Members, 76-77; Paul H. Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: the "Dirty War" in Argentina 
(Westport: Praeger, 2002), 220. 
87 Department of State Memorandum, Steven Oxman to Warren Christopher, April 12, 1978, Subject: 
“Argentine Arms Transfer Cases,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina III, RWC, ODS, GRDS, 
RG 59, Archives II. 
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Specifically, I think we should tell them that unless they curtail the irregular 
detention practices routinely used by the security forces, and begin to charge 
and try—or to release—those held under executive authority, we will be 
unable to approve most of these transfers.  If there were solid steps in these 
directions, we would be prepared to be responsive in a “calibrated and 
sequential” fashion, but if there are only minor improvements, then the status 
quo will persist. 
 
Militating in favor of United States success in eliciting Argentine human rights 
improvements, Oxman contended, was the growing backlog of sales that had been 
held up by the Christopher Committee over the past year.  In fact, by March 1978, 
more than 100 applications from U.S. firms for sales to Argentina had been frozen by 
the State Department, including $48 million in U.S.-approved but undelivered military 
equipment purchased through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, $510, 
390,000 in outstanding Export-Import Bank (Exim) credits, along with $23.8 million 
in pending loan applications.88
                                                 
88 Department of State Report, “Argentine Human Rights Strategy Paper,” March[?] 1978, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Argentina II, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
  Citing the importance of sending a clear message 
regarding the Administration’s human rights policy to both the Argentine government 
and U.S. domestic interests, Oxman advocated making the sales contingent on 
significant evidence of Argentine political normalization.  “When all is said and done, 
we have, though this backlog of cases, built up a very considerable amount of leverage 
over the Argentines, and I think it would be a pity to squander it,” Oxman wrote.  “In 
general, it is preferable to avoid quid pro quo arrangements in the human rights 
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context,” he concluded, “but given the gravity of the human rights problems and the 
strength of our leverage, I think would be worth making an exception.”89
Strengthening Oxman’s appeal to increase U.S. pressure on Argentina in the 
spring of 1978 was the departure of Latin America Bureau Chief Terrence Todman.  
Over the course of his short tenure at ARA, Todman had developed a reputation 
among human rights advocates and sympathetic members of Congress for near-total 
opposition to Patricia Derian’s initiatives in the hemisphere.  Regarding U.S.-Latin 
American military ties, for example, Todman strongly viewed the maintenance of U.S. 
assistance as an essential means of retaining leverage over Latin American armed 
forces.  “Our military ties are now so curtailed […] that we have few means available 
to induce Latin American military leaders and institutions to cooperate with us in 
achieving these or other goals,” Todman wrote Secretary Vance in March 1978.   
Noting that Indonesia alone was slated to receive nearly as much FMS financing for 
fiscal year 1979 as all of Latin America and the Caribbean combined, Todman 
concluded, “Our responses to individual military requests of all kinds are so erratic 
that most of the continent’s influential military leaders no longer consider the United 
States a reliable ally.”
 
90
Similarly, in regard to U.S.-Argentine relations, throughout 1977 Todman had 
set the tone for the U.S. emphasis on Jorge Videla as the nation’s best hope for 
political liberalization.
  
91
                                                 
89 Department of State Memorandum, Steven Oxman to Warren Christopher, April 12, 1978, Subject: 
“Argentine Arms Transfer Cases,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina III, RWC, ODS, GRDS, 
RG 59, Archives II. 
  Capturing the flavor of ARA’s consistent efforts to dilute 
Patricia Derian’s repeated call for a more punitive human rights policy, in regard to a 
90 Department of State Memorandum, Terence Todman to Cyrus Vance, March 3, 1978, Subject: 
“Results of the ARA Chiefs of Mission Conference,” Box 17, Folder: Human Rights—Latin America, 
RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
91 See the heavily redacted, State Department Memorandum, ARA (Todman) to Secretrary of State 
(Vance), September 27, 1977, Subject: “A Time to Support Argentina’s Videla,” ADP.  
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proposed Inter-American Development Bank Loan to Argentina shortly before 
Secretary Vance’s November visit to Buenos Aires, Todman asserted that “diplomatic 
nuances are important.”   
 
The explicit strategy in the Secretary’s trip involves a judgment that in the 
tragic Argentine situation, Videla is the best and only hope, however uncertain, 
in the near run, for some progress on both the human rights and nuclear issues 
as exemplified by his restoration of the right of option and his interest in the 
Tlatelolco Treaty [on nuclear non-proliferation], both anathema to Argentine 
hard-line military.   
 
In sum, Todman concluded, “If we accept the consequences of that strategy, prudence 
dictates abstention.”92
 By early 1978, however, Todman seemed increasingly out-of-step with the 
Carter Administration’s human rights policy.  After giving a public address to a New 
York business association on Valentine’s Day, the ARA Chief was hammered by 
human rights organizations—with Lawrence Birns at the Council on Hemispheric 
Affairs (COHA) leading the attack—for defending right-wing dictatorships.
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92 Department of State Memorandum, Terence A. Todman to Warren Christopher, Undated, Subject: 
“IDB Loan for Argentina,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina I, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, 
Archives II. 
  In fact, 
Todman’s speech, centering on ten broad practices the United States should avoid in 
its dealings with Latin America, hardly constituted a revanchist assault on Carter’s 
human rights policy.  In addition to emphasizing the need to learn the facts in each 
case before taking action, for example, Todman warned against “being so concerned 
with declaring the rightness of our course that we lose sight of our true objective—to 
93 Personal Interview with Lawrence Birns, May 2, 2008, Washington, D.C. 
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alleviate individual suffering.”94  Nonetheless, COHA used the address as an 
opportunity to highlight Todman’s resistance to prioritizing human rights in U.S.-
Latin American relations.  “Todman is systematically undermining Christopher’s 
efforts for a coherent human rights policy” COHA declared, “and is apparently 
winning his struggle to maintain normal relations with Latin American dictatorships 
because of Christopher’s preoccupation with other regions of the world.”95
If the row over Todman’s speech was somewhat overblown, there was little 
doubt that the ARA director nonetheless was proving an enormous obstacle for 
Patricia Derian’s efforts to promote human rights in Argentina.  And as Stephen 
Oxman and Warren Christopher began moving toward tightening human rights 
restrictions toward Argentina in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz abductions, Todman’s 
stance toward the Argentine military junta began to appear increasingly obstructionist.  
“I can plot several possible plans which would be superior to this hit or miss pulling 
and tugging we have now,” a frustrated Derian wrote Christopher in April.  “We could 
do the same for each troublesome country in that region and at the same time have a 
regional, coherent policy with a great many positive aspects.”  Derian continued:  
 
 
At present, this would simply be a paper exercise because our human rights 
efforts are being subverted by the bureau’s leader.  Instead of bona fide efforts 
to work on the problem, we have bureaucratic game playing which is entirely 
negative.   
                                                 
94 Terence A. Todman, “The Carter Administration’s Latin American Policy: Purposes and Prospects,” 
Address at the Center for Inter-American Relations, New York, February 14, 1978, Box 17, Folder: 
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In a remarkable display of candor, the Human Rights Bureau Chief concluded, “There 
is no hope for an effective policy in Latin America under these circumstances.”96  
Christopher apparently concurred with Derian’s assessment; on April 8, Todman was 
quietly reassigned as Ambassador to Spain.97
In the weeks following the Bureau chief’s departure, Stephen Oxman’s 
proposal for increasing U.S. pressure on the Argentine military junta moved to the 
center of U.S. policy toward the South American nation.  Hoping to stimulate “a 
serious exchange with the Argentine government as to where our relationship is 
heading in view of the human rights situation in Argentina,” the State Department 
arranged for a formal visit to Buenos Aires in late May by Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs David Newsom.
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96 Department of State Memorandum, Patricia Derian to Warren Christopher, April 1978, Subject: 
“Human Rights Policy in Latin America,” Box 17, Folder: Human Rights—Latin America, RWC, 
ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.  See also Caleb Rossiter, "Human Rights: The Carter Record, the 
Reagan Reaction," in International Policy Report (September 1984), 20-21. 
  Specifically, the Under Secretary would press the 
Argentines to try, release, or send into exile the more than 3,000 prisoners held 
without charge under the Executive Authority, as well as establish an official 
procedure to account for the disaparecidos.  Most importantly, the United States 
hoped to convince the Argentine military junta to make a formal invitation to the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), an autonomous organ of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).  As part of Carter’s effort to promote 
multilateralism and U.S. non-intervention abroad, at the OAS General Assembly the 
97 John M. Goshko, “Todman Asks Out of State Post,” Washington Post, April 8, 978, pg. A12.  With a 
reputation for opposing Carter’s human rights policy, Todman received a tepid welcome in post-Franco 
Spain.   “A lot of people are upset,” a Spanish diplomat told the Washington Post’s Stanley Meisler.  
“Here we are trying to create a system that will lean over backwards in favor of human rights, and you 
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Meisler, “Spanish in Flap Over Prospect of Todman as U.S. Envoy,” The Washington Post, May 4, 
1978, pg. A20. 
98 Department of State Cable, Secretary of State to American Embassy Buenos Aires, May 11, 1978, 
Subject: “Argentine Human Rights,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina III, RWC, ODS, 
GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
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previous year, the Administration had signed the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights, supported the decision to increase the IAHRC budget, and encouraged 
member states to invite the commission for a formal visit.99  Throughout 1977 and 
early 1978, however, the Argentine military junta had refused to admit the IAHRC on 
the grounds of defending national sovereignty.  Faced with Argentina’s intransigence, 
Newsom’s primary objective was thus to convince the Argentine military junta, “that 
if they implement the kinds of human rights improvements he will be talking to them 
about, we will be in a position to be forthcoming on a variety of fronts, including arms 
transfers[,] EX-IM as well as other programs.”100
 
   
At the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Tex Harris welcomed the rising tide of 
State Department pressure on the Argentine military junta.  Over the course of late 
1977 and early 1978, Harris had positioned himself in the vanguard of diplomatic 
efforts to promote human rights in Argentina, gaining recognition by tracking the costs 
of the Argentine military’s dirty war with irrepressible energy.  In particular, Harris’s 
successful petition to invite non-U.S. victims of state-sanctioned violence into the U.S. 
Embassy inaugurated what Buenos Aires Herald editor and steadfast human rights 
advocate Robert Cox would later describe as “an incredible change, an extraordinary 
change” from previous U.S. foreign policy.101
                                                 
99 Department of State Memorandum, Richard Feinberg to All S/P Members, June 15, 1978, Subject: 
“Paper on U.S. Policy Goals and Achievements in Latin America,” Box 1, Folder Misc.: re Issues and 
Priorities ’78 etc., Policy and Planning Staff, Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-
1981, RG 59, GRDS, Archives II.  See also John P. Salzberg, "The Carter  Administration and Human 
Rights," in The Diplomacy of Human Rights, ed. David D. Newsom (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1986), 62. 
  Capturing the unique challenges of 
Harris’s position vis-à-vis victims of extra-legal repression, in April 1978 Embassy 
Political Counselor William H. Hallman wrote, “Mr. Harris has counseled and 
100 Department of State Memorandum, Steven Oxman to Warren Christopher, May 23, 1978, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Argentina III, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II. 
101 Telephone interview with Robert Cox, April 14, 2008.  
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consoled, and though there was little hope he could offer he has comforted many with 
the belief that the United States is aware of dramatic personal needs.”102
Combined with Harris’s close engagement with Argentine organizations such 
as the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, the opening of the Embassy ingratiated 
the young diplomat into the local human rights community.  In June 1978, for 
example, the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo wrote Harris to “express all the gratitude 
that your human and consistent actions deserve,” The letter continued:  
   
 
As a diplomat of a friendly country, we acknowledge your cordial and sincere 
assistance to our painful demands.  For this, and especially your abundant 
humanity that has strengthened our spirits, we would like to recognize your 
efforts and express how much we value them.103
 
   
Underscoring the sea change in Argentine human rights advocates’ perception of the 
U.S. Embassy that occurred during the Carter Administration, at the end of 1977 the 
Country Team cited the Embassy’s transformation over the previous 12 months into a 
“beacon of hope” for the Argentine human rights community as a major achievement.  
“For the guy who puts the oil in the beacon,” Harris noted wryly in a subsequent self-
evaluation, “that is progress.”104
Harris was also heralded by U.S. human rights advocates concerned with 
military repression in Argentina.  After the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) completed a fact-finding visit to Argentina in late 
1977 to gauge state-sanctioned violence against doctors and scientists, for example, 
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15, 1978, Derian Papers.   
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Bruce Allan Kiernan, the organization’s human rights coordinator, expressed 
admiration for the U.S. Embassy’s internal liaison.  “The reason for the effectiveness 
of our human rights policy in Argentina is due, in large measure, to the work of F. 
Allen Harris,” Kiernan later wrote Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher.  
“The position of human rights officer in Argentina is a full-time job,” he continued.  
“Hundreds of family members of the disappeared look to the American Embassy, and 
in particular Tex Harris, for understanding and compassion.”  Harris, Kiernan 
concluded, “has shown himself, in my view, to be an exemplary representative of this 
government.”105
Most importantly, Harris’s weekly “temperature charts,” drawing upon an 
ever-expanding pool of sources that included journalists, diplomats, and human rights 
advocates, as well as the daily meetings at the U.S. Embassy with relatives of 
desaparecidos, provided Washington policymakers—particularly the Human Rights 
Bureau—with unprecedented insight into the scale of Argentine human rights 
violations.  Indeed, by debunking the Argentine military’s claim that the targets of 
counterinsurgency operations were confined to violent left-wing terrorists, Harris’s 
human rights reporting and policy recommendations formed the evidentiary base for 
Patricia Derian’s efforts to curtail U.S. security and economic assistance to 
Argentina.
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105 Official Correspondence, Bruce Allan Kiernan to Warren Christopher, July 30, 1979, Box 2, Folder 
5, George Lister Papers, Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas Libraries, the 
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  The human rights officer added “a new and well-rounded dimension to 
our understanding of developments and trends in that country,” Derian would write at 
the end of Harris’s tenure in Buenos Aires.  “This information and analysis have been 
106 See Anderson, Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty War", 252. 
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of invaluable assistance to the Department” she continued, “in monitoring events in 
Argentina and in developing policies to further U.S. human rights objectives.107
If the zeal with which Harris carried out his mandate was welcomed by human 
rights advocates in Buenos Aires and Washington, his military hosts were far less 
accommodating.  On one occasion, a reception for members of the human rights 
community hosted by Harris and his wife Jeanie was interrupted by a group of heavily 
armed men, who—after Jeanie unwittingly answered the door—stood menacingly for 
a moment then dubiously claimed that they had the wrong address and departed.   The 
message was clear: Harris’s reporting was ruffling feathers among the military—a 
dangerous enterprise in the capital of Latin America’s most egregious human rights 
violating regime.   
   
Worse was yet to come.  Driving home from a human rights meeting late one 
night in his unmistakable Chevrolet Caprice station wagon, Harris was suddenly 
pinned at a stoplight by unmarked military vehicles.  As plainclothes state security 
personnel swarmed around his car, Harris remembered having read that forensic 
autopsies could determine if the victim had resisted arrest according to the body’s 
posture at the instant of death.  Cracking the window, he slipped his U.S. diplomat’s 
passport to one of the security officers, and then waited, awkwardly holding his arms 
as high above his head as possible.   “At the time I was very calm,” Harris recalled 
years later.  “But afterward I just completely broke down.”108
Resistance to Harris’s human rights reporting was not limited to Argentine 
dirty warriors.  Indeed, by mid-Spring 1978 Harris had become a virtual pariah within 
the U.S. Embassy.  With his ties to the Argentine human rights community, coupled 
with the close professional relationship he had established with Patricia Derian’s 
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Human Rights Bureau, Harris was “regarded as ‘grandstanding’ and not being a ‘team 
player,’” recalled Labor Attaché Anthony G. Freeman.  “The extreme reaction within 
the embassy bordered on the ridiculous” Freeman asserted, with Harris “virtually 
treated as a subversive.”109
In particular, Harris clashed with Ambassador Raúl Castro, whose appointment 
as U.S. envoy to Argentina had roughly corresponded with Harris’s own arrival.  A 
charismatic former Ambassador to El Salvador and Bolivia, Castro’s appointment to 
Argentina by President Carter stood as a testament to a life of assimilation and hard-
work in the face of deeply-entrenched racial discrimination in the American 
Southwest.  Born in Sonora, Mexico as the second-youngest of 14 children, Castro 
immigrated with his family to Pirtleville, Arizona, a tiny hamlet just north of the 
border, near Douglas.  Despite the death of his father when Castro was 12, he 
nonetheless excelled in his adopted nation, particularly in athletics, winning a football 
scholarship to the Arizona State Teachers College in Flagstaff, where he also led the 
track team and was the undefeated Border Conference Boxing champion.
 
110
Although Castro became a naturalized U.S. citizen shortly after graduation in 
1939, as a Mexican-American his efforts to obtain a teaching position in Douglas were 
repeatedly rejected.
 
111  Unable to find work, Castro eventually became an itinerant 
prize fighter.  “I was boxing on the road for a couple of years—New Orleans, 
Pennsylvania, New York,” Castro recalled in a recent interview.  “I would fight at 
carnivals, wherever, get $50 or $100.”112
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follow a similar path, however, Raul Castro returned to Arizona, and eventually found 
work overseeing immigration and accounting services at the American Consulate in 
Sonora. 
The position marked the beginning of Castro’s hard-won rise to national 
prominence.  Shortly after the end of World War II, Castro was hired to teach Spanish 
at the University of Arizona and he quickly enrolled in the institution’s law degree 
program.  Rejected on racial grounds—Castro recalls being told by the University 
Dean that “Mexican-Americans just did not graduate”—he was accepted into the 
program only after threatening to cancel his teaching contract, which the university 
sorely needed.113  Four years later, Castro was the senior partner in the law firm Castro 
and Wolfe, and after serving successive terms as District Attorney and a Juvenile 
Court Judge in Pima County, Castro was widely recognized as a rising star in Arizona, 
winning the “Naturalized Citizen of the Year” award in 1963.114
Having achieved extra-ordinary success in his adopted nation, Castro 
nonetheless retained a strong cultural, class, and racial identity.  Selected by the 
Johnson Administration to serve as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador (1964-1968) and 
reappointed by Richard Nixon as envoy to Bolivia (1968-1969), Castro brought a 
dynamic, rough-and-tumble approach to diplomatic affairs.  When asked by a group of 
Bolivians of mixed European and indigenous Latin American ancestry if he too was a 
mestizo, Castro responded, “hell no,” and raised eyebrows by describing himself as 
“pure indio.”  A few months later, in the immediate aftermath of the October 1969 
nationalization of Gulf Oil’s concessions in Bolivia, Anthony Freeman overheard 
Castro brazenly inform a Bolivian caller over the telephone, “we’ve just landed the 
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Marines in Valparaíso and they’ll be up here by tomorrow.”  Unsure whether Castro 
was attempting to give Bolivian wiretappers a scare or simply “venting his macho 
side,” Freeman was impressed.  “You can’t help but like a guy like this,” he 
concluded.115
Appointed U.S. Ambassador to Argentina in mid-1977, Raúl Castro proved 
willing to go to bat for the Carter Administration on behalf of human rights—dutifully 
carrying out dozens of representations and demarches to Argentine leaders over the 
following months.  “I am constantly pressing [the] GOA [Government of Argentina] 
for improvement in the field of human rights,” Castro wrote in February 1978.  “It 
isn’t that we aren’t pressing,” he concluded.  “We do that seven days a week.”
   
116  
Testifying to Castro’s loyalty to the human rights agenda, in August 1978 the U.S. 
Embassy would present the Argentine government with its 500th human rights case 
inquiry.117
Yet by early 1978, Castro had become a strong supporter of the perceived 
“moderate” military faction led by Jorge Videla.  Quietly snubbed by aristocratic 
Argentines for his Mexican ancestry and humble origins, Castro also formed a close 
friendship with General Roberto Viola, who had overcome a humble background by 
rising through the ranks of the Army to become Videla’s second-in-command.
   
118
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  As a 
result, Castro increasingly viewed Washington’s economic and military sanctions 
against Argentina as counterproductively playing into the hands of military hardliners, 
and, by the end of 1977, his initial support for Tex Harris’s human rights reporting had 
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soured as Washington overruled his own policy recommendations on human rights 
grounds with increasing frequency.  For Castro, in other words, by supplying the State 
Department Human Rights Bureau with evidence of the Argentine military’s human 
rights abuses (resulting in political decisions antithetical to the Ambassador’s wishes), 
Harris was acting outside the Embassy chain-of-command—a subversion of Castro’s 
leadership to which the fiery Ambassador would not abide.  “God damn it Harris … 
this is crap,” Castro told the human rights officer on one occasion after his favorable 
recommendation of a sale of  pilot helmets to the Argentine Navy had been rejected by 
the Christopher Committee—in part due to Harris’s reporting on Navy counter-terror 
teams operating out of the ESMA.  Bluntly informing Harris that it was the 
Ambassador’s job to direct U.S. policy, Castro concluded, “that’s not happening and 
it’s because of your reporting, and we’ve got to change that.”119
Castro’s frustration with Tex Harris reverberated throughout the U.S. 
Embassy, and by mid-1978, the human rights officer had become the target of intense 
antipathy from his Foreign Service colleagues.  As with the Ambassador, much of the 
animosity directed toward Harris—particularly from the Economic/Commercial 
Section, the Military Group, and the Defense Attaché’s Office—stemmed from the 
impression that his human rights reporting constituted the impetus behind 
Washington’s increasingly stringent delays, cutbacks, and cancellations of U.S. 
programs and product transfers to Argentina.  Given the traditional mandate of the 
Foreign Service, and especially representatives of the Department of Defense, such a 
response was perhaps predictable.
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terror campaign responsible for eliciting U.S. sanctions, in other words, many 
Embassy officials blamed the Carter’s Administration’s human rights policy for 
interfering in the preservation of close U.S.-Argentine relations—with Harris at the 
point of the lance.121
Opposition in the Embassy to Harris’s human rights advocacy dramatically 
curtailed his ability to influence Embassy reporting on human rights developments in 
Argentina.  Following the December 1977 abduction of the Madres and French nuns 
at Santa Cruz, for example, Ambassador Castro repeatedly responded to State 
Department requests for human rights updates by asserting that the Embassy was 
“puzzled” by the disappearances.  In fact, by the end of the year Harris had presented 
the Embassy Country Team with a full description of the Argentine security forces’ 
role in the kidnappings drawn from his web of local contacts.  The report, however, 
was “voted down as mere speculation,” by top-ranking Embassy personnel; in his 
missives to Washington, Ambassador Castro professed ignorance as to the perpetrators 
of the raid until the bodies of the nuns were recovered in late March.  It was no small 
coincidence that during this same three-month period, lacking critical information 
regarding military operations in Argentina, the Christopher Committee switched from 
“no” votes to abstentions on International Finance Institution loans, and approved a 
limited U.S. military equipment transfer to the Argentine military junta.
 
122
                                                                                                                                            
United States.  When refused, a cordial relationship may be harder to maintain, especially if the other 
government suspects that the reason for refusal is a judgment that it has mistreated its own citizens.” 
Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices," 257. 
  As Harris 
complained in a one-way recorded telephone message to Patricia Derian, “I have done 
a number of cables which tied in reported events to targeting by the Argentine security 
121 See Seoane and Muleiro, El Dictador: La Historia Secreta y Pública de Jorge Rafael Videla, 268.  
122 Department of State Telegram, State 027853, Secretary of State (Vance) to U.S. Embassy Buenos 
Aires, April 7, 1978, Subject: “Report of Nuns Death,” ADP.  
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forces of individuals for intellectual subversion.  This has been taken out of all 
messages going out.”123
Opposition to Harris’s human rights reporting also threatened to derail his 
chances for career advancement.  In the annual Officer Evaluation Report, Deputy 
Chief of Mission (DCM) Maxwell Chaplin criticized Harris for failing to draft reports 
“rapidly and clearly” as well as experiencing “difficulty in producing the volume of 
reporting required.”  Most importantly, Harris needed to direct his energy, Chaplin 
contended, “at the objectives of the organization of which he is a part.”
   
124  Privately, 
Embassy officials were more direct; as one Foreign Service Officer pointedly 
informed Jeanie Harris, “The State Department needs good, grey men.”125
For Tex Harris, such criticism obscured the real issue at stake: his superiors’ 
unwillingness to embrace the Carter Administration’s human rights policy.  “The 
Country Team would greatly prefer that the Embassy’s ‘Human Rights Attache’ 
maintain a lower profile, concentrating on political reporting,” Harris wrote in 
response to Chaplin’s evaluation.  He continued: 
 
 
However, such a policy does not respond to the real demands made on the 
Embassy by this Administration, the Congress, and the American and 
Argentine publics. […] A great number of my Human Rights reports either 
have not been sent or were deferred by the DCM who later complains that 
there was not enough reporting.   
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During the nine months covered by the evaluation report, Harris concluded, “I sent in 
over 200 cables to the Department on human rights.”126
 
   
 By mid-April 1978, as the State Department’s increasingly hard-line toward 
the Argentine military junta sent a deep chill through U.S.-Argentine relations, tension 
between Tex Harris and the Country Team at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires 
neared a fever pitch.  On the one hand, led by the U.S. Ambassador, top-Embassy 
officials chafed against the increasingly stringent approach to the Argentine military 
government emanating from Foggy Bottom.  “I consider this policy poorly timed as 
regards U.S. trade and aviation interests in Argentina” Raúl Castro angrily cabled 
Washington regarding delays in Exim Bank Loan approvals to Argentina on human 
rights grounds, “and irrelevant to the end sought.”127
On the other hand, despite his superior officers’ none-too-subtle demands that 
he moderate his reporting, Tex Harris continued to push his brief as internal liaison to 
the limit, playing a central role in the Buenos Aires human rights community and 
serving as Patricia Derian’s eyes and ears at the center of the military junta’s terror 
campaign.  Death threats from Argentine security personnel and sub-standard FSO 
evaluations notwithstanding, Harris remained resolute.   “I will close with my best 
regards and a bon mot” he wrote the Human Rights Bureau after detailing ongoing 
efforts to discover the locations of clandestine military detention sites.   “Argentina is 
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the only country in the world where you are safe in the streets, but not in your 
home.”128
The failure of Under Secretary Newsom’s attempt to make significant headway 
on the human rights issue during his diplomatic visit to Buenos Aires in late May 
further accentuated diplomatic tension.  After an exhausting series of talks with top-
Argentine policymakers, along with a small sample of human rights advocates, 
Newsom had departed confident that a major diplomatic breakthrough was in the 
offing.
 
129  In addition to convincing the Under Secretary that the military junta’s 
ultimate goal was restoring civilian democracy, in a confidential meeting, President 
Videla informed Newsom that the IAHRC would be invited to Argentina in June.   
Clearly impressed, Newsom cabled Washington that the military junta had 
demonstrated a “clear desire to improve [the] situation,” and that United States 
pressure had “clearly raised the consciousness of human rights concerns, and has, I 
believe had [a] positive impact.”  Accordingly, Newsom recommended that once the 
junta extended an invitation to the IAHRC, Washington should release military 
training credits to Argentina, and match subsequent human rights improvements with 
the staged released of the backlog of U.S. transfer cases.130
On the seventh floor of the Department of State, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance concurred with Newsom’s recommendation, and Ambassador Castro was 
dispatched to inform Jorge Videla.
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characteristically taciturn commander;  Videla, Castro reported, “smiled, gave a sigh 
of relief and said, ‘your news gives me the spirit to absolutely insist on a tremendous 
improvement in the field of human rights.’”132  Nonetheless, the following month, the 
Foreign Ministry refused to offer an unconditional invitation to the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission, resulting in a prompt IAHRC rejection, thus propelling 
U.S.-Argentine relations closer to a historic nadir.133
The rebuff corresponded with the culmination of tension within the U.S. 
Embassy between the Country Team and Tex Harris.  During his lunch break on a 
Friday in mid-June, Harris borrowed the file on a pending Exim Bank decision for 
Allis-Chalmers, a Milwaukee-based manufacturing firm seeking a U.S. government 
loan guarantee for the construction of a hydro-electric turbine factory.  Once 
completed, the plant would be turned over to Astilleros Argentina, an Argentine 
shipyards company intending to produce nearly two-dozen turbines, governors, and 
generators for Entidad Binancional Yacyretá, a bi-national Argentine-Paraguayan 
commission charged with constructing a massive, long-delayed dam on the Paraná 
River near the Argentine city of Ituzaingó in Corrientes Province.
   
134
Reading over the details of the proposed sale while eating a sandwich at his 
desk, Harris stumbled upon an internal “memo to the files,” an information brief not 
  Given the 
significant cost of the project—roughly $270 million—Harris had a hunch that it 
would be worthwhile to review the details; fortunately for the human rights officer, the 
chief of the Embassy’s Economic/Commerical Section was out of the office and the 
administrative assistant imperturbably handed over the file.    
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distributed outside the Embassy.  To his amazement, the memorandum indicated that 
Astilleros Argentina was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Argentine Navy—a fact 
that the Embassy Country Team had failed to report to Washington.135
Quickly finishing his meal, Tex Harris drafted an urgent missive to 
Washington according to the format recently facilitated by Under Secretary Newsom.  
During his visit to Buenos Aires in May, Newsom had recognized the antagonism Tex 
Harris faced within the Embassy.  Thanks to strong support from the Human Rights 
Bureau, the Under Secretary had brokered an unprecedented arrangement between the 
Embassy Country Team and Harris, allowing the human rights officer to transmit 
information to the State Department that the Embassy did not wish to send through 
formal channels by using “official-informal” letters carried by diplomatic pouch to 
Washington.  Although Harris was obligated to send a copy of each letter to the 
Ambassador, under the agreement he was at liberty to provide human rights 
information to HA and ARA without the threat of censorship by his superiors.
  It could hardly 
have been an accidental omission; over the past 9 months, Harris’s consistent 
reporting on kidnappings, torture, and clandestine killings linked to the ESMA had led 
to an almost total curtailment of U.S. transfers to the Navy.   
136
Accordingly, Harris drafted three copies of an official-informal letter on the 
Allis-Chalmers project—one addressed to Patricia Derian, another to the Latin 
America Bureau, and a final copy for Ambassador Castro.  After delivering Castro’s 
copy to the Ambassador’s office, Harris walked the remaining two letters to the 
Embassy pouch room, where they would be secured in a large bag with wax seals and 
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sent to Washington by airplane that evening.  The letter was short and direct: “Did you 
know that the beneficiary of the EXIM loan to Argentina was the Argentine Navy?”137
The reaction to Harris’s communiqué was swift.  Late in the afternoon, the 
human rights officer was stopped in the Embassy hallway by his boss, Political 
Counselor William H. Hallman, who began to lecture Harris on the value of “working 
for those who had more experience and wisdom.”  Never one to back down on a point 
of principle, Harris fervently defended his actions, and a heated discussion ensued.  
Finally, Hallman abruptly ended the conversation by handing Harris the two letters 
that he had delivered to the pouch room earlier that day.  “Well, at least you won’t get 
it in the pouch this week,” Harris remembers Hallman concluding.
   
138
For Harris, the episode constituted a flagrant breach of the informal rules on 
human rights communications established during Under Secretary Newsom’s visit in 
May.  Indeed, although Ambassador Castro was away from the Embassy, DCM 
Chaplin had read the Ambassador’s copy of the Harris’s official-informal letter.  
According to Harris, Chaplin recognized that the revelation in Washington that 
Astilleros Argentina was owned by the Argentine Navy would almost certainly result 
in a disapproval of Exim guarantees for Allis-Chalmers.  Unbeknown to Harris at the 
time, however, was the fact that the deliberations for the Allis-Chalmers Exim loan 
were slated for the following Monday.  Chaplin, Harris later concluded, calculated that 
if the human rights officer’s letters were delayed, by the time the next flight carrying 
U.S. diplomatic correspondence from Argentina arrived in Washington, the Exim 
decision would already be concluded.
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Outraged at his superiors’ apparent duplicity, Harris refused to concede defeat.  
Although it was late in the afternoon, Harris hurried back to the pouch room, arriving 
moments before the office closed for the weekend.  The clerk, however, had already 
affixed the wax seals on the diplomatic pouch.  It was, Harris would recall years later, 
“a tough negotiation.”  Nonetheless the tenacious human rights officer eventually 
succeeded in convincing the clerk to break the seals and place the two letters once 
again into the pouch.  Three days later, the Christopher Committee denied the $270 
million Exim bank loan to Allis-Chalmers.140
 
  
The Exim rejection brought U.S. relations with the Argentine military junta to 
a historic low.  Indeed, the Argentine government considered the Allis-Chalmers case 
to have “profound political significance,” as Deputy Foreign Minister Gualter Allara 
told State Department officials on June 24.141  Required by law to take human rights 
considerations into account on Exim Bank loan proposals, and recognizing that the 
Argentine government “sought approval of such financing as [an] indication of U.S. 
acceptance,” two days later Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher ordered 
Ambassador Castro to inform the military junta that, barring a significant 
improvements in the protection of human rights, the United States was withholding 
financing for Allis-Chalmers, as well as the pending military training package.142
In Buenos Aires, news of the rejection stirred shock and outrage among 
Argentine military leaders and their supporters.  When Raúl Castro informed Roberto 
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Viola, the General “looked like a ghost and his lips were quivering,” the Ambassador 
reported.  Predictably, the formal rejection of the credits on July 17 sparked a fervent 
outburst of reactionary Argentine nationalism.  Capturing the mood, President Videla 
gravely intoned, “As the Armed Forces of the nation, we must, permanently, 
spiritually and materially remain on guard against any type of aggression jeopardizing 
our territorial integrity or the full exercise of our sovereignty which may be launched 
against us in order to divide us from within or from without.”143  Two weeks later, the 
Argentine government issued a formal note of protest to the United States, specifically 
citing the Allis-Chalmers rejection as an “intrusion into the affairs of a sovereign 
government.”144
Argentine indignation notwithstanding, from his vantage point at the White 
House, President Carter supported the State Department’s decision.  Indeed, during the 
summer of 1978, Carter kept an eye on developments in Argentina; in mid-June the 
President personally wrote Jorge Videla to encourage steps in the protection of human 
rights and nuclear non-proliferation, and when he learned of the Exim rejection in a 
brief memorandum from Cyrus Vance at the end of the month, Carter wrote in the 
margin, “My slight inclination would be to find an excuse to approve training—and 
hold back EXIM deal.”
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at the end of July a further update was included in the President’s evening reading.146   
The National Security Advisor’s prognosis was grim: “While we are eager to build 
good relations with Argentina, the current human rights situation is so dismal that our 
relations may be reaching a breaking point,” Brzezinski informed the President.  
Although the Argentines had not cut-off negotiations with the IAHRC, Brzezinski 
concluded, “we fear that if they don’t reach agreement soon—i.e., before the October 
1 deadline of the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to bar military sales and training—
our relations may be set back irreparably.”147
Adding Allis-Chalmers to the long list of delayed or denied U.S. transfer cases 
had sent an unmistakable signal of U.S. censure to the Argentine military junta.   
Coupled with the looming congressionally-mandated arms cutoff, in the summer of 
1978, it was clear to Argentine leaders that rapprochement with the United States 
would require at least limited concessions on human rights.  And although Argentina’s 
stunning victory over the Netherlands in the championship match of the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup in late June ushered in a 
frenzy of nationalistic euphoria among much of the Argentine population, Patricia 
Derian’s extraordinarily frank explanation of the rationale behind the Exim decision in 
August brought the human rights issue once again to the fore.  “The reason for our 
advice was the continuing violation of basic human rights by Argentina,” Derian told 
the Congressional Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.  Specifically, Derian 
continued:  
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The systematic use of torture, summary execution of political dissidents, the 
disappearance and the imprisonment of thousands of individuals without 
charge, including mothers, churchmen, nuns, labor leaders, journalists, 
professors and members of human rights organizations, and the failure of the 
government of Argentina to fulfill its commitment to allow [a] visit by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.148
 
  
Widely reported in the Argentine press, Derian’s comments elated human rights 
advocates.149 For military leaders, however, the fiery Human Rights advocate’s 
statement stoked U.S.-Argentine tensions that had festered since the beginning of the 
summer.  “I do anticipate that when the whole affair is better digested all hell will 
break loose,” Ambassador Castro glumly cabled Washington.150
United States pressure eventually succeeded, however, in convincing 
Argentine leaders to invite the IAHRC.  At the end of August, the Argentines quietly 
proposed a meeting between Jorge Videla and Vice-President Walter Mondale, both of 
whom would be attending the coronation of Pope John Paul I in Rome the following 
month.  It was, as NSC Latin America expert Robert A. Pastor wrote Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, “the opportunity we have been waiting for”:  in a private meeting in Rome 
on September 13, Videla assured Mondale that Argentina would “seriously consider” 
an IAHRC visit in exchange for Exim Bank approval.
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assurance that the United States would give the Allis Chalmers sale a green light if 
Buenos Aires would provide an unconditional invitation to the IAHRC, Videla 
successfully orchestrated the invitation the following month.152
 
    
The military junta’s invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission constituted a signal victory in the Carter Administration’s effort to curtail 
state-sanctioned violence in Argentina.  In comparison with the previous three decades 
of bilateral relations between the United States and Argentina, the Carter 
Administration’s emphasis on human rights constituted an extraordinary shift away 
from the policy prescriptions of the Cold War; in addition to reducing Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) credits to Argentina in early 1977, the Christopher Committee’s review 
of Argentine arms transfer requests had resulted in dramatic cutbacks in the export of 
U.S. military equipment to the South American nation.  Moreover, by the end of 1978, 
the U.S. had abstained or voted “no” on 11 International Finance Institution (IFI) loans 
to Argentina, a number that would rise to 28 by the end of 1980—the highest number 
of U.S. negative votes for any single nation.  Although U.S. censure did not prevent 
the loans being delivered, in each instance, the United States capitalized on the 
negative publicity to press Argentine military leaders to make advances in the 
protection of human rights.   
Throughout 1977 and the first half of 1978, the United States had also made 
repeated diplomatic representations on behalf of human rights in Argentina.  In fact, 
by the fall of 1978, human rights had been raised in conversation with Argentine 
leaders by a remarkable number of top-U.S. policymakers including President Jimmy 
                                                                                                                                            
Christopher to Jimmy Carter, September 13, 1978, DDRS, Document Number: CK3100503818 
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Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, Under 
Secretary David Newsom, and Assistant Secretaries Patricia Derian and Terrence 
Todman.  Correspondingly, human rights had dominated the U.S. Embassy’s 
relationship with the Argentine Foreign Ministry. 
Nonetheless, the Carter Administration’s success in eliciting human rights 
improvements in Argentina over the course of 1977 and the first-half of 1978 was 
decidedly limited.  Repeated U.S. representations on behalf of victims of state-
sanctioned violence no doubt forced the Argentine military junta to consider 
international opprobrium as the necessary price for its use of dirty war tactics.  
Perhaps more significantly, Carter’s human rights policy—and particularly Tex 
Harris’s vigorous application of the policy—provided an unprecedented mantle of 
U.S. government legitimacy to Argentine human rights groups, thus providing a 
modicum of protection as well as a much-needed sense of solidarity.  Such 
developments did little, however, to curtail the Argentine military’s campaign to 
eradicate perceived subversives.  In fact, dirty war violence remained at peak-levels 
during Carter’s first year in office: an estimated 80 percent of disappearances occurred 
during 1976 and 1977, and the number of desaparecidos dropped only marginally in 
the spring and summer of 1978.153
The Carter Administration’s failure to curtail political repression in Argentina 
stemmed in part from the challenges of transforming lofty human rights ideals into 
practical policy prescriptions.  As elsewhere in the hemisphere, in its effort harness 
U.S. economic and military leverage to pressure the Argentine military junta, the 
Administration faced fierce pressure from Washington bureaucrats and the 
Department of Defense, as well as strong lobbying by the U.S. business community 
and its sympathizers on Capitol Hill.   On a deeper level, despite its political, military, 
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economic, and cultural power, the Carter Administration found itself with relatively 
little leverage with which to pressure the Argentine military junta.  Throughout 1977 
and 1978, Argentina’s access to non-U.S. economic and military suppliers, 
particularly in Western Europe and Israel, rendered U.S. sanctions largely symbolic.  
“Put simply,” a State Department report on U.S.-Argentine relations asserted in 
November 1978, “the U.S. is trying almost single-handedly to encourage a basic 
policy reorientation on a sensitive matter in a country where its leverage is limited and 
competing policy objectives (nuclear) might be endangered.”154
The Administration’s success in pressuring the military junta to accept an 
IAHRC visit, however, marked a turning point for the Argentine dictatorship.  Hoping 
to avoid a deeply embarrassing and politically damaging report, in the months leading 
up to the September 1979 visit Argentine military leaders made substantial progress 
toward political normalization.  As General Roberto Viola informed Ambassador 
Castro, “all of the GOA is being geared for [the] IAHRC visit resulting in virtually no 
disappearances, no torture and no irregular arrests.”
  More importantly, 
Argentine military leaders’ radical belief in the National Reorganization Process 
superseded any fealty to U.S. hemispheric leadership.  The Carter Administration’s 
human rights initiatives, in other words, failed to dramatically alter the convictions of 
Argentine military leaders who saw themselves as engaged in a historic conflict of 
global proportions.   
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  Indeed, disappearances 
dropped dramatically from the 1978 average of 50 per month; in June 1979 the U.S. 
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months.156  Underscoring the significant role the IAHRC visit played in the decline in 
state-sanctioned violence, one top-ranking Argentine officer told DCM Maxwell 
Chaplin, “it would be inconceivable to have disappearances taking place when the 
IAHCR was visiting.”157
Correspondingly, the number of clandestine prisons decreased precipitously 
from more than 300 at the peak of the military’s terror campaign in 1976-1977 to 45 
by the end of 1978.  When the IAHRC arrived in Buenos Aires, only seven camps 
remained in operation, and by 1980 all but two had been shuttered.
   
158  Prison 
conditions and prisoner treatment also improved for individuals held under Executive 
Authority (PEN) declining from more than 3,000 at the beginning of 1978 to roughly 
1,600 in the months leading up to the IAHRC visit, and in the first-half of 1979 
hundreds of PEN prisoners received formal charges.159  Although such improvements 
were, as Tex Harris fittingly put it, little more than “apple-polishing” in light of the 
previous three years of intense state-sanctioned violence, the Argentine military 
junta’s preparations for the IAHRC nonetheless constituted a success for the U.S. 
human rights policy.160
Perhaps most importantly, the IAHRC’s visit to Argentina in September 1979 
provided an unprecedented opportunity for members of the human rights community 
to raise national and international awareness of the extent of human rights violations 
perpetrated by the military government.  The visit received an enormous amount of 
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coverage in Argentine press, radio, and television reporting, and despite a blanket of 
self-censorship regarding dirty war tactics, the human rights issue received widespread 
domestic scrutiny.  Correspondingly, the image of thousands of Argentines waiting in 
lines stretching five blocks through the center of Buenos Aires to give testimony 
regarding the disappearance of loved ones shocked onlookers and electrified human 
rights advocates.161  “For the first time the nation ‘sees’ our reality,” one human rights 
pamphlet subsequently asserted.  “‘There are so many?’ they ask.  ‘Yes, we are, and 
we are not afraid to publicly testify in front of the IAHRC, destroying the expectations 
of the Dictatorship that had counted on the terror that enveloped the population to 
keep us quiet.’”162  Underscoring the significance of the visit in raising awareness of 
the human rights issue, Ambassador Castro cabled Washington shortly after the 
commission’s departure, “There can hardly be an Argentine alive who is now unaware 
that human rights are an issue of significance.”163
Finally, the IAHRC’s 374-page report on Argentina, delivered to the Argentine 
Embassy in Washington in December 1979 and published in a shorter-form in April 
1980 was immediately recognized as a landmark condemnation of the Argentine 
military junta’s systematic use of abduction, torture, and murder.  Backed by the 
formal imprimatur of the Organization of American States, and based on testimony 
from 5,580 Argentines, the commission produced a scathing denunciation of the 
military junta’s draconian violations of personal liberty and security, habeas corpus, 
freedom of expression and religion, and political and labor rights.
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military leaders publicly dismissed the report’s findings and banned its distribution in 
Argentina, its publication was nonetheless highly significant.  “An impartial, official 
hemispheric body had now laid the facts on the public record and had recommended 
specific improvements,” wrote Patrick J. Flood, who served in the State Department 
Human Rights Bureau.  “The hemisphere would be watching Argentina’s compliance 
with these recommendations,” Flood continued.  “Argentine policymakers were 
beginning to accord more weight to the country’s international reputation, and the visit 
was a factor in stimulating a trend toward better observance of human rights.165
 
 
The successful orchestration of the IAHRC visit thus constituted a historic 
victory for the Carter Administration’s human rights policy.  In the summer of 1978, 
however, the Administration’s decision to deny the $270 million Allis Chalmers Exim 
loan to Argentina on human rights grounds did not go unnoticed by the U.S. business 
community and their supporters on Capitol Hill.  In fact, in subsequent months Carter 
would face sharp criticism from the U.S. business leaders, conservative media pundits, 
and sympathetic members of Congress over the perceived detrimental effects the 
Administration’s policy toward Argentina was having on the United States economy.  
Exacerbated by a ballooning balance of payments deficit and a resurgence of Cold 
War tension, over the second half of the Jimmy Carter’s presidency the human rights 
agenda would increasingly move to the back burner as a U.S. policy priority.  Indeed, 
notwithstanding the successful IAHRC visit, setbacks in the struggle to institutionalize 
human rights in U.S. foreign policy pushed Patricia Derian to the brink of resignation 
so many times in the second-half of the Carter presidency that by 1980 her packing 
boxes were permanently stacked along one wall of her office.166
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Chapter 6: 
“Tilting Against Gray-Flannel Windmills”: 
U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1979-1980 
 
 Patricia Derian’s frustration was palpable.   “Unless things change I’ll 
probably resign in a few days, over a major policy disagreement,” the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs informed Washington 
Post reporter Ann Crittenden in late May 1980.  Having spearheaded U.S. efforts to 
promote human rights in Argentina for the previous three years, Derian was outraged 
when she returned from a brief vacation to discover that the Carter Administration had 
decided to initiate “a major policy shift” toward the South American nation that 
aimed, in her view, to “normalize relations and end our official criticism of the 
regime.” Barring a reversal of the decision, Derian told Crittenden with characteristic 
candor, “I’m leaving, and I won’t say it’s for ‘personal reasons.’”1
It was a remarkable announcement, particularly in light of the publication only 
a month earlier of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) report on 
its visit to Argentina in the fall of 1979.  In the months leading up to the visit, the 
protection of human rights in Argentina had improved significantly, and the report 
itself constituted a landmark condemnation of the Argentine military junta’s terror 
campaign against perceived subversives.   Nonetheless, by the spring of 1980, it was 
increasingly evident at the State Department Human Rights Bureau that the Carter 
Administration’s success in orchestrating the Argentine military junta’s invitation to 
the IAHRC had come at a heavy political cost.  Indeed, the Administration’s July 1978 
decision to make Export-Import (Exim) Bank approval of the $270 million Allis-
Chalmers sale of a hydro-electric turbine factory to Argentina contingent on the 
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junta’s invitation to the IAHRC sparked a firestorm of criticism from the U.S. and 
Argentine business communities, sympathetic members of the U.S. Congress, 
Washington bureaucrats, and conservative journalists, threatening to reverse the 
limited gains Derian’s Human Rights Bureau had achieved over the previous 19 
months.    
Corresponding with rising domestic resistance to the human rights policy, a 
resurgence of Cold War tension in the second-half of the Carter Administration 
hardened the President’s outlook in foreign affairs, a development that reverberated 
with particular intensity in the developing world.  As the Carter team grew 
increasingly concerned with Soviet adventurism in the Horn of Africa, rising popular 
unrest in Iran, and the deteriorating political situation in Nicaragua, human rights 
increasingly moved to the back burner as a U.S. policy priority.  Most significantly for 
U.S.-Argentine relations, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979, Argentina’s strategic significance for the United 
States increased dramatically, and in the opening months of 1980 the fear that 
Argentina would offset the U.S. grain embargo on the Soviet Union had rapidly 
accelerated rapprochement between Washington and Buenos Aires.  “The decision 
will probably result in Mrs. Derian’s resignation early next week,” Ann Crittenden 
wrote, “for if Patt Derian was identified with any single issue while in office it was her 
constant, and generally successful battle to distance the United States from the military 
regime in Argentina.”   That fight, Crittenden concluded, “now seems to have been 
lost.”2
 
 
●●● 
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 To a considerable extent, tension between the Carter Administration and the 
U.S. business community was rooted in the contradictory impulses that emerged from 
Jimmy Carter’s self-avowed social liberalism and fiscal conservatism.3  On the one 
hand, Carter’s inaugural declaration that the U.S. commitment to human rights would 
be “absolute,” honestly reflected the President’s religious beliefs and moralism, 
coupled with a keen political sense of the national mood in the post-Vietnam, post-
Watergate era.  Although the protracted struggle to transform Carter’s lofty rhetoric 
into concrete policy prescriptions over the course of 1977 made it clear that the pursuit 
of human rights would necessarily be conditional upon a wide range of additional 
foreign policy considerations, Carter remained dedicated to infusing U.S. foreign 
policy with a heavy dose of morality.  “My personal commitment to human rights is 
very strong,” Carter observed during Human Rights Week in December.  “The 
American people feel as I do,” he continued.  “Our government will continue to 
express that commitment and not ever hide it.  And we will always encourage other 
nations to join us.”4
 On the other hand, Jimmy Carter’s economic policies were fundamentally 
conservative.  In what became known as the “locomotive strategy,” Carter sought to 
expand the U.S. economy—particularly by increasing trade with Western Europe and 
Japan—thereby increasing U.S. production, lowering unemployment, and 
strengthening the dollar.
 
5
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year.6  Finally, the President supported traditionally Republican issues such as the 
deregulation of major industries; as Carter later wrote in his memoirs, “for more than 
three and a half years, my major economic battle would be against inflation, and I 
would stay on the side of fiscal prudence, restricted budgets, and lower deficits.”7
Significantly, in the realm of foreign policy, Carter saw no contradiction 
between promoting both human rights and U.S. economic expansion overseas.  During 
an official visit to Brazil in March 1978, Carter informed journalists that “it would be 
inconceivable to me that any act of Congress would try to restrict the lending of 
money by American private banks . . . under any circumstances.”   More broadly, 
there was “no conflict” Carter asserted “between human rights […] and the free-
enterprise system.”
   
8
Carter’s statement came as a shock to members of the non-governmental 
human rights community in Washington.  It was “an enormous gaff,” recalled Larry 
Birns, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA).  Human rights 
advocates were not unaware of the limits to Carter’s dedication to human rights, Birns 
asserted, “but the illusion was that the human rights factor affects everything.”
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rights, as well as legally-binding requirements that human rights be taken into 
consideration in the Export-Import Bank (Exim) and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC).10
The apparent contradictions in Jimmy Carter’s avowed support for both human 
rights and market capitalism also raised the hackles of the U.S. business community, 
particularly in regard to U.S. policy toward Argentina.  Less than a year into Carter’s 
presidency, the growing backlog of delayed or denied U.S. transfers to the South 
American nation was generating increasingly sharp criticism from business leaders, 
who regarded the Administration’s human rights policy as inconsistent, capricious, 
and counter-productive in the effort to curtail state-sanctioned violence.  As a 
representative from the American League for Exports and Security Assistance bluntly 
informed a congressional committee, Carter’s export policy was a “costly failure.”  
Citing the Carter Administration’s human rights policy toward Argentina as a 
particularly egregious example of the failed “export of morality,” the League—a 
business lobby representing 34 U.S. aerospace corporations—emphasized the need to 
move beyond “principles of high moral purpose” and focus instead on “the reality of 
American national interest.”
 
11
To a considerable extent, such resistance reflected a combination of expanding 
trade and investment opportunities available to U.S. firms in Argentina and the 
military junta’s savvy self-promotion.  Following the March 1976 coup d’état, the 
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military junta had assumed leadership of a nation on the brink of total economic 
collapse; during the chaotic presidency of Isabel Martinez de Perón inflation had 
reached 700 percent, productivity had fallen by 50 percent, and international investors 
had fled the threat of left-wing terrorist kidnappings in droves.12  To reverse the 
nation’s precipitous financial decline, the military junta’s newly-installed Minister of 
the Economy, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, immediately implemented tough market-
based austerity measures: devaluation of the peso, elimination of price controls, and a 
freezing of wages.  A staunch opponent of excessive government intervention in the 
economy, the Economy Minister also set out to reduce state spending, privatize 
government-owned enterprises, and deregulate banking.  Finally, seeking to encourage 
the influx of foreign capital and increase trade, Martínez de Hoz offered tax 
incentives, freed exchange rates, and lowered tariffs.13
The viability of Martínez de Hoz’s economic strategy was inextricably linked 
to attracting foreign investment and expanding trade, and with U.S. investment in 
Argentina at $1.395 billion in 1976—roughly 40 percent of total foreign holdings—
the Argentine military junta placed special attention on enticing additional U.S. 
capital.  Accordingly, in August 1976 the junta paid the New York-based public 
relations firm Burson-Marsteller (BM) $1.1 million to “assist in promoting confidence 
in and good will toward the country and its government” in eight countries, with 
$590,000 earmarked for the United States.
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image throughout the world.”  Focusing on three target audiences: “those who 
influence thinking,” including government officials, the press and academics; “those 
who influence investments;” and “those who influence travel,” particularly in the 
tourist industry, BM offered a comprehensive series of steps to project a national 
image of economic stability, political security, and financial opportunity.  On BM’s 
recommendation, for example, more than 50 foreign journalists identified as 
particularly influential were plied by the Argentine government with all-expense-paid 
visits to Argentina, including extensive tours of Buenos Aires, entertainment, and the 
opportunity to meet Argentine government and business leaders.15  BM further 
advocated the creation of training courses for Argentine government personnel 
focusing on how to respond to “international groups such as Amnesty International 
which carry out local anti-Argentina campaigns.”16
In the United States, with Burson-Marsteller’s oversight, the security of 
Argentina’s political climate and the nation’s extensive investment opportunities were 
touted in newspaper advertisements and radio and television slots.
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when members of a non-governmental human rights organization investigated the 
Maryland address provided by the group of “Concerned Argentine Women” who 
purportedly paid for an ad in the Washington Post, for example, they discovered a 
private house rented by the Argentine Naval Attaché at the Argentine Embassy in 
Washington.18
 The Argentine military junta’s economic policy, coupled with its savvy public 
relations campaign, quickly garnered support from U.S. business lobbies, led by the 
Council of the Americas (COA), a non-profit business association funded by more 
than two-hundred corporations with investments in Latin America.  With direct access 
to top-U.S. policymakers, legislators, and business leaders, along with extensive 
financial resources and a reputation for expertise in U.S.-Latin American economic 
issues, COA had emerged in the mid-1970s as the preeminent U.S. lobby on U.S.-
Latin American affairs.
   
19  Shortly after the 1976 military coup d’état, COA sponsored 
a meeting between the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Argentina, a 
group of Argentine business leaders, and representatives of nearly three dozen COA-
affiliated corporations.  Similarly, in June the organization facilitated a gathering of 
300 U.S. business leaders to hear Martínez de Hoz discuss the Argentine military 
junta’s economic policy, and when the Argentine Economy Minister visited the United 
States to attend the board of governors meeting of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund in September 1978, COA organized investment workshops focusing 
on Argentina as well as radio and television interviews in five U.S. cities on 
investment opportunities in the South American nation.20
                                                 
18 “U.S.-Argentine Relations,” Editorial, Argentina Outreach: Bulletin of the Argentine Information 
Service Center, Vol. 3, October- November 1978, Box 84, Folder: Argentina, 1978, International 
League for Human Rights Records. 
   
19 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America, 66-72. 
20 Ibid, 51; “U.S.-Argentine Relations,” Editorial, Argentina Outreach: Bulletin of the Argentine 
Information Service Center, Vol. 3, October- November 1978, Box 84, Folder: Argentina, 1978, 
International League for Human Rights Records. 
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Such lobbying, combined with the military junta’s austere economic policies 
and harsh repression of organized labor initially proved effective in reversing 
Argentina’s economic decline.  Inflation fell to 176 percent in 1978, and dropped 
under 100 percent in early 1979.21  Moreover, with financial backing from the Gerald 
Ford Administration and multi-national lending institutions, including the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, Martínez de Hoz successfully renegotiated 
Argentina’s $9 billion foreign debt; by the summer of 1977 the military junta had built 
up foreign currency reserves of $2.4 billion, with economists optimistically predicting 
a 4 percent rate of annual economic growth.22  Correspondingly, thanks in no small 
measure to BM and COA, the Argentine military junta’s pro-business policies and 
eradication of the left-wing terrorist threat to foreign investors succeeded in increasing 
the influx of U.S. private investment in Argentina, particularly in oil exploration.  In 
November 1977, U.S. News and World Report asserted that “slowly, almost secretly, 
American businessmen are returning to Argentina,” a theme echoed a few months later 
in Business Week.23  “They are cautious, still not entirely assured by the apparent 
economic and political stability there,” the latter asserted, “but within the last year 
they have proposed deals worth some $400 million to the government, half of which 
have already been approved.”24
 
 
Not surprisingly, the Carter Administration’s efforts to promote human rights 
in Argentina through delaying or denying U.S. trade and economic assistance sparked 
sharp criticism from the U.S. business community.  In fact, many multi-national firms 
that had weathered the storm of left-wing terrorist kidnappings in the first-half of the 
                                                 
21 “Military’s Radical Cure for Argentina,” U.S. News and World Report, October 15, 1979, pg. 84.   
22 “A Show of Confidence in Economic Recovery,” Business Week, May 30, 1977, pg. 40. 
23 “Despite Kidnappings and Murder, Americans are Returning to Argentina,” U.S. News and World 
Report, November 21, 1977, pg. 26. 
24 “Argentina; Budget Reforms Lure Foreign Investment,” Business Week, April 24, 1978, pg. 47. 
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decade openly praised the Argentine military junta’s success in re-establishing 
security.25  “American business has shown little inclination to involve itself on behalf 
of human rights in Argentina,” a State Department memorandum asserted in March 
1978.  “On the contrary, American businessmen resident there have been the targets of 
leftist assassinations and many therefore support the Argentine government’s harsh 
tactics.”  Tightening United States government restrictions on private U.S. businesses 
and banks operating in Argentina, the memo prophetically concluded, “would be 
seriously resented.”26
Indeed, the increasing backlog of delayed or denied U.S. transfers to Argentina 
in late 1977 and early 1978 generated strident complaints from the U.S. business 
community.  Private executives affected by the sanctions, such as E. B. Fitzgerald, 
Chairman of the Milwaukee-based Cutler-Hammer, Inc., dismissed government 
restrictions on U.S. trade and investment abroad as politically counter-productive and 
economically detrimental.  When a proposed $8 million sale of Cutler-Hammer’s 
AN/PPS-5 battlefield surveillance radar to the Argentine military was denied by the 
State Department, in late 1977 Fitzgerald fired off an angry letter to Representative 
Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI).  “I […] am seriously concerned about our nation’s 
interest in the face of what appears to be inconsistent and whimsical application of 
government authority on a tenuous premise” Fitzgerald wrote, “which denies to our 
country sorely needed export trade in an era of overwhelmingly unfavorable balance 
 
                                                 
25 Post-dictatorship testimony indicated that some international firms actively assisted the Argentine 
military carry out dirty war violence, including Ford and Mercedes-Benz.  See for example, Larry 
Rohter, “Ford Motor is Linked to Argentina’s ‘Dirty War,’”  New York Times, November 27, 2002, 
accessed online (September 21, 2009) at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/27/international/27ARGE.html; “Argentina Checks Ford’s ‘Military 
Ties,’” BBC News, accessed online (September 21, 2009) at  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2410551.stm; and, more recently, Kenneth Ofgang, “Court Rejects 
Suit Over Argentine Rights Violations,” Metropolitan News-Enterprise, August 31, 2009, pg. 1, 
accessed online (September 21, 2009) at http://www.metnews.com/articles/2009/baum083109.htm. 
26 Department of State Report, “Argentine Human Rights Strategy Paper,” March[?] 1978, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Argentina II, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
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of trade and which  denies to American workers employment in an era of significantly 
high unemployment.”  Noting that the Argentine military government had 
subsequently purchased a similar radar system for $11 million from a French 
company, Fitzgerald acidly concluded, “Thus, the U.S. government did not succeed in 
denying Argentina anything; but it did succeed in depriving the U.S. economy of 
sorely needed income and jobs.” 27
As Fitzgerald’s letter made clear, at the heart of U.S. business leaders’ 
frustration with the Carter Administration was the apparent lack of a clear set of 
human rights policy guidelines.   Over the course of 1977, State Department policy 
planners had struggled to generate an overarching human rights policy framework; by 
the time Jimmy Carter delivered Presidential Directive/NSC-30 in February 1978—a 
formal ukase defining human rights as a “major objective of the United States”—the 
locus of human rights decision-making had centered almost by default on the Inter-
agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by Deputy Secretary 
Warren Christopher (and referred to as the Christopher Committee).
   
28
It was an approach that underscored the State Department’s recognition that 
the multiplicity of competing considerations in each bilateral relationship made 
achieving across-the-board consistency in the promotion of human rights impossible.  
Indeed, in response to the question of whether the U.S. human rights policy was 
  Instituting a 
case-by-case decision-making process, Christopher examined each proposal for U.S. 
economic or security assistance to human rights violating regimes individually, thus 
consciously avoiding the establishment of human rights precedents that could be 
interpreted as guiding policy principles.   
                                                 
27 E. B. Fitzgerald to Clement J. Zablocki, December 12, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—
Argentina II, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
28 Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive/NSC-30, February 17, 1978, accessed online (September 15, 
2009) at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd30.pdf. 
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consistent, Director of Policy Planning Anthony Lake candidly responded, “No.  And 
we should not try to be completely so.”  In a remarkable illustration of challenges 
inherent in the effort to link human rights to U.S. foreign aid, Lake continued:   
 
There are times when security considerations, or broader political factors, lead 
us to be “softer” on some countries’ human rights performance than others.  
Moreover, it often is a close call just what action is most likely to produce 
improvement in a human rights situation.  We sometimes, for instances, 
approve a loan in recognition of a positive trend—even though the overall 
situation in the country remains as bad or worse than that in countries whose 
loans we oppose.  One of the most difficult questions in the human rights 
business is what actions on our part are most likely to encourage a government 
to believe that further progress is worthwhile, without leading it to think we 
believe its human rights problem is solved.   
 
In sum, Lake concluded, “This can only be done on a case-by-case basis, and some of 
our decisions will turn out to have been wrong.”29
 If the Christopher Committee’s approach to human rights reflected a concerted 
effort to avoid applying narrow policy prescriptions to multifaceted political realities, 
it nonetheless accentuated the Carter Administration’s vulnerability to domestic 
political criticism.  Indeed, when Carter quietly backed away from promoting human 
rights in U.S.-Soviet relations after representations on behalf of dissidents threatened 
to derail the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), a bi-
partisan collection of congressional Cold Warriors loudly complained that the 
 
                                                 
29 Department of State Action Memorandum, Anthony Lake to Cyrus Vance, January 20, 1978, Subject: 
“The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment,” Box 19, Folder: Human Rights—Policy 
Implementation, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
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Administration was unfairly targeting right-wing allies while soft-peddling human 
rights in its relations with the Communist world.  Capturing the mood, Representative 
Larry T. McDonald (D-GA) declared, “We roar at our friends and whisper accusations 
at the Communist nations. In fact we even ignore human rights violations in 
Communist China entirely.  This policy has failed.”30
Correspondingly, as Carter’s human rights policy became increasingly focused 
on Latin America over the course of 1977, the Administration was roundly criticized 
from both sides of the political spectrum.  While liberal internationalists such as 
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) 
advocated equally tough U.S. sanctions toward right-wing human rights violators with 
higher geo-strategic importance to the United States—such as South Korea, the 
Philippines, and Iran—Cold War hawks pressed for the maintenance of close U.S. ties 
with anti-communist military regimes in the hemisphere.  Ideological differences 
notwithstanding, both groups associated the problems of the Carter Administration’s 
human rights policy with its inconsistent application; as Earl C. Ravenal asserted in 
the January 1978 issue of Inquiry, “When it comes to human rights, the very essence 
of what we should be doing is to draw a firm, straight line—a constraint—across all 
our diplomatic relations, and accept the consequences.”  Rather than creating a 
flexible, pragmatic human rights policy, Ravenal continued, “the administration’s 
flexibility has degenerated into hypocrisy, and its attempted policy has remained just 
noise.”
   
31
                                                 
30 Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 
Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: Experiences and Issues in Policy Implementation (1977-
1978), Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 
November 1979, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 47.  
Ironically, McDonald was later killed when the Soviet military destroyed Korean Air Lines flight 007 in 
mid-flight on September 1, 1983. 
   
31 Earl C. Ravenal, “Carter’s Year of Human Rights,” Inquiry, January 23, 1978.  A professor at the 
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Ravenal later joined the Cato Institute, where he 
became a distinguished senior fellow.  
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As a defining test-case for the Carter Administration’s human rights initiative, 
Argentina held a central position in the increasingly raucous domestic political debate.  
While congressional liberals complained that the Administration was doing too little—
culminating in Senator Kennedy’s successful amendment eliminating all U.S. military 
transfers to Argentina on September 30, 1978—a growing chorus of conservatives 
criticized Carter for doing too much.  “The people in the United States are going to 
hear a lot about the Argentine from old Hollings,” Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) 
told a group of U.S. business leaders operating in Argentina in August 1977 after an 
official visit to Buenos Aires.  Emphasizing Argentina’s “free government,” Hollings 
criticized the Carter Administration for engaging in “too much moralizing.”  
Representative Eligio de la Garza, Jr. (D-TX) was equally dismissive of Carter’s 
human rights initiatives.  “I expected to see tanks in the street,” de la Garza asserted.  
“I expected oppressed people without civil rights, but I have found something 
completely different.”  Elating his Argentine hosts, de la Garza concluded, “I wish 
each member of Congress could come here and see the truth.”32
 It was the U.S. business community, however, that emerged in the spring of 
1978 as the foremost critic of the Carter Administration’s effort to promote human 
rights in Argentina.  In the face of widespread state-sanctioned violence punctuated by 
uneven responses to U.S. pressure—“promises of progress, short term progress then 
regression, a forward and back pattern repeated over and over,” in the words of 
National Security Council staff member Jessica Tuchman Mathews—Warren 
Christopher’s attempt to reward indications of Argentine political normalization and 
punish retrograde violence was perceived by many U.S. business leaders as 
 
                                                 
32 Karen DeYoung, “Argentina Woos and Wins its Visiting Americans,” Washington Post, August 30, 
1977, pg. A17.    
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unpredictable and capricious.33  Concessions to domestic political lobbying—such as 
the State Department’s November 1977 approval of submarine periscopes to the 
Argentine Navy from the Massachusetts-based firm Kollmorgen and Boeing Vertol 
helicopters to the Argentine Air Force—further aggravated business leaders.  E. B. 
Fitzgerald, for example, described as “disquieting” the fact that the Kollmorgen and 
Boeing sales had been approved at roughly the same period that Cutler-Hammer’s 
proposed sale of battlefield radar to Argentina was denied.  His unease turned to 
irritation, however, when the State Department subsequently approved the sale of an 
AN/PPS-15 battlefield radar system to Argentina—a model nearly identical to Cutler-
Hammer’s AN/PPS-5.  “It is inconceivable to me how one sale can be contrary to 
government policy and the other is not,” Fitzgerald complained.34
 By mid-summer 1978, as the backlog of delayed and denied U.S. transfers to 
Argentina deepened, tension between the Carter Administration and the U.S. business 
community reached a fever pitch.  When the State Department delayed a $1.6 million 
sale of a Swearingen Merlin 4A air ambulance to the Argentine military, despite 
having previously sold a similar model to the Argentine Ministry of Public Health, the 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association openly criticized the Carter 
Administration.  “If they would define what countries have human rights problems, 
and what it will require to sell aircraft to those countries, we would establish the 
mechanism and attempt to comply,” Vice President William R. Edgar asserted.  “Our 
frustration revolves around the fact that we don’t know the ground rules.”
 
35
                                                 
33 National Security Council Memorandum Jessica Tuchman Mathews to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
September 25, 1978, Subject: “Thoughts on the Attached,” Box: 4, folder: Argentina, 1/77-12/78, 
Office of the National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Country Files, 1977-1981, JCL.   
  
34 E. B. Fitzgerald to Clement J. Zablocki, December 12, 1977, Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—
Argentina II, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
35 Alton K. Marsh, “Rights Policy Confusion Halts Air Ambulance Sale,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, July 31, 1978, pg. 18. 
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Such complaints reverberated across the Washington bureaucracy and were 
echoed with increasing frequency by pro-business agencies within the U.S. 
government.  In the same month as the air ambulance denial, Julius L. Katz, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, recommended that 
President Carter sign an executive order stipulating that the Departments of State, 
Defense, and Commerce should avoid controlling exports for “non-strategic reasons” 
if the withheld goods could be purchased from other countries.  “The harmful effect of 
current practice on our trade is already apparent and the potential for further harm is 
great,” Katz asserted.  Not only did delayed and denied U.S. transfers based on human 
rights considerations total several billion dollars, the Assistant Secretary contended, 
the indirect effects of the human rights policy would have long-term negative 
implications for the U.S. economy.  As a result, “the U.S. is coming to be regarded as 
an unreliable supplier,” Katz wrote, with the effect that “U.S. companies are losing 
market positions which have taken years to develop and cannot be regained 
quickly.”36
Echoing Katz’s concern, Aviation expert Robert Hotz—who had edited the 
trade journal Aviation Week and Space Technology since the Eisenhower era—
captured the intense frustration Carter’s human rights policy was generating among 
U.S. firms operating in police and military exports.  “The Carter disarmament coterie 
includes some of the most naïve people to operate in the capital city during the 30 
years we have observed the scene,” Hotz editorialized in mid-1978.   With 
bureaucratic obstacles hamstringing government clearance “on even the most routine 
export sales,” Hotz asserted, the Carter Administration was “eroding an industry that 
over the past eight years contributed $52 billion in exports for a nation that had a $53-
 
                                                 
36 Department of State Draft Memorandum, Julius L. Katz to Cyrus Vance, July 15[?],1977, Box 13, 
Folder: Human Rights—Arms Transfers, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.  
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billion trade deficit for the same period.”  Rather than inserting morality into U.S. 
foreign policy, Hotz concluded, the Carter team was merely “transferring jobs from 
Wichita, Dallas, Cincinnati, St. Louis and Hartford to Paris, Toulouse, Bordeaux, 
London, Bristol and Manchester.”37
 
  
 The accumulated tension between the Carter Administration and the U.S. 
business community exploded following the State Department’s July denial of the 
$270 million Allis-Chalmers sale.   The sheer size of the transaction, combined with 
the questionable effect its rejection would have on the human rights situation in 
Argentina sparked fierce outcry from business leaders, members of Congress, 
Washington bureaucrats, and conservative media pundits.  At the center of the 
controversy, David Scott, Chief Executive Officer at Allis-Chalmers, captured the 
mood.  Angrily dismissing the decision as “arbitrary,” Scott predicted that it would not 
“have any effect upon human rights policies in Argentina.”  In a revealing admission, 
Scott added that “most importantly” the Exim denial “was severely damaging to his 
company, audits, [and] shareholders.”38  Similarly, after a September meeting 
intended to cover a broad range of foreign policy issues with nearly two-dozen senior 
U.S. business executives, Paul H. Kreisberg reported that “the only subject they
                                                 
37 Robert Hotz, “Carter’s Export Muddle,” Editorial, Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 7, 
1978.  On Hotz see “Robert B. Hotz, 91; Arms-Control Expert Ran Aerospace Publication,” Los 
Angeles Times, February 12, 2006, accessed online (September 8, 2009) at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/12/local/me-hotz12; Jeremy Pearce, “Robert B. Hotz, 91, a Critic of 
NASA’s Disaster Response, Dies,” New York Times, February 15, 2006, accessed online (September 
14, 2009) at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/national/15hotz.html?fta=y. 
 were 
interested in was human rights.”  Deeply concerned over the inability to predict how 
the Carter Administration’s human rights policy would affect their businesses 
38 Department of State Memorandum, William C. Harrop to Warren Christopher, August 11, 1978, 
Subject: “The Allis-Chalmers Argentine Project,” Box 8, Folder: Memoranda from WC to Bureaus—
1978, RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
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overseas, the group expressed “great skepticism that the State Department really cared 
much about U.S. exports and trade.”39
Adding fuel to the controversy, conservative media pundits pounced on the 
Allis-Chalmers denial as a golden opportunity to pillory the Carter Administration’s 
human rights policy.  Leading the attack were Washington Post columnists Rowland 
Evans and Robert Novak, whose influential editorials served as staple reading for 
much of Washington’s policymaking elite.  Praising the Argentine military junta for 
having squashed an impending communist takeover, Evans and Novak savaged 
Patricia Derian for her harsh criticism of the military regime in congressional hearings 
in early August.  Dismissing the Human Rights Bureau’s estimate of the number of 
Argentines killed and missing as having “dubious reliability,” the columnists hinted 
that the human rights agenda was being used “to support revolutionary forces in the 
hemisphere.”
 
40  More significantly, in a subsequent column two weeks later, Evans 
and Novak directly linked Carter’s human rights policy toward Argentina to the 
sputtering U.S. economy.   According to the columnists, delayed or denied U.S. 
transactions based on human rights considerations had resulted in $1.4 billion in lost 
business with the South American nation.  “Excess zeal,” Evans and Novak 
concluded, had resulted in “overstress on human rights at the cost of U.S. jobs during 
high unemployment and record trade deficits.”41
In fact, such criticism exaggerated the stringency of the Carter 
Administration’s human rights policy.  The lack of consensus among top-policy 
   
                                                 
39 Emphasis original.  Department of State Memorandum, Paul H. Kreisberg to Patt Derian, Jules Katz, 
and Steve Oxman, September 20, 1978, Subject: “Human Rights Advisory Group,” box 4, Folder: TL 
9/16-30/78, Policy and Planning Staff, Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, 
GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
40 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “‘Undiplomatic’ Incident,” Washington Post, September 6, 1978, 
pg. A15. 
41 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Human-Rights Zeal that Costs U.S. Jobs,” Washington Post, 
September 18, 1978, pg. A23. 
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planners at the State Department on how the human rights policy should be applied 
over the course of 1977, combined with resistance from Washington bureaucrats and 
the U.S. business lobby had resulted in a highly limited application of constraints on 
U.S. foreign assistance, trade, and investment.  First, the Carter Administration 
approved the vast majority of U.S. assistance, trade and investment abroad.  By the 
Christopher Committee’s own account, of the more than 500 International Finance 
Institution (IFI) loans that were voted upon during the Carter Administration’s first 16 
months, the United States voted against only 10 and abstained on 17 (all the loans 
were approved despite the U.S. show of censure).42  Similarly, in 1978, the State 
Department reported that it denied fewer than 350 out of 50,000 applications for 
exports, and only 23 of the 1,000 license applications reviewed on human rights 
grounds were subsequently refused.43  Finally, out of 169 countries served by the 
Exim Bank, only four were subject to human rights denials.44
Second, the State Department consistently refused to “lobby” the private sector 
in regard to human rights considerations, instead projecting an image of neutrality 
regarding commercial transactions—a position that was thoroughly undermined in 
practice by extensive promotion by U.S. government officials at both the Department- 
and Embassy-level.  In regard to a pending $150 million sale of Boeing aircraft to the 
Argentine national carrier Aerolineas Argentinas, for example, Ambassador Raúl 
Castro strongly argued that a Department denial would not be perceived by the 
Argentine military junta as an official sanction on human rights grounds.  Instead, 
 
                                                 
42 “Report of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance Concerning the 
Effectiveness of U.S. Human Rights Actions in the International Financial Institutions,’ April 30, 1978, 
Box 18, Folder: PD-30—Response (Final), RWC, ODS, GRDS, RG 59, Archives II.   
43 Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy, 222. 
44 In addition to Argentina, the U.S. denied Exim bank transactions based on human rights 
considerations to Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay.  Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance: 
Experiences and Issues in Policy Implementation (1977-1978), Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, November 1979, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979).   
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emphasizing his own extensive involvement in the case, Castro argued that the 
decision would almost certainly rekindle a bitter dispute dating back to 1972 between 
Aerolineas Argentinas and Pan American and Braniff Airlines over a proposed route 
expansion.  Similarly, Castro argued against State Department action in the Exim 
Bank on a General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) project to expand 
telecommunication infrastructure in Argentina, a long-term contract that U.S. 
investors hoped would ultimately garner nearly $1 billion.  Noting his own active 
lobbying on behalf of GTE, Castro asserted that, “our competition from the Japanese, 
Germans, and the Swedes can probably count on official credit or guarantee 
assistance, and if the contract goes to one of them our gesture in removing GTE from 
the field will go unnoticed in Argentina.”45  Such pro-business lobbying was not an 
isolated case; underscoring the traditionally close relationship between the State 
Department and the U.S. business community, to Patricia Derian’s frustration, more 
than a year after Carter entered office, State Department responses to potential 
investors’ queries regarding particular U.S. bilateral relationships failed to include any 
mention of U.S. human rights actions.46
 Finally, even toward Argentina the Carter Administration’s constraints on U.S. 
trade and investment were far less stringent than critics alleged.  By 1978, U.S. 
banks—led by David Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan—had lent Argentina almost $3 
billion, with $1.2 billion earmarked for government- or state-owned companies.
   
47
                                                 
45 Department of State Cable, Buenos Aires 3767, American Embassy (Castro) to Secretary of State, 
May 15[?] 1978, Subject: “Export Import Bank Loans to Argentina,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—
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46 Department of State Action Memorandum, Patricia Derian and Anthony Lake to Cyrus Vance, March 
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47 It was a pattern that was repeated throughout the hemisphere.  “When the Carter Administration has 
withheld foreign aid,” wrote journalist Michael Massing in early 1979, “Latin America’s dictators 
usually have responded with a virulent verbal outburst and then simply turned to prominent members of 
the U.S. banking and business community for assistance.”  Indeed, by June 1978, U.S. banks had loaned 
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the same year, arguably the nadir of U.S.-Argentine relations, U.S. exports to the 
South American nation equally nearly $700 million.48  Indeed, U.S. private sector 
trade with the Argentine military junta was so extensive that Steven Oxman, Warren 
Christopher’s Special Assistant for human rights issues, proposed issuing a set of 
informal guidelines emphasizing that notwithstanding the lack of U.S. government 
constraints on the vast majority of transfers to Argentina, U.S. business leaders should 
not “believe they are freed from the necessity of moral choice.”  Underscoring the 
limited nature of U.S. sanctions toward Argentina, Oxman continued, “The fact is that 
a manufacturer who sells, say, a computer to the Argentine Navy is making an 
important moral choice: he is choosing to conduct business as usual with people who 
condone the torture of human beings.  Nothing would prevent him from choosing not 
to do so, and I think it is important that he be reminded of that fact.”49
 If the human rights policy was far less restrictive on U.S. assistance, trade, and 
investment overseas than critics alleged, the furor surrounding the Allis-Chalmers 
denial nonetheless brought to the fore the incongruity at the heart of Jimmy Carter’s 
self-described social liberalism and fiscal conservatism.  In the face of a $16.4 billion 
trade deficit in the first half of 1978, Carter advocated a substantial increase in U.S. 
exports.  Yet the Allis-Chalmers denial brought the total amount of lost U.S. business 
with Argentina to an estimated $800 million according to the State Department Bureau 
of Inter-American Affairs (ARA); although substantially less than the figures touted 
by critics of the human rights policy, the denials nonetheless primarily affected a 
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military-industrial complex that employed 700,000 U.S. workers.50
 Not surprisingly, pro-business agencies within the U.S. government were far 
less conflicted regarding the balance between promoting human rights and market 
capitalism abroad.   Less than a week after the Allis-Chalmers decision Undersecretary 
of State for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper pointed out to Secretary of State 
Vance that discouragement from the U.S. government based on political 
considerations would inhibit medium-sized U.S. producers from entering the export 
market.  “The costs in this dimension” Cooper argued, “seem to me potentially greater 
than the incremental gains with respect to human rights from prohibiting this class of 
transactions.”
  Moreover, the 
Exim Bank’s Supplier Credits and Discount Loans were primarily geared toward 
medium-sized U.S. manufacturers, precisely the kind of firms that the President 
needed to mobilize in order to substantially increase exports of manufactured goods.   
51  Underscoring Cooper’s point, the following day a Cabinet-level 
National Export Policy Task Force led by Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps 
delivered a set of recommendations to President Carter for stimulating the nation’s 
flagging export sector.  The Carter Administration needed to eliminate obstacles 
inhibiting potential exporters from entering the market, the Task Force asserted, not 
least by substantially increasing the lending capacity of the Exim Bank.52
 Caught between the competing demands of the human rights policy and the 
imperatives of U.S. economic growth, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
tried to chart a middle path that would placate both human rights advocates and the 
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U.S. business leaders.  When Julius L. Katz criticized the Christopher Committee for 
denying exports of non-lethal manufactured goods to human rights violating regimes, 
Christopher wrote in margin, “This was the Argentine case.  Should work gloves go to 
torturers?”53  Similarly, when apprised of Allis-Chalmers CEO David Scott’s livid 
reaction to the Exim Bank decision, Christopher’s frustration was unmistakable.  
“Does Scott understand that a Congressional statute requires us to give our advice to 
Ex-Im?” he wrote at the bottom of the memo.  “I challenge anyone to objectively 
review the Argentine human rights picture and give advice different from ours.”54  
Nonetheless, continuous resistance to the human rights policy took a toll on the 
Deputy Secretary—indeed, in at least one instance, Christopher approved a transfer to 
Argentina against his own better judgment in order to avoid a bureaucratic battle; “I 
would vote no,” he noted to Steven Oxman in a 1978 memo, “but it is not worth a 
battle with the Treasury.”55
More broadly, by the end of the July 1978, pro-business criticism of the human 
rights policy had placed the Carter Administration squarely on the defensive.   Indeed, 
Carter’s top-advisors warned in the President’s Evening Reading on July 28 that 
“There is mounting pressure on us from business and some Members of Congress to 
modify our advice to Ex-IM, since it may well result in the loss of considerable 
business for American firms.”
   
56
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  Rising dissention within the ranks of the Carter team 
itself regarding the efficacy of the Allis-Chalmers decision further complicated 
matters.  In a remarkable memorandum to Warren Christopher on August 10, Director 
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of Policy Planning Anthony Lake asserted that “the human rights policy, and 
American interests in general, ultimately will benefit if we do not seem to be using 
economic pressure to bring down a particular government.”  Economic sanctions, 
Lake argued, risked poisoning relations with the target government and eroding 
domestic support in the United States for the human rights policy.  Conspicuously 
absent from the analysis was the fact that congressional legislation specifically linked 
U.S. economic actions to human rights; instead, in an extraordinary display of how far 
the backlash against the Allis-Chalmers decision had shifted the human rights debate, 
Lake went so far as to compare the Carter Administration’s use of economic sanctions 
on behalf of human rights to Richard M. Nixon’s attempts to sow economic crisis in 
Chile at the outset of the decade.  “The strongest argument seems to us to be one of 
principle,” Lake wrote.  “To deny a country access to international financial support in 
order to try to force political change on it is not qualitatively different from the Nixon 
Administration’s efforts to ‘destabilize’ the Allende government.”57
A similar theme was sounded by Andrew Young, the outspoken U.S. 
representative to the United Nations and a well-known supporter of the human rights 
policy.  In mid-August, Young criticized the Exim denial as attempting to promote 
human rights at the expense of economic and social development.  In Young’s view, if 
a development project was soundly planned and would be administered efficiently it 
deserved U.S. support—even if the beneficiary was an authoritarian government.  “I 
think we should avoid using our economic power in a way that impedes development 
in the recipient country” Young wrote, “while denying jobs to U.S. workers and 
weakening our own economy and balance of payments situation.”
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Finally, the Allis-Chalmers controversy brought the National Security Council 
(NSC) into the debate over U.S. policy toward Argentina.  During the 1976 
presidential campaign, Carter’s hawkish-NSC advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had 
recognized the potential of the human rights issue to bridge the ideological divide 
between liberal internationalists and Cold Warriors.  Although he later claimed 
intellectual authorship of core components of the Carter Administration’s human 
rights policy, in practice, Brzezinski envisioned human rights as first and foremost a 
means to weaken the Soviet Union, and his support for the application of sanctions 
toward right-wing U.S. allies was tepid.59  As early as March 1977 the National 
Security Advisor had warned that U.S. human rights sanctions might lead to “a kind of 
coalition of Latin American countries against us,” a position that hardened in the 
aftermath of the Allis-Chalmers decision.  As a result of the Department’s punitive 
human rights actions, Brzezinski informed Jimmy Carter on August 7, 1978, the 
United States was “running the risk of having bad relations simultaneously with 
Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.”60
                                                                                                                                            
Development, and Export Policy,” Box 13, Folder: Human Rights—Argentina IV, RWC, ODS, GRDS, 
RG 59, Archives II.   
  Two weeks later, the National Security Advisor 
personally forwarded Andrew Young’s critique of the Allis-Chalmers decision to 
Warren Christopher.  Concurring with Young’s negative assessment, Brzezinski 
staked a claim on future decisions regarding U.S. policy toward Argentina by 
59 “I had long been convinced that the idea of basic human rights had a powerful appeal in the emerging 
world of emancipated but usually nondemocratic nation-states and that the previous Administration’s 
lack of attention to this issue had undermined international support for the United States, Brzezinski 
wrote in his memoirs.  “I was concerned that America was becoming ‘lonely’ in the world.  I felt 
strongly that a major emphasis on human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy would advance 
America’s global interests by demonstrating to the emerging nations of the Third World the reality of 
our democratic system, in sharp contrast to the political system and practices of our adversaries.  The 
best way to answer the Soviets’ ideological challenge would be to commit the United States to a 
concept which most reflected America’s very essence.”  Indeed, Brzezinski claimed authorship of 
Carter’s inaugural assertion that the U.S. commitment to human rights would be “absolute.” Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 124-25. 
60 Ibid, 128. 
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pointedly noting that the “counter-productive” decision had not been cleared by the 
NSC.61  The National Security Advisor’s most candid assessment of U.S.-Argentine 
relations, however, was reserved for Secretary Vance.  “We have a large economic 
relationship with a relatively prosperous middle-income developing country,” 
Brzezinski wrote.  “We want to expand, not contract that.”62
 
   
The intense outcry over the Allis-Chalmers decision, coupled with top U.S. 
policymakers’ focus on stimulating the economy effectively curbed the State 
Department’s use of economic leverage to promote human rights overseas.  The 
increasingly dour mood in Washington was unmistakably evident when congressional 
lawmakers repealed the legislation linking the Exim Bank to human rights 
considerations only two months after the Allis-Chalmers denial.63
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  Although the 
Carter Administration refused to reverse the Exim ruling until the Argentine military 
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reluctant to invest the necessary political capital and energy in future battles with 
domestic interests and their supporters in Washington,” recalled Patrick Flood, who 
served as HA Desk Officer for the Southern Cone.  “The Human Rights Bureau 
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continued, “but as a policy instrument the EXIM lever had effectively fallen from our 
hands.”64
More broadly, although the Allis-Chalmers denial successfully elicited the 
Argentine military junta’s invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission, ironically, the decision constituted the high-water mark in the Carter 
Administration’s effort to promote human rights in Argentina.  In fact, the State 
Department began caving to domestic pressure almost immediately; in the lead-up to 
the congressionally-mandated cutoff date for U.S. sales to Argentina on September 30, 
the Christopher Committee authorized nearly $120 million in military transfers to the 
military junta.  In addition to approving the export of two Boeing helicopters to the 
Argentine Army in mid-August, only days before the cutoff went into effect, the 
Deputy Secretary Christopher authorized clearing all the military and safety-related 
items in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) “pipeline,” and tentatively approved more 
than 30 slots for Argentine officers at U.S. military training facilities.
   
65
Reviewing the issue in a series of memoranda to Brzezinski, NSC Latin 
America expert Robert A. Pastor captured the fundamental challenge at the heart of 
the Carter Administration’s human rights policy.  Following Patricia Derian’s harsh 
congressional testimony in August, Brzezinski had dispatched Pastor to assess the 
State Department’s policy toward Argentina and take an active role in developing a 
long-term strategy.
   
66
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  Yet despite ARA Assistant Secretary Viron P. Vaky’s promise 
to include him in the planning process, by the end of August Pastor had developed a 
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deep skepticism regarding the State Department’s decision-making approach, 
particularly regarding the question of consistency in the application of the human 
rights policy.  “Decisions are beginning to be made in a haphazard, uncoordinated 
manner,” he warned Brzezinski on August 31.67
Pastor was particularly concerned by Warren Christopher’s approval of the 
Boeing helicopters to the Argentine Army less than a month after the Allis-Chalmers 
Exim denial.  Without a coherent strategy, he maintained, the human rights policy 
would be misunderstood domestically and lack leverage abroad; specifically, when 
U.S. business leaders learned that the Carter Administration had approved the sale, 
“the President and our policy will look foolishly inconsistent.”
 
68  By the time the State 
Department approved the FMS pipeline and training slots, Pastor’s frustration was 
manifest.  “This is just the latest set of decisions in a disastrous policy,” he wrote 
Brzezinski on September 25.  “We are exactly back where we hoped we wouldn’t be: 
dribbling out decisions rather than agreeing to a strategy.”69
The flurry of transfer approvals, however, signified more than mere 
inconsistency.  In subsequent months, the Carter Administration’s efforts to rebuild 
relations with the U.S. business community resulted in a dramatic increase in U.S. 
transfers to Argentina.  As a result, despite the moratorium on security transfers, U.S. 
trade and investment soared, with U.S. exports to the South American nation topping 
$1.7 billion in 1979, a 140 percent increase over the previous year.
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Argentina’s debt to international private banks—with U.S. firms leading the pack—
grew from $4.139 billion to $9.074 billion during the same period.71
The Carter Administration’s effort to accommodate the U.S. business 
community hamstrung Patricia Derian’s ongoing struggle to maintain pressure on the 
Argentine military junta.   In fact, although the number of kidnappings and killings by 
state security forces declined precipitously in 1979, the human rights situation in 
Argentina remained dire.  First, the infrastructure for dirty war violence was largely 
intact, and the threat of state-sanctioned violence against perceived “intellectual 
subversion” remained high.  As General Omar Rubens Graffigna, recently-installed 
Commander of the Air Force and a member of the ruling junta declared in September, 
“the war continues.  The enemy will change his tactics and terrain.  He will appear to 
be in retreat … only to reappear in the most remote places, in classrooms, universities 
[and] in all the areas of the nation’s life that can be used as a base.”
     
72
Second, despite significant preparations for the IAHRC visit, throughout 1979 
the Argentine military junta categorically refused to provide an accounting of the 
untold thousands of desaparecidos.  They were “absent forever” (los ausentes para 
siempre”), General Roberto Viola asserted in an Army Day address in May.
 
73  Four 
months later, the military junta approved Law 22.068, effectively insulating the 
military from judicial investigations regarding desaparecidos by mandating that 
anyone who disappeared between November 1974 and September 1979 could be 
declared legally dead.74
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Jorge Videla dismissed the issue as beyond the government’s control.  Nothing could 
be done for the desparecidos, Videla contended in late 1979, since they were “neither 
dead nor alive.”75
Such denials were undermined, however, by a growing body of evidence 
regarding the web of clandestine military detention centers.  After an official visit to 
Buenos Aires in April, Patrick Flood, HA’s desk officer for Latin America, returned to 
Washington certain that hundreds, if not thousands, of Argentines were being held in 
what he described as the “Gaucho archipelago.”  “The evidence of secret 
interrogation/transit and prison facilities is too strong to be put down to wishful 
thinking by families of the disappeared,” he wrote Patricia Derian.  “There are too 
many first-hand accounts, too many cross-references and corroborating testimonies, 
too many verifiable details to deny the existence of these facilities.”
   
76  Estimates of the 
number of detainees held at such sites varied considerably (in fact, by mid-1979, most 
clandestine prisoners had been killed); strong evidence did indicate, however, that at 
least partial records of the prisoners who had passed through clandestine centers 
existed.77  The U.S. Embassy reported in July, for example, that the Argentine 
Minister of Interior had allegedly confided to a diplomatic colleague, “we know who 
is dead, but saying this to anyone is impossible.  So many officers […] simply must be 
protected against reprisals at some future date.”78
Finally, beginning in 1979 the Argentine military junta began actively 
exporting dirty war tactics to assist in the stabilization of embattled right-wing regimes 
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in Central America.  Following the overthrow of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio 
Somoza Debayle by the left-wing Sandinista revolutionaries in July 1979, Argentine 
military leaders sent advisors to oversee the mobilization and training of counter-
revolutionary forces in Honduras.   During the same period, Argentine military 
interrogation and intelligence analysis experts were dispatched to El Salvador to assist 
the fiercely anti-communist regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero fend off a 
growing leftist insurgency, and the following year, an Argentine counterinsurgency 
training team began operating in Guatemala.  By assuming a leadership role in what 
historian Ariel Armony describes as a “transnational counterrevolutionary network,” 
the Argentine military thus actively sought to extend the practice of systematic 
kidnapping, torture, and clandestine murder throughout the region.79
The grim human rights situation in Argentina notwithstanding, the Carter 
Administration’s effort to rebuild relations with the U.S. business community over the 
course of 1979 edged human rights into the background of U.S.-Argentine relations.  
In January, despite news that nearly 40 mutilated corpses had recently washed onto 
Argentina’s South Atlantic coastline, Derian’s recommendation that the U.S. tighten 
restrictions on commercial sales and deny Exim bank financing for Argentina was 
ignored by Secretary Vance.
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  Instead, for human rights advocates closely attuned to 
developments in U.S.-Argentine relations, the Carter Administration appeared to be 
listening more closely to U.S. business leaders such as Chase Manhattan Bank 
Chairman David Rockefeller, who, in a February address dismissed efforts to link U.S. 
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counterproductive.”81  Indeed, by mid-May, non-governmental human rights leaders 
were openly complaining that the policy was being quietly shelved.  “Their impression 
is that the President ‘put his hand in the fire’, got burned, and at present is backing 
away now that he ‘understands the realities,’” wrote HA staff member Roberta 
Cohen.82
  
 
 Accelerating the Carter Administration’s shift away from human rights as a 
top-policy priority was a resurgence of Cold War tension between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, and the rising influence of Carter’s hawkish National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.  In what U.S. policymakers feared was an expanded 
version of Cuba’s successful military intervention in Angola during the Ford 
Administration, by early summer 1978 the Soviets had delivered approximately $1 
billion in weapons to assist the pro-Soviet regime in Ethiopia fend off an attack by 
Somalia.  Moreover, in what historian Odd Arne Westad describes as the most 
significant non-European Soviet military operation since the Korean War, Moscow 
deployed more than 11,000 Cuban and 6,000 Soviet military personnel in Ethiopia to 
assist in the defense of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s fledgling Marxist-Leninist regime.83
 United States policymakers’ anxiety regarding the apparent surge of Soviet 
adventurism in the Horn of Africa was heightened by the implosion of longstanding 
U.S. client regimes in Iran and Nicaragua.  Installed by a U.S.-led coup in 1953, 
Iranian Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s rampant corruption, repressive internal 
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security apparatus, and abortive modernization efforts had engendered near-total 
opposition among the Iranian people by the late 1970s.84  As popular unrest intensified 
and the influence of radical exiled cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini deepened, the 
Carter Administration was forced to contemplate the possibility of a political vacuum 
in a leading oil producing nation with a 1,500-mile border with the Soviet Union.  
Although recognizing the indigenous origins of the crisis, the prospect of the Shah’s 
overthrow was nonetheless daunting; as Brzezinski wrote Carter in late 1978, “The 
disintegration of Iran would be the most massive American defeat since the beginning 
of the Cold War, overshadowing in its real consequences the setback in Vietnam.”85
 Corresponding with the Iranian crisis, Nicaragua descended into civil war over 
the course of 1978, with the widespread brutality of the Somoza regime’s security 
forces pushing thousands of ordinary Nicaraguans into the ranks of the left-wing 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) revolutionaries.  The assassination 
of moderate opposition leader Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in January brought the full 
extent of Nicaraguan instability to the Carter administration’s attention: thirty 
thousand Nicaraguans took to the streets in protest, and a subsequent general strike 
achieved a fifty percent closure in the capital and eighty percent in most provincial 
cities.
  
86
                                                 
84 On Iran, see David Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter 
with Radical Islam (2004); Steven Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of 
Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2003); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: 
The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2008), 193-228. 
  By the time tepid U.S. efforts to orchestrate a moderate political transition 
85 Quoted in Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 301. 
86 Central Intelligence Agency, Secret, January 20, 1978, Subject: “Assassination of Pedro Chamorro, 
the Somoza Regime's Most Prominent Domestic Critic, Discussed,” DDRS, Document Number: 
CK3100250749 (accessed August 28, 2005). 
306 
 
broke down 12 months later, the first successful leftist insurgency in the hemisphere 
since the Cuban Revolution in 1959 was imminent.87
 In the face of aggressive Soviet initiatives in Africa and the deepening crises in 
Iran and Nicaragua, Jimmy Carter increasingly shifted toward the more traditional 
U.S. Cold War posture advocated by Zbigniew Brzezinski.  In January 1978, Carter 
recommended 3 percent increases in defense spending for all North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) members, and he approved the expanded use of theatre nuclear 
weapons by NATO-members four months later.
   
88  Underscoring the deepening chill in 
U.S.-Soviet relations, in a widely-publicized address at Wake Forest University in 
mid-May, Carter asserted that the Administration had completed a “major 
reassessment” in response to an “ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet Union 
to use its military power—to intervene in local conflicts, with advisers, with 
equipment, and with full logistical support and encouragement for mercenaries from 
other Communist countries[.]”89 
 More significantly, in March 1978 Carter approved Brzezinski’s proposal to 
visit China, paving the way for normalization of relations between the two countries at 
the end of the year.  The trip’s timing was an unmistakable indication of U.S. 
preoccupation with Soviet assertiveness in foreign affairs; as Brzezinski informed the 
President in April, “We have failed to use the China card against the Soviets.”90
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(a concession denied to the Soviet Union) and initiated an intelligence sharing 
program with the Chinese military.91
 Brzezinski’s influence on Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy increased in 1979 as 
the Administration struggled to respond to the deepening crises in the Middle East and 
Central America, along with increasing Soviet interventionism in Central Asia.  
Following the Shah’s humiliating departure, in February the Ayatollah Khomeini 
returned to Iran in triumph, presenting U.S. policymakers with a successor regime 
whose political orientation centered on a visceral anti-Americanism.  Six months later, 
as tens of thousands of ecstatic Nicaraguans crowded the central plaza of the largely-
destroyed capital to celebrate the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, U.S. 
intelligence analysts warned that the political sea-change could lead to revolutionary 
upheaval throughout the region; “a key U.S. security interest,” the NSC’s Robert 
Pastor later wrote, “was to try to prevent the FSLN from pouring gasoline on its 
increasingly combustible neighbors.”
   
92
With U.S. power in the international sphere facing unprecedented challenges, 
Brzezinski repeatedly pushed Carter to adopt a hard line in U.S.-Soviet relations.  In 
the effort to orchestrate a hard-nosed U.S. response to global turmoil, the National 
Security Advisor, writes historian Melvyn P. Leffler, was “unrelenting.”
  Finally, reports of deepening Soviet support 
for the recently-installed Marxist-Leninist government in Afghanistan further 
accentuated the Carter Administration’s fear that the Soviet Union was engaged in a 
concerted effort to foster Third World revolutionary unrest.   
93
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in September.  “I believe that both for international reasons as well as for domestic 
political reasons you ought to deliberately toughen both the tone and the substance of 
our foreign policy.”94 Carter agreed; U.S. defense spending for fiscal year 1979 
increased by 10 percent, and in June Carter announced the development of the MX 
nuclear missile.95  The following month, plans for removing U.S. troops from South 
Korean were indefinitely postponed, and Carter’s initial promises to restore U.S. 
diplomatic relations with Vietnam and Cuba were quietly shelved.96  More 
significantly, at Brzezinski’s request, in July the President authorized the Central 
Intelligence Agency to begin supplying covert non-lethal support to Afghan 
insurgents.97
 
   
The ascendance of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s hard-line approach to foreign affairs 
corresponded with a marked decline in the Carter Administration’s emphasis on 
promoting human rights overseas.  From the outset of his tenure as National Security 
Advisor, Brzezinski’s support for the human rights policy had been contingent on 
whether he perceived it to be enhancing U.S. power abroad.  Accordingly, “when a 
choice between the two had to be made, between projecting U.S. power or enhancing 
human rights […] I felt that power had to come first,” Brzezinski later wrote in his 
memoirs.  “Without credible American power, we would simply not be able either to 
protect our interests or to advance more humane goals.”98
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Brzezinski, historian Gaddis Smith writes, “power was the goal and morality was an 
instrument to be used when appropriate, abandoned when not.”99
By mid-1978, Brzezinski’s support for the active promotion of human rights 
had been largely supplanted by traditional Cold War policy prescriptions.  On the one 
hand, in the face of rising Cold War tensions and a spate of Third World revolutions, 
Brzezinski was concerned that the human rights policy was “in danger of becoming 
one-sidedly anti-rightist.”
  
100  On the other hand, Brzezinski’s shift away from human 
rights was indicative of broader trend among the U.S. electorate.  In a national poll 
conducted in late 1978, only 14 percent of respondents felt the United States was 
stronger than the Soviet Union, compared to 40 percent who emphasizing Soviet 
strength.101  Although Carter’s human rights policy remained popular, rising Cold War 
anxiety was clearly evident in the congressional election of November 1978, which 
resulted in a string of defeats for outspoken supporters of human rights, including 
Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN).102  Arguably the most influential human 
rights advocate on Capitol Hill, Fraser’s defeat not only silenced his own consistent 
support of human rights, but also closed off one of the primary channels for non-
governmental human rights advocacy.103
By the end of the 1978, Brzezinski’s ability to frame foreign policy issues 
according to his own prescriptions through tight control over the NSC staff and direct 
access to President had spearheaded a widely-recognized policy shift to a more 
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traditional Cold War posture at the expense of human rights.  Indeed, in an article 
entitled “Is Carter Abandoning his Policy on Human Rights?” a reporter for U.S. News 
and World Report bluntly asked Patricia Derian if “political and economic realities” in 
nations such as Iran, Nicaragua, and Argentina, were “forcing the administration to 
switch to a less vigorous and public approach to human rights.”104
Derian demurred.  In private, however, the Human Rights Bureau Chief was 
highly critical of the Carter Administration’s flagging support for human rights.  
Although the Carter team had “done more in human rights than any other 
administration and have some positive results to show for the policy,” Derian wrote 
Secretary Vance the following October, “we have done less than we could or should 
have.”  Derian continued: 
   
 
Our policy is erratic and confusing.  We send a mixed message; in the past we 
sent a consistent one, (e.g. it’s business as usual), so a mixed message is an 
improvement.  But we should be striving for a consistent message
 
.  We could 
achieve that goal.   
Nonetheless, in an unmistakable indication of her increasing pessimism, Derian 
concluded, “I don’t see the will to do it or to do more than coast along.”105
In particular, Derian blamed Brzezinski for the drop-off in support for human 
rights.  The NSC, Derian asserted in an internal memorandum to Secretary Vance, was 
“frequently an obstacle.”  Underscoring Brzezinski’s control over information that 
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reached Carter, Derian maintained that, “it does not serve the President to present him 
papers so sanitized that there are no real choices in the human rights field.”106  
Brzezinski, Derian concluded in a subsequent memo, “talks beautifully on the topic, 
but there’s no follow through.”107  Similarly, by mid-1979, non-governmental human 
rights organizations were openly complaining of an “absence of anyone in the White 
House or National Security Council strongly supportive of human rights[.]”108
The increasingly cold reception Derian’s human rights initiatives received at 
the White House quickly translated into deepening resistance to the Human Rights 
Bureau from the State Department geographic and functional bureaus.  Indeed, there 
was a “widespread perception” in the State Department that “the emphasis given 
earlier to human rights has gradually taken a backseat in Administration concerns to 
security factors, and therefore that neither human rights considerations nor HA need 
be given as much attention as formerly,” Paul Kreisberg informed Warren Christopher 
in October 1979.   Not only were career Foreign Service Officers paying less attention 
to the human rights issues, Kreisberg asserted, but the apparent drop-off in Executive 
support for Derian “may have increased the sense of an adversarial relationship 
between HA and the rest of the Department on both sides of the issues.”
   
109
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Combined with the Carter Administration’s emphasis on increasing U.S. 
exports, the President’s shift away from human rights was particularly significant for 
U.S. policy toward Argentina, and by mid-1979, Derian’s relentlessly harsh criticism 
of the Argentine military junta—such as a blistering May address at Florida 
International University—sounded increasingly out-of-step with White House 
policy.110  In fact, relations between Derian and Brzezinski had deteriorated to the 
point of obstructing the normal flow of information regarding the South American 
nation; when Derian forwarded a copy of the recently published report on human 
rights violations in Argentina by the Lawyers Committee for International Human 
Rights, NSC staff member Thomas Thornton wrote Brzezinski, “I gather that there is a 
considerable amount of history to your relations with Ms. Derian on the subject of 
Argentina and don’t have any idea of how you want this handled.”  Underscoring the 
NSC’s limited receptivity—and notwithstanding the unimpeachable credentials of the 
Lawyers Committee—Thornton dismissed the 70-page report, informing Brzezinski, 
“Frankly, I haven’t mustered the courage to read it yet.”111  By the end of the year, the 
declining visibility of the Carter Administration’s human rights policy toward 
Argentina was clearly evident.  As Juan de Onís perceptively reported in the New York 
Times in early December, “the Carter Administration continues to press for respect for 
human rights in Argentina, but the strident tone has disappeared.”112
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 The momentum toward rapprochement between Washington and Buenos Aires 
accelerated dramatically following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 
December 1979.  Already struggling to find a diplomatic solution to the November 4 
takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Jimmy Carter responded to the Afghanistan 
crisis with alacrity.  The invasion, Carter told NBC-TV’s Meet the Press on January 
20, 1980, was “the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War.”113  In 
his State of the Union Address three days later, Carter presented himself as a tough-
minded Cold Warrior by laying out an updated version of containment doctrine that 
media pundits quickly dubbed the “Carter Doctrine.”  “An attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region” the President gravely intoned, “will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and 
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”114  
To further demonstrate U.S. resolve, Carter enacted a series of punitive sanctions 
against the Soviet Union, including revoking the Soviet national airline’s landing 
rights in the United States, restricting U.S. high-technology transfers to the Soviet 
Union, restricting Soviet fishing rights in U.S. waters, and, most significantly, 
curtailing the 17 million metric tons of U.S. grain earmarked for export to the Soviet 
Union.115
 As one of the world’s leading producers of grain, Argentina’s geostrategic 
significance for the United States surged following Carter’s enactment of the grain 
embargo.  Ironically, according to Brzezinski, when the decision to enact the embargo 
was taken on January 4, no one in the Administration had seriously considered 
 
                                                 
113 John L. Moore, ed., President Carter, 1979, Congressional Quarterly (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980), 41. 
114 Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980, accessed online (September 23, 2009) 
at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml. 
115 Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New 
York: Cambridge, 1999), 74-75. 
314 
 
Argentina’s ability to step into the void, leading to a subsequent “acrimonious” 
internal debate.116   It was a significant oversight; in 1979, the Soviet Union had 
purchased 19 percent of its grain needs in Argentina, and with the export capacity of 
the upcoming harvest estimated at 12 million metric tons, the South American nation 
suddenly emerged as a key player in U.S. Cold War policymaking.117
 Having belatedly recognized Argentina’s potential for offsetting the U.S. 
embargo, the Carter Administration quickly moved to accelerate rapprochement with 
the military junta.  On January 25, General Andrew J. Goodpaster was dispatched to 
Buenos Aires to discuss the grain issue as the Carter’s special emissary.  The former 
Supreme Commander of NATO, Goodpaster’s  brief—to “exchange views on the full 
range of U.S.-Argentine relations, including Argentina’s role in Western security, 
human rights, technical cooperation, and bilateral consultations”—was an 
unmistakable indication that human rights had ceased to hold a virtual monopoly on 
U.S.-Argentine relations.
   
118  In addition to a personal letter from Carter to Videla 
thanking the Argentine leader for his “cordial reception of General Goodpaster” and 
encouraging Argentine participation in the Olympic boycott, subsequent high-level 
diplomatic U.S. visits to Argentina further demonstrated the Carter Administration’s 
downgrading of the human rights issue.119
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mid-March, Gerard C. Smith, Carter’s head negotiator on nuclear disarmament, 
arrived to discuss Argentina’s plans to construct the nation’s third nuclear reactor.120
Widely perceived in Buenos Aires as a “U.S. courtship” after four years of 
tension regarding the human rights issue, Argentine military leaders relished 
Washington’s unexpectedly conciliatory tone.  Argentina, Videla told reporters at the 
end of January, “had never been in a stronger position in its relations with the U.S.”
   
121  
Similarly, in March the U.S. Embassy reported that the Argentine military junta was 
savoring the “spirit of Goodpaster.”  The regime, the Embassy concluded, “no longer 
feels itself under global siege as a human rights pariah, [and] has faced the prospect of 
better Argentine-U.S. relations with a combination of hope and rising self-
confidence.”122
The Carter Administration’s effort to improve U.S.-Argentine relations 
culminated in Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting on May 14.  With the explicit 
intent to “counteract alleged Soviet influence,” the PRC recommended that the 
Administration normalize U.S.-Argentine relations.
   
123
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high-level U.S. military visit to Argentina.124  Significantly, underscoring the extent to 
which Carter had moved away from the human rights issue, the President not only 
concurred with the PRC’s proposal, but noted that he was “inclined to move faster” 
than the Committee had recommended.125
At the Human Rights Bureau, the PRC decision came as a shock to Patricia 
Derian.  In fact, in a remarkable display of Administrative disregard for the Human 
Rights Assistant Secretary, Derian was on a vacation in Maine with her husband 
Hodding Carter III when the PRC meeting transpired.
   
126  Apprised of the event upon 
her return to Washington, Derian attacked the decision with characteristic fervor, 
situating herself at the center of an “intense controversy” as veteran journalist Josh 
Goshko subsequently reported in the New York Times, between “officials who see the 
policy shift as a retreat from the administration’s international advocate of human 
rights and those whose primary concern is to deter what they see as a Soviet bid for 
greater influence with the third largest country of Latin America.”127
 
  For human 
rights supporters, however, it was a rearguard struggle; although Derian’s public threat 
to resign over the proposed normalization demonstrated an ongoing commitment to 
promoting human rights in U.S.-Argentine relations, it was also an unmistakable 
indication of the Assistant Secretary’s declining influence in the Carter 
Administration.   
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Derian did not resign.  Instead, less than two months after the PRC meeting, 
the U.S. normalization initiative ground to a halt following the Argentine military 
junta’s participation in the Bolivian military’s July coup d’état.  Revealing Argentine 
military leaders’ continued adherence to a national security doctrine situating 
Argentina on the front lines of the “Third World War” against global communism, the 
junta not only assisted in planning the coup—“The Argentine military did everything 
but tell Gen. García Meza the day to pull it off,” a U.S. military advisor confided to 
journalist Ray Bonner—but more than 200 Argentine military personnel were 
estimated to have actively participated in the takeover.128  And although the Carter 
Administration delivered a clear show of disapproval by cancelling all military and 
economic aid to Bolivia and recalling the Ambassador, in subsequent months 
Argentina continued to raise U.S. policymakers’ ire by actively exporting dirty war 
tactics to the Andean nation via the Bolivian Ministry of Interior.129  Combined with 
the military junta’s unwillingness to support the U.S. grain embargo, Argentina’s 
adventurism in Bolivia effectively halted the momentum toward normalization with 
the United States.  As Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie wrote to Carter in mid-
October, “it would be inappropriate to proceed this year with some of the steps earlier 
contemplated.”130
 If the Bolivian coup d’état sent a chill through U.S.-Argentine relations, the 
Carter’s human rights policy would nonetheless remain in the background for the 
remainder of the Administration’s tenure.  Preoccupied by the ongoing hostage crisis 
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in Iran, the newly-installed revolutionary government in Nicaragua, and the 100,000 
Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan, in the fall of 1980 the Carter Administration 
resigned itself to maintaining a holding pattern in regard to U.S.-Argentine relations, 
an approach that continued following Carter’s decisive defeat to Ronald Reagan in the 
November 1980 presidential election.  “To the extent that we have cards to play, let’s 
leave them for the next administration, who might get something in return for them,” 
National Security Council member Thomas Thornton advised shortly after the 
election.  “The Carter Administration certainly won’t.”131
Two months later, nearly 100 human rights advocates gathered at the Rayburn 
Office Building for a luncheon to honor Patricia Derian, whose tenure as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was drawing to a close.   
The atmosphere was grim; a staunch Cold Warrior, Reagan’s vituperative criticism of 
the Carter Administration’s human rights sanctions against right-wing U.S. allies led 
many advocates to predict the incoming President would dismantle the entire Human 
Rights Bureau.  “This is my graveside suit,” a somberly-attired Lawrence Birns of the 
Council on Hemispheric Affairs told a reporter.  “I’ve been wearing it a lot these 
days.”
  
132
In fact, as U.S. policy toward Argentina made clear, the political tide had 
turned against the human rights movement long before Reagan’s sweeping election 
victory in November.  In the aftermath of the Carter Administration’s July 1978 
decision to make Export-Import (Exim) Bank approval of the $270 million Allis-
Chalmers sale of a hydro-electric turbine factory to Argentina contingent on the 
junta’s invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, fierce resistance 
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from the U.S. business community, coupled with top U.S. policymakers’ focus on 
stimulating the economy dramatically constrained the State Department’s use of 
economic leverage to promote human rights overseas.  Correspondingly, the 
resurgence of Cold War tension in the second-half of the Carter Administration, 
combined with Zbigniew Brzezinski’s hard-headed approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, 
had precipitated Jimmy Carter’s embrace of a more-traditional U.S. Cold War policy, 
relegating human rights to the back burner as a U.S. policy priority.   
Throughout, Patricia Derian had kept up the struggle to institutionalize human 
rights in U.S. foreign policy, and at the January luncheon in her honor, one human 
rights advocate after another offered heartfelt praise.  When one individual waxed 
poetic, describing the Assistant Secretary as “tilting against gray flannel windmills,” 
Derian responded with characteristic irony.  “Well, here I am in my gray flannel suit,” 
she told the assembled gathering.  “Actually,” Derian continued after a moment’s 
pause, “I always had a gray flannel suit.  It’s good camouflage.”133
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Conclusion 
 
 In the opening months of Ronald Reagan’s tenure in the White House, human 
rights advocates’ fear that the new Administration would systematically uproot the 
hard-won advances to institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy appeared to 
be born out.  Reagan’s visceral anti-communism and determination to reverse 
perceived Soviet advances harkened back to the uncompromising rhetoric of the early 
Cold War—capturing the strident tone that would guide Reagan’s foreign policy 
approach, an influential 1980 monograph by the right-wing Committee of Santa Fe 
asserted that “Containment of the Soviet Union is not enough.  Détente is dead.”1  
Determined to stem the spread of communism in the Developing World, the 
Administration exacerbated local conflicts, particularly in Central America, where 
Sandinista revolutionaries had consolidated political power in Nicaragua and a leftist 
guerrilla threat in neighboring El Salvador was gaining strength.  “The Caribbean is 
rapidly becoming a Communist lake in what should be an American pond” Reagan 
declared at the outset of his tenure, “and the United States resembles a giant, afraid to 
move.”2
 Corresponding with its aggressive posture in the international arena, the 
Reagan Administration set out to dramatically downgrade the promotion of human 
rights as a U.S. foreign policy goal.  During the electoral campaign, the Reagan team 
had sharply criticized Jimmy Carter’s perceived inability to differentiate between 
“traditional authoritarian governments” and the totalitarianism of “revolutionary 
autocracies,” resulting in U.S. destabilization of right-wing allies in an era of 
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deepening Cold War tension.  As Reagan advisor Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote in an 
influential article in Commentary:  
 
In the thirty-odd months since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President 
there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military build-up, matched by the 
stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet 
influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the 
Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas.  The 
U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in 
the Third World.3
 
 
Concurring with Kirkpatrick’s assessment, in early 1981 Reagan nominated Ernest 
Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.  
A conservative political theorist and founder of a right-wing think tank, Lefever had 
openly encouraged dismantling the Bureau during the 1980 presidential campaign.4
The Reagan Administration’s repudiation of Jimmy Carter’s human rights 
policy was particularly evident in U.S.-Argentine relations.  Echoing Kirkpatrick, 
during the presidential campaign Reagan had sharply criticized the Carter 
Administration’s opprobrium toward the Argentine military junta.  “There is an old 
Indian proverb: Before I criticize a man, may I walk a mile in his moccasins,” Reagan 
declared in a late-1978 radio broadcast.  “Patricia Derian and her minions at Mr. 
Carter’s human rights office apparently never heard of it.  If they had, they might not 
be making such a mess of our relations with this planet’s seventh largest country, 
   
                                                 
3 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary, November 1979, 34.   
4 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 1989), 121. 
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Argentina, a nation with which we should be close friends.”5  Under Reagan, the 
candidate’s foreign policy team made clear, human rights would be conducted through 
“quiet diplomacy”; as advisor Roger Fontaine asserted in a forum on U.S. policy 
toward the Southern Cone in June 1980, “The general belief is that you get more 
political mileage conducting things in private.”6
The Reagan team was more direct in its initial communications with Argentine 
military regime.  Carter’s human-rights policy has had “disastrous effects on our 
relations with Latin America,” retired U.S. Army General and Reagan advisor Daniel 
Graham told Argentine officials in late June.  Reagan, he promised, “will abandon the 
policy of throwing our old friends to the wolves to get along with Peking and 
Moscow.”
   
7  Such favor was not lost on the Argentine military.  In August, for 
example, a reliable source informed the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires that Minister 
of Interior General Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy believed Reagan would “applaud 
the Argentine government tactics in the ‘dirty war’ and encourage such tactics in 
Argentina and elsewhere.”8
The Interior Minister’s prediction proved prescient.  Two months after entering 
the Oval Office, the Reagan Administration announced plans to convince 
congressional legislators to lift the ban on military sales to Argentina, and in July the 
Administration ended the Carter Administration’s policy of voting against 
International Finance Institution loans to Argentina on human rights grounds.
   
9
                                                 
5 Quoted in Richard Cohen, “Principles,” Washington Post, May 25, 1982, pg. C1. 
  
6 Roger Fontaine, Transcript of Presentation for “Presidential Candidates Forum Series: U.S. Policy 
Toward Latin America,” organized by the Center for Inter-American Relations, June 25, 1980, Box 
110, Folder: Latin America: 1980, ILHR Records, New York Public Library, Rare Books and 
Manuscript Division. 
7 Bill Roeder, “Reagan’s Man in Argentina,” Newsweek, June 30, 1980, pg. 15. 
8 Department of State Memorandum, Townsend B. Friedman, August 21, 1980, Subject: “Human 
Rights” (Argentina Project). 
9 Iain Guest, Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United 
Nations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 276; Caleb Rossiter, "Human Rights: 
The Carter Record, the Reagan Reaction," in International Policy Report (September 1984), 23. 
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Moreover, in an unmistakable show of presidential favor, General Viola was invited 
on an official visit to Washington in mid-March.  Underscoring the buoyant mood 
among military leaders in Buenos Aires following Reagan’s victory, in a press 
conference during the visit, Viola dismissed the possibility of an inquiry regarding the 
whereabouts of the thousands of Argentine desaparecidos.  “I think you are suggesting 
that we investigate the Security Forces—that is absolutely out of the question,” he 
asserted.  “This is a war and we are the winners.  You can be certain that in the last 
war if the armies of the Reich had won, the war crimes trials would have taken place 
in Virginia, not in Nuremberg.”10  Illuminating the extremism at the heart of the 
Argentine military’s national security doctrine, Viola’s statement nonetheless came as 
a shock to even close observers of the Argentine dictatorship.  As the Buenos Aires 
Herald subsequently pointed out, “Viola after all is supposed to be a moderate, and if 
the moderates think the only thing the Nazis did wrong is to lose, the normal mind will 
find it hard to imagine what the view of the hardliners must be.”11
It was not an issue that troubled the Reagan Administration.  Indeed, the 
fanatical anticommunism that underlay the Argentine dirty war dovetailed nicely with 
the Reagan team’s plan to orchestrate a “low-intensity” conflict with Nicaragua’s 
recently-installed revolutionary government.  Aware that since mid-1979 the 
Argentine military had been quietly exporting dirty war tactics through 
counterrevolutionary training programs in Nicaragua and El Salvador, in early 1981 
the Reagan Administration invited Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Leopoldo 
Galtieri to Washington and secretly agreed to provide a stepped-up Argentine advisory 
 
                                                 
10 Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, 1st American ed. 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1986), 445. 
11 Quoted in Guest, Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the 
United Nations, 277. 
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program with military aid and financial support.12  The details of the agreement were 
finalized by former Deputy CIA Director Vernon Walters—whose harsh criticism of 
the Carter Administration’s human rights policy was well known in Argentine military 
circles—during a quiet visit to Buenos Aires in May.13  As one U.S. official later 
asserted, “it was convenient to run the operation through the Argentines.  We didn’t 
have to ask questions about their goals that we couldn’t escape asking about our own 
goals when we took over.”14
 
   
If the Reagan Administration’s opening moves—particularly in regard to U.S.-
Argentine relations—seemed to confirm human rights advocates’ worst fears, the 
Administration’s subsequent setbacks revealed the human rights movement’s 
resilience, and underscored the rationale—if not the success—behind the Patricia 
Derian’s opprobrium toward Argentine military.  In May, the White House 
encountered unexpectedly stiff congressional resistance to Ernest Lefever’s 
nomination as Human Rights Assistant Secretary, a development influenced in no 
small degree by the attendance at the hearings of Argentine journalist Jacobo 
Timerman.  The founder of the influential Argentine daily La Opinión, Timerman had 
discussed U.S.-Argentine relations with Derian in a private meeting on her first visit to 
Argentina in March 1977.15  Less than a month later, Timerman was abducted by state 
security personnel and deposited in a clandestine detention center, where he endured 
torture and extreme privation.16
                                                 
12 See Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central 
America, 1977-1984 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997). 
   
13 William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 116. 
14 Quoted in Ibid, 292.  
15 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, March 31, 1977, ADP. 
16 Jacobo Timerman, Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1981), 22, 33. 
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News of the kidnapping quickly reached the State Department, and in 
subsequent months Derian spearheaded efforts to secure Timerman’s release.  By the 
time military leaders transferred Timerman from clandestine detention to house arrest 
in October 1977 he had become an international symbol of Argentine political 
repression, and in subsequent months, Timerman’s imprisonment was repeatedly 
raised by top-U.S. policymakers, the United States Embassy in Buenos Aires, human 
rights advocates in the U.S. Congress, and non-governmental human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International.17  Derian’s own advocacy was 
particularly significant—on one occasion, the Assistant Secretary was so adamant to 
Harguindeguy regarding the case that after the meeting concluded the Interior Minister 
personally summoned Timerman to his office and demanded to know if he and Derian 
were related.18  Underscoring the depth of U.S. human rights efforts on Timerman’s 
behalf, when the journalist was finally expelled from Argentina in September 1979 
after 29 months in captivity, Jimmy Carter sent a personal letter of congratulations.19
Two years later, Timerman’s attendance as a spectator at the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee hearings on the Lefever nomination galvanized human rights 
advocates’ effort to derail the confirmation.  With the English-translation of his 
extraordinary memoir Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number newly-
 
                                                 
17 Following Timerman’s abduction, Drinan declared, “It is evident that the Argentine Government is 
cracking down viciously on the few remaining independent journalists.  All those who respect the 
freedom of the press ad the fundamental human rights of the individual must protest the arrest of Mr. 
Timerman and other journalists.  By their recent actions, Argentina’s military leaders have 
demonstrated once again that they merit condemnation by all civilized men and nations.”   Robert F. 
Drinan, “Argentina’s Military Junta Arrests Leading Independent Journalist,” Congressional Record, 
April 19, 1977, pg. E 2266.  See also, Robert F. Drinan, Congressional Record, June 21, 1979, pg. H 
4934; and Robert F. Drinan, “The Release of Yacobo Timerman,” [sic] Congressional Record, 
September 26, 1979, pg. E4771. 
18 State Department Telegram, Buenos Aires 6137, U.S. Embassy (Chaplin) to Secretary of State 
(Vance), August 19, 1977, Subject: “Interior Minister Sees Jacobo Timerman; Congressman Gilman 
also to be Permitted Interview with Timerman,” ADP.  
19 White House Official Correspondence, Jimmy Carter to Jacobo Timerman, November 5, 1979, Box: 
4, folder: Argentina, 1/79-1/80, Office of the National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 
Country Files, 1977-1981, JCL.   
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released in the United States, during the hearings Timerman was asked to stand by 
Committee Chairman Charles H. Percy (R-IL) to be acknowledged for his efforts on 
behalf of human rights.  The audience, journalist Josh Goshko reported in the 
Washington Post, “burst into a thunderous applause.”  More significantly, although 
Timerman did not officially testify, during an informal press conference following the 
day’s hearings, he offered strong praise for the Carter Administration’s human rights 
policy.  “I know positively how many lives were saved because Patt Derian was 
making a great scandal.  She was always outspoken.  There is no other way,” 
Timerman asserted.  Quiet diplomacy, he concluded, “is surrender.”20  The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee agreed; feeling as though “they were choosing between 
Timerman and Lefever in casting their votes on the latter’s confirmation,” in the 
words of Human Rights Watch founder Aryeh Neier, a majority of the Committee 
members voted against confirmation.21
The Lefever fiasco forced the Reagan Administration to reevaluate its 
approach to human rights.  Indeed, by the fall of 1980, the President had eschewed the 
harsh criticism of human rights in U.S. foreign policy that had characterized the 
electoral campaign.  Instead, taking a page from congressional Cold Warriors’ use of 
human rights in the early 1970s as a weapon to batter the communist world, the 
Reagan team initiated a concerted effort to fold the human rights policy into the 
Administration’s over-arching Cold War objectives—an approach clearly evident in 
Reagan’s decision to nominate Elliott Abrams for the Human Rights Assistant 
Secretary position.  A former aide to Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) and Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), and son-in-law to neoconservative stalwarts 
     
                                                 
20 John M. Goshko, “Argentinian Visits Lefever Hearing, Criticizes ‘Quiet Diplomay’ Policy,” 
Washington Post, May 20, 1981, pg. A3.  See also, Richard Cohen, “Shhh! And Pretend You Can’t 
Hear the Screams,” Washington Post, May 21, 1981, pg. C1.   
21 Aryeh Neier, Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights (New York: Public Affairs, 
2003), 179. 
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Norman Podhoretz and Midge Dector, the 33-year-old Abrams was an outspoken 
proponent of U.S. support for “pro-democracy” forces fighting to stave off communist 
advances in the Developing World.22  “To prevent any country from being taken over 
by a Communist regime” Abrams later asserted, “is in our view a very real victory for 
the cause of human rights.”23
With Abrams at the helm, the Reagan Administration’s human rights policy 
would subsequently serve as rhetorical justification for United States military and 
financial aid to repressive right-wing clients in the Developing World, particularly 
Central America, with appalling human and material costs.  Indeed, over the course of 
the decade, more than 300,000 Central Americans were killed by military and 
paramilitary forces supported by the United States, and millions more were displaced.  
United States intervention also had crippling effects on the Central American 
economy; by one estimate, the region suffered $30 billion in economic losses.
 
24  
Significantly, the Reagan Administration adopted the human rights idiom to shield the 
abuses perpetrated by U.S. clients.  According to Reagan, Efraín Ríos Montt, the 
architect of the Guatemalan military’s genocidal campaign in the Western Highlands, 
was “totally committed to democracy.”25  When four U.S. nuns were raped and 
murdered by the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military, Jeane Kirkpatrick disingenuously 
told members of the press, “The nuns were not just nuns.  The nuns were also political 
activists.”26
                                                 
22 George Lardner Jr., “Human Rights Spokesman Reported Chosen,” Washington Post, October 30, 
1981, pg. A12; Ibid, 185. 
  Perhaps most horrifying was Reagan’s description of the Contras—the 
U.S. financed guerrilla army waging an extraordinarily brutal war of attrition against 
23 Quoted in A. Glenn Mower, Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: the Carter and Reagan 
Experiences (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 26.   
24 Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America and the Roots of U.S. Imperialism (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2005), 71; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central 
America, Second ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993), 362-63. 
25 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 188. 
26 Quoted in LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992, 63. 
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Nicaragua’s revolutionary government—as the “moral equivalent of our founding 
fathers.”27
The Administration’s use of the human rights policy to justify U.S. support of 
repressive regimes outraged liberal human rights advocates.  Nonetheless, the 
Administration’s decision to utilize—rather than uproot—the Human Rights Bureau 
had significant long-term ramifications.  In part due to Reagan’s conflation of human 
rights with the export of democracy, and partially as a result of what political scientist 
Clair Apodaca describes as “the bureaucratic tendency toward policy inertia and 
entrenchment,” during the 1980s the fierce bureaucratic opposition to the very concept 
of pursuing human rights in U.S. foreign policy largely dissipated.
 
28  As a result, HA 
increasingly became accepted as a legitimate player in the foreign policymaking 
process, thus enjoying greater access to the flow of information and, in a dramatic 
shift from the late 1970s, a growing reputation as a vehicle for career advancement in 
the Foreign Service.  Correspondingly, human rights reporting—both by members of 
HA and Foreign Service officers charged with reporting on human rights at U.S. 
embassies—underwent a slow professionalization, a process particularly evident in the 
rising quality of the congressionally-mandated Country Reports.29
Over the course of the 1980s, in other words, the Human Rights Bureau 
became increasingly entrenched in the Byzantine web of Washington bureaucracy.  
“You can imagine how difficult it was in the beginning,” recalled George Lister, who 
worked on human rights at the State Department throughout the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations.  Nonetheless, he continued, 
   
 
                                                 
27 Peter Kornbluh, "The U.S. Role in the Counterrevolution," in Revolution and Counterrevolution in 
Nicaragua, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 333. 
28 Clair Apodaca, Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy: A Paradoxical Legacy (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 107. 
29 Ibid, 106-10. 
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[…] I soon discovered this work is like pushups—the more you do, the more 
you can do.  [… W]hen Ronald Reagan became President in 1981, many 
assumed our human rights policy was over and our Bureau would be closed 
down.  But it soon became clear the human rights policy had become 
institutionalized.  There was widespread support in the Congress, and we were 
still required by law to get the annual Human Rights Reports up to Congress 
by January 31 of every year.  So our performance continued to improve, like 
pushups.   
 
Human rights, Lister concluded, had been “injected into the State Department’s 
bloodstream.”30
 
   
If human rights advocates in the United States found some solace in the 
Reagan Administration’s inability to dismantle the State Department Human Rights 
Bureau, the Argentine military junta’s implosion following the disastrous decision in 
1982 to invade the Malvinas/Falkland Islands clearly validated the human rights 
movement’s effort to censure the military dictatorship over the previous seven years.  
With the economy in a shambles—Argentina’s external debt reached $46 billion in 
1983—and facing increasingly assertive demands for an accounting of human rights 
violations, in April 1982 the military junta dispatched an expeditionary force to wrest 
the long-disputed Malvinas islands from the United Kingdom.31
                                                 
30 George Lister, “Human Rights: Our World’s Best Chance,” address at George Washington 
University, February 5, 1998, Box 18, Folder 8, Lister Papers. Lister retired in 1981, but continued to 
work on human rights in the State Department without compensation until 2001.  In 1992, Lister was 
awarded by the government of Chile for his participation in the restoration of Chilean democracy.  Six 
years later Lister was recognized by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung for his assistance during 
Kim’s exile and house arrest.  Although in the second-half of his career Lister had faced repeated 
attempts to oust him from the State Department, in 1997, he was nominated for the Warren Christopher 
Award, for “sustained outstanding achievement on behalf of democracy and human rights.”    
  A desperate effort to 
31 Colin M. MacLachlan, Argentina: What Went Wrong (Westport: Praeger, 2006), 154. 
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garner popular support by playing to Argentines’ nationalist sympathies, the Malvinas 
adventure not only illuminated the military junta’s moral and financial bankruptcy, but 
a remarkable lack of diplomatic aptitude and military prowess—in a predictable 
decision that nonetheless came as a shock to Argentine leaders, the Reagan 
Administration promptly offered material and intelligence assistance to the British 
retaliatory force, which in turn routed the poorly-trained Argentine conscripts 
defending the islands.32
Coupled with the deteriorating economic situation, the defeat eviscerated 
popular support for Argentina’s military leaders.  In the face of deepening divisions 
within the Armed Forces and intense popular outcry led by Argentine human rights 
organizations—100,000 protesters gathered in one rally in December 1982—the 
Argentine military hastily declared a “self-amnesty law” before withdrawing from the 
political stage in favor of national elections in late October 1983.
   
33  The subsequent 
electoral victory of Radical Civic Union party candidate Raúl Alfonsín underscored 
the widespread support the human rights issue enjoyed in Argentina; during the 
campaign, Alfonsín repeatedly called for an investigation into the desaparecidos, and 
pledged to prosecute those responsible for crimes committed during the period of 
military dictatorship.34
                                                 
32 Luis Alberto Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 242-47.  Joseph S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United 
States: A Conflicted Relationship (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 154-56. 
  Accordingly, less than a week after entering office on 
December 10, 1983, the new president announced the creation of a National 
Commission on the Disappeared (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de 
33 Alison Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change, and Democratization 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 58-62; David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish 
Colonization to the Falklands War, Revised ed. (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1985), 385-
87. 
34 Ronald Dworkin, introduction to Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on 
the Disappeared, 2. 
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Personas, CONADEP) to investigate the victims of state-sanctioned violence during 
the Argentine dirty war. 
CONADEP’s subsequent report, Nunca Más (Never Again), was immediately 
recognized as a landmark contribution to the struggle for human rights in Argentina.  
Chaired by prominent writer Ernesto Sábato, the commission methodically cross-
checked testimonies, visited detention centers, and drew heavily on the assistance of 
the Argentine and international human rights community.  Eventually compiling fifty 
thousand pages of testimony on 7,000 cases over a nine-month period, the CONADEP 
report, as legal scholar Ronald Dworkin aptly put it, was a thickly-documented 
narrative with two themes: “ultimate brutality and absolute caprice.”35  Detailing the 
military’s systematic use of abduction, torture, and clandestine murder of perceived 
subversives—along with corresponding practices such as theft, sexual violence, and 
stealing victims’ babies—the report documented nearly 9,000 cases of known victims 
of state-sanctioned violence, and estimated that the actual number was far higher.36  
“Thus, in the name of national security,” the report concluded, “thousands upon 
thousands of human beings, usually young adults or even adolescents, fell into the 
sinister, ghostly category of the desaparecidos, a word (sad privilege for Argentina) 
frequently left in Spanish by the world’s press.”37
An immediate bestseller, more than a quarter-million copies of Nunca Más 
were sold during the Alfonsín Administration.  Underscoring the report’s 
extraordinarily success in promoting popular awareness of human rights violations 
during the military dictatorship, political scientist Alison Brysk recalled seeing Nunca 
Más “in settings ranging from a remote farmhouse in Entre Rios to supporting a 
 
                                                 
35 Ronald Dworkin, introduction to Ibid. 
36 Ibid, 5. 
37 Ibid, 3. 
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heraldic crest on the bookshelf of a member of the Buenos Aires elite.”38  More 
concretely, the report facilitated the legislative abrogation of the outgoing military 
junta’s self-amnesty law.  After an unsuccessful attempt to have dirty war-era military 
leaders prosecuted by military justices, Alfonsín transferred the cases to the Buenos 
Aires Federal Appellate Court.  In the subsequent trial, after hearing the testimony of 
more than 800 individuals and compiling 29,000 pages of records, the Court convicted 
the leaders of the 1976 coup d’état—General Jorge Videla and Admiral Emilio 
Massera received life sentences, and Brigadier Orlando Ramón Agostí was sentenced 
to four-and-a-half years in prison.  Additionally, Lieutenant-General Roberto Viola 
received 17 years in prison and Admiral Armando Lambruschini received eight; all 
those punished were permanently banned from holding public office in the future.39
Given the increasingly vocal criticism from Argentine military circles, the trial 
was an extraordinary achievement on behalf of human rights.  Granted, in light of the 
enormity of the crimes committed, the sentences meted out to the military leaders 
were extraordinarily lenient, eliciting harsh criticism from human rights advocates.
   
40  
Nonetheless, the CONADEP report and the closely-followed judicial proceedings 
against the former military leaders nonetheless served as a landmark repudiation of the 
illegality and immorality of the Argentine dirty war, establishing a precedent for future 
human rights trials in Argentina, as well as providing a model for subsequent truth 
commissions in nearly three dozen nations across the globe.41
 
   
                                                 
38 Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change, and Democratization, 71. 
39 Amnesty International, Argentina: the Military Juntas and Human Rights, Report of the Trial of 
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Significantly, Argentina’s post-dictatorship strides in the human rights arena 
offered unmistakable validation for U.S. human rights advocates’ struggle to curtail 
longstanding U.S. Cold War ties to anti-communist, right-wing military regimes in 
Latin America.  In fact, the penultimate chapter of the CONADEP report expressly 
indicted the United States for its role in facilitating the Argentine military’s national 
security doctrine.  Comprised of a series of short statements by U.S. and Argentine 
political and military leaders over the course of the Cold War—ranging from U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara’s call for increased U.S. military instruction 
for Latin American soldiers in 1963 to Argentine General Ramón Camps’ admission 
in 1981 that the United States had served as the predominate source of Argentine 
counterinsurgency training—Nunca Más outlined the foundational role of U.S. 
military training and aid in facilitating the dirty war.42
Similarly, Patricia Derian’s tireless advocacy on behalf of human rights in 
U.S.-Argentine relations received a significant degree of validation when she was 
invited by Raúl Alfonsín participate as an honored guest in the presidential 
inauguration ceremony.
 
43
                                                 
42 Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, 442-45. 
  Along with then-former Representative Richard A. Drinan 
(D-MA), Derian returned to Buenos Aires in 1985 to give testimony at the much-
publicized trial of the military junta.  Underscoring the extent to which the former 
Human Rights Assistant Secretary’s efforts had ruffled the feathers of Argentine 
military leaders, as Derian assumed the witness stand the defense lawyers left the 
courtroom in protest.  Undeterred, with characteristic candor Derian contributed to the 
prosecution’s case by described her meetings with Argentine military leaders, 
including Videla’s repeated assertions that it was “difficult to control the lower rank 
43 Neier, Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights, 175; Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed 
Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 154. 
334 
 
personnel,” and Massera’s macabre allusion to Pontius Pilate when pressed to halt 
human rights violations carried out by Navy operatives.44
More significantly, the restoration of democracy in Argentina marked the end 
of Argentina’s participation in the Cold War.  Since the late 1940s, United States 
relations with Argentina—and Latin America as a whole—had been defined by an 
overriding emphasis on protecting U.S. national security against the perceived threat 
of global communism.  By the mid-1960s, the United States had succeeded in enticing 
Argentina into a hemispheric alliance system predicated on U.S. hegemony and 
sustained through extensive transfers of military equipment and training.  Heightening 
military leaders’ political ambitions, accelerating the development of a distinctly 
Argentine doctrine of national security, and enhancing the armed forces’ repressive 
capacity, the United States played a decisive role in the formulation of the 
counterinsurgency doctrine that guided the Argentine dirty war.   
   
Despite Reagan’s efforts to reestablish close U.S.-Argentine military ties, the 
election of Raul Alfonsín forced the White House to reverse its support for the 
military junta.  Indeed, with the Administration’s human rights policy predicated on 
the expansion of democracy overseas and its foreign policy priorities elsewhere, the 
Reagan team responded to Argentina’s 1983 election—along with the return to 
civilian government in Brazil and Uruguay—with strong rhetorical backing.   
Although the Reagan Administration’s policy of supporting the region’s representative 
governments “by applause” offered almost no economic benefits, Washington 
nonetheless provided Alfonsín with an added dose of political clout in his bid to 
consolidate civilian rule in Argentina.45
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More importantly, the cessation of close U.S.-Argentine military ties that 
accompanied the Reagan Administration’s belated support for Argentine democracy 
clearly validated the abiding efforts of U.S. human rights advocates.  A heterogeneous 
mix of grassroots organizers, Washington-based lobbyists, and sympathetic members 
of Congress, the human rights movement had emerged in the late 1960s and early 
1970s in opposition to the maintenance of close U.S. ties to anti-communist, right-
wing military regimes.  Notwithstanding intense opposition by the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations, by mid-decade, human rights advocates had succeeded in making 
significant inroads into the policymaking process, including more than dozen pieces of 
congressional legislation binding U.S. foreign policy to human rights considerations, 
and had established a broad base of popular support—a key factor in Jimmy Carter’s 
1976 electoral victory.    
Indeed, Carter’s election constituted a defining moment in the effort to 
institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy.  At the outset of his tenure in the 
White House, Carter recognized the fundamentally illiberal nature of U.S. Cold War 
policy toward the Developing World, particularly Latin America.  By mandating that 
the promotion of human rights be “a major objective of U.S. foreign policy,” and by 
appointing supporters of the initiative in key Administration positions, over the course 
of 1977 and 1978 Carter shifted the locus of human rights advocacy from the non-
governmental sector and Capitol Hill to the White House and Foggy Bottom.  That 
Carter failed to fully institutionalize human rights should not obscure just how far the 
President advanced the debate over U.S. foreign policy as a whole; in light of the 
previous three decades of U.S. support for right-wing military regimes, the remarkable 
shift the human rights initiative embodied was clear, even when shorn of rhetorical 
flourishes and lofty idealism, such as Cyrus Vance’s 1977 address at the University of 
Georgia Law School.  “We seek these goals because they are right—and because we, 
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too, will benefit,” Vance asserted.  “Our own well-being, and even our security, are 
enhanced in a world that shares common freedoms and in which prosperity and 
economic justice create the conditions for peace.  And let us remember that we always 
risk paying a serious price when we become identified with repression.”46
Both the power and pitfalls of Carter’s human rights policy were starkly 
evident in U.S. relations with Argentina.  In its effort to curtail state-sanctioned 
violence, the Administration sharply curtailed U.S. grant and commercial transfers of 
military equipment and training, and consistently opposed or abstained on 
International Finance Institution loans to Argentina.  With unprecedented intelligence 
on the extent of political repression in Argentina thanks largely to the efforts of F. A. 
“Tex” Harris at the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, the Carter Administration also 
made hundreds of consular representations on behalf of human rights. 
 
As a result, human rights entered into the lexicon of U.S. diplomacy toward 
Argentina, forcing the Argentine military junta to consider international opprobrium as 
the necessary price for its campaign of extra-legal violence.  More significantly, the 
Carter Administration’s successful effort to convince the Argentine military junta to 
invite the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) contributed to a 
dramatic decline in disappearances, improved prison conditions, and increased popular 
awareness of the government’s human rights abuses.  Finally, Carter’s human rights 
policy provided an unprecedented mantle of U.S. government legitimacy to Argentine 
human rights groups, thus providing a modicum of protection against extra-legal 
violence, as well as a much-needed sense of solidarity.  Harris played a particularly 
influential role in establishing the U.S. Embassy as a center for human rights 
advocacy.  As Aída Sarti, a member of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo later recalled, 
                                                 
46 Cyrus Vance, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy,” statement made at the University of Georgia 
School of Law at Athens, GA, April 30, 1977; reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. 76, 
May 23, 1977. 
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Harris “would receive us, protect us, he kept us away from the military camps.”  The 
young Foreign Service Officer, Sarti concluded, “had a disposition for human rights 
that one could not believe coming from the United States.”47
By the same token, the declining visibility of human rights in the latter-half of 
the Carter Administration dramatically constrained the effort to curtail state-
sanctioned violence in Argentina.  In the face of deepening economic stagflation, 
Carter proved unwilling to face down the concerted efforts of the U.S. business 
community, resulting in an immense influx of private credit and sales to the Argentine 
military junta.  Similarly, the Carter Administration’s adoption of a more traditional 
Cold War approach in the face of deepening U.S.-Soviet tension and revolutionary 
upheaval in the Developing World cast the limits of the President’s dedication to 
human rights in sharp relief—a trend particularly evident in the shift toward 
rapprochement with Argentina following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.    
 
In the final analysis, the mixed legacy of the Carter Administration’s human 
rights policy toward Argentina most clearly illustrates the abiding significance of the 
non-governmental human rights community and its supporters in the U.S. Congress.  
Not only were Carter’s human rights initiatives rooted in the legal foundation 
established by congressional legislation, but the constant pressure leveled on the 
Administration by the human rights community played a key role in facilitating 
Carter’s own achievements in the human rights arena.  The Administration’s success 
in eliciting the IAHRC invitation in 1978, for example, was inextricably linked to the 
impending congressionally-mandated U.S. arms cutoff to Argentina; arguably the 
most significant U.S. human rights initiative toward the military junta, the amendment 
had passed the previous year over determined White House opposition.   
                                                 
47 “Este Mr. Harris nos recibía, nos protegía, nos sacaba de la comisaría.”  Aída Sarti in Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo Línea Fundadora, Memoria, Verdad y Justicia a los 30 Años X los Treinta Mil, Voces de 
la Memoria, Volumen I (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Baobab, 2006), 89. 
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The centrality of the human rights community was a theme that Patricia 
Derian, the consummate Washington outsider, fully recognized.  Describing the future 
prospects of the U.S. human rights policy, Derian told a gathering of advocates on the 
thirtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “people have to 
care enough about it to watch, to complain, to push, to press, to say that this is what 
we want, that this doesn’t match our standard, or that we are not satisfied with it and 
we must do better.  If that doesn’t continue, then 15 or 20 years down the pike this will 
just be something else that happened or still has a little office percolating somewhere.  
It really depends on the people who are gathered here today.”  In sum, Derian 
concluded, “You are the human rights establishment.  You are the authors of human 
rights in American foreign policy.”48
At the end of the Cold War less than a dozen years later, the human rights 
movement’s effort to remake U.S. foreign policy remained unfulfilled.  The formative 
struggles of the late 1960s and 1970s would serve as a blueprint, however, in the 
struggle to shape U.S. actions in the international arena in the post-Cold War world.  
As successive presidential administrations sought to expand the reach of global 
capitalism and protect U.S. national security from threats ranging from drug 
trafficking to international terrorism, the human rights movement would remain a 
powerful influence in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign 
policy.  As George Lister enthused to a colleague shortly after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, “Human rights has become the authentic world revolution, democratic, 
peaceful and very powerful—so long as we keep it honest.”
 
49
                                                 
48 Patricia Derian, remarks at the White House Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 6, 1978, box: 48, folder: Human Rights Day, 
12/6/78, Staff Offices, Assistant for Communications—Press Events, Rafshoon, JCL.   
  
49 Official Correspondence, George Lister to Oliver T. Covey, November 5, 1992, Box 11, Folder 3, 
Lister Papers.   
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